( 1 ) THIS revision is brought from the judgment of the First Addl. Civil judge, Bangalore, under Sec. 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act), wherein the decision of the civil Judge evicting the petitioner from premises No. 1709 Ramamohanapuram, nagappa Block, Bangalore, is called in question. ( 2 ) HRC. NO. 1546 of 1975 was filed by the landlady Rajalakshmi against her tenant Ramachandra Setty occupying the complete tenement no. 1709 in Ramamohanapuram consisting of the ground-floor and the firs'; floor as tenant on monthly tenancy which was stated in the petition to commence on the 10th of every English calendar month. The petition was made on two grounds that is, Clauses (a) and (h) of the proviso to Sec. 21 (1) of the Act. The landlady mentioned in her petition that she issued notice to quit dated Dec. 27, 1972 and in that notice she terminated the tenancy on the 9th of the following month It was also seated that the premises were leased on June 10, 1965 for a period of eleven months. The lease period expired long back and obviously thereafter the tenant continued as tenant by holding over under Sec. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. The notice of demand of rent, according to the landlady was also issued and the tenant had not paid the rent. In the petition it was stated that the premises is reasonably and bonafide required by the landlady for occupation as the premises already in the occupation of the landlady are insufficient for her family needs. It was also specified in the petition that some time before, the ground-floor of the out-house occupied by her had fallen vacant but the said accommodation would not have met her needs and as such she let it out to somebody else. On these grounds, the petitioner tenant was asked to vacate the premises in dispute. ( 3 ) THE petitioner-tenant filed his counter statement and in that he admitted that the tenancy commenced from the 10th of every month although according to him lasted with the 10th of the succeeding month. the tenant also pleaded that he was not due for the arrears of rent. He denied that the landlady was in reasonable and bonafide requirement of the premises. the tenant also pleaded that he was not due for the arrears of rent. He denied that the landlady was in reasonable and bonafide requirement of the premises. It was also contended that the tenant will be put to greater hardship if the order of eviction is passed in favour of the respondent-landlady. It is significant that no plea was taken pertaining to notice to quit not any objection was availed of signifying that the needs of the landlady would be provided for if the tenant is asked to vacate the disputed premises partially. ( 4 ) BEFORE the learned Civil Judge, the respondent-landlady produced her husband PW. 1 and her son PW. 2 while the petitioner-tenant produced two witnesses besides giving his own statement. The two witnesses almost confined their version in supporting the petitioner for the contention that the landlady had approached the petitioner for enhancement of rent to which he had not agreed. Besides this oral evidence, the notice to quit and its reply were also filed. The learned trial Judge considered it fit to get a report of the Court Commissioner pointing out the extent of the tenement in possession of the respective parties. This he did to satisfy the greater hardship caused to either party by the order of eviction. After a careful consideration of the entire evidence filed in the case, the learned, trial Judge held that the plea regarding arrears of rent was not made out. However, in respect of the plea regarding reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlady, the rinding was in favour of the respondent-landlady. It was also held in her favour that she would be caused greater hardship as compared to the petitioner in case an order of eviction is not made. With these findings, the HRC petition was granted and six months time was given to the petitioner to vacate the premises. The petitioner tenant has felt aggrieved with that decision and has preferred this revision. ( 5 ) SRI B. Ramachandra Rao, learned Counsel for the petitionertenant did not press for the ground Clause (a) of the proviso relating to the arrears of rent which may or may not be due from 'the tenant. However he strenuously contended against the other finding of the learned civil Judge, namely, the reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlady. However he strenuously contended against the other finding of the learned civil Judge, namely, the reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlady. The learned Counsel also contended that the notice to quit was invalid and did not determine the tenancy. According to him the plea was sustainable in this Court because it needed no fresh evidence. He rather argued the entire matter on the evidence already on record. According to him, the notice to quit Ex. P. 1 was short by one day. In other words, the notice did not end with end of the month of the tenancy and as such there could not be a valid order of eviction. The learned counsel further contended that the learned Civil Judge did not consider the plea as to the pantial eviction which may or may not be ordered against the tenant and proceeded to submit that despite that plea not having been taken by the tenant, it was incumbent on the Court to have considered it. Since more emphasis was laid by the learned Counsel on the plea pertaining to the notice to quit. I intend taking up that question at the first instance. ( 6 ) SRI P. R. Srinivasan, learned Counsel for the respondent-landlady, while dealing with the plea concerning the notice to quit referred to Sec. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. According to him it is not a case where the time limit for the lease is expressed as commencing from a particular date. It is not a case of written lease nor is there any evidence to indicate that the parties contracted for any expressed date from which the tenancy is to commence. According to Sri Srinivasan, it is a case of the making of a lease from a particular date mentioned in the petition and not denied by the tenant. Therefore, it is a case where the time so limited under the lease has to begin from the making of the lease. Sec. 110 may be extracted as below :"110. Exclusion of day on which term commences:-Where the time limited by a lease of immoveable property is expressed as commencing from a particular day, in computing that time such day shall be excluded. Where no day of commencement is named, the time so limited begins from the making of the lease. Sec. 110 may be extracted as below :"110. Exclusion of day on which term commences:-Where the time limited by a lease of immoveable property is expressed as commencing from a particular day, in computing that time such day shall be excluded. Where no day of commencement is named, the time so limited begins from the making of the lease. The petitioner's case is that the first part of Sec. 110 applies while the respondent's case is that the case falls under the second part of that section. It is no doubt correct that the plea regarding notice was not taken in the counter objection and hence no evidence was led on that question. The, Court was asked to consider the case on the pleadings filed by the parties. Besides that whatever admissions are made with reference, to that pleading will also be considered. In the petition of the respondent-landlady it was stated in para 2 : this tenancy between the petitioner and the respondent was from month to month commencing on the tenth of every English calendar month. In para 5 the respondent stated : - that the above said tenancy of the respondent has been terminated as on February 10, 1973 under the notice dated December 27, 1972. "in the counter-statement filed by the petitioner it was mentioned in para 1 : - that the tenancy is from the 10th of every month to the 10th of the succeeding month. " in the notice Ext. P1 the respondent specified in para 1 ; the said tenancy of yours in respect of the said premises commences on the ten h of every English calendar month and ends on the ninth of the following English calendar month. The said premises was leased. 'o you on June 10, 1965 for a period of 11 months. The lease period has expired long back. " further the respondent-landlady stated in para 4 : for the abovesaid reasons, your tenancy in respect of the above referred premises is terminated with effect from February 10, 1973 and you are hereby called upon to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the said premises in your occupation to our client on the expiry of February 9, 1973. " further the respondent-landlady stated in para 4 : for the abovesaid reasons, your tenancy in respect of the above referred premises is terminated with effect from February 10, 1973 and you are hereby called upon to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the said premises in your occupation to our client on the expiry of February 9, 1973. " it is evident from thq above noted pleadings and admissions which were very much adhered to by the respective parties, that the tenancy was stated to commence on the 10th of every English calendar month. Similarly the petitioner also contended that the tenancy "was from the 10th of every month From this state of pleadings and admissions it is not difficult to infer that the case really falls under the second part of Sec. 110 of the Transfer of Property Act and the time limited under the lease is to run "from the making of the lease. It was maintained that the tenancy commenced from 10th of every English calendar month. The inference is that the lease was made on that date and it would not be a case where the time limited under the lease "was expressed as commencing from a particular day. The expression "expressed" and "named" used in Sec. 110 leads one to infer that something more is required, in the) contract besides the making of the lease from a particular day. There has to be a consensus between the parties for a particular date which has to be expressed in the contract as the da e when the time limited under the lease has to commence and only in those cases where that date is 'named' that the first part of Sec. 110 will be applicable. The learned Counsel relied upon the case Datttonpant Gopala Rao Devakatc v. Vithal Rao maruti Rao AIR. 1975 SC. 1111. But in that case there was a written lease dated 15-6-1945 and in that written document the tenancy was expressed to commence irom a prior date, namely, 9-4-1945. The first part of Sec. 110 was applied and the date 0-4-1945 was excluded and hence the tenancy was held to commence from 10-4-1945 ending on 9-4-1946. Therefore the said case was clearly under the first part of Sec. 110 and would be of no help to the petitioner. The first part of Sec. 110 was applied and the date 0-4-1945 was excluded and hence the tenancy was held to commence from 10-4-1945 ending on 9-4-1946. Therefore the said case was clearly under the first part of Sec. 110 and would be of no help to the petitioner. ( 7 ) IT was then contended by Sri Ramachandra Rao that it was not the requirement of Sec. 110 that in every case there should be a written lease. This is submitted in reply to the argument on behalf of the respondent that in view of the decision in Mst Dudmera Bibi v. Hari bhakta Seal AIR. 1970 Assam 115. the exclusion of the date of commencement of the lease under Sec. 110 can only be in cases of written leases. The learned Counsel also referred to the Dictionary meaning of the word "express" which means "definitely stated, not merely implied". Since in the instant case the date of commencement was not definitely stated, it was submitted that no date of commencement for the time limited under the lease was expressed or named and as such the first part of Sec. 110 will not apply. The learned Counsel for the, petitioner also relied on the case kedar Nath v. Ramendra Nath Mallik AIR. 1946 Cal. 460. wherein it was observed by a learned single Judge that Sec. 110 is not confined to written leases only but applies to oral leases also as the term "expressed" can be included for both oral and written leases. As I have already referred to, the expression "expressed" and "named" used in Sec. 110 and the Dictionary meaning of the word "express" relied upon by Sri Ramachandra Rap may lead to an inference that the first part of Sec. 110 may apply only to the written leases where the date is expressed in a document and the tenancy has to commence from that date. In that contingency the Division bench view of the Assam High Court may be accepted. But, to me it appears that the controversy need not be decided in this case. The pleadings of the respective parties make the position very much clear that the case falls under the second part of Sec. 110 and it is only a case where the tenancy is seated to have been made on the 10th of the calendar month. But, to me it appears that the controversy need not be decided in this case. The pleadings of the respective parties make the position very much clear that the case falls under the second part of Sec. 110 and it is only a case where the tenancy is seated to have been made on the 10th of the calendar month. As such, the date 10th has to be included and the tenancy ended on /the 9th of the succeeding month. In that case, the notice to quit Ex. P. 1 is a perfectly valid notice. In that notice the petitioner was asked to vacate by the end of the 9th day of February 1973. The notice terminated with the end of the tenancy and as such was a valid notice. ( 8 ) SRI P. R. Srinivasan also brought to my notice a very recent observation of the Supreme Court jn Bhagwandas Agarwala v. Bhagwan- das Kanu ILR. 1977 Kar. 469. While dealing with a case of notice to quit under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act their Lordships observed that tha validity of a notice to quit ought not to turn on the splitting of a straw and rather the notice must be construed in a common sense way. In the present case, it was stated in the notice that the tenancy commenced from the 10th in the sense that the tenancy was made on that date and this position was admitted by the tenant. Therefore, interpreting the no ice in a common sense way and construing the pleadings of the parties, it is not difficult to hold that it is not a case where the tenancy is expressed or named to commence from a particular date. ( 9 ) SRI Ramachandra Rao, the learned Counsel for the petitioner referred to the other grounds and submitted that the findi up of the learned Civil Judge was only to the extent that the accommodation was insufficient for the landlady. The said finding need not be construed as one to hold that the premises were reasonably and bonafide required by the landlady for her occupation. One has to refer to Sec. 50 of the act to assess the jurisdiction of the Court under that provision. The said finding need not be construed as one to hold that the premises were reasonably and bonafide required by the landlady for her occupation. One has to refer to Sec. 50 of the act to assess the jurisdiction of the Court under that provision. As observed by their Lordsips in Dattonpant Gopala, Rao Devdkate v. Vithal Rao Maruti Rao (l) supra this Court cannot convert itself into a second Court of first appeal. Sri Ramachandra Rao then submitted that at any rate the power of revision under Sec. 50 is rather wide as compared to the power of revision of the High Court under Sec. 115 of the c. P. Code. That may be so, but it is none-the-less correct to say that the court will not be justified to scrutinise the evidence and assess the probative value as if sitting in appeal over the judgment of the learned trial Judge. As indicated by Sec. 50, the legality and correctness of the order made by the trial Judge has to be considered. As regards the legality there can be no two opinions and thei learned Counsel naturally depended upon the correctness or otherwise of the order made by the learned Civil Judge. According to the learned Counsel the order of eviction is incorrect inasmuch as, from the evidence adduced no inference could be, drawn that the landlady reasonably or bona fide required the premises. The learned trial Judge has considered the entire evidence. He has assessed the value of that evidence. It cannot but be stated that any reasonable Court would have arrived at those inferences. It would not be a correct standard to judge the order of the learned trial Judge in a revision under Sec. 50 of the Act to say that although the learned trial Judge had reasons to take a certain view, any other Court left to itself may have arrived at a different conclusion. So long as the petitioner does not succeed in challenging the legality or correctness of the order made by the trial Judge, it is difficult for him to succeed in revision under Sec. 50 of the Act. ( 10 ) THE learned trial Judge found that the landlady occupied the first floor of the outhouse which is a separate tenement, Her son is already married and needs a separate apartment. The childern are also grown up. ( 10 ) THE learned trial Judge found that the landlady occupied the first floor of the outhouse which is a separate tenement, Her son is already married and needs a separate apartment. The childern are also grown up. There are three girls aged 19, 17 and 15 years, one of them is also stated to be mentally retarded. These childern also need some apart ment for their need. The husband of the landlady is already transferred to Bangalore and he too needs some place to accommodate himself. At present the landlady occupies the first floor of an house. The area of that firs. floor is determined by the Court Commissioner. There is one living room and one hall divided into two rooms. Taking into consideration all these facts, the learned Civil Judge rightly concluded that the accommodation was insufficient and hence the landlady could state that she reasonably and bona fide requires the disputed premises which are sufficiently extensive. It is correct that the ipse dixit of the landlady would not be a criterion in these cases and sri Ramachandra Rao is right when he submitted that any fanciful whim of the landlady will not be material. At the same time the need of a landlady in order to assess her reasonable or bona fide requirement under this section will have to be assessed with reference to her essential needs coupled with the surrounding circumstances. The Court will have to peep into her mental adjustment taking regard to her education, status, habits and pattern of life to which she may be accustomed. One does not merely exist but lives and for that living all that is necessary for a living in a decent manner, will have to be considered. After all the test is of a reasonable and bona fide requirement which is contradistinguishable from mala fide and unreasonable requirement. If the learned trial Judge considered upon the evidence that the need was reasonable and bona fide taking regard to the education, status and the mode of living adopted by the landlady and her family, that will be the end of the matter. In that connection Sri B. Ramachandra Rao referred to the vacation of the ground floor of the tenement occupied by the landlady. In the petition itself it was mentioned that the said ground floor was vaca'ed but it was let out to somebody else. In that connection Sri B. Ramachandra Rao referred to the vacation of the ground floor of the tenement occupied by the landlady. In the petition itself it was mentioned that the said ground floor was vaca'ed but it was let out to somebody else. That was done because the accommodation in the ground floor was similar to. the accommodation in the first floor and both the accommodations were not interconnected. As such, it is clear that the requirement of the landlady was not satisfied even if she could have occupied the ground floor. The argument of Sri B. Ramachandra Rao that the landlady could do with the two floors of the cut house will be neither here nor there. The test was of reasonable and bona fide requirement and considering 'the circumstances of the case, that test was satisfied. ( 11 ) AS regards the element of greater hardship, the learned Civil judge considered the case from all relevant aspects. It is true that the, number of the family members of the tenant are considerable. But, so long as the requirement of the landlady is considered reasonable and bona fide, that will not stand in the way of an order of eviction. It was stated in that connection that there are other houses and that the rents demanded will be high. These two grounds were also considered by the learned trial Judge. If these grounds are considered conclusive on the. question of hardship, perhaps in no case the land-lords will be able to get an eviction order in their favour. ( 12 ) SRI B. Ramachandra Rao, finally argued on the plea pertaining to partial eviction. It may be held that the said plea was required to be considered by the learned trial Judge. Accordingly Sri B. Ramachandra rao canvassed that plea and submitted that it will be easier to ask the tenant to vacate a part of his tenement. But the difficulty in that connection will be, that the two floors occupied by the 'tenant belong to a separate tenement and are inter-connected. The tenement, namely the outhousel occupied by the landlady, is a separate building. In such a situation, even if the tenant is asked to vacate one of the floors, that will be of no use for the landlady. The tenement, namely the outhousel occupied by the landlady, is a separate building. In such a situation, even if the tenant is asked to vacate one of the floors, that will be of no use for the landlady. It will not be possible for her to occupy two houses instead of one as she will be compelled ,to break her family. Therefore, in my opinion, the plea regarding partial eviction cannot succeed. It is evident, the said plea was not taken by the tenant in his counter-objection and rightly so because he was himself faced with that difficulty. ( 13 ) IN view of what I have stated above, the revision is dismissed and the order of eviction granted by ,the learned Civil Judge is sustained. However the petitioner is granted two months time to vacate the premises. No costs. --- *** --- .