JUDGMENT - S.K. DESAI, J.:---In this petition the petitioners have impugned the order of requisition passed on 23rd July, 1976 requisitioning flats Nos. 9-A on the 9th floor and 10-A on the 10th floor of a building known as "Sunita", situate at Ridge Road, near Hanging Garden, Malbar Hill, Bombay. The purpose of requisition mentioned in the order is for housing a foreign Consul. On that very day allotment order was issued in favour of the consul General, Consulate General of United Republic of Egypt in Bombay, permitting him to occupy the said premises for the personal use of himself and for the use of his dependants normally residing with him. The allotment was on certain further terms and conditions. In order to appreciate the grounds of challenge, a few facts may be stated. 2. The petitioners are a private limited company, having their registered office at Baroda and the head office in Bombay. The Board of Directors of the petitioner company consists of Chairman Shri D.D. Desai, and two other directors Mrs. S.D. Desai and Dr. Narendra D. Desai. By an agreement dated 13th April, 1971 the petitioners agreed to purchase the two flats from Messers Comtrust Investment. The building "Sunita" was completed some time in March 1974 and the petitioners were put in possession of the two flats in June 1974. According to the petitioners, the two flats in June 1974. According to the petitioners, the two flats were purchased by the petitioners for the use of one of their Directors, the said Mrs. S.D. Desai. According to the petitioners, thereafter various contracts were awarded for the purpose of furnishing, decorating and fitting the said flats. Details of all such work are indicated in para 2 of the petition. Particulars of the various Architects, Interior decorators, Electrical Contractors and similar person approached and appointed by the petitioners are indicated in para 3 of the petition. According to the petitioners, extensive electrical work was required to be done, with the result that the certificate of completion was required to be given by the B.E.S. T. Undertaking. The petitioners claim that for the purchase of the two flats from the said firm of M/s. Comtrust Investment and for the purposes of furnishing decorating and providing additional fittings and fixtures the petitioners expended a large amount as indicated in para 4 of the petition. 3. The petitioners claim that for the purchase of the two flats from the said firm of M/s. Comtrust Investment and for the purposes of furnishing decorating and providing additional fittings and fixtures the petitioners expended a large amount as indicated in para 4 of the petition. 3. On 13th April, 1976 a notice was received by the petitioners from the Accommodation Officer calling upon the petitioners to see him on 5th May, 1976 and to show cause why the said two flats should not be requisitioned. In reply to this notice the petitioners by their letter dated 4th May, 1976 complained that the notice was vague, and by the said letter the Accommodation Officer was requested to clarify the position. On 20th May, 1976 a detailed reply was sent by the petitioners which gave, inter alia, the area of the flats, the various works which were being carried out in the said flats and the various personnel of different categories who had been employed for diverse purposes. Particulars of the outgoings including maintenance charges and municipal taxes were also furnished. In the said letter it was, inter alia, pointed out that the petitioner-company had purchaased the said flats on ownership basis for the use and occupation of one of the Directors of the company but that the same had not been occupied because furnishing and decoration work had not been completed. Affidavits of several persons concerned with the work which was being done in the said flats were also filed with the Accommodation Officer. On 14th July, 1976, the Controller of Accommodation addressed a letter to the petitioners attorneys calling upon them to let him know the specific reason for the very long time taken for carrying out renovation, additions and alterations to make the flats suitable for occupation. By this letter agreement for the purchase of the flats was also sought. According to the petitioners, the attorneys received this letter on the 15th July and on 19th July, 1976 the attorneys addressed a letter stating that the necessary information was being gathered and instructions sought from the petitioners and that as soon as this was available, particulars would be sent to the Controller of Accommodation. It is in this state of affairs that the impugned order was issued. It is in this state of affairs that the impugned order was issued. According to the petitioners, this was received by their Bombay Office at about 1.30 p.m. Within a short time thereafter the petitioners learnt that the officers of the respondents accompanied by a Police Sub-Inspector and a duplicate key-maker had gone to the flats and taken possession thereof; this was alleged to have taken place at about 2.00 on that very day. It is thereafter that on 20th July, 1976 the present petition was filed. 4. At this juncture the subsequent events may be referred to. According to the petitioners although the allottee was given the flats for his residential use, the allottee was using the premises also for office purposes. According to the petitioners, the building in which the two flats are situate was a purely residental building and such use was contrary to the Bye-laws of the Co-operative Society viz., the 5th respondent before me. According the petitioners had taken out a Notice of Motion for necessary orders restraining the allottee from using the premises contrary to the purpose mentioned in the allotment order and also contrary to the Bye-laws of the Society. Although the Motion was served on the allottee, the allottee chose not to appear. From the affidavits made at that stage it is clear that the petitioners grievances about the misuse of the premises by the allottee were also to a considerable extent verified by the officers of respondents 1 to 3 and in fact they had written necessary letters to the allottee directing him not to use the premises in a manner contrary to that mentioned in the allotment order. 5. The contentions of the learned Counsel for the petitioners may now be briefly summarized. In the first place, according to him, the so-called inquiry purported to have been held before the impugned order was passed was no inquiry or merely a pretence of an inquiry; this was on a two fold footing. In the first place, according to the counsel, the initial show cause notice was not and could not be regarded as a proper notice requiring the party to show cause and, therefore, the entire proceedings suffered from the defect of informality which would vitiate the ultimate order. In the first place, according to the counsel, the initial show cause notice was not and could not be regarded as a proper notice requiring the party to show cause and, therefore, the entire proceedings suffered from the defect of informality which would vitiate the ultimate order. Secondly, it was submitted that the inquiry was abruptly terminated, which would show that by 23rd April, 1976 the concerned officer had made up his mind and decided to pass the order of requisition irrespective of the explanation and material which would have been submitted by the petitioners to the Controller of Accommodation pursuant to the demand made in the Controllers letter of 14th July, 1976. It was submitted that it was a settled legal position that such inquiry was required to be held in a responsible and fair manner and if it could be shown that the necessary responsible or fair inquiry had not been held, the ultimate order would be required to be quashed and the premises would have to be restored to the petitioners. In the second place, it was submitted that the declaration made by the Officer in the impugned order which was under section 5(1) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, was in the circumstances of the case a declaration which revealed a total non-application of mind. According to counsel for the petitioners, this was apparent from the fact that the premises which were not habitable were held to be one in which the owner had not actually resided for a continuous period of six months. The argument was that before such declaration could be made, it could be made only in respect of habitable premises and not in respect of premises which are being furnished or got ready or made suitable for the purposes of occupation. The third argument was that the State could not take action under the Bombay Land requisition Act for the purpose mentioned in the impugned order viz. for housing a foreign consul. It was submitted by counsel that such purpose must be regarded as a Union purpose, for which necessary action could be taken under section 3 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immoveable Property Act, 1952 (Act 30 of 1952), and that accordingly the bar contained in section 23 of the Bombay Act would come in the way of the State of Maharashtra passing the impugned requisition order. Fourthly, it was submitted that the orders requisitioning the premises are liable to be quashed inasmuch as the allottee had failed to restrict his user of the premises to the user permitted under the allotment order and for that purpose counsel relied on the law expounded in (Rangubai Pandurang Joshi v. The State of Maharashtra)1, 71 Bom.L.R. 624. Fifthly, it was urged that the way in which the order was made and in particular the hurried manner in which the final order was made and possession taken would indicate that there was some pressure on the Officer, which would show that the order was not passed bona fide in the proper exercise of discretion by the Officer but for some collateral purposes or as a result of some pressure being brought on him. Finally and sixthly, it was submitted that these were not premises intended to be let and that although section 5 talks of requisition of land whereas section 6 permitted requisitioning of premises, the principle of harmonious construction requires that the premises requisitioned under either section should have a similar character. 6. In my view, there is not much substance in three of the aforesaid six contentions. A consular office is different from an embassy and although it is true that diplomatic, consular and trade representation is to be found as Entry 11 in List I of the Seventh Schedule of our Constitution, it will not be correct to say that this purpose must be regarded as purely within the ambit of Union purpose which would preclude a State from exercising its power of requisitioning in order to furnish residential accommodation to a consular Officer. This would be too narrow a view of the provision, and perhaps a better view would be that this would be a purpose which could be a public purpose generally or a purpose which would be both Union and State purpose, so that either Government may exercise its power of requisitioning. In the actual circumstances and bearing in mind the provision in the constitution concerning Centre-State relationship and the power of the Centre to give direction to the State Governments in certain matters, I would hold that for such matters the more convenient method would be that a requistioning order be made by the State pursuant to the Central direction. In the actual circumstances and bearing in mind the provision in the constitution concerning Centre-State relationship and the power of the Centre to give direction to the State Governments in certain matters, I would hold that for such matters the more convenient method would be that a requistioning order be made by the State pursuant to the Central direction. This, however, must not mean that on such direction such orders have to be made irrespective of the cause shown or without following the proper procedure laid down in the enactment or without holding the necessary inquiry as is requisite. 7. Similarly I must hold that although the manner in which the entire proceedings have taken place and the ultimate order passed cannot be commended, from this it would not necessarily follow that the order is pervaded by such mala fide as would be sufficient for the purpose of quashing the order. The haste, perhaps unseemly, in taking possession of the premises may be something which is to be deprecated but is not something which by itself would entitle the petitioners to get relief from the Court. Finally, the submission made by counsel as to giving a harmonious construction to sections 5 and 6 of the State Act is based upon a misreading of the statutory provisions. Section 6 provides for requisitioning of vacant premises, which brings in its wake the definition of premises to be found in section 4(3). On the other hand section 5 provides for requisition of land and under section 4(1) "land" includes benefits to arise out of land and buildings and all things attached to the earth or permanently attached to the buildings or things attached to the earth. As section 5 indicates, under this section a building or part of a building can be requisitioned where the owner or the landlord or the tenant has not actually resided for a particular period specified in the section. Thus section 5 is available for all types of premises, not being restricted to the premises in respect of which a requisition order can be made under section 6, which will be premises as defined under section 4(3). Thus section 5 is available for all types of premises, not being restricted to the premises in respect of which a requisition order can be made under section 6, which will be premises as defined under section 4(3). Thus there is no occasion or warrant for applying the principle of harmonious construction as to accept the submission would amount to apply a definition in a section in which the word which is defined has not been used and a totally different word utilised. In other words, the definition of premises cannot be imported into section 5 which speaks of requisition of land which is separately and differently defined. 8. We now turn to the contention of the petitioners that the proceedings are vitiated inasmuch as there was merely a pretence of an inquiry. In my opinion, the petitioners grievances on this head are well founded on both counts. In (Chhotalal Ramdas Patel v. The State of Bombay)2, 57 Bom.L.R. 748 it has been observed that the Government cannot in the exercise of discretion conferred on it pretend to hold an inquiry whilst in fact holding none. It was further observed that where the facts of the case justify an inference or a finding that no inquiry was in fact held although there was a pretence of holding an inquiry, the declaration made as a result of such an inquiry would stand vitiated. It is true that in Chhotalals case the Court was considering an order made under section 6. But the requirements of holding an inquiry to be found in section 6(4)(a). Proviso, and under section 5(2) are in almost identical terms. The observations then as to the nature of the inquiry and the consequence of holding a pretence of an inquiry would be identical for both the sections. 9. Let us now see what inquiry was held in this case. The first grievance of the petitioners in respect of the inquiry also pertains to the notice dated 13th April, 1976 which does not mention the basis of the proposed action of requisition and just calls upon the petitioners to show cause why their promises ought not to be requisitioned. That may hardly be regarded as a proper show cause notice which can be followed by an order of requisition, and in fact in the affidavit in reply itself this notice has been characterised as a preliminary notice. That may hardly be regarded as a proper show cause notice which can be followed by an order of requisition, and in fact in the affidavit in reply itself this notice has been characterised as a preliminary notice. Regarded as a preliminary notice for the purpose of gathering the necessary information before the actual action is taken, which action must first commence with a proper show cause notice such preliminary notice may be considered something desirable. If it is considered merely to be a preliminary notice, then it is clear that a regular show cause notice calling upon the party to show cause against the proposed specific action under a specific section has not been issued. The learned Advocate General referred me to the details furnished by the party in its letter of 20th May, 1976 and submitted that it is clear, if this letter is perused, that no prejudice whatsoever was caused to the party. A fair reading of the letter shows that at the very outset the party has complained of vagueness inherent in the earlier notice and has merely furnished certain information. From this it would not follow that the necessity to issue a proper show cause notice has been waived or could be regarded as waived or could be held as unnecessary. As a matter of fact, in the preliminary paragraphs of the letter the party has indicated that if and when a proper show cause notice is issued, a further proper written statement would be put in. It will not be possible for any Court of law considering whether the requirements of the statute have been properly adhered to hold that such a preliminary notice can be accepted as a proper show cause notice or substitute for one. Similarly the contention of the Advocate General that because pursuant to such notice certain information has been furnished by the party, such party could not be said to have been prejudiced by the failure to issue a proper show cause notice cannot be accepted. In the same way the action of the authorities in the middle of July 1976, just prior to the issue of the impugned order, cannot but be vehemently and strongly criticised. The letter of 14th July, 1976 was served on the petitioners attorneys on the next day and certain information was sought in the said letter. In the same way the action of the authorities in the middle of July 1976, just prior to the issue of the impugned order, cannot but be vehemently and strongly criticised. The letter of 14th July, 1976 was served on the petitioners attorneys on the next day and certain information was sought in the said letter. The letter gives an indication of how the mind of the authority concerned was working. As the letter was addressed to the petitioners attorneys, it would be reasonable even if the attorneys were supposed to act with such despatch as is not normally found in Government Departments that they would take at least a day or two to contact their clients and thereafter furnish the necessary material. As a matter of fact intimation was given by the attorneys by their letter dated 19th May, 1976 that they were proceeding to gather the necessary information which would be shortly conveyed to the appropriate officer. The time taken for the purpose cannot be regarded as unreasonable or unjustified. If the necessary information was required to be furnished within a particular time limit, that ought to have been so specifically stated in the Departments letter. If that had been done and the time given was reasonable, although it may be somewhat on the short side, the petitioners might not have been heard to say that "the inquiry was completed in an abrupt manner without giving us a full opportunity to show cause and without in fact considering the cause which we could have shown". No such time limit was sent in the letter of 14th July, 1976. Bearing in mind the nature of the letter and the tenor of the letter, the decision takes on 23rd July, 1976 in issuing the order and taking possession of the premises does suffer from the vice of abruptness and would justify criticism that a decision had been taken without properly allowing the party concerned an opportunity to show cause and without properly considering the cause shown by it. Such feeling receives sustenance from the unsatisfactory manner in which the entire proceedings have taken place. 10. Once the Court comes to the conclusion that proper inquiry has not been held prior to the issue of the impugned order, the declaration made by the Government would stand vitiated and the order would be required to be quashed. Such feeling receives sustenance from the unsatisfactory manner in which the entire proceedings have taken place. 10. Once the Court comes to the conclusion that proper inquiry has not been held prior to the issue of the impugned order, the declaration made by the Government would stand vitiated and the order would be required to be quashed. In these circumstance it appears to me to be unnecessary to consider the two other submissions made by counsel for the petitioners on which he has sought the quashing of the order of requisition and the subsequent order of allotment. There is considerable substance in the contention that unless the premises can be regarded as habitable, the conclusion of non-residence cannot be arrived at on a proper application of mind. On the other hand, bearing in mind the scheme of the Act, can a party on the pretext of renovation, decoration and additional fittings and fixtures keep the premises uninhabitable to get over the disability flowing from non-residence viz. disability of liability of the premiss being requisitioned? Even if a reasonable period for such decoration and renovation is conceded, it might be moot point whether the period taken by the petitioners can be regarded as reasonable. It appears to me to be a border line case and I would hesitate to rest my decision on this ground simpliciter. 11. That brings us to a consideration of the final and the last ground which has been pressed into service by the petitioners. It is very clear from the affidavits filed on behalf of the petitioners as also by the 5th respondent Society in the interlocutory proceedings and the correspondence addressed on behalf of the State to the Counsel General that the premises are being used by the allottee in a manner and for a purpose in flagrant and direct contravention of the restricted user permitted in the order of allotment. In Rangubais case the facts were much stronger. It was held in that case that where the premises were not used for a purpose authorised by the Act for length of time which is unreasonable and the Government chooses not to derequisition the premises, the order of requisition ceases to be operative and the Government can be compelled under Article 226 of the Constitution to carry out its duty to deliver possession to its owner. In this case we have (1) an allotment order permitting a limited user by the allottee; (2) such permitted limited user is consistent with the nature of the building, a portion whereof is requisitioned, and the rules of the 5th respondent Co-operative Housing Society; (3) the fact of actual user in breach and violation of the limitation regulations of the Co-operative Housing Society; and (4) we have therefore the incapacity of the State of Maharashtra to control the actions of the allottee. The question is can the requisition order or the purpose of the requisition be said to have ceased to become operative or be deemed to be inoperative by any logical principle which must be a principle by way of extension of the principles underlying Rangubais case? As stated earlier, it is unnecessary to rest the decision in this matter on this ground. But speaking for myself I would be inclined in an identical situation to quash the order of requisition and the order of allotment in an identical situation where the State reveals its inability to regulate the conduct of the allottee who acts in a manner in flagrant violation of the limit put on his occupation. As stated earlier, this must be regarded as a tentative or a prima facie view inasmuch as I am not called upon to rest my decision on this ground. 12. In the view that I have taken, I am of opinion that a proper inquiry as is implicit in an order for requisition was not made and the inquiry suffered from infirmities on both counts indicated by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. Where there is no proper inquiry or a pretence of an inquiry, it is now well settled that the declaration made must be quashed. This declaration is found in the impugned requisition order dated 23rd July, 1976, and if that order is quashed, the consequential order of allotment made under section 11 must also be quashed and set aside. 13. In the result, the Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). The 1st respondent State is directed to restore possession of the two flats to the petitioners. 14. The learned Advocate General applies that some reasonable time may be provided inasmuch as the State may have to provide alternative accommodation to the 4th respondent. 15. 13. In the result, the Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). The 1st respondent State is directed to restore possession of the two flats to the petitioners. 14. The learned Advocate General applies that some reasonable time may be provided inasmuch as the State may have to provide alternative accommodation to the 4th respondent. 15. Bearing in mind all the circumstances, direction is given to the State to restore possession of the two flats in question to the petitioner latest by 30th of November, 1977. 16. Respondents 1, 2 and 3 will also pay to the petitioners the costs of this petition including all costs of interlocutory proceedings made costs in the cause. -----