Research › Browse › Judgment

Karnataka High Court · body

1977 DIGILAW 218 (KAR)

LAXMI SHEDTHI v. UDUPI TALUK LAND TRIBUNAL

1977-11-08

GOVINDA BHAT, VENKATACHALAIAH

body1977
GOVINDA BHAT, CJ. ( 1 ) THIS appeal was originally preferred by two land-holders-the first appellant Laxmi Shedthi is the mother and the second appellant the daughter. The first appellant is stated to have died during the pendency of the appeal leaving the second appellant as the sole member of her kavaru. ( 2 ) THE second respondent-Subraya Naik made an application to the Land Tribunal, Udupi taluk on 10-12-74 alleging that he is a tenant personally cultivating 75 cents in Sy. No. 34/112 and 5 acres 70 cents in sy. No. 126 of Yedthadi village, Udupi taluk in the Dist of S. Kanara, since three years prior to the date of the application. Upon receipt of notices of the application, the appellants represented themselves before the Tribunal through their Power of Attorney who is the husband of the second appellant. Both parties produced a number of documents. They also examined witnesses. The Tribunal held local inspection on 10-3-1976 and made an order on 27-5-1976 upholding the claim of the second respondent and conferring occupancy right on him. The said order was challenged by the appellants before this Court in WPNo. 9389 of 1976. The matter came-up for preliminary hearing before Malimath, J, who rejected the petition on 20-10-1976. This appeal is directed against the said order. ( 3 ) THE second respondent has remained unrepresented before us despite notice. We directed that the State be impleaded as party-third respondent and the learned Government Pleader was asked to take notice on behalf of the State. Sri Brahmarayappa, learned High Court government Pleader appeared for the State. We heard Sri Viswanatha shetty, learned Counsel for the surviving appellant and Sri Brahmarayappa for the State. We directed that the State be impleaded as party-third respondent and the learned Government Pleader was asked to take notice on behalf of the State. Sri Brahmarayappa, learned High Court government Pleader appeared for the State. We heard Sri Viswanatha shetty, learned Counsel for the surviving appellant and Sri Brahmarayappa for the State. ( 4 ) THE first ground urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the Land Tribunal, while deciding the dispute whether or not the lands in question were tenanted lands immediately prior to 1-3-1974, has altogether ignored the legal presumption arising under Sec. 133 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 ; secondly, that several documents referred to and relied on by the Tribunal relate to the years subsequent to 1-3-1974 and were therefore of no evidentiary value in deciding the question whether the lands were tenanted lands immediately prior to 1-3-1974 ; and lastly it was urged that the Tribunal had merely made an incantation of the oral evidence of the witnesses there being no critical assessment and evaluation of the evidence, that is expected of a tribunal which was the final authority on the question of fact. ( 5 ) THE learned single Judge, while dealing with the first ground, rejected the same stating thus : the observations of the Tribunal clearly indicate that it did bear in mind the presumption arising in regard to the entries in the record of rights and that it was not willing to attach any weight to those entries having regard to the circumstances and the evidence in the case. . . . . . . . . ( 6 ) WE have perused the entire order of the Tribunal. There is nothing to indicate therein that the Tribunal had informed itself of the legal presumption arising under Sec. 133 of the Land Revenue Act. The second respondent who is an applicant before the Tribunal, did not state that the entries in the Record of Rights had been manipulated. No suggestions to this effect were made to the Power of Attorney examined on behalf of the land-holders. Sec. 133 of the Land Revenue Act states that an entry in the Record of Rights shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefor. No suggestions to this effect were made to the Power of Attorney examined on behalf of the land-holders. Sec. 133 of the Land Revenue Act states that an entry in the Record of Rights shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefor. The burden was clearly on the second respondent to show that the legal presumption arising under Sec. 133 of the Land Revenue Act should not be drawn. The Tribunal has made a sweeping statement that the tenants are illiterates and the land-holders are all powerful persons and they can get up documents as they like. Such general observations disclose that the members of the Tribunal had certain ideological bias and its expression would weaken the confidence of the parties before it in its sense of justice and impartiality. in the absence of any evidence adduced by the applicant before the tribunal to discredit the entries in Record of Rights, the Tribunal was bound to take into consideration the legal presumption arising thereunder. ( 7 ) IT has been repeatedly observed by this Court that mere subjective satisfaction of the Tribunal cannot sustain its adjudication. The tribunal must accordingly give its reasons for discarding the legal presumption arising under Sec. 133 of the said Act. If it fails to do so, it amounts to failure to take into consideration relevant material in deciding the issue of tenancy disputed before it. ( 8 ) THE second ground urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant is also not without substance. Most of the documents referred to in the order of the Tribunal relate to the years subsequent to 1974. Sec. 44 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 states that all tenanted agricultural lands immediately prior to 1-3-1974 vest in the State Government and Sec. 45 states that the tenant, personally cultivating such tenanted land immediately prior to 1-3-1974, is entitled to conferment of occupancy rights. From a perusal of the order of the Tribunal, it does not appear that the Tribunal has borne in mind this aspect of the law bearing on the subject. Parties might bring into existence documents to support their respective cases subsequent to 1-3-1974. Such documents should be construed as evidence post-litem-motam. From a perusal of the order of the Tribunal, it does not appear that the Tribunal has borne in mind this aspect of the law bearing on the subject. Parties might bring into existence documents to support their respective cases subsequent to 1-3-1974. Such documents should be construed as evidence post-litem-motam. That distinction does rot appear to have been borne in mind by the Tribunal at the time of local inspection made on 10-3-1976. The local inspection can only disclose the facts as on that day and it cannot indicate-at any rate conclu sively-who was cultivating the land immediately prior to 1-3-1974. Let us assume a case where an agricultural land was tenanted and the tenant was cultivating the same immediately prior to 1-3-1974; but the landholder forcibly evicted him and was actually cultivating the land after 1-3-1974. Can the fact that the land-holder was cultivating the land when the Tribunal inspected the land be conclusive in deciding the issue as to who was cultivating the land personally prior to 1-3-1974?. ( 9 ) IN the present case what the Tribunal is stated to have observed at the spot-inspection related to a period nearly two years after 1-3-1974. The case of the appellants is that the second-respondent was an agricultural labourer and was permitted to reside in a house situate in SNo. 126 and that in October 1975 he entered upon the lands in dispute by force. In the context ot this specific case of the land-owners what was stated to have been observed at the time of local inspection cannot be conclusive. ( 10 ) IT is no doubt true that if a state of things is shown to exist, an inference of its continuity within a reasonably proximate time both forwards and backwards may some times be drawn. It all depends on whether the circumstances justify presumptur-retro. The Tribunal has not invoked this presumption of continuance backwards nor set-out circumsances which justify that presumption. ( 11 ) THE third ground urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant is also one of substance. The Tribunal has written a lengthy order ; but the cogency of its reasoning and the firmity of its findings in the order have not been proportional to its size. This Court has to consider whether there is real adjudication by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has written a lengthy order ; but the cogency of its reasoning and the firmity of its findings in the order have not been proportional to its size. This Court has to consider whether there is real adjudication by the Tribunal. It has to be remembered that under the Act parties are prohibited from having the assistance of the lawyers and 'there is no provision for appeal or revision. A fact finding authority is required to critically evaluate the evidence let in on an issue and then record its findings on that issue. Mere paraphrasing the evidence is not assessment and evaluation of evidence. The second respondent-applicant has staged the holding is 8 mura seed area, that the contractual rent was 16 muras of paddy per annum and that in the first crop i. e. , Karthika crop, he gets a total yield of 20 muras of paddy. The total area of the holding is over six acres. The object of including non-official Members in the Tribunal is stated to be that persons who have local knowledge should be associated with the implementation of the Act. The District Gazetteer of South Kanara gives the normal rent of one mura seed area, of wet I, wet II and wet III lands in that District. If the evidence of the second respondent is true, the rent was only two muras of paddy for one mura seed area of wet land. The normal rate of rent before the Land Reforms Act was brought into force was very much more than two muras of paddy per mura seed area of wet land in udupi taluk or anywhere in the District of South Kanara. Equally, the statement that the yield of six acres of land is 20 muras of paddy from karthika crop appears wholly inconsistent with the general and accepted estimates of the yield and indeed borders on absurdity. The Tribunal has not critically evaluated the relevant evidence in deciding the truth or otherwise of the case as putforward by 'the alleged tenant. There has been, in our opinion, no application of the mind by the Tribunal to the relevant and material facts in deciding the fact in issue. In other words, there has been no real adjudication by the Tribunal. There has been, in our opinion, no application of the mind by the Tribunal to the relevant and material facts in deciding the fact in issue. In other words, there has been no real adjudication by the Tribunal. The decision of the Tribunal is therefore wholly arbitrary and stands vitiated and calls for interference as it has resulted in substantial injustice to the landholder whose property rights have been affected. ( 12 ) ACCORDINGLY, we allow this appeal and reversing the order of the learned single Judge, quash the order of the Tribunal and remit the matter back for adjudication afresh in the light of the observations contained in this order. There will be no order as to costs. ( 13 ) THE learned Government Pleader is permitted to file his memo of appearance in two weeks from this date. --- *** --- .