JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal is at the instance of the defendant and it is against a judgment of reversal. The plaintiff-respondent instituted a suit for recovery of possession of the disputed premises on the ground that the term of the lease having expired, the defendant was liable to deliver up possession of the disputed premises to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's case in short, is that he leased out the disputed premises to the defendant by a registered deed dated April 25, 1955. The lease was for a period of 16 years commencing from November 1, 1954 and ending on October 31, 1970. It was provided in the lease that the lessee will give up peaceful and vacant possession of the suit premises to the lesser on the expiry of the term of the lease. The plaintiff through his Advocate wrote a letter dated August 17, 1970 to the defendant requesting him to act in compliance with the aforesaid term of the lease. The defendant not having complied with the plaintiff's request the suit, out of which this appeal arises, was filed by the plaintiff. In the letter which was written to the defendant by the plaintiff's advocate it was mentioned that the plaintiff, required the suit premises for his own use and occupation. 2. THE defendant contested the suit by filing a written statement in which the defendant denied that it was in wrongful possession of the disputed premises from November 1, 1970. The defendant asserted that under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act, 1956 the defendant was entitled to remain in possession of the suit premises as long as the defendant paid the monthly rent as stipulated in the aforesaid lease. The defendant alleged that it had been duly observing and complying with the provisions of the lease and also of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and as the plaintiff landlord refused to accept rent, the defendant had been depositing the rent with the Rent Controller regularly. The defendant also took the plea that the letter addressed to him by the learned Advocate for the plaintiff was not a notice to quit and the suit was not maintainable in the absence of such a notice. The defendant also took the plea that the letter addressed to him by the learned Advocate for the plaintiff was not a notice to quit and the suit was not maintainable in the absence of such a notice. The trial court came to the conclusion that the defendant was a tenant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for some limited purpose, namely, for the purpose of sections 4 to 12 and sections 31 and 2. 36 of the Act. Relying on certain decisions mentioned in its judgment the trial court came to the conclusion that after the expiry of the lease when the contractual tenancy came to an end, the defendant became a statutory tenant under the provisions of the Act and it was not liable to eviction under the provisions of the Act and also for want of a notice under section 13 (6) of the Act. In this view of the matter the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit. 3. ON appeal by the plaintiff the lower appellate court disagreed with the view taken by the trial court that the defendant had become a statutory tenant under the Act. The lower appellate court took the view that the lease having stood determined by efflux of time, the landlord was not required to serve any notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property act or under section 13 (6) of the Act. The lower appellate court was of the view that the protection afforded to tenants under the Act was not available to the defendant. The suit was accordingly decreed by the lower appellate court. Against the decision of the lower appellate court the present second appeal has been preferred on behalf of the defendant. 4. MR. Sen, learned Advocate, appearing in support of this appeal has contended before us that under the provisions of the Act the defendant after the expiry of the lease became a statutory tenant, and as such, the defendant was entitled to protection against eviction in terms of the previsions contained in section 13 of the Act. Mr. Sen has contended that the definition of a 'tenant' as given in clause (h) of section 2 of the Act includes any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy. Mr. Sen has contended that the definition of a 'tenant' as given in clause (h) of section 2 of the Act includes any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy. He has accordingly contended that in the present case the defendant is continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy and accordingly the defendant is a tenant within the meaning of the Act. He has accordingly contended that if the defendant is a tenant within the meaning of the Act, he is entitled to protection against eviction under section 13 of the Act. In order to ascertain whether the defendant is a tenant within the meaning of the Act or not we have to look at the lease under which the defendant was holding the disputed premises under the plaintiff. The deed of lease has been marked as Ext. 1. It appears from ext. 1 that the lease was for a period of 16 years commencing from November 1, 1954. The lease is dated April 25, 1955. The purpose for which the lease was taken appears from clause (5) thereof which stipulates that the defendant which is a limited company is given permission to allow its officers and employees to occupy the disputed premises without the approval and consent of the landlord. The lease therefore comes squarely within the provisions of section 3 of the Act. Section 3 provides : " (1) The provisions relating to rent and the provisions of sections 31 and 36 shall apply to any premises held under a lease for residential purpose of the lessee himself and registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908, where- (a)such lease has been entered into on or after 1st December, 1948, and (b)such lease is for a period of not leases than 20 years, and save as aforesaid nothing in this Act shall apply to any premises held under a lease for a period of not less than 15 years. " From the provisions of section 3 it is clear therefore that the only provisions applicable to the premises held under the lease Ext. 1 are the provisions relating to rent and the provisions of sections 31 and 36 of the Act. Section 2 of the Act appears under Chapter I which is headed as 'preliminary'. If the provisions of Chapter I are not applicable to the premises then it is not open to Mr. 1 are the provisions relating to rent and the provisions of sections 31 and 36 of the Act. Section 2 of the Act appears under Chapter I which is headed as 'preliminary'. If the provisions of Chapter I are not applicable to the premises then it is not open to Mr. Sen to rely upon the definition of a 'tenant' as contained in clause (h) of section 2 of the Act. If the whole of Chapter I is inapplicable then it is not open to the appellant to take advantage of the definition of a 'tenant' as given in clause (h) of section 2 in support of his claim that as the defendant is continuing in possession after the termination of its tenancy, it is also included within the definition of a 'tenant'. The next contention of Mr. Sen is that section 3 provides that the provisions 'relating to rent' and the provisions of section 31 and 36 shall apply, and therefore, all those sections in the Act where the word 'rent' has been used contain provisions 'relating to rent'. According to him the lower appellate court was wrong in construing the provisions of section 3 as limited only to sections 4 to 12 and sections 31 and 36 of the Act. Mr. Sens contention is that sections 4 to 12 which find place under Chapter II are provisions 'regarding rent' as the heading of the chapter shows. Mr. Sen has distinguished between the provisions 'regarding rent' and provisions 'relating to rent'. According to him the provisions 'relating to rent' is an expression which has wider connotation than the provision 'regarding rent'. In other words, sections 13 (l) (i) which refers to payment of lent is a provision 'relating to rent'. Similarly, section 17 which also contains reference to payment or deposit of rent is also a provision relating to rent. According to him, therefore, by virtue of the provisions of section 3 all those provisions in the Act which contain reference to payment or deposited of rent are provision relating to rent, and therefore, those provisions are applicable in the present case as well. If that is so, argued Mr. Sen, his client is amply protected under section 13 (1) (i. We are unable to accept this contention put forward by Mr. Sen. If that is so, argued Mr. Sen, his client is amply protected under section 13 (1) (i. We are unable to accept this contention put forward by Mr. Sen. If this contention is accepted, it would render the provisions of section 3 (1) of the Act almost nugatory. Section 3 (1) specifically mentions certain provisions which would be applicable to a kind of lease with which we are concerned in the present case. To extent other provisions of the Act to such a lease would amount to introducing something into the section which is not there in Syed Ali Kaiser v. Mstt. Ayesha Begum reported in A. I. R. 1977 Cal. 226=81 C. W. N. 639, a similar question came up for consideration although not in the same form in which it has come up before us now. In that case the Division Bench to which I was a party took the view that in a lease executed after the 1st December, 1948 for a period of not leas than 15 years the provisions of the Act other than those mentioned in section 3 (1) would have no application. We see no reason to take a different view in the present case. 5. THE other branch of Mr. Sen' s argument has been that section 3 (1) of the Act puts certain restrictions on the rights of a lessee and the protection conferred upon him by the Act so long as the lessee holds the property for a period not less than 15 years as limited by the lease itself. But as soon as that period expires and the lessee continues in possession all the rights and benefits under the Act are available to him. In other words, the argument is that once the lease under which the lessee is holding comes out of section 3, the limitation imposed by that section ceases to operate and the lessee becomes entitled to all the benefits and protection under the Act. That being so, Mr. Sen has contended that the protection against eviction under section 13 (1) (i) is available to the defendant. Although Mr. Sen has placed this point in an apparently attractive manner, we are unable to accept his argument. To do so would be to confer greater right upon a lessee whose term has expired than the rights which he had during the continuance of the lease. Although Mr. Sen has placed this point in an apparently attractive manner, we are unable to accept his argument. To do so would be to confer greater right upon a lessee whose term has expired than the rights which he had during the continuance of the lease. In Panchanan Basak and Ors. vs. Ishanitosh Ghatak and Ors., reported in 66 C. W. N. 872 it has been pointed out that in order that a person can establish his right as a statutory tenant he must first establish that he was a tenant of the premises within the meaning of the Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 prior to the expiry of the lease, and that he continued in possession after termination of that tenancy. If the Act did not apply to the lease or the contractual tenancy under which the person was holding he would not be a statutory tenant by merely retaining possession after expiry of the lease. We respectfully agree with the view expressed in the said case. The trial court referred to certain decisions mentioned in his judgment. But it appears, that those decisions were on different facts and the decisions in those cases are of no assistance to the defendant in the present case. In the present case the defendant was holding the disputed premises under the lease for a period of 16 years. After the determination of that lease by efflux of time the defendant cannot claim to be a statutory tenant merely because he has not delivered up possession to the lesser. In such a case, in purr opinion, the protection against eviction given to tenants under section 13 of the Act is not available to the defendant. This appeal therefore fails and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. On the prayer of the learned Advocate for the appellant, we stay the operation of this order for a period of four weeks from this date. Appeal dismissed