JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :–– The petitioner, Shri Shri Raj Rajeswari Jew Thakur, represented by the shebait Prodyot Kumar Mallick, obtained this Rule against an order dated 16th August, 1973, made by the Revenue Officer, Midnapore in a proceeding under section 6(1)(i) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, hereinafter referred to as the said Act and made in Case No. 13 of 1970. 2. The predecessor-in-interest of Prodyot Kumar Mallick, who claims to be the present Shebait, settled, dedicated absolutely and exclusively, certain properties including lands appertaining to Khatian Nos. 5, 5/1 and 5/2 of Mouja Maharajpur, J.L. No. 217, by a registered Will dated 28th July, 1941 in favour of the petitioner deity. The letter of administration of that Will was granted on 28th May, 1943 by the learned District Judge, Midnapore, in Probate case No. 17 of 1942 / Suit No. 11 of 1942 and it has been stated that since then those properties are being enjoyed and possessed by the petitioner. There is no dispute that in the record of rights those debutter properties were and are also recorded in the name of the petitioner deity. On or about 10th September, 1970, the Revenue Officer, Sadar Settlement Camp, Midnapore, started a proceeding, being Case No. 13 of 1970, for the purpose or enquiry under section 6(1)(j) of the said Act and to ascertain whether the shebait in question was holding the lands covered by the debutter under the Endowment mentioned herein before, exclusively for religions purpose and whether the benefits of section 6(1)(i) of the said Act, were available. As such, it appears from the records as produced in this proceeding, that notices of the said enquiry were directed to be served upon the petitioner and consequently a notice wall served upon one Sm. Champak Sundari Mallick, the widow of the deceased settlor, who incidentally was treated by the said respondent No. 3 as the shebait. It also appears from the records of this proceeding that Prodyot Kumar Mallick, claiming to be a shebait appeared in the proceeding and represented the deity before the respondent No. 3 on 31st October, 1970, when the hearing was adjourned to 12th November, 1970 when again the said respondent No. 3 directed the said Sm. It also appears from the records of this proceeding that Prodyot Kumar Mallick, claiming to be a shebait appeared in the proceeding and represented the deity before the respondent No. 3 on 31st October, 1970, when the hearing was adjourned to 12th November, 1970 when again the said respondent No. 3 directed the said Sm. Champak Sundari Mallick, treating her as shebait, to submit accounts for the years 1355 to 1362 B.S., relating to the debutter properties. There is also no dispute that such accounts were duly filed and placed. Thereafter, the respondent No.3, by his order dated 26th June, 1972, further directed the S. R. O. (II) and the Revenue Officer to make a local enquiry as to the mode of seva puja of the deity in question. Before the respondent No.3, the said Sri Prodyot Kumar Mallick, contending himself to be the real shebait, raised specific objection regarding the jurisdiction of the respondent No.3 to initiate the proceedings as well as regarding the maintainability of the same, due to the non-service of the notice upon him. From a reference to the impugned order dated 16th August, 1973, it was found that on enquiry it was found that the Endowment was completely and exclusively for the religious purpose. Even thereafter, the said respondent No. 3 proceeded with the enquiry and held that the usufructs of the properties were not spent exclusively for the religious purposes, as the shebait could not prove beyond reasonable doubt that the surplus income wall kept for the deity and as such it was observed that the properties in question were not held exclusively for religious and charitable purpose or both and that that special benefits for such properties under the said Act, would not as such be admissible in the case. It may also be mentioned that Mr. Mitra submitted that when the endowment in question was found to be bonafide, the respondent No.3 had no authority to enquire into the matter and if the shebait has really mis-conducted by not acting in terms of the endowment, then other procedures for removing him would be open, but that would not authorize the respondent No. 3 to initiate the enquiry as in the instant case. 3. The respondents Nos. 3. The respondents Nos. 1 and 3 in their return to the rule, apart from contending that the present petition should be dismissed in limini for suppression of material facts, contended that no case has been made out for investigation and/or interference or for the grant of any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and it was also contended by them, that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, a suit and not a writ proceeding would be the appropriate remedy. That apart, it has been contended by them that the present enquiry under section 6(1)(i) of the said Act, as initiated, was to determine whether the properties were held exclusively for religious or charitable purpose or for both the said purposes and whether the petitioner was entitled to the protection under the provisions of section 6 of the said Act. Those answering respondents have further stated that on enquiry as made, it revealed that the usufructs of the disputed properties were not spent exclusively for religious or charitable purposes and no material was ever produced in the proceedings, from which it could be held that the surplus, was at all kept for the deity. In that view of the matter, it was submitted that the determination as made, was due and proper. The respondents have further contended that although the proceedings was finally disposed of on 16th August, 1973, nobody ever raised any objection regarding the jurisdiction of the respondent No.3 for initiating the same as well as regarding the maintainability of the same on account of the alleged non-service of the notice upon the petitioner. It was also submitted that the enquiry in the instant case was lawfully made and initiated and the findings as arrived at on the basis of such enquiry, were due, legal, bonafide and proper. 4. Mr. It was also submitted that the enquiry in the instant case was lawfully made and initiated and the findings as arrived at on the basis of such enquiry, were due, legal, bonafide and proper. 4. Mr. Nirendra Krishna Mitra, who argued the case on behalf of the petitioner, in addition to his contentions as recorded above submitted that the entire proceeding was vitiated firstly, for non-service of notice on Sri Prodyot Kumar Mallick, who contended to be the shebait and secondly, it was submitted by him that the respondent No.3, having himself found on examination, the endowment in question to be complete and exclusively for the religious purposes, had no jurisdiction or authority under the provisions of section 6(1)(i) of the said Act to embark into a further enquiry for the purpose of finding out whether the intention of the endowment in question, were actually given effect to or whether the usufruct, of the same were used for the purpose of deity. 5. It is true that the deed of endowment was examined in the instant case and same, as observed by the respondent No.3 in the impugned order, was found to be complete and exclusively for the religious purposes. In that view of the matter and on the arguments as advanced, the question to be decided is, whether under the provisions of section 6(1)(i) of the said Act, which is to the following effect : S. 6. Right of intermediary to retain lands "Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 4 and 5, an intermediary shall except in the case mentioned in the proviso to subsection 2 but subject to other provisions of that sub-section be entitled to retain with effect from the date of vesting ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… (i) where the intermediary is a corporation or an institution established exclusively for a religious or a charitable purpose or both or is a person holding under a trust or an endowment or other legal obligation exclusively for a purpose which is charitable or religious or both – land held in khas by such corporation or institution, or purpose, for such purpose, including land held by any person, not being a tenant, by leave or lincense of such Corporation or institution or person; the respondent No.3, was justified in embarking into the enquiry after holding in the manner as stated hereinbefore about the character of the endowment. 6. 6. Admittedly, under section 6, an intermediary is given certain specific and specified rights to retain certain lands and under subsection (i) as aforesaid, a religious or charitable institution or a person holding under a trust or an endowment or other legal obligations, is entitled to retain and held lands as an intermediary, exclusively for the charitable as well as religious purposes and such an intermediary may retain lands held in khas possession for such purpose, including lands held by any person, not being a tenant, by leave or licence of such Corporation or Institution or person. A "charitable purpose" under section 2(c), includes the relief to the poor, medical relief or the advancement of education or any other object of general public utility and under section 2(n), "religious purpose" means a purpose connected with religious worship, teaching or service or any performance of religious rights. In (1) Kawsar Alam v. State of West Bengal, 66 CWN 651, it has been observed by this Court that the expression "charitable purpose" is an exclusive definition and not an exhaustive one. While the expression "religious purpose" is an exhaustive one, because the definition gives the meaning of it and/no other meaning can be possible. This decision was upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of (2) Fazlul Rabbi v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1965 SC 1722 , wherein it has been observed that the word "exclusively" in section 6(1)(i), limited the expression to trusts, endowments or other legal obligations, which came solely with the "charitable" or "religious" purpose within the meaning of sections 2(c) and 2(n) respectively. The tests for "charitable purpose" would be that there must always be some element of public benefit. The expression "charitable purpose" conveys the sense of some public purpose viz., something tending to the benefit of the community. There is also no doubt that section 6(1)(i) gives the intermediary as mentioned therein, certain rights to hold specified properties and such rights as granted will have to be read along with or in the line of the intention as to be gathered from the section itself. For the purpose of finding out that, the key words in the section would be "purpose" or "such purpose" as used therein. For the purpose of finding out that, the key words in the section would be "purpose" or "such purpose" as used therein. The words "purpose" can be used to designate either the main object which a man wants or hopes to achieve by the contemplated act, or it can be used to designate those objects which he knows will probably be achieved by the act, whether he wants them or not. The words "purpose" and "object" as held in the case of (3) Sridhar Misra v. Joy Chandra Vidyalankar, AIR 1959 Allahabad 598, are synonymous. The section itself empowers, as stated hereinbefore, an intermediary to hold land subject to such check as mentioned in the section and that will prove, in my view, the power of the authority concerned, the respondent No. 3 in the instant case, to find out whether the purpose of endowment was real, in addition to the power to find out whether the purposes of the endowment were or are being carried on duly and the acts or actions of the intermediary are not meant to frustrate the objects of the said Act. That being the position, I hold that the respondent No. 3 was justified in initiating the enquiry in the instant case and as such the contentions of the learned Advocate of the petitioner are of no substance. The first point viz., non-service of notice on the shebait, as was argued by Mr. Mitra, has also lost all its vigour in view of the admitted position that to be pretended shebait Sri Prodyot Kumar Mallick appeared in the proceeding all throughout and on the basis of the notice which was served on Champak Sundari Mallick, as shebait under the endowment. 7. In view of my findings as above, the Rule is discharged. There will be no order for costs.