Judgment :- 1. In a suit for partition which has been pending from 1968, the petitioner who was a stranger made an application in March 1977 and obtained an order in the same month adding him as the additional 48th defendant. He filed a written statement claiming to be the tenant of certain of the suit properties and thereafter made an application I. A. 1066 of 1977 praying that under S.125 (3) of the Land Reforms Act 1 of 1964 the suit might be stayed and that the question of tenancy raised by him might be referred for decision to the appropriate Land Tribunal. On the objection of the plaintiff-first respondent the court dismissed the application by the order, which is the subject of this revision, on the ground that S.125 (3) had no application as the suit was pending even before it came into force. 2. Counsel for the petitioner contended that the pendency of the suit from 1968 was irrelevant as it should be deemed to have been instituted against him only in March 1977 when he was brought on record and as the question of tenancy itself arose only thereafter when he filed his written statement. In aid of this contention he relied upon S.21, Limitation Act 1963 and two decisions, Sreedevi Nettiyar v. Devaki Amma, 1977 KLT. 356 and Gopala Kurup v. Krishnan Nambiyar, 1977 KLT 409. Before discussing how far this provision and the two decisions will help the petitioner sustain his contention I think it necessary to notice S.125 (1) and (3) of the Land Reforms Act, and examine the Supreme Court decision Eapen Chacko v. Provident Investment Co., 1977 KLT. 1. 356 and Gopala Kurup v. Krishnan Nambiyar, 1977 KLT 409. Before discussing how far this provision and the two decisions will help the petitioner sustain his contention I think it necessary to notice S.125 (1) and (3) of the Land Reforms Act, and examine the Supreme Court decision Eapen Chacko v. Provident Investment Co., 1977 KLT. 1. S.125 (1) and (3) read: 125 (1) "No civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question or to determine any matter which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with or to be determined by the Land Tribunal or the appellate authority or the Land Board or the Taluk Land Board or the Government or an officer of the Government: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to proceedings pending in any court at the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1969." 125(3) "If in any suit or other proceeding any question regarding rights of a tenant or of a kudikidappukaran (including a question as to whether a person is a tenant or a kudikidappukaran) arises, the civil court shall stay the suit or other proceeding and refer such question to the Land Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the land or part thereof situate together with the relevant records for the decision of that question only." The above provisions were introduced by Act 35 of 1969 and were brought into force from 1-1-1970 (except the words "or the Taluk Land Board" in subsection (1) which were added by Act 17 of 1972). In 1977 KLT 1 the tenant appellant invoked S.125 (3), although his appeal was pending in the Supreme Court on 1st January 1970. After pointing out that the provisions of S.125 (1) are prospective and that the proceedings in the case which were pending on 1st January 1970 are saved from the operation of that sub-section and are therefore to be determined by the civil court, the Supreme Court discussed the effect of S.125 (3) thus: "S. 125 (3) of the Act is equally prospective. S.125 (3) of the Act will be applied with regard to the provisions contained in S.125 (1) of the Act. S.125 (3) of the Act will be applied with regard to the provisions contained in S.125 (1) of the Act. Matters which will be within the mischief of S.125 (1) of the Act are matters which will arise in suits or proceedings initiated and originated after the commencement of the Act. It is unsound to suggest that pending proceedings which are excepted from the application of S.125 (1) of the Act will yet fall within S.125 (1) of the Act by reference to S.125 (3) of the Act. The Kerala High Court fell into the error of overlooking the purpose of S.125 (3) of the Act. The purpose is that suit or other proceedings shall be stayed. In the present case the appeal in this court which was pending on 1st January 1970 is a proceeding which was pending at the commencement of the Act and was not initiated or originated at the commencement of the Act. Therefore, the provisions contained in S.125 are not applicable in the present case." In this view the Supreme Court overruled the Full Bench decision, Anantha Narayana Iyer v. Paran,1976 KLT. 403, where it had been held by this Court that suits or other proceedings which are pending at the commencement of Act 35 of 1969 will be governed by S.125 (3) of the Act. 3. This decision therefore settles that neither sub-section (1) nor subsection (3) of S.125 governs suits or proceedings pending at the commencement of Act 35 of 1969 and that they apply only to "suits or proceedings initiated or originated after the commencement of the Act' in the language of the Supreme Court. The suit in the present case is of 1968 and was pending at the commencement of Act 35 of 1969 and is not therefore struck either by sub-section (1) or (3) of S.125. This means that the court has jurisdiction to determine all matters in the case including those contemplated by S.125 (1) and (3) of the Land Reforms Act. 4. It only remains to consider whether S 21 of the Limitation Act or the decisions quoted by counsel compels a contrary conclusion. S.21 (1) of the Limitation Act enacts, so far as relevant, that where in a pending suit a new defendant is added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party. S.21 (1) of the Limitation Act enacts, so far as relevant, that where in a pending suit a new defendant is added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party. Counsel argued that in terms of this provision the suit, as regards the petitioner should be deemed to have been instituted only in March 1977 when he was made a party and on that basis it fell within the scope of S.125 of the Land Reforms Act. Now the Limitation Act is concerned only with "the law for the limitation of suits and other proceedings and for purposes connected therewith". The fiction involved in the deeming provision of S.21 that the suit shall, as regards the new plaintiff or defendant added, be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party, must be restricted to the law of limitation. A legal fiction is created only for a definite purpose and so must not only be restricted by the plain terms of the statute which is its parent but must also be limited to the purpose for which it is created and it should not be extended beyond its legitimate field. This deeming provision in S.21 (1) of the Limitation Act cannot therefore be applied to decide whether a suit or other proceeding was pending at the commencement of Act 35 of 1969. The time of addition of the petitioner as a party has therefore no bearing on determining whether the suit was pending on 1-1-1970 within the sense of S, 125 of the Land Reforms Act and the circumstance that he was made a defendant only in March 1977 does not make it a suit initiated or originated in that month. 5. Sreedevi Nettiyar's case, 1977 KLT. 356 only decided that S.21 read with S.29 of the Limitation Act, applies to applications under Section )3B of the Land Reforms Act and so an application for restoration of possession under S.13B was beyond time as regards persons brought on record after expiry of the period of six months from the commencement of Act 35 of 1969, as prescribed by sub-section (2). The decision in my view has no application. 6. In Gopala Kurup's case, 1977 KLT. The decision in my view has no application. 6. In Gopala Kurup's case, 1977 KLT. 409 the question involved was whether in a suit for partition in which a defence of tenancy is set up by some defendants, the proceedings for preliminary decree could be allowed to go on, with a direction that the suit would be stayed at the stage of the final decree and the question of tenancy would be referred to the Land Tribunal for decision under S.125 (3). It was held that as the question arose even at the stage of the preliminary decree the suit was liable to be stayed. The decision has no bearing on the question in this case and even the observation in Para.2 (page 410) that " the liability to stay arises whenever a question regarding rights of a tenant springs up for consideration; and (2) that on such question cropping up for consideration, the court is bound to stay the suit and not any portion thereof or any aspect of the same." on which counsel placed particular reliance, is only a general statement of the purport of S.125 (3) and its does not decide when a suit or proceeding can be held to be pending on 1st January 1970 in order to find whether it is struck by S.125. This case does not therefore provide any support to the petitioner or assistance in deciding the question before me. The court below was therefore right in dismissing the petitioner's application. I confirm the order and dismiss the revision but without costs.