Judgment Madan Mohan Prasad, J. This is an application in revision directed against an order rejecting an application under section 19C of the Court Fees Act. 2. It appears that one Mossomat Chulhia, widow of one Chhedi Mahton, executed a will and registered it bequeathing her properties to one Mossomat Dukhia. The testatrix died in the year 1946. Mossomat Dukhia, therefore, applied for grant of probate of the aforesaid will in 1948, letters of Administration with a copy or the will annexed thereto was, however, granted to her on the 20th of March, 1948, but the inventory and accounts not having been filed within six months the question of revocation of the grant was taken up and ultimately on the 29th of June, 1950 the grant, was revoked. It is relevent to mention that after the grant, a valuation report of the property was sent to the court by the Collector on the 20th of January, 1950. However, a revised valuation report was again sent on the 11th of September. 1950 assessing the value of the property at Rs.15,747/-. In January 1967 Mossomat Dukhia is said to have died leaving behind a daughter's son (the petitioner) and daughter's daughter as heirs. The latter sold her interest in the property to the former by a deed of sale on the 23rd of December, 1967. Thereafter in 1969 the petitioner applied for a fresh grant of letters of Administration. The present application arises out of this proceeding. 3. On his application, it is said inadvertently the petitioner paid the court fee on the basis of the valuation given by him. The Court, however issued notice to the Collector as a result of which the latter valued the properties at Rs.39,938/-. As against this the petitioner made his objection and State tiled a rejoinder. On the basis of the objections a miscellaneous case was instituted. This was, however, dismissed and by on order dated the 21st of July, 1975 the petitioner was asked to pay the Court fee on the basis of the Collector's valuation. On the 28th of November, 1975 the petitioner filed an application praying for a recall of the aforesaid order directing him to pay the court fee. This was, however, dismissed and by on order dated the 21st of July, 1975 the petitioner was asked to pay the Court fee on the basis of the Collector's valuation. On the 28th of November, 1975 the petitioner filed an application praying for a recall of the aforesaid order directing him to pay the court fee. On the 5th of August, 1976 the court held that the miscellaneous case had been wrongly started on the basis of the rejoinder filed by the Collector; on the other hand, it should have been started on the basis of the objection made by the petitioner. In that view of the matter even though be refused to recall his order dated the 21st of July, 1975 he hold the case required evidence to be taken and a fresh miscellaneous case was ordered to be registered on the basis of the objection filed by the petitioner. According he fixed the 20th of August, 1976 for the aforesaid purpose. On that date, however, the petitioner instead of leading evidence on the question of valuation and his objection to the Collector's report in that respect, filed an application under section 19C of the Court Fees Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') stating that the full court fee had been paid on the first occasion in respect of the same properties at the time the first grant was made and therefore, no further court fee was payable. The court below rejected this application. Hence, the petitioner has come up to this Court. 4. Two grounds have been given by the Court below in support of its order. Firstly that the order dated 5th of August, 1976 refusing to recall the earlier order to pay the court fee was final and it could not be reopened. Secondly, that the plea bad not been raised earlier and could not be allowed to he raised subsequently, the earlier order being final. 5. Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the order dated the 5th of August, 1976 was not final inasmuch as it had reopened the question of valuation and allowed evidence to be taken and, therefore, did not exclude the raising of the question whether section 19C of the Act was applicable. 5. Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the order dated the 5th of August, 1976 was not final inasmuch as it had reopened the question of valuation and allowed evidence to be taken and, therefore, did not exclude the raising of the question whether section 19C of the Act was applicable. Secondly, he has urged that in view of section 19C of the Act the court had no jurisdiction to ask for payment of court fee on the basis of the second application for the grant, court fee having been paid on the earlier grant. 6. On the other side, it has been contended by counsel for the opposite party that the court fee paid on the first occasion was not the full tee chargeable under the Act and thus Section 19C of the Act has no application in the alternative, it has been urged that in any case the fee paid on the first occassion was subject to the decision of the court after an enquiry into the question of valuation and any excess payable by the petitioner over the amount paid on the first occasion could be ordered to be paid by the petitioner. 7. Counsel for the parties have said that the point raised in this case viz an interpretation of section 19C of the Act is one of first impression inasmuch as there is no decision directly on the point. 8. Before I enter into the question of application of section 19C of the Act, I will do well to meet the reasoning of the court below with regard to the right of the petitioner to raise the point. It is obvious that the order dated 5th of August, 1976 is on its face self contradictory. The learned Additional District Judge said that he could not recall his order dated the 21st of July, 1975 which was an order to pay court fee on the basis of the Collector's valuation and yet he held that he would entertain the objection to the aforesaid valuation and allow the parties to lead evidence in that respect. Whether he said so or not, the result is that in effect he recalled his previous order. The question being still in controversy, the order determining the court fee was not final at all. Whether he said so or not, the result is that in effect he recalled his previous order. The question being still in controversy, the order determining the court fee was not final at all. There is thus no question of application of the principle of constructive resjudicata if any, to the circumstances of the present case. That is what I understand the learned Additional District Judge meant when he said that the matter cannot be reopened and the petition under section 19C of the Act was not maintainable on that ground. Secondly, I wish to say that there is no estoppel against the statue. The question is one which goes to the root of the jurisdiction and can be raised at any time, the question being as to whether or not the court below had the jurisdiction to call for any court fee once it had been paid is respect of an earlier grant with respect to the same property. The learned Additional District Judge was, therefore, not correct in law in throwing out the petition on these grounds. The petitioner is thus entitled to raise the point. True it is that inadvertently he had paid that court fee even on this occassion. That would not, however, dabar him from raising the point that court fee is not payable on a second application. 9. The question thus arises as to whether the petitioner is entitled to rely on section 19C of the Act and claim exemption from payment of court fee on the basis of the valuation submitted by the Collector in respect of the present application for a second grant. 10. The Act contains Chapter IIIA which relates to probates, letters of administration and certificates of administration containing section 19A to 19K. Section 19A relates to a case where an applicant for probate has estimated the value of the property to be higher than it is proved to be subsequently, and enables the Chief Revenue authority to make allowance for the same or repay the same in money. Section 19B of the Act enables the Revenue authority to refund the court fee already paid in case a debt of the testator had been paid by the executor out of the assets, thus reducing the value of the property left by the deceased. Section 19B of the Act enables the Revenue authority to refund the court fee already paid in case a debt of the testator had been paid by the executor out of the assets, thus reducing the value of the property left by the deceased. Then comes section 19G of the Act which is as follows:- “Whenever a grant of probate or letters of administration has been or is made in respect of the whole of the property belonging to an estate and the final fee chargeable under this Act has been or is paid thereon, no fee shall be chargeable under the same Act when a like grant is made in respect of the whole or any part of the same property belonging to the same estate. Whenever such a grant has been or is made in respect of any property forming part of an estate, the amount of fee then actually paid under this Act shall be deducted when a like grant is made in respect of property belonging to the same estate, identical with or including the property to which the former grant relates.” Section 19D of the Act relates to validity of probate in respect of trust property and is not of relevance to the question arising in the present case. Section 19E provides for a case where too low a court fee has been paid and probate has been granted but subsequently value is proved to be higher. In such case the Revenue authorities may cause the probate or letters of administration to be duly stamped on payment of the full court fee which ought to have been originally paid thereon and also the penalty prescribed. Section 19F relates to the giving of security by the Administrator in such cases. This is also not relevant. Section 19G of the Act provides for a procedure where too low a court fee has been paid in consequence of any mistake or of its not being known at the time that some particular part or the estate belonged to the deceased. In such a case the applicant has to pay within six months after the discovery of 'he mistake etc. In such a case the applicant has to pay within six months after the discovery of 'he mistake etc. by applying to the authority, what is wanting Section 19H of the Act, which is relevant to the present discussion, provides for the procedure to be followed in case where an application for probates or Letters of Administration is made. Under sub-section (1) thereof notice bas to be issued by the Court other than the High Court to the Collector. Under Subsection (2) if the application is made before the High Court, notice is to be issued to the Chief Controlling Authority. Under sub-section (3) the Collector may inspect the records of the case and if he is of opinion that the petitioner bas underestimated the value of the property, he may take evidence and enquire into the matter in such manner as be thinks fit. If after this enquiry be is still of opinion that the value of the property has been underestimated, he may require the petitioner to amend the valuation. Under sub-section (4), if the petitioner does not amend the valuation the Collector may move the court to hold an enquiry into the true value of the property, provided that no such motion is to be made after the expiry of six months from the date of filing of the inventory. Sub-section (5) provides that after being so moved the court shall hold an enquiry, and record a finding regarding the true value of the property and the Collector shall be deemed to be a party to such an enquiry. Under Subsection (6) the court while holding the enquiry may examine the petitioner for probate and take such further evidence, as may be produced somebody elss is holding the enquiry he has the same right and the court on his report may record a finding in accordance there with unless it is satisfied that it is erroneous. Subsection (7) provides that the finding of the court recorded under sub-section (5) shall be final but it shall not bar the entertainment and disposal, by the Revenue authorities, of any application under section 19E of the Act. Subsection (7) provides that the finding of the court recorded under sub-section (5) shall be final but it shall not bar the entertainment and disposal, by the Revenue authorities, of any application under section 19E of the Act. Section 19I provides as follows:- "(1) No order entitling the petitioner to the grant of probate or letters of administration shall be made upon an application for such grant until the petitioner bas filed in the Court a valuation of the property in the form set forth in the third schedule, and the Court is satisfied that the fee mentioned in No. II of the first schedule has been paid on such valuation. (2) The grant of probate or letters of administration shall not be delayed by reason of any motion made by the Collector under section 19H, sub-sec. (4)". Section 19-J provides that any excess fee found to be payable on any enquiry held under Sub-section (6) of section 19H, and any penalty or forfeiture under section 19-G, may on the certificate of the Chief Controlling Revenue-authority be recovered by the Collector from the executor or administrator as if it were an arrear of land-revenue. The said Revenue Authority has been given also the rig ht to remit penalty or forfeiture. Section 19-K excludes the application of sections 6 and 28 of the Act to probate and letters of Administration. It will thus appear from the aforesaid that the Chapter is more or less exhaustive, the legislature having provided for all likely situations in respect of the payment of court fee relating to probate and Letters of Administration. 11. Coming now to the question of the effect of section 19C, it will appear that the first part of the section applies to a case where a grant had been made in respect of the whole of the property of the deceased, and the latter part deals with a case where the grant was made in respect of a part of the estate. With regard to the first part of the section naturally when full fee chargeable had been paid, no further fee shall be chargeable. In respect of the latter part of the section, naturally the court fee having been paid only on a part of the estate, it has to be deducted when a like grant is made in respect of property belonging to the same estate. In respect of the latter part of the section, naturally the court fee having been paid only on a part of the estate, it has to be deducted when a like grant is made in respect of property belonging to the same estate. It will thus appear that where the conditions of the first part of section 19C have been fulfilled, no fee is chargeable under the Act when a like grant is made in respect of the whole or any part of the same property belonging to the same estate. The point is so obvious from a mere reading of the section itself that no authority is needed in support of the proposition. The question arose, though in different circumstances, in the case of Bhagwati Saran Singh V. Secretary of State. Even before that the question had arisen in the case of Swarnamoyi Debi V. Secretary of State. In the latter case the question had arisen on account of the fact that on the earlier occasion the probate duty paid was in accordance with the law as it obtained then, hot the law had been changed subsequently and the petitioner was asked to pay the difference on account of the change in law. The learned Judges of the Court held that the full fee chargeable under the Act had to be determined by reference to the point of time when the grant of probate was made. On the basis of section 19C of the Act, thus the learned Judges held that in view of section 19-I of the Act requiring the probate duty to be paid before the order of grant of probate the Court fee on the first occasion was the full fee payable. In the case of Bhagwati Saran Singh (Supra), it appears, the Raja of Maksudpur had executed a will bequeathing certain properties to his daughter. The lady in her turn executed a will in respect of her properties, including that which she had got by the will of her father, in favour of her husband, the appellant in that case. In the case of Bhagwati Saran Singh (Supra), it appears, the Raja of Maksudpur had executed a will bequeathing certain properties to his daughter. The lady in her turn executed a will in respect of her properties, including that which she had got by the will of her father, in favour of her husband, the appellant in that case. The appellant had thus filed a petition under section 19C of the Act saying that no fee was chargeable In respect of the grant in so far as it concerned the property which his wife had inherited from her father and bequeathed to him since duty had already been paid thereupon when letters of administration had been granted to the widow of the Raja of Maksudpur who also had left a will disposing of his properties including the one which came Into the hands of the appellant's wife. The learned Judges decided the question adversely to the appellant on the ground that section 12-C of the Act has to be so road as to mean “that the estate therein referred to mean the property of a deceased person" and to disassociate the identity of the person from the property in the meaning of the word "estate" is not possible." The learned Judges, therefore, held that the estate must belong to the same person in order that section 19-C of the Act may be applicable. Their Lordships observed:- "The probate is sometimes revoked and again a portion of the estate may remain un-administered and may require a fresh grant, and there are many cases in which a fresh grant becomes necessary. It is clearly to provide such cases that section 19C of the Act was passed..." 12. An analysis of the two decisions aforesaid would bring out that in the case of Swaranamoyi Devi (Supra), it was held that what was payable under section 19-I of the Act was full fee chargeable under the Act. In the case of Bhagwati Saran Singh (Supra) the important point laid down wall that the estate must be identical. The decision in the case of Swaranamoyi Devi (Supra) was followed in the case of Maung Win Pan and another-in the matte, of the estates and effect of. In that case the question had arisen on account of rise in the value of the property. The decision in the case of Swaranamoyi Devi (Supra) was followed in the case of Maung Win Pan and another-in the matte, of the estates and effect of. In that case the question had arisen on account of rise in the value of the property. On an earlier occasion, Letters of administration had been granted and court fee paid on the value of the property obtaining at that point of time. On the occasion of the second grant the contention was that the value of the property having increased, higher court fee was payable. The learned judges held that the full fee chargeable under the Act was the fee on the basis of the valuation of the property obtaining at the time of the first grant and consequently no fee was leviable on the second occasion. 13. Before I come to my conclusion, I will draw attention to some of the relevant 'provisions which have been noticed earlier and which have a bearing on the points raised. As seen earlier sections 19E and 19G provide for cases where a court fee lower than that required had been paid. In the cases mentioned in these two sections the Revenue authorities have been given the right to realise the same. It will however, be relevant to mention that both the cases relate to a situation where probate has already been granted and fee lower than that required under the law had been paid. It will be necessary to bear in mind thus that there are provisions under this Chapter which entitled the Revenue authority to realise court fee not paid at the time the application was made, or in any case before the grant was made. Thus in such cases the State is not left without a remedy. Section 19H however provides for a situation before the grant is made, The first three subsections provide for notice to the Collector or the Revenue authorities and give them the chance of determining the question as to whether a petitioner has under-estimated the value and further to require the petitioner to amend the valuation. If it is so amended, there is no conflict left between the state and the petitioner. If it is not in that situation the provision of Sub-section (4) comes into play. If it is so amended, there is no conflict left between the state and the petitioner. If it is not in that situation the provision of Sub-section (4) comes into play. The Collector has then been given the right to move the court to hold an enquiry into the true value of the property. It is, however obvious from the proviso to this sub section that such a motion can be made even after the grant of proviso or letters of administration, the time limit provided therefore being not more than six months from the date of filing of the inventory, which itself under section 317 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 can be filed within six months from the date of the grant of probate or letters of administration. The point that I wish to high-light is that the enquiry under subsection (4) on the court being moved by the Collector or the revenue authority, can be made prior to the grant as also enquiry after the grant and that has a bearing on the decision of the issue involved. This is to be held in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (5) and I finding has to be recorded there under and this finding in view of sub section (7) is final. It will be relevant to point out at this stage the provision of sub-section (2) of section 19-I of the Act which lays down that the grant shall not be delayed by reason of any motion made under sub-section (4) of section 19. It thus follows that in cases where the valuation has been determined by the court prior to the grant the court fee payable is the full fee payable under the Act on the basis of such valuation already determined and a person who has paid this must be deemed to have paid the full fee chargeable under the Act. 14. The question, however, arises whether the amount of court fee determined as a result of the finding relating to valuation, after the grant, in view of subsection (4) of section 19H or subsection (6) thereof should be taken as the court fee chargeable under the Act. I do not have any decision of any court at least none has been cited before me which would help me to decide the matter. I do not have any decision of any court at least none has been cited before me which would help me to decide the matter. It seems to me, however, that even if the law prescribes a procedure for re-determination of the value of the property after the grant of probate and the court is called upon to give a finding regarding the true value of the estate, it does not follow that the full fee chargeable under the Act' for the purpose of section 19 must be the amount d court fee payable on such revised valuation. The reason is that the court fee is payable before the grant. The value of the property after re-determination may be realised later but that is not the court fee payable for the purpose of making the grant. I am, therefore, of the view that prior to the gram, whatever be the valuation of the property as determined by the court, whether after the enquiry under section 19H or before that the fee chargeable under the Act is that which is mentioned in section 19-I of the Act. That section only requires the petitioner to file a valuation of the property in the form of a schedule and in view of item no. II of the First Schedule of the Act he has to pay court fee ad valorem on the basis of a certain percentage mentioned therein. So before the grant if a person has paid court fee on the valuation given by him and accepted by the court or on the basis of the valuation as revised by him in accordance with the objection raised by the Collector under the provision of subsection (3) of section 19-H, or as determined under sub-section (4) of the same section he has paid the full court fee. This is, however, subject to the right of the State or the court to revise the valuation after coming to a finding with regard to the true value of the property after the enquiry under section 19-H. 15. The question next arises what is the purpose of the court holding an enquiry into the matter of valuation and recording a finding thereon after the grant is made. The purpose must be to make it possible for the State to realise a court fee due from the litigant. The question next arises what is the purpose of the court holding an enquiry into the matter of valuation and recording a finding thereon after the grant is made. The purpose must be to make it possible for the State to realise a court fee due from the litigant. Section 19-J of the Act, as stated earlier, provides for the recovery of any excess fee found to be payable on an enquiry held under section 19-H, sub-section (6). Thus, it is clear that by virtue of section 19-I the necessary court fee wanting can be recovered by the Collector from the person concerned as if it were land revenue. It will be relevant to notice in this connection that there is no provision in this Chapter which specifically entitled the court which has granted the probate, to require the applicant to pay the excess fee on the revised valuation arrived at after the enquiry under section 19-H if such determination is made subsequent to the grant. 16. It is clear from the provisions aforesaid that the realisation of court fee from the applicant by the Court is to be made only before the grant is made. With regard to whatever is to be realised after the grant has been made, it is not specifically laid down to be the concern of the court which granted the probate or letters of administration. Another authority has been clothed with the power to realise the excese fee required. 17. I would refer to a few decisions of this court which could lay my hands on. One is to be found in the case of Suraj Narain Gupta V. Sarosi Bala Devi & Ors. In this case an application for probate of a will had been filed in this Court. Under the rules of this Court the application has to be accompanied by a certificate that the duty has been paid. Such duty was paid on the basis of Article II. Schedule I, and the Registrar granted the certificate. But before the probate had been granted there was en amendment of the Court Fees Act called Bihar Court-Fees War Surcharge (Amendment) Act, 1943. The question, therefore, arose whether additional fee was payable. The learned Judge held that the crucial time in respect of payment of court fee would be the time probate is granted and thus enhanced fee was payable. The question, therefore, arose whether additional fee was payable. The learned Judge held that the crucial time in respect of payment of court fee would be the time probate is granted and thus enhanced fee was payable. The learned Judge explained away the rule of the court by saying that it was merely an administrative rule for convenience and did not affect the legal position. The learned Judge disagreed with a contrary view expressed in the case of Thaddens S. Nahapiet and others V. Secretary of State (AIR 1924 Calcutta 987). Another decision by the same learned Judge sitting singly is to be found in the case of Jagat Kishore Prasad Narain Singh V. Smt. Girja Kishori, Devi. Here again the learned Judge reiterated the view he had taken earlier, and held that the aforesaid rule of this Court cannot be ignored and the petitioner must pay the court fee payable under the law at that time, but in case the law changes be has to pay increased court fee before the hearing of the application is made and he may also get a refund if the law is altered in his favour. There is another case of this Court in Mundrika Prasad Singh V. Mst. Kachnar Kuer and others. In that case the question really was in respect of the time when the applicant is to pay the court fee. The court below had directed the petitioner of that case to deposit the requisite probate duty before hearing. The learned Judges held upon their interpretation of section 19-I that the duty payable is to be paid before the hearing which includes the order of the court entitling the petitioner to the grant of probate or letters of administration. It appears that in the case before their lordships there had been an enquiry by the court under section 19-H. Obviously this was done before the grant. These are not of any assistance to me in deciding the, present question which was really not before this Court in the aforesaid cases. 18. It appears that in the case before their lordships there had been an enquiry by the court under section 19-H. Obviously this was done before the grant. These are not of any assistance to me in deciding the, present question which was really not before this Court in the aforesaid cases. 18. The full fee chargeable under the Act, as held in the case of Maung Win Pan and another (Supra) as also in the case of Swarnamoyi Debi (supra) is the court fee payable by the applicant on the basis of the valuation of the property as given by him in accordance with the Third Schedule at the rate prescribed in Article II of Schedule I, in cases where there is no challenge to the valuation and any enquiry or determination there of before the grant is made, and in cases before where the valuation is amended in view of any objection by the Collector under subsection (3) of section 19-H or is determined after the enquiry under section 19-H but, of course, prior to the making of the grant, the court fee payable on such valuation would be that full fee chargeable under the Act for the purposes of section 19-C. It is obvious that upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court In the case of Mundrika Prasad Singh (supra) the full court fee has to be paid before the date of the bearing; in other words before the grant. It is that date, therefore, which is relevant for determining as to what is the full fee pay bale under the Court Fee Act. If the question bas been determined at that date that is the full fee payable and if that has been paid, section 19C of the Act comes into play. 19. In the light of the aforesaid discussions coming to the facts of the present case. It is obvious that the petitioner had paid the court fee payable on the basis of the valuation given by him and in accordance with Article II of Schedule I. The court had further accepted that fee as the full fee inasmuch as there was no dispute with regard to the valuation of the property. It is obvious that the petitioner had paid the court fee payable on the basis of the valuation given by him and in accordance with Article II of Schedule I. The court had further accepted that fee as the full fee inasmuch as there was no dispute with regard to the valuation of the property. I have already stated earlier that the date on which the valuation report of the Collector for the first time was received, was long after the grant had been made for the purpose of making the grant, therefore, the full fee chargeable under the act had been paid by the petitioner. Upon the facts of the present case, therefore, the Collector neither filed any objection before the grant of the probate the valuation given by the petitioner was not correct and he had under estimated it, nor did be make any motion as required by subsection (4) of section 19-H of the Act. The question, therefore of the valuation of the petitioner not being accepted by the court did not arise, nor did the court suo motu think that the valuation was low. It was on this basis that the letters of administration was already granted. 20. Coming to the next stage the petitioner filed the present application for a similar grant obviously because the earlier grant had been revoked on account of the non-filing of the inventory and the accounts. It is quite clear that upon the view of the law which I have taken it was not open to the Court below to determine the valuation of the property at the dace of the present application since an earlier application had already been granted. It is well known that the estate under a will does not devolve on the applicant on the date of the second application. The State had come down to the legatee on the date of the first application The parties are at one that by the will in question, the properties had been bequeathed to Mossomat Dukhia and her living heirs which, of course, included the petitioner and his sister (who has transferred her interest" to him by sale). The date of the second application is therefore, absolutely irrelavant for the purpose of determination of the court fee. The date of the second application is therefore, absolutely irrelavant for the purpose of determination of the court fee. That being so the court below had no jurisdiction to ask the petitioner to pay court fee on the basis of the valuation reported by the Collector during the course of the present proceeding. If section 19-H of the Act so permits, perhaps, it may be open to the Collector to move the court to determine that the valuation as given by the petitioner at the time of the earlier grant was by way of an under-estimated value. It may be open to the Collector, if the law so permits, to proceed under section 19-E or 19-G or 19-J of the Act. The Collector's valuation on the basis of the value of the property as it obtains on the date of the second application is, as I have said absolutely irrelevant. If at all he could do, as I have said earlier, he could ask the court to hold that the valuation given by him at the time of the first application was low, but even in that respect it is clear that Collector himself had made a revised valuation and submitted a report saying that the value of the property was Rs.15,747/-. At the time of the valuation in the present case he has reported the value to be Rs.39.938/- The Increased valuation being on the basis of extraneous material cannot be the subject matter of amendment of the present petition or any enquiry. 21. Counsel for the petitioner has conceded that valuation report as given by the Collector during the first proceeding though after the grant, can be considered to be an objection by him in respect of the valuation given by the petitioner on that occasion. In that view of the matter it will be open to the court to call upon the petitioner either to amend his application in accordance with the valuation given by the Collector or to hold an enquiry on failure of that under section 19-H or the Act. The amount of Rs.15,747/- reported by the Collector to be the correct value must be the basis for the prayer to amend the petition as filed then and at best the petitioner may be as filed to amend the valuation in the present application to that extent. The amount of Rs.15,747/- reported by the Collector to be the correct value must be the basis for the prayer to amend the petition as filed then and at best the petitioner may be as filed to amend the valuation in the present application to that extent. In no case however, can the valuation given by the Collector a third time and during the present proceeding and on basis of present value, be the basis for court fee. 22. In the circumstances aforesaid the order of the learned Additional District Judge asking for court fee to be paid on the basis of the valuation given by the Collector in the present proceeding must be set aside. It must be held that in the first proceeding the petitioner had paid the full fee chargeable under the Act at that point of time since there is no challenge to the valuation before the grant was made and the same was accepted by the court. In view of the provisions of section 19-H, however, it must be held that it is open to the Collector to show that the fee paid then was not the full fee chargeable under this Act on account of the valuation being under estimated. In such circumstances the court bas to record its finding on the question and such fee becomes recoverable from the applicant in accordance with section 19-I. 23. In the circumstances of the present case, on the concession made by the counsel for the petitioner, the learned Additional District Judge may make an enquiry into the question of true value of the property as at the date of the first application if the court is moved by the Collector under sub-section (4). He will, however do well not to delay making of the grant for section 19-I(2) of the Act specifically lays down that the grant of probate or letters of administration shall not be delayed by reasons of any motion made by the Collector under section 19-H, subsection (4). He will, however do well not to delay making of the grant for section 19-I(2) of the Act specifically lays down that the grant of probate or letters of administration shall not be delayed by reasons of any motion made by the Collector under section 19-H, subsection (4). If after the enquiry under section 19-H of the Act it is found that the petitioner bas paid less than what was payable at the date of the first application on the value of the property, it can be realised from him by the Collector under section 19-J or the Revenue authority may take recourse to the provision of section 19-E or 19-G, if they apply to the circumstances of the case. 24. In the result this application is allowed the order passed by the learned additional district Judge dated 9.2.1977 is set aside and the court below is directed to proceed in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above. Application allowed.