JUDGMENT H.N. Agrawal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree dated February 19, 1974 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Jhansi Division, in Appeal No. 74/218 of of 1967-68 setting aside the judgment and decree dated February 24, 1968 passed by the Assistant Collector First Class, Banda in Suit No. 10 of 1968 under Section 209, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties, and have gone through the record. 3. Srimati Ram Deiya had filed a suit claiming to be a Bhumidhar of the land in suit and seeking the ejectment of Range Lal and Hari Shanker as trespassers. Range Lal and Hari Shanker contested the suit by claiming that the plaintiff was not the Bhumidhar and instead Hari Shanker was the Bhumidhar on account of a Bakhshisnama executed on June 24, 1949 by his grandmother Srimati Gangia and was in cultivatory possession of the land first through his father and guardian, Range Lal when he himself was minor, and later after attaining majority he himself was in cultivatory possession. The Trial court by its order dated February 24, 1968 dismissed the suit. The Additional Commissioner, has, however, allowed the first appeal and decreed the suit. Range Lal and Hari Shanker alongwith Ajodhya Prasad and Kashi Prasad, who are also sons of Range Lal, have come up in second appeal before this court. 4. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that admittedly according to the plaintiff's own admission in compromise filed in Civil Court on July 15, 1939, 150 Bighas of land was transferred to Basdeo, predecessor-in-interest of the defendant-appellants together with Badri and Chetani and they were recorded as co-shares in Khewat alongwith the plaintiff, and such the view of the lower appellate court that the defendant-appellants are trespassers is illegal and unwarranted. Now, the learned Additional Commissioner has discussed this question at length and has held that Srimati Ram Deiya had merely transferred her proprietary rights and there was nothing to show that she also transferred her Sir land including the land in suit. This view of the learned Additional Commissioner is not legally sound. Now, the learned Additional Commissioner has discussed this question at length and has held that Srimati Ram Deiya had merely transferred her proprietary rights and there was nothing to show that she also transferred her Sir land including the land in suit. This view of the learned Additional Commissioner is not legally sound. The learned counsel for the appellants has in this connection referred to Chhatrapal v. Ram Sakhi, 1965 A.L.J. 637, in which the following observations have been made: "It is, however, not disputed before me that the right to exclusive possession of Sir as against co-shares only in the proprietary right has always been a feature of the rights of Sir holder both in Agra and in Oudh and I, therefore, think that the Oudh case cannot be distinguished on the basis of which it has been distinguished by the lower appellate court. I may, in this connection mention that in Uttam Singh v. Taluqdar Singh, 1941 A.W.R. 1121 a case under the U.P. Tenancy Act, the Board of Revenue recognised the general rule that Sir rights went along with proprietary rights when the latter were transferred." "For the foregoing reasons, it is, to my mind, clear that Sir right was included in the proprietary rights of a Sir holder and, in any case, it was a legal incident of his proprietary rights and as such if the conditions laid down in Section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act were present sir right passed to the transferee alongwith a transfer of proprietary rights." (P. 640). 5. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellants in that defendant-appellants were recorded in their own rights over the land in suit and their possession was duly recorded in 1359F and in subsequent years, but the lower appellate court on mere presumptions and wrong assumptions discarded the documents as incorrect. The learned Additional Commissioner has clearly held that in the Khasra of 1359F the possession of the defendant-appellants is recorded over the land in suit, but he has drawn the inference that this was a gorgery. The learned Additional Commissioner has clearly held that in the Khasra of 1359F the possession of the defendant-appellants is recorded over the land in suit, but he has drawn the inference that this was a gorgery. During the following years also the defendant-appellants are recorded in possession over some of the plots in suit but the learned Additional Commissioner has brushed aside this record by saying that in his opinion this record was not sufficient to hold that the defendant appellants had been in continuous possession of the land in suit. It may be observed that the trial court had recorded the finding that the remarks columns entry of Khasra 1359 Fasli showing the defendant-appellants in cultivatory possession was not a forged entry at all and that the plaintiff-respondent could have summoned the Patwari or the Lekhpal who prepared the Khasra of 1359 Fasli if there was any doubt but she did not do so. I am affraid, the learned Additional Commissioner has erred in law in holding that the Khasra entry of 1359 Fasli was forged without any positive evidence to this effect. There is neither the evidence of any handwriting expert nor any other piece of evidence from which such an inference could have been lawfully drawn. There is no reason at all why the Patwari or the Lekhpal or any other revenue official concerned with the maintenance of the revenue records could not be summoned by the plaintiff-respondent if there was any doubt about the genuineness of the entry. 6. The third contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the lower appellate court acted illegally and with material irregularity in lightly interfering with the judgment of the trial court which was based on proper and legal appreciation of the evidence on record. The learned counsel for the appellants has pointed out that whereas the trial court has based its finding on the discussion of the oral evidence, the lower appellate court has altogether ignored the plaintiff's own admission and the oral evidence. There are on record the certified copies of Srimati Ram Deiya's statement made in a mutation case wherein she stated that Badri Prasad, Chetani and Basdeo were in possession over 150 Bighas of land which she gave to them and that her name be expunged and they be recorded. This order was incorporated in the Register Malikan on August 19, 1939. This order was incorporated in the Register Malikan on August 19, 1939. There is also a certified copy of Smt. Ram Deiya's statement made in a mutation case before the Panchayati Adalat on April 12, 1967 to the effect that she has given 50 bighas of land to the share brothers Badri Prasad, Chetani and Basdeo and this included plot No. 541, area 35 bighas 18 biswas, (plot No. 541 is one of the plots in the present suit). Again, Ram Kumar appearing as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff respondent has admitted in his statement that the land in suit had been given by the plaintiff to Basdeo. The learned Additional Commissioner has either omitted or misinterpreted these statements. The learned counsel for the appellants has referred to A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 100, in which it has been held that an admission is the best evidence that an opposite party can rely upon and it is decisive of the matter unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous. He has further referred to the decisions in A.I.R. 1965 Madras 417 and 1974 R.D. 386 in which it has been held that where the lower appellate court does not touch the oral evidence and upsets the decree and other of the trial court it has not properly discharged the duty laid upon as a first appellate court. 7. Yet another contention of the counsel for the appellants is that the lower appellate court has itself upheld the possession of the appellant Hari Shanker 1362 Fasli for the plots Nos. 374, 375 and 541 and yet it erred in not dismissing the suit for these plots on account of adverse possession till the date of the finding of the suit. As seen above, the trial court has found the defendant-appellants to be in possession from 1359 Fasli onwards on the basis of the revenue records. The lower appellate court has disbelieved the entry of 1359 Fasli but has upheld the entry of 1362 Fasli, in which the appellant Hari Shanker is recorded in possession over plots Nos. 373, 374 and 541. The lower appellate court has not recorded any reason for not holding that the suit in respect of these plots was barred by time. The learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate court should be accepted as final by this Court. 373, 374 and 541. The lower appellate court has not recorded any reason for not holding that the suit in respect of these plots was barred by time. The learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate court should be accepted as final by this Court. I am unable to accept this argument. The finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court can be accepted as final in second appeal only where such findings are based on a proper consideration of the entire material evidence on record and do not suffer from misreading or omission or perversity. In the present case, however, the learned Additional Commissioner has omitted to consider vital pieces of evidence, has misread and misconstrued other pieces of evidence and has based his conclusions not on evidence but on surmises. The trial court has, on the other hand, discussed the entire oral and documentary evidence threadbare and its findings are sound in law. To my mind, the trial court had correctly held that the plaintiff-respondent had transferred her proprietary rights as well as her cultivatory rights in the land in suit and ceased to have any connection with the land in suit even before the abolition of Zamindari and thus her suit was not maintainable. The trial court has held that the defendant-appellants are Bhumidhars of the land having cultivated the suit land as zamidars and Khudkasht holders before the abolition of zamindari. The question whether the defendant-appellants are Bhumidhars or merely Sirdars by virtue of their cultivatory possession since 1359 Fasli is not material for the purpose of the second appeal as the present suit is not one for declaration of rights but merely of ejectment under section 209 filed by the plaintiff-respondent. I, therefore, need not affirm here the trial court's finding that the defendant-appellants as Bhumidhars of the land. I would, however, hold that the trial court had rightly dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-respondent and the lower appellate court has erred in law in decreeing the suit. 8. The result is that I hereby allow the second appeal and set aside the impugned order of the lower appellate court. The suit stands dismissed.