JUDGMENT 1. ON the 31st January, 1968, 22 workmen were dismissed by the appellant Oil India Ltd., Duliajan, Assam. On January 27, 1971, the Central Government made a reference under section 10 (1) (d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to Mr. G. N. Borah, Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dibrugarh for adjudication of the following industrial dispute : "whether the action of the management of Oil India Limited, Duliajan in dismissing the following thirteen workmen is justified? If not, to what relief are the work men concerned entitled to from the dates of their dismissal. It may be mentioned here that out of 22 workmen dismissed the reference was only made in respect of 13 workmen mentioned in the order of reference. 2. PRIOR to the order of reference, on December 14, 1970 the respondent No. 2 and another acting on behalf of themselves being workmen Nos. 2 and 5 as also three others being workmen Nos. 8, 10 and 12 in the order of reference filed an application before the Central Government Labour Court, Assam under section 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for computing their entitlements as if they were never dismissed. When this application was pending, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal to whom the reference was made as aforesaid published an interim Award on June 13, 1972 holding that it would refrain from adjudicating the dispute of workmen Nos. 2, 5, 8, 10 and 12 as they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of a court which was capable of giving adequate relief to their grievances. Thereafter, on August 26, 1972, the Labour Court held that the application made before it under Section 33c (2) of the said Act was premature in view of the pending reference before the Industrial Tribunal and the application was accordingly dismissed by the Labour Court. An application for review of the aforesaid interim Award was filed by the workmen concerned on December 8, 1972 before the Industrial Tribunal to which the appellant company filed opposition and rejoinder was also filed by the workmen. By an order dated October 16, 1974, the Government of India, in exercise of powers under section 7a (1) and Section 33b of the Act, withdrew the proceedings before the said Industrial Tribunal and transferred the same to Mr. By an order dated October 16, 1974, the Government of India, in exercise of powers under section 7a (1) and Section 33b of the Act, withdrew the proceedings before the said Industrial Tribunal and transferred the same to Mr. E. K. Moidu, Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta for disposal of the said proceedings with the direction that the said Tribunal would proceed with the proceedings from the stage at which it was transferred to it and to dispose of the same according to law. Thereafter, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Dibrugarh before whom the reference was so pending directed by its order dated November 11, 1974 the transfer of the records of the reference to the Presiding Officer, Central Government industrial Tribunal at Calcutta as directed by the Central Government order mentioned above. On January 31, 1975, the workmen concerned withdrew the review application. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Calcutta by the notice of February 17, 1975 intimated the date of hearing of the reference at Dibrugarh on March 17, 1975. On March 10, 1975 the respondent No. 2. being the workman No. 5 moved an application in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for quashing the interim Award passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal on June 13, 1972 as already stated. On this application, a rule nisi was issued by this Court giving rise to the Matter No. 74 of 1975. This matter was disposed of by A. N. Sen, J. by the judgment and order dated June 28, 1975 whereby the rule nisi was made absolute and the interim Award of June 13, 1972 was set aside and quashed. The Court further directed that the Tribunal was to proceed with the reference expeditiously. The company preferred this appeal against the aforesaid decision and in the said appeal, this Court gave liberty to the Tribunal to proceed with the hearing of the reference with the direction that the Tribunal would not publish its Award till the disposal of this appeal. 3. MR. Ginwalla and later on Mr. Arijit Chowdhury learned counsel for the appellant have taken various grounds in support of the appeal. The first submission is that the trial court has interfered with the discretion properly exercised by the Tribunal in holding that the workmen having regard to the conduct were entitled to no relief. According to Mr. 3. MR. Ginwalla and later on Mr. Arijit Chowdhury learned counsel for the appellant have taken various grounds in support of the appeal. The first submission is that the trial court has interfered with the discretion properly exercised by the Tribunal in holding that the workmen having regard to the conduct were entitled to no relief. According to Mr. Ginwalla in view of the proper exercise of the jurisdiction by the Tribunal on due consideration of relevant materials, the trial court was not justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion by the Tribunal which should not have been interfered with. Mr. Ginwalla submitted that the Tribunal had not said that it has no jurisdiction to grant the relief but having considered all aspects, the Tribunal was not inclined to grant any relief to the workmen concerted. We may refer to the relevant portion of the interim Award of the Industrial Tribunal which runs as follows: - "the Tribunal feels that it should refrain from adjudicating the matters mentioned in this reference in respect of the following workmen in the schedule, workmen serial numbers 2, 5, 8,10 and 12 for reasons stated above, and this reference is asswered accordingly in respect of these workmen". 4. UNDER section 7a of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the appropriate government may constitute one or more industrial Tribunals for adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule thereof. Section 10 (1) provides that where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing refer the dispute or any matter connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, to a Tribunal for adjudication. It will therefore be clear from the above provisions that the Tribunal in law is under a statutory obligation to adjudicate the disputes referred to it by the appropriate Government. This function of the Tribunal has to be discharged by it in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Act and the rules framed there under. The Tribunal, accordingly, is also under a statutory obligation on adjudication of the dispute to grant such relief as it may think fit and proper. This function of the Tribunal has to be discharged by it in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Act and the rules framed there under. The Tribunal, accordingly, is also under a statutory obligation on adjudication of the dispute to grant such relief as it may think fit and proper. It may be that in a proper case the Tribunal may hold that even if the dismissal was not justified the workmen are not entitled to any relief in view of their conduct or such relevant factors. But the Tribunal has to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it by making an adjudication and such adjudication cannot be avoided or relinquished. 5. IN the interim Award it would appear that the Tribunal had stated that in view of the pendency of the application under Section 33c (2) of the Act, which was subsequently dismissed as not maintainable though not on merits, and the workmen concerned having elected to seek their relief before the Labour Court, which was capable of giving such relief, the Tribunal felt that it should refrain from adjudicating the matters referred to in this reference in respect of the aforesaid workmen. This in our opinion, constitutes failure to discharge the statutory function by the Tribunal conferred on it by law and such action accordingly cannot be sustained. The conduct of the workmen or their harassing tactics as alleged by Mr. Ginwalla may be a relevant consideration in so far as the grant of relief is concerned but that does not imply that the Tribunal, for that reason, even if be correct, which is not the case here, refrain from adjudicating the dispute referred to him under the said Act. Mr. Chowdhury in his rejoinder said that the Tribunal had in fact exercised its jurisdiction as it has adjudicated that the workmen concerned are not to be entitled to any relief in the proceedings. Unfortunately, that is not the decision of the Tribunal which we have quoted in the earlier part of the judgment wherein the Tribunal expressly said that it refrained from adjudicating the matters mentioned in the reference in respect of the said workmen for certain reasons. The impugned Award accordingly was patently without jurisdiction and calls for issuance of appropriate Writs, if other conditions are satisfied, as contended by Mr. Dutt learned Counsel for the concerned workmen. 6. MR. The impugned Award accordingly was patently without jurisdiction and calls for issuance of appropriate Writs, if other conditions are satisfied, as contended by Mr. Dutt learned Counsel for the concerned workmen. 6. MR. Ginwalla next contended that the dispute contemplated under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a collective dispute with the management on one side and the workmen on the other sponsored and supported by the Union representing such workmen. If, therefore, certain workmen in course of proceedings cease to be represented by the Union in terms of the reference, the collective dispute in so far as these workmen are concerned comes to an end and they cannot avail of the benefits of the proceedings contemplated under the said Act. Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of Ram Prasad Vishwakarma vs. Chairman, industrial Tribunal, Patna, A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 857 in which the Court referred to the earlier decision in Central Provinces Transport Service Ltd., vs. Raghunath Gopal, A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 104 laying down the well settled principle that a dispute between an individual workman and an employer cannot be an industrial dispute as defined in section 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act unless it is taken up by an Union of the workmen or by a considerable number of the workmen. The court further observed at page 859 as follows: - "the necessary corollary to this is that the individual workman is at no stage a party to the industrial dispute independently of the Union. The Union or those workmen who have by their sponsoring turned the individual dispute into an industrial dispute, can therefore claim to have a say in the conduct of the proceedings before the Tribunal". The court further observed that the ordinary rule should be that such representation by an officer of the trade union should continue throughout the proceedings in absence of exceptional circumstances which may justify the Tribunal to permit other representation of the workmen concerned. In this case in the connected industrial dispute the Union which took up the case of the workman filed certain terms of settlement on the basis whereof an Award was passed. In this case in the connected industrial dispute the Union which took up the case of the workman filed certain terms of settlement on the basis whereof an Award was passed. Thereafter, the workman who was member of the Union till the date the Award was passed wanted to reopen the Award which was refused by the Tribunal and the order was approved by the Court as it found that there was no exceptional circumstances to interfere nor was the interest of the workman overlooked. In this case before us, it is to be seen that after the Tribunal had issued notice to the parties pursuant to the order of reference of January 27, 1971, the workmen concerned by their letter dated March 30, 1971 informed the Tribunal that they were no longer the members of the Union and notices were to be issued to them individually. Such notices were accordingly issued by the Tribunal and the written statements were filed on behalf of the workmen Nos. 2 and 5 as also the Union. The Union also by the letter of April 20, 1971 informed that it would not represent the case of the said workmen but it would represent the case of others. It would further appear that the written statements thereafter were filed by all the said workmen while the Union filed the written statement separately for other workmen and there were additional written statements and the rejoinders filed by the parties before the interim Award was passed. 7. THE contention is that since certain workmen went out of the union, the dispute in so far as such workmen are concerned ceased to be an industrial dispute and they had no further right to proceed in this proceedings. The Supreme Court in the case of Binny Limited vs. Their Workmen and Anr. A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 1975 observed as follows :- "the Union further undertook not to represent Kuppuswamy's case or prosecute it before the Labour Court in view of this overall settlement with the Management. It is not necessary for us to consider whether S. 2a of the Act which was introduced in the statute in 1965 has any application to the facts before us. It is not necessary for us to consider whether S. 2a of the Act which was introduced in the statute in 1965 has any application to the facts before us. We do not however see any reason to hold that the dispute which had already been referred by the Government should cease to be one in respect of a portion of it merely because the Union did not choose to represent the case of a particular dismissed employee. If there was an industrial dispute at the time of reference it would not cease to be one merely because the claim of some of the dismissed employees was settled by mutual agreement. " 8. APPLYING the above principle to the facts of this case it would obviously appear that even if the Union did not want to represent the case and in fact did not represent the case of some workmen the dispute thereby did not cease to be an industrial dispute only for that reason as has been noticed by the Supreme Court that the Union did not choose to represent such workmen. The industrial dispute was there when the reference was made and at no point of time the Union did say or it has been found by the Tribunal that the Union took the position that there was no such industrial dispute in so far as the concerned workmen were concerned. Further Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 provides the right of representation of the workmen in such disputes. In Section 36 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 it is provided as follows : - "sec. 36. Representation of Parties. (1) A workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceedings under this Act by- (a) any member of the executive or other office bearer of a registered trade union of which he is a member; (b) any member of the executive or other office bearer of a federation of trade unions to which the trade union referred to in clause (a) is affiliated; (c) where the worker is not a member of any trade union, by any member of the executive or other office bearer of any trade union connected with, or by any other workmen employed in the industry in which the worker is employed and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed". The above section provides that if the worker is not a member of any trade union he will be entitled to be represented by any other workman employed in an industry in which the worker is employed and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed. We have seen that at the very initial stage of the proceedings before the Tribunal both the workmen concerned as also the union informed the Tribunal that such workmen would not be represented by the union in the proceedings. On the basis of that representation the workmen concerned were given due notice to file their written statements and they in fact filed their written statements as also additional written statements and it appears that rejoinders were also filed in the proceedings. This right of representation which is conferred on any workman who is not a member of the trade union obviously at material time by another workman, employed in the industry or deemed to be so, cannot be taken away by the Tribunal as such action would be in gross violation of the provisions referred to above resulting in deprivation of the right of the workmen to be represented in accordance with the provisions of Section 36 (1) (c. The position in this case constituted an exceptional circumstances for the Tribunal to permit separate representation of the workman concerned through other workman of the industry. We, therefore, think that the workmen concerned were entitled to represent their case before the Tribunal through other dismissed workman of the industry who is such workman as defined in section 2 (S) under Section 36 and such right did not cease to exist merely because they were no longer represented by the union. 9. MR. Ginwalla referred to the decision in Vashist Bhargava vs. The Income-tax Officer, Salary Circle, New Delhi, 99 I. T. R. 148 in support of the proposition that a Writ of Certiorari by the High Court under Art. 226 shall not issue as a matter of course. It does not follow as soon as some legal infirmity is shown by the petitioner in the impugned order. The Court has discretion to abstain from interference if (a) the conduct of the petitioner is such as to disentitle him to the relief, (b) he has not suffered any injustice or (c) that the grant of the relief to him would result in injustice. The Court has discretion to abstain from interference if (a) the conduct of the petitioner is such as to disentitle him to the relief, (b) he has not suffered any injustice or (c) that the grant of the relief to him would result in injustice. In this case, as we have seen, the concerned workmen undoubtedly made a misconceived application before the Labour Court under Section 33c (2) of the Act which was dismissed as not maintainable in due course; but that by itself should be no reason to disentitle the workmen to the relief if we find that by reason of the order in the interim award the workmen are subjected to great injustice. By the order in the impugned award the petitioners have been deprived of their right to represent their case before the Tribunal as it has elected not to adjudicate on the dispute in respect of such workmen in gross violation of the provisions of the Act. We think that this present case is a fit case where all the conditions referred in the judgment are satisfied for issuance of appropriate writ and a Writ of Certiorari would otherwise be available to the workmen. 10. MR. Ginwalla has next contended that this Court has no jurisdiction to issue a Writ of Certiorari as the records of the case are not within its jurisdiction. This contention is wholly unacceptable. We have seen that by an order of the Central Government the entire proceedings had been transferred to the Central Government industrial Tribunal at Calcutta which has its office well within the jurisdiction of this Court. It is stated that the Tribunal has fixed the case for hearing at Dibrugarh which is out side the jurisdiction of this Court. The Tribunal may fix the place of hearing outside the court's jurisdiction for the purpose of adjudication but the fact remains that as the adjudication has been transferred to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Calcutta all the records in connection therewith will have to be kept and preserved at the office of the said Tribunal at Calcutta. Accordingly we are of opinion that this Court has jurisdiction to issue the Writ of Certiorari if the situation calls for such action. Accordingly we are of opinion that this Court has jurisdiction to issue the Writ of Certiorari if the situation calls for such action. The last contention on behalf of the appellant is that there has been long delay in moving this application, and in view of the conduct of the parties this Court should have refrained from entertaining the application filed by the concerned workmen under Article 226 of the Constitution. We have seen that the impugned award was made on June 13, 1972 and this application under Article 226 was moved on March 10, 1975, patently after a considerable length of time. The explanation of the workmen is that they had filed the application for review on December 8, 1972 and the review petition was withdrawn on January 31, 1975, obviously on the ground that the Tribunal has no power to review its judgment under the law. There can be no dispute that misconceived proceedings will not extend the period of limitation to the benefit of the defaulting party, but nonetheless the Courts have refused to condone the delay when the claim has become stale by lapse of time and rights have accrued to others in the meantime. In Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar and others vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 259, relied on by Mr. Dutta, it has been laid down that the rule which says that a Court may not inquire into a belated or a stale claims is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. The question is one of discretion to be followed on the facts of each case when no rights of others have accrued for and there is reasonable explanation for the delay. 11. IN this case the claim of the workmen has not become stale, nor any rights of others have accrued in view of the fact that the proceedings before the Tribunal are still pending for no fault of the workmen and it has already proceeded for adjudication in the meantime. 11. IN this case the claim of the workmen has not become stale, nor any rights of others have accrued in view of the fact that the proceedings before the Tribunal are still pending for no fault of the workmen and it has already proceeded for adjudication in the meantime. Further, in the facts of the case as indicated above we think that delay should not stand as a bar to the grant of relief to the concerned workmen to which they are unjustly deprived of by the impugned interim award in gross violation of the previsions of law. 12. FOR the reasons indicated above this appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in the circumstances. All interim orders are vacated. All parties concerned including the Tribunal will act on a signed copy of the minutes upon the usual undertaking of the Advocate on record for the respondents to have this order drawn up, completed and filed. An order for stay has been asked for on behalf of the appellant. We are informed that Mr. Moidu the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal is retiring at the end of this month. In these circumstances, the prayer for stay is refused. Appeal dismissed.