Judgment B. S. Sinha, J. 1. This application In revision by the informant is directed against the judgment and order dated the 18th May, 1976 passed by Shri anirudh Prasad Singh, Judicial Magistrate, Second Glass, Nawadah, in C. R. Case No.696 of 1972/t. R.262 of 1976. By this judgment, the learned magistrate has acquitted the members of the opposite-party who were charged for offences under sections 323 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The relevant facts are that on the 29th September, 1972, the petitioner filed a complaint before the learned Subdivisional Magistrate, Nawadah, alleging therein that on the previous day in the evening when he was returning from Pakri - Barawan Block Office, the members of the opposite-party way laid him and took away from his upper pocket a sum of Rs.1200 and also assaulted him with fists and slaps, on which the petitioner raised an alarm. Some persons who were also going the same way and were about 20 banses behind are also alleged to have seen the occurrence and gone to the help of the petitioner. However, by then the opposite party, it is alleged, fled away through a maize field. The learned subdivisional Magistrate directed the Pakri -Barawan Police to investigate and submit charge-sheet in the case. The police after the investigation, submitted charge-sheet under sections 323 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. In support of its case, the prosecution examined not only the petitioner but various other witnesses who are said to be the eye-witnesses. The defence of the opposite-party at the trial was that they had been falsely implicated. On a consideration and appraisal of the evidence and the materials of the record, the learned Magistrate, as I have stated above, acquitted the members of the opposite-party. 4. In support of this application, Mr. Jugal Kishore Prasad has urged two points. The first submission of the learned Counsel is that the acquittal by the learned Magistrate is no acquittal in the eyes of law as he was not competent to try the opposite-party for the offences which were disclosed on the facts stated in the petition of complaint by the informant. The second submission of the learned Counsel is that in any view the judgment of the court below is not accordance with law and must be set aside. 5. The second submission of the learned Counsel is that in any view the judgment of the court below is not accordance with law and must be set aside. 5. I will first take up the first submission made on behalf of the petitioner. Sec.530 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as the Code)by which this case will be governed provides that if any Magistrate not being empowered by law in this behalf, does any of the following things namely (a) to (r) his proceedings shall be void. By reading clause (p) of this section, it would appear that if any Magistrate not being empowered by law in this behalf tries an offender, his proceeding shall be void. Learned counsel urges that the facts disclosed that an offence under section 390 of the Indian Penal Code had been committed and not offences under sections 323 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code. The offence under section 390 of the Indian Penal Code, it is not disputed, is exclusively triable by a Magistrate of the First Class. It is also not disputed that the learned Magistrate who tried this offence had powers of a Magistrate of the second class. In such circumstances, it is urged with a considerable vigour that the whole proceeding before the learned Magistrate was void. 6. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer that this plot was not taken up before the learned Magistrate. However, it is said that as the proceeding was void from the very begining, event if the point was not raised by the petitioner, that would not give the learned Magistrate jurisdiction to try the case. In further support of this submission, learned counsel has referred to me section 529 of the Code wherein it is provided that if any magistrate not empowered by law to do any of the following things named therein erroneously does that thing in good faith, his proceedings shall not be set aside merely on the ground of his not being so empowered. By contrasting the languages used in sections 529 and 530 of the Code, it is urged that once a matter is covered by any of the clauses referred to in section 530 of the Code, then the question of good faith does not arise and the matter is void and it is not a mere irregularity. By contrasting the languages used in sections 529 and 530 of the Code, it is urged that once a matter is covered by any of the clauses referred to in section 530 of the Code, then the question of good faith does not arise and the matter is void and it is not a mere irregularity. In further support of this submission, learned counsel relied upon a Bench decision of this Court in Mahadeo Chaudhary V/s. State, (1971 BLJR 378), wherein it was held that as the petitioners in that case had been tried and convicted by a Magistrate when on the offence disclosed the matter was exclusively triable by a Bench or Gram Cutcherry, the conviction of the petitioners must be set aside as being without jurisdisdiction. That was a case under the Bihar panchayat Raj Act, and section 62 of that Act provides that the offences falling under that section of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act are exclusively triable by Gram Cutcherry unless an order to the contrary is passed by the subdivisional Magistrate or the Munsif-Magistrate concerned. In such circumstances, as it was found in that case that the case was triable exclusively by the Gram Cutcherry, it was held that the conviction by the Magistrate being without jurisdiction must be aside. That case, as I read it, merely an authority on the point that the forum of trial depends on the allegations made in the petition of complaint and not upon the cognizance taken by the Subdivisional Magistrate. It was held by their Lordships in that case that on the complaint offences under sections 323 379 of the Indian Penal code where disclosed and not one under 353 of the Indian Penal Code which was not triable by a Bench of the Panchayat. 7. In the case of Balgobind Thakur and others V/s. King-Emperor, (AIR 1926 Patna 393), one of the question that fell for consideration was that inasmuch as the case of the prosecution showed offences under sections 148 and 395 of the Indian Penal Code, the matter was not triable by a Magistrate of the second class, and hence the conviction by him under section 379 and 147 of the Indian Penal Code could not be upheld. In dealing with this question, Macpherson. In dealing with this question, Macpherson. J. held that this fact was not sufficient to establish the case for retrial as in the first place no objection was taken before the magistrate who was under the bona fide belief that he has jurisdiction. He further held that "it is now settled law that the proceeding of the Magistrate in a case like the present are not void under the provisions of section 530 of the Code of Criminal Procedure", and in support of it, he referred to various decisions mentioned in the judgment as also to numerous unreported cases and hence he rejected the plea. The principle of this decision of macpherson, J. has also been reiterated by Horwill, J. In re Perianna Mudali and others, (MR.1942 Madras 31 ). In this context, it would also be relevant to refer to a Bench decision of this Court in Awadh Singh and others V/s. Emperor, (AIR 1947 Patna 23 ). In that case the accused were tried upon two charges namely, under sections 420 and 366 of the Indian Penal code and were convicted under both of them by a Magistrate of the first class. On appeal, however, the learned Sessions Judge affirmed the conviction under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code but set aside the conviction under section 366 of the Indian Penal Code upon the ground that the charge under section 366 is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of session. In revision, it was argued in this court that as the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the offence under section 366, so the whole trial before him must be held to be void under section 530 of the Code. Rejecting that argument, it was held that where person was properly charged with two separate offence in one trial, his conviction upon each must constitute a separate conviction, and there seems to be no reason in principle why the invalidity of one coviction upon grounds which affect that conviction alone should affect or invalidate the other conviction and it was further held that if in a particular circumstance prejudice be shown, the appellate or the revising court has certainly jurisdiction to put the matter aright. Although this decision no direct bearing on the point in issise before me, it will be seen that in the case before them their Lordships were of the view that if prejudice was shown, then the revising court jurisdiction to put the matter aright. It would further be observed that in that case this court upheld the conviction of the accused under section 420 and although their convictions had been set aside under section 366, they did not order for retrial. Of course, i must hasten to add that this point was not urged before their Lordships. This Bench of our Court has been followed by a Bench of the Mysore High court in the case of State of Mysore V/s. Dattaraya Nagappa, (AIR 1960 mysore 86 ). 8. In the instant case before me, there can be no doubt that on the allegations made, the members of the opposite-party assaulted the petitioner and had also temporarily kept him under wrongful restraint However, the police had submitted a charge-sheet under sections 379 and 323 of the Indian Penal code and on the facts which I have stated above, it cannot be said that it was not a case where theft had been committed and there were also some allegations with regard to the assault. I am, however, of the view that in the instant case the facts disclosed offences which were within the jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate to try inasmuch as the offences of theft and assault were made out on the allegations made. It is also equally true that the same facts also disclosed a more serious offence which was beyond the jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate. However, in trying the case there is nothing to indicate that the learned Magistrate had deliberately overlooked certain aggravating facts with the object of obtaining jurisdiction for himself. In the circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the learned Magistrate believed that the whole facts revealed an offence triable by him. In such circumstances, following the the decision of Macpherson, J. in Balgobind Thakurs case (AIR 1926 Patna 393), I am of the view that the acquittal cannot be set aside merely on the ground that the facts disclosed a more serious offence, particularly as this point was not raised before the learned Magistrate concerned and no prejudice has been shown. In such circumstances, following the the decision of Macpherson, J. in Balgobind Thakurs case (AIR 1926 Patna 393), I am of the view that the acquittal cannot be set aside merely on the ground that the facts disclosed a more serious offence, particularly as this point was not raised before the learned Magistrate concerned and no prejudice has been shown. I accordingly reject the first submission made on behalf of the petitioner. 9. The second submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the judgment of the learned Magistrate in not in accordance with section 367 of the Code also has not much substance. It is true that section 367 of the Code states that every judgment shall contain the point of points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision. In the instant case, the grievance made is that the learned Magistrate has merely quoted verbatim not only the complaint of the informant but also the evidence of the informant and the relevant eye witnesses. After quoting them in extenso the learned magistrate has given his reasons for acquitting the members of the opposite party which are there. The first reason is that the informant did not show any receipt to the investigating officer with regard to the deposit of Rs.1300 that the informant had made that day in the block office. The second reason given by him is that the eye-witnesses had seen the occurrence from 20 banses behind the petitioner, and when they reached the place of occurence, they came to know about the occurrence from the informant. The third reason given by him is that there are contradictions in the evidence of the eye-witnesses. Mr. Jugal Kishore Prasad for the petitioners has urged that the learned Magistrate has committed an error of record when he says that the eye-witnesses came to know about the occurrence when they were fold by the informant. It is true that in their statement the witnesses have said that they had seen the money being taken out from the pocket of the informant and when they reached near informant, he told them the amount which had been taken away by the members of the opposite party. However, the learned Magistrate has stated that the occurrence was seen by these witnesses from a distance of about 20 banses. However, the learned Magistrate has stated that the occurrence was seen by these witnesses from a distance of about 20 banses. In such circumstances, I am extremely doubtful, when the prosecution case is that the members of the opposite party bad surrounded the informant that these eye-witnesses from such a distance would have seen the actual money being taken out from the pocket of the informant. In such circumstances, i am of the view that the learned Magistrate has, after stating the prosecution case, acquitted the opposite-party for reasons recorded by him. 10. However, before parting with this case I would like to observe that the learned Magistrate would do better in future to state the prosecution case as he understands it from the materials on the record and the state the defence of the accused persons. He should thereafter indicate in the judgment the points to be determined in the case and thereafter consider the evidence and the materials on the record in the background of the points which have got to be decided in the case. In conclusion, he should record his final decision. 11. For the reasons given above there is no merit in this application and it is, accordingly, rejected. Application rejected.