Short Note : 1. By impugned order dated 4-7-1976, the trial Court refused to implead the applicant as a party to the suit observing that the application was very much belated, that the legal representatives already brought on record effectively represented the estate including the interest of the applicant and that there was a presumption about the family being a joint Hindu family which could be represented by the senior most member as Karta of the family. 2. The applicant being aggrieved by the order filed this revision. In the meantime, the suit came to be decreed and the losing defendants have preferred an appeal. Held : The question to be considered preliminarily is whether after the suit had been decreed, this revision could be entertained. The matter was no longer pending in the trial Court and Order 1, rule 10; CPC could be invoked only when a suit was pending. Had the suit been pending, I could rely on the observations made in para 12 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dayaram v. Shyam Sundari, AIR 1965 SC 1049 to hold that as soon as it was brought to the notice of the plaintiff that a particular legal representative had been left out, it was his duty to bring him on record so as to make the suit as one property constituted. He could not be heard to say that it was his choice whom to implead and whom to ignore. The law required that all the legal representatives must be impleaded. 3. After passing of the decree however, the question would be whether the decree would be binding on the legal representative left out. That is a question normally considered when the person left out resists the execution of the decree. The unfortunate position here is that the trial Court declined to make the applicant a party and yet observed without making any enquiry whatsoever that the decree would be binding on him. The learned counsel for the applicant contends that his real grievance was against those observations made rather than against the order refusing to make him a party. Had the order been one of refusal to join alone he could protect his interest by resisting the decree. The observations that the decree would be binding on him, have made all the difference. 4. Had the order been one of refusal to join alone he could protect his interest by resisting the decree. The observations that the decree would be binding on him, have made all the difference. 4. Be that as it may, the applicant being one of the legal representatives of Deshraj can continue to defend an appeal though he was not himself a party to the suit. That is what section 146, CPC permits. He can, therefore, apply to the Court hearing the appeal to be Joined as an appellant or as a respondent. He claims to be a person adversely affected by the decree and though not a party, the appellate Court, if it thinks fit in its discretion, may grant him leave to appeal. 5. The trial Court has clearly observed that the legal representative left out was effectively represented by others brought on record and particularly by Karta of the family. That being the observation, the applicant must be deemed to be a party to the suit, adversely affected by the decree and, therefore, entitled to file an appeal. [See : AIR 1962 AP 140 : D. Pullayya v. Narashushanan and AIR 1971 SC 374 : Jatan Kanwar v. Coloba Properties]. He may therefore, either prefer an appeal or join as a respondent by moving the appeal-Court under Order 41, rule 20, CPC. AIR 1965 SC 1049 , referred to, AIR 1962 AP 140 , AIR 1971 SC 374 , relied on. Revision dismissed as infructuous.