Judgment D. P. Sinha, J. 1. This Appeal has arisen out of Probate Case No.7 of 1972 of the Court of District Judge, Gaya. An application for grant of probate has been filed by Smt. Girja Debi on the following averments. She is the adopted daughter of Firangi Singh, son of Nathp Singh of village Bermi, Police Station nawadah, district Gaya. Firangi Singh duly executed his last will and testament in her favour on 5/12/1971. He died on 11/1/1972 and at the time of his death he was possessed of the properties specified in Schedule a of the application. The applicant also claims to be the sole heir of the deceased. 2. Darogi Singh, the appellant, filed a petition on 1/3/1973 objecting to the prayer for grant or probate to the applicant on the grounds that the applicant, Srimati Girja Debi, was not the adopted daughter of Firangi Singh ; that the will was forged and fabricated ; that Firangi Singh was not in sound state of health and mind at the time of his death and that Darogi Singh himself was the nearest agnate of Firangi Singh, being the son of his deceased brother, Makhan Singh. He had given a genealogy in his petition to show that relationship. According to him Firangi Singh was joint with him and he was the karta of the family and he remained so till he died and on his death he came in possession of the said properties by survivorship and his name was also mutated in place of Firangi Singh in the office of the State of Bihar. By an order, dated 9/4/1973 the District Judge made Darogi Singh a caveator and converted the probate case into a title suit, being Title Suit No.4 of 1973. On 12/6/1973, a petitition was filed on behalf of the applicant alleging that Darogi singh had been made a caveator without the matter having been heard in her presence. She further alleged that he was not the nephew of Firangi Singh and he had no interest in the properties bequeathed to her and that therefore, the prayer made by him in his petition dated 21.2 1973 which had been filed on 1.3.1973 he rejected. The learned District Judge, therefore, decided to hear the matter and fixed 16.7.1973 for the purpose and directed that the lawyer for the other side be informed. The learned District Judge, therefore, decided to hear the matter and fixed 16.7.1973 for the purpose and directed that the lawyer for the other side be informed. No step was taken on that date and, therefore, the matter was adjourned to the following day i. e. , on 17/7/1973 and on that date the learned District Judge passed an order recalling the order dated 9/4/1973 by which he had allowed Darogi Singh (the appellant) to enter caveat and converted the probate case into Title Suit No.4 of 1973. Against that order, dated 17.7.1973, Derogi Singh preferred an appeal before this Court, being First Appeal No.416 of 1973. This Court by its order dated 19/7/1973 set aside the District Judges order dated 17/7/1973 and sent back the case to the learned District Judge with a direction that he should decide whether the appellant was a person claiming to have any interest in the estate of the deceased within meaning of section 283 (i) (c) of the Indian Succession Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and thereafter to dispose of the case. After receipt of the order of remand, the, matter was heard by the Additional district Judge, Vth Court, who by his order dated 15.9.1976 has come to the conclusion that Darogi Singh (the appellant) cannot be allowed to enter caveat in the proceedings. 3. Relying on the provisions of section 299 of the Act, Mr. Shreenath singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, has raised a preliminary point that in view of the said provisions the appeal is not maintainable as the order rejecting the prayer of the appellant to be allowed enter caveat is not appealable under any of the provisions of the Code of Civil procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code"), applicable to appeals. On the other hand, Mr. Kaushal Kishore Sinha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has contended that an appeal against the order of the district Judge by which he finally disposed of the appellants claim to enter caveat is appealable to this Court by virtue of the provisions of the said section 299. 4. Section 299 of the Act stands as follows : - "299. 4. Section 299 of the Act stands as follows : - "299. Every order made by District Judge by virtue of the powers hereby conferred upon him shall be subject to appeal to the High court in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil procedure, 1908, applicable to appeals. " 5. According to Mr. Shreenath Singh, the words "in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, applicable to appeals" occurring in section 299 indicate that an appeal from an order of the District judge may lie to the High Court only against the final order granting or refusing the probate as such an order would amount to a decree within the meaning of the Code provides for an appeal against a decree but it provides no appeal against an order of the kind which is in question. In my opinion this is putting too narrow an interpretation on the wide provision of the said section. If the legislature intended that to be the only contingency in which an appeal could be preferred to the High Court against an order of the District Judge, it would have specifically said so and would not have expressed itself in the manner it has done By using the words every order made by a District Judge by virtue of the powers hereby conferred upon him shall be subject to appeal to the High Court". In my opinion, the words "in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, applicable to appeals" only indicate that appeal to the High Court against an order of the District Judge made by him by virtue of the powers conferred under the Act upon him shall be preferred in the manner and according to the procedure prescribed in the Code with respect to presentation of appeals. I do not, however, conclude that an appeal would lie even against. an interlocutory order which is inconsequential so far as the rights or claims of the parties are concerned but an order by which the District Judge finally rejects the prayer of an objector claiming to have an interest in the estate of the deceased to be allowed to enter caveat, is certainly an order against which an appeal would lie to the High Court by virtue of the provision of section 299 of the Act. 6. 6. So far as the Code is concerned, it permits appeals against orders specified in sub-section (1) of section 104 and it lays down that save, as otherwise expressly provided in the body of the Code or by any law for the time being in force no appeal shall lie from any orders other than those specified therein and prohibits appeals against other orders. Undoubtedly, the Act is a law for the time being In force, as such sub-section (1) of section 104 of the Code saves the special provisions of appeal provided in section 299 of the Code. In the circumstances, there is no reason why the provisions, of section 299 of the Act should not be construed in the manner I have indicated above. If it be hold that an appeal against an order of the District Judge can lie only if the order comes within any of the categories described in sub-section (1) of section 104 or under any of the Rules made under the code then an anomalous position would arise because the Code or the rules do not make any provisions for appeal against any order made under the Act, and, therefore, it would really mean that no order under the Act is appealable except the final order in the proceedings which amounts to a decree. This would be a result apparently highly inconsistent with the express words used in section 299 of the Act. By using the opening word "every" in the section, the legislature intended to provide emphasis as to what was being provided therein and it is difficult to nullify the effect of that word without adding words and changing the construction of the section. 7. It was submitted by learned counsel of either side that through numerous appeals against orders refusing or granting prayers of objectors to enter caveat had been preferred and disposed of by this Court, in none of those cases the question as to whether an appeal was or was not maintainable against such an order under section 299 of the Act had been raised or considered. 8. In support of their respective contentions learned counsel have cited some reported case of the Calcutta and Bombay High Court. 9. On behalf of the respondent Mr. 8. In support of their respective contentions learned counsel have cited some reported case of the Calcutta and Bombay High Court. 9. On behalf of the respondent Mr. Shreenath Singh has cited the decisions in the cases of Prosad Narain Singh and another V/s. Dulhin Genda koer, (AIR 1914 Calcutta 259) and Presh Chandra Das V/s. Bidhu Bhusan banerji, (1955) (1) ILR Calcutta 429 ). So far as Prosad Narain Singhs case is concerned, reliahce had been placed on the decision in the case of khettramoni Dasi V/s. Shyama Churn Kundu, (AIR 21 Calcutta 539) and in the other case reliance had been placed on the decision in the case of Lakhi Narain shaw V/s. Multan Chand Daga, (1912) 16 CWN 1099. Both the above cases cited by Mr. Singh had been decided by Benches of the Calcutta High Court aad they appear to lend support to the contention of Mr. Singh that no appeal lies against an order of the District Judge holding that the objector has no locus standi to enter caveat and contest the probate proceedings. In none of these two cases, however, the decision in the case of Uma Charan Das V/s. Muktakesh Dasi, (1901) 28 Calcutta 149, in which the opposite view had been taken, had been noticed. It may be mentioned that Uma Charan Dass case had been decided by a Bench of three Judges. In that case it had been held that an appeal lay to the High Court against an order passed, by the District judge granting permission to the executor or administrator to dispose of immovable properties under section 90 of the Probate and Administration act, 1881. That case appears to be a direct authority for the proposition that orders made by the District Judge under the Indian Succession Act or the Probate Act which preceded it are made appellable. The same view had been taken by the Rangoon High Court in U. Po Hnit V/s. Mg. Bo Cyi (AIR.1929 Rangoon 109) and by the Bombay High Court in Fakirji Navroji tadivala V/s. M. Maherban Faredoon Alamshaw, (AIR 1942 Bombay 276 ). The leading judgment in Fakirjis case was rendered by Beaumont C. J. (as he then was ). The same view had been taken by the Rangoon High Court in U. Po Hnit V/s. Mg. Bo Cyi (AIR.1929 Rangoon 109) and by the Bombay High Court in Fakirji Navroji tadivala V/s. M. Maherban Faredoon Alamshaw, (AIR 1942 Bombay 276 ). The leading judgment in Fakirjis case was rendered by Beaumont C. J. (as he then was ). He had expressed himself on the point at issue as follows ; - "section 104, Civil P. C. , which deals with appeals against orders, allows appeals against certain orders, and prohibits appeals against other orders, except as otherwise expressly provided in the body of the Code or by any law for the time being in force. So that s.104 would save an appeal, if sanctioned by the Succession Act. Under the Civil Procedure Code no order made under the succession Act is appealable, and, therefore, if the view of the calcutta High Court in the case to which I have referred is correct, it really means that no order made under the Succession act is appealable, unless it amounts to a decree. That seems to me a very strange result to arrive at from the language used in section 299, Succession Act, which provides that every order by a district Judge under the Act shall be subject to appeal. The view taken in 21 clause 539, namely that the only orders appealable under section 299, Succession Act, are those made appealable by the Civil Procedure Code, has been followed in other Calcutta cases, including 39, Cal.563 and AIR 1926 Cal.180. On the other hand, the opposite view has prevailed in 20 CWN 28 and 28 Cal.149. The latter case was a decision of a Bench of three judges and it was held that an appeal lay to the High Court against an order passed by a District Judge granting permission to an executor to administrator to dispose of immovable property under section 10, Probate and Administration Act of 1881. That case seems to me a direct authority for the proposition that all orders made by a District Judge under the Succession Act or the probate Act, which preceded it, are made appealable. In 39 cal.563 that case was distinguished on the rather curious ground that the effect of the words under the rules contained in the Code of Civil Procedure in section 86, Probate Act, had not been considered. In 39 cal.563 that case was distinguished on the rather curious ground that the effect of the words under the rules contained in the Code of Civil Procedure in section 86, Probate Act, had not been considered. I do not think one can assume that a Bench of three Judges of the Calcutta High Court would omit to read the whole of the section, which they were engaged in construing. In the result, so far as the Calcutta High Court is concerned, it seems to me that there are authorities in favour of either reading of section 299, Succession Act. " The decision of the Rangoon High Court in AIR 1929 Rangoon 109 had also been relied upon in the above case apart from 2 Bombay LR 798 (Madhavrav v. Nazir ). 10 It would thus appear that the decision in Fakirjis case (AIR 1942 bombay, 276) and in 20 CWN 28 and that ILR 28 Calcutta 149 which had been decided by a Bench of three Judges and the ratio of AIR 1929 Rangoon 109 fully support the view that I have taken.1 therefore, hold that this appeal is maintainable under section 299 of the Act. 11. The next question which arises for consideration is as to whether the apaellant has locus standi to contest the probate proceedings and whether the impugned order of the learned Additional District Judge, dated 5.8.1976 should be set aside and reversed. The appellant claimed to be the son of a deceased brother of Firangi Singh (the deceased ). It is the admitted position that Firangi Singh did not leave him behind any natural issue. The respondent claims to be his adopted daughter, This fact has been denied by the appellant and the respondent has asserted that the appellant is not the nephew of the deceased. The appellant has further alleged in his petition that the will is a forged and fabricated document. 12. The relevant provisions in this behalf are contained in sub-section (1) (c) of section 2s5 of the Act. Sub-section (1) (c) provides that in all cases the. The appellant has further alleged in his petition that the will is a forged and fabricated document. 12. The relevant provisions in this behalf are contained in sub-section (1) (c) of section 2s5 of the Act. Sub-section (1) (c) provides that in all cases the. District judge or District Delegate may, if he thinks proper, issue citations calling upon all persons claiming to have any interest in the estate of the deceased to come and see the proceedings before the grant of probate or letters of administration, The question is whether the appellant is a person claiming to have any interest in the estate of the deceased. It has been contended by mr. Singh on behalf of the respondent, thai before a person can be permitted to enter caveat and object to the grant of probate or letters of administration, he must establish the right he claims in the estate of the deceased before a comperem court in presence of the applicant and that if he has not done so, he can be allowed to enter caveat only with the consent of the propounder of the will I do not think these contentions are sound. Had that been the intention of the legislature it would have expressed itself quite differently and not by using the words "claiming to have any interest". Those words appear to have been used advisely and unite purpose fully. They cover ihe case of the appellant. The appellant does claim in interest in the estate of the deceased on the allegation that he is the son of the deceased brother of Firangi Singh who is alleged 10 have executed the will It is true that this allegation has been denied by the respondent and the respondent herself claims to be the adopted daughter of the deceased which allegation has been controverted by the appellant. These question of title cannot be gone into and decided in the probate proceeding. In the circumstances, it is difficult to say as 10 which of the two allegations is correct. This can be decided only in a properly instituted suit and unless so decided it cannot be said in view of his claim that the appellant has no locus standi to enter caveat and contest the probate proceedings. 13. Mr. In the circumstances, it is difficult to say as 10 which of the two allegations is correct. This can be decided only in a properly instituted suit and unless so decided it cannot be said in view of his claim that the appellant has no locus standi to enter caveat and contest the probate proceedings. 13. Mr. Singh referred to the observations made by this Court in F. A. No.416 of 1973 which had been preferred against the order dated 17.7.1973 passed by the District Judge in the proceedings in question recalling his previous order dated 9 4.1973 by which he had allowed the appellant to contest the proceedings and convened the proceedings into Title Suit No.4 of 1973. Mr. Singh relied upon the following observations made in that appeal : "in dealing with the question whether the eaveaior has the necessary interest to support the caveator the real test is whether a grant under the will disposes of any right to which the caveator would otherwise be entitled. If so, he has such an interest if not he has no interest In Ihe instant case, it appears that the learned district Judge has not proceeded to dispose of the matter which was before him in the manner indicated above and in those circumstances, the impugned order passed by the learned District judge in this case cannot be supported and it has to be set aside. " 14. The learned Additional District Judge has by the impugned order held that even if the will is false appellant will have no interest in the property by reason of the fact that the respondent will be entitled to the property of the deceased by virtue of her being his adopted daughter. In short, the learned judge has taken it for granted that she is the adopted daughter of the deceased. a fact which i. s being challenged by the appellant and which cannot be decided in the probate proceedings. In the circumstances, in view of the assertion made by the appellant, it is difficult to hold that prima fade he has no locus standi to contest the. proceedings. A reference may also be made to the provisions of seciion 263 of the Act which provides that the grant of probate or ietters of administration may be revoked or annulled lor just cause. proceedings. A reference may also be made to the provisions of seciion 263 of the Act which provides that the grant of probate or ietters of administration may be revoked or annulled lor just cause. Illustration (ii) to that section indicates that the grant of probate or letters of administration may he revoked or annulled if the grant was made without cuing parties who ought to have been cited. There can be little doubt that in the circumstances of this case, the appellant is a person who ought to be cited into the proceedings. 15. On behalf of the respondent, Mr. Singh cited the decision in the case of Thillainavgi Ammal V/s. Saradamal, (AIR 1955 Madras 576; in which a number of reported cases had been noticed by the learned Single Judge who decided the case. I do not find anything in the said case which may stand in she way oh my taking the view which I have taken. It had been held in that case in paragraph 12 that the interest in the estate of a deceasd which would make it proper to issue citation on the objector must be an interest under the deceased and not one paramount to that of the deceased and that a person who claims independently of the testator and disputes his rights to dispose of the properly had no locus standi. It has already been pointed out that the plaintiff is not claiming adversely to the alleged testator. He is claiming on the footing that he is the nearest heir of the deceased being the son of a brother of the deceased. He had no doubt, alleged that the deceased Firangi Singh was joint with him and he was also the Karta of the family but in view of the provisions of section 30 read with the Explanation thereto of the Hindu Succession Act 1956, it was submitted by Mr. K. K. Sinha on behalf of the appellant that the appellant was not challenging the right of the deceased to make a will in respect of the properties In the circumstances, the said decision is of no help to the respondent. K. K. Sinha on behalf of the appellant that the appellant was not challenging the right of the deceased to make a will in respect of the properties In the circumstances, the said decision is of no help to the respondent. On the other hand, there are observations in the cases of priya Nath Bhattacharji V/s. Saila Bala Debi, (AIR 1929 Patna 385); R. S. Sinha v. Miss Salena Hector, (AIR 1941 Patna 151) and Mossomat Sheopati Kuer V/s. Rama Kant Dikshit, (AIR 1947 Patna 434) which lend support to the view that i have taken. 16. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the order of the Additional district Judge dated 15.9.1976 is hereby set aside and reversed and the learned additional District Judge is directed to make the appellant a party to the probate proceedings and allow him to contest the same. In the particular circumstances of this case the parties are directed to bear their own costs of this appeal. 17. In the present case, Smt. Girja Devi (respondent) filed an application for grant of probate and letters of administration before the district Judge, Gaya. Appellant, Darogi Singh lodged a caveat before the district Judge and raised objection to the grant of probate on the ground that the will is a forged document. On these facts the 5th Additional District Judge gaya, held that Darogi Singh cannot he said to have any interest in the estate of the deceased within the meaning ot section 283 (1) (c) of the Indian Succession act, 1925 (Act 32 of 1925) (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and as he is not entitled to contest the suit. 18. The simple point for consideration in this appeal is as lo whether darogi Singh is claiming any interest in the estate of the deceased or not within the purview of section 283 (1) (c) of the Act. In my opinion the answer must be given in the affirmative. In the objection petition Darogi singh claimed that he was the brothers son of Firangi Singh (testator deceased ). He claims interest in the estate of Firangi Singh deceased-testator)Darogi Singh has given a genealogy in his objection petition. On a perusal of the genealogy given in the objection petition, it is clear that prima facie darogi Singh has established that he has an interest in the estate of the deceased. He claims interest in the estate of Firangi Singh deceased-testator)Darogi Singh has given a genealogy in his objection petition. On a perusal of the genealogy given in the objection petition, it is clear that prima facie darogi Singh has established that he has an interest in the estate of the deceased. If it is so, the case of Darogi Singh (appellant) will come under the purview of Sec.283 (1) (c) of the Act. 19. Another question for decision is as to whether an appeal lay under section 299 of the Act against the order refusing to allow the appellant to enter caveat in the probate matter. In view of the decision of Bombay High court in Pakirji Navroji Tadivala V/s. Mahe ban Faredoon Alamshaw, AIR 1942 Bombay 276) the caveator has the right to prefer appeal under section 299 of the Act against an order passed by the District Judge under the Act. 20. The point raised in this appeal may be summarised thus : a person claiming any interest in the estate of the deceased is entitled for citations. Sec.283 (1) (c) of the Act proceeds with the words" all persons claiming to have any interest in the estate of the deceased. . . . . " he section is not preceded by the words" all persons having any interest in the state of the deceased". In my opinion, if any person claims to have any interest in the estate of the deceased is entitled for citations. In my opinion, if a person has a reasonable claim to have any interest in the estate of the deceased, he is entitled to have notice of the probate proceeding before the Court though his claim of interest may be remote. In the present case, darogi Singh claims that he has interest in the estate of the deceased-testator because he is the brothers son of the testator. In this view of the matter the case of Darogi Singh comes under the purview of section 283 (1) (c)of the Act. If it is so, Darogi Singh is entitled for citations and to contest the validity of the will. Under section 299 of the Act, every final order made by a District judge under the Act shall be appealable to the High Court in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. If it is so, Darogi Singh is entitled for citations and to contest the validity of the will. Under section 299 of the Act, every final order made by a District judge under the Act shall be appealable to the High Court in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the present case, the order against the caveator (appellant) has become final between the parties. By the impugned order, the trial court held that the appellant is not entitled to contest the validity of the will as he has no interest in the estate of the deceased. The impugned order passed by the learned Additional district Judge has become final so far as the right of the appellant to contest the suit is concerned. If it is so, the impugned order of the learned Additional district Judge is appealable under section 299 of the Act read with section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code), Section 104 of the Code provides three classes of orders to be appealable. The first ciass of order is mentioned in section 104 of the Code, the second class of order is mentioned therein as "save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code" and the third class of orders is also mentioned therein as"or by any law for the time being in force". The present case will come under, the purview of third class. If any law provides that an appeal shall he against any order passed under that law, such orders shall be appealable under the third category mentioned in section 104 of the Code. Sec.299 of the Act provides that all orders passed by the District Judge under the act shall be appealable to the High Court in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Hence, I hold that if section 299 of the act is read along with section 104 of the Code, then it is clear that an appeal shall lie against every final order made by the District Judge under the provisions of the Indian Succession Act. 21. Hence, I hold that if section 299 of the act is read along with section 104 of the Code, then it is clear that an appeal shall lie against every final order made by the District Judge under the provisions of the Indian Succession Act. 21. In this connection I may quote here the wordings of Beaumont, c. J. in Fakirji Navroji v, Maherban Faredoon, (AIR 1942 Bombay 276) which runs as follows : - "section 104, Civil P. C. , which deals with appeals against orders, allows appeals against certain orders, and prohibits appeals against other orders, except as otherwise expressly provided in the body of the Code or by any law for the time being in force. So that Sec.104 would save an appeal, if sanctioned by the Succession Act". It is, therefore, clear that section 104 of the Code lays down that an appeal can be preferred under section 299 of the Act against any final order passed by the District Judge under the Act though the appeal may not technically lie either in the first category of section 104 or under Order XLIII rule 1 of the code. 22 In these circumstances, I allow the appeal and direct the court below to allow the appellant to contest the validity of the will as he (appellant)claims to have interest in the property of the deceased. 23. In the result the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the cpurt below is set aside with the observations made above. The parties will bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.