Judgment :- 1. These two revisions involve the same question and are being, therefore, disposed of by a common judgment. The matter arises under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The petitioners before me are in possession of the ground floor and the first floor of one building situated within the Kunnamkulam Municipality. Eviction was sought, among other grounds, on the ground of bona fide requirements for reconstruction of the building. The Rent Control Court, the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Court ordered eviction. These revisions are filed in challenge of the orders passed by the revisional court. 2. As per a notification dated 1-7-1959 issued under S.3 of the Act, the Wadakkancherry Munsiff was constituted the Rent Control Court to decide cases under the Rent Control Act in respect of buildings within the Kunnamkulam Municipality. In supersession of the said notification another notification was issued by the Government on 30-5-1973 by which the Chowghat Munsiff was constituted the Rent Control Court in respect of buildings within the Kunnamkulam Municipality. The Rent Control petitions in these cases were filed before the Wadakkancherry Munsiff 's Court on 15-7-1972. The only point raised before me in these revisions is that the Rent Control Court who passed the orders of eviction in the two petitions on 28-2-1976 after the second notification dated 30-5-1973 came into force, had no jurisdiction to pass those orders and therefore on that ground the orders of eviction have to be set aside. 3. This objection was not taken before the Rent Control Court. It was only before the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Court that this objection was raised. The counsel for the respondent has a case that the petitioners submitted to the jurisdiction of the Rent Control Court and therefore waived their right to question the jurisdiction to the Rent Control Court in passing the orders of eviction. I shall come to that question presently. The important question that falls for consideration is whether the notification dated 30-5-1973, on its terms, renders the Wadakkanchery Munsiff, without jurisdiction to try the cases pending before it. The notification only constitutes the Chowghat Munsiff as Rent Control Court for disputes relating to buildings within the Kunnamkulm Municipality. There is nothing in the notification as to what should happen to pending cases. The notification only constitutes the Chowghat Munsiff as Rent Control Court for disputes relating to buildings within the Kunnamkulm Municipality. There is nothing in the notification as to what should happen to pending cases. In the absence of any guidance in the notification as to what should happen to pending cases, the only possible inference is that the said court should continue to proceed with these pending matters. The contention whether the notification is prospective or retrospective or weather the notification creates procedural right or substantive right, according to me, are not strictly germane while considering the notification. Even so, I shall consider this question of law since it was agitated at the bar. 4. On a consideration of analogous provisions in other enactments it will be seen that the legislature or the executive always took care to make provision for pending matters while transferring jurisdiction of courts or tribunals. I shall illustrate this with reference to two enactments. In the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 where Special Judges were constituted to try cases mentioned in the said Act, S.10 is specifically enacted under the caption'Transfer of certain pending cases. It is provided in S.10 that "all cases triable by a Special Judge under S.7 which, immediately before the commencement of this Act, were pending before any Magistrate shall, on such commencement, be forwarded for trial to the Special Judge having jurisdiction over such cases." 5. Under S.77 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, the original jurisdiction was vested in the Munsiff. Subsequently by Act 25 of 1971 this jurisdiction was transferred to the Land Tribunals. S.23 of the said Act was specifically enacted as a transitory provision which provided that all pending matters before any court at the commencement of the new Section shall be transferred to the Land Tribunal having jurisdiction. 6. The new notification does not give any guide line as to what a Rent Control Court should do regarding pending cases. The only conclusion pos-sible is that those cases must be tried by the courts before which they are pending. Transfer of cases under the Rent Control Act pending before the Rent Control Court can be made only by the appellate authority suo motu or on motion under R.14 of the Rent Control Rules The Rent. The only conclusion pos-sible is that those cases must be tried by the courts before which they are pending. Transfer of cases under the Rent Control Act pending before the Rent Control Court can be made only by the appellate authority suo motu or on motion under R.14 of the Rent Control Rules The Rent. Control Court cannot of its own motion transfer cases pending before it to any other Rent Control Court and unless the notification in question contained a general authorisation regarding transfer of pending matters, they should remain where they are. The contention that the Rent Control Court in this case had no jurisdiction to try these cases must therefore fail. 7. The matter although in a different form and relating to a different enactment came for consideration before Bhaskaran J., in the case reported in K.N. Kaliyanikutty v. Block Development Officer (AIR. 1976 Kerala 109). In that case a provision of transfer of cases under the Land Reforms Act was considered by the learned Judge. Since Ext. P4 notification which was the subject matter of consideration in that case did not indicate anything about the matters pending before the Munsiff-Land Tribunal the learned judge held that the Land Tribunals before whom those matters were pending should deal with them and dispose of those petitions. 8. The main contention of the counsel for the petitioners is that the right created by the notification is a procedural right and therefore the notification has retrospective operation. This contention in this form cannot be seriously disputed. In support of this position the decisions reported in Eapen Chacko v Provident Investment Co. (p) Ltd (1977 KLT.1) and Gopalakrishnan Nair v. P. Amma (1970 KLT 888) were brought to my notice. These decisions can be easily distinguished on facts. All that the present notification does is to constitute a new Tribunal, that is Chowghat Munsiff, as the Rent Control Court to decide disputes relating to buildings' within the Kunnamkulam Municipality. Therefore the question whether the notification is prospective or retrospective, in the context of the contention whether the notification created procedural right or vested right, does not become relevant. 9. The other important question that was agitated at the bar was the one already referred by me, namely, submission to jurisdiction by the petitioners. The petition was filed on 19-7-1972 and the order passed on 21-2-1976. 9. The other important question that was agitated at the bar was the one already referred by me, namely, submission to jurisdiction by the petitioners. The petition was filed on 19-7-1972 and the order passed on 21-2-1976. The notification came into existence on 30-5-1973. It is well settled that a person who submits to the jurisdiction of a tribunal or a court and does not challenge the jurisdiction before the said tribunal but invites an order, will not be permitted to question the jurisdiction at a later stage, unless the order is ab initio void. Here the petitioners have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Wadakkancherry Munsiff Court and that court had jurisdiction to decide. This plea also is not available for the landlord against the petitioners. These Civil Revision Petitions are without merits and are dismissed. However, I direct the parties to bear their respective costs. The petitioners are given one month's time from to-day to surrender the property. A carbon copy of this order will be furnished to the counsel for the respondents on payment of the requisite charges.