Ramaprasada Rao, J.-This is an appeal against the judgment of Paul, J., who adjudicated the appellants as insolvents in I.P. No. 85 of 1972 mainly on two grounds. The first ground is that one of the insolvents was not ‘found in the usual place of residence and business and that he secluded himself from the creditors, and the second ground is that the debtors suspended payment. The petitioning creditors complained that the debtors have committed acts of insolvency within the meaning of section 9 (d) (iii) and section 9 (g) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. The facts which led to the filing of the petition may be briefly summarised thus: The petitioning creditors claimed that Audilakshmi Venkateswara Iron Traders represented by its partners, K. Subbarayalu Chetty and K. Radhakrishnan and Sri Balaji & Co., represented by its partners K. Radhakrishnan and K. Balasubramaniam were indebted to them in the sum of Rs. 3,500 on the foot of a promissory note executed by the partners of the above firms and that before they came to Court with this insolvency petition another creditor attached the goods of the debtors and the debtors have removed a substantial portion of their stock in trade and they were arranging to sell both their business and other properties with intent to defeat and delay their creditors. The acts of insolvency are sought to be established by the petitioning creditors through their two witnesses examined as P.Ws. 1 and 2. We shall presently consider their testimony in detail. Their case is that P. W. 1 by himself or along with P.W. 2 approached the debtors and demanded payment and that the debtors expressed their unwillingness to pay the same and finding that the father of one of the debtors Was not available in the business premises, they went to the residence of the father where admittedly the other sons were also residing (sons being the other debtors in the case) and finding that the father was not available at his residence they were satisfied that there was not only a seclusion of one of the partners from the business premises and from the normal place of residence but, also an express uncanny expression by the debtors that they have suspended their payments. Paul, J., accepted the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2. Paul, J., accepted the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2. He would not believe the father examined as R.W. 1 that he was not present on the date when P.Ws. 1 and 2 are said to have visited him at his residence since he was regularly going to the hospital having been struck by paralysis by then and that he did not at all meet P. Ws. 1 and 2 in the manner suggested by them. P.W. 2 denied the demand alleged to have been made either by P. W. 1 or by P.W. 2 and would say that though they have adjusted with some of the creditors by paying them a lesser amount than what was due to them no-act of insolvency has been committed in so far as the petitioning creditors are concerned and that, therefore, the petition had to be dismissed. We shall now take up the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 to find out whether the evidence in this case is sufficient to establish the acts of insolvency complained of. P.W. 1, is the authorised agent of the petitioning" creditors. He speaks to the debt due and owing by the debtors as is seen from Exhibit P-1, the promissory note. In answer to a question whether he demanded the amount under the promissory note, he answered in the affirmative. Thereafter he referred to certain suits filed by other creditors of the debtors which in our view is not relevant for the purpose of this case. On the allegation that the debtors grave notice of suspension of payment of debts he swore in the witness box as follows: Q: When did you go to their place of business ? A: On the morning of 24th August, 1972. Q: Who were all there? A: The sons were there. Q: What did they tell? A: They said that they were not in a position to pay, that they had suspended payment to the creditors and that the creditors could do what they liked. Q: What did you do? A: I went to their residential place to meet their father. Q: Where? A: At 13 and 14, Thandavaraya Mudali Street, Madras-7. Q: Did you find their father there? A: No. Q: Did you go there thereafter ? A: On 25th August, 1972 I went to the residential place but did not find the father. Q: What did you do? A: I went to their residential place to meet their father. Q: Where? A: At 13 and 14, Thandavaraya Mudali Street, Madras-7. Q: Did you find their father there? A: No. Q: Did you go there thereafter ? A: On 25th August, 1972 I went to the residential place but did not find the father. Q: When you went to the business premises on 25th August, 1972 who accompanied you? A: The second petitioning creditor accompanied me. 2. The learned single Judge concluded by saying that the above conduct and representation of the debtors are by, themselves sufficient to adjudicate them insolvents under section 9 (d) (iii) and section 8 (g) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. In cross-examination he was unable to state as to how he remembered that he went to the debtors’ business place on the 24th of August, 1972. As a matter of fact there is admittedly evidence on record to show that the debtors were being served with summons in other cases filed by the creditors which gives a reasonable impression that the debtors were permanent residents of that place. P.W. 2 in his attempt to corroborate the evidence of P.W. 1, in our view failed. His evidence regarding the demand and relating to the alleged act of seclusion on the part of the father-debtor is couched in the following words. After referring to the debts owing by the debtors, his testimony was to the following effect? Q: When did you go and demand? A: On 24th August, 1972 morning I went to their shop at No. 275, Rasappa Chetty Street. Q: What did they say? A: They refused to pay the money and told that we can take any action we liked. Q: What did you do? A: On the 24th evening we went to the house at No. 13 and 14, Thandavaraya Mudali Street, Madras-7. Nobody was there. The father was not there. We were told that he was hiding. Only ladies were there. Again on the 25th we went there and he was not available there. Q: When you went, you went alone? A: I went along with Arjunlal (P.W.1)". 3. At this stage it is necessary to compare the two versions given by P.Ws.1 and 2. The father was not there. We were told that he was hiding. Only ladies were there. Again on the 25th we went there and he was not available there. Q: When you went, you went alone? A: I went along with Arjunlal (P.W.1)". 3. At this stage it is necessary to compare the two versions given by P.Ws.1 and 2. Whilst P.W.1 would say that he alone went to the business place on 24th August, 1972 and that he went to the residential place on 25th August, 1972, P.W.2 would say that he went on the 24th evening to the residential premises and again on the 25th he along with P.W.1 went to see the father. The question put in the witness box even in chief examination to P.W. 1, was "When you went to the business on 25th August, 1962 who accompanied you". The answer by P.W. 1 was "the second petitioning creditor accompanied me". This is not even corroborated by P.W. 2. Whilst P.W.1, is silent about his visit to the residential premises on the 24th of August, 1972, P.W. 2 would have it that he and P.W.1 went twice to the residential premises once on the evening of the 24th and again on the 25th. These inconsistent and irreconcilable versions given by P.Ws. 1 and 2 make the weight of their testimony very light. Even apart from it, law requires in such circumstances corroboration of the attitude of the debtors as spoken to by interested winesses like P.Ws. 1 and 2. That P.Ws. 1 and 2 are partisans and are undoubtedly interested witnesses cannot be disputed. Their testimony as demonstrated by us earlier is not the same in relation to the spoken facts. Apart from that it would be hazardous to imprint a badge of insolvency on a debtor merely basing it on the interested ipse dixit of a petitioning creditor Who is anxious to adjudicate the debtors willy nilly so that he could secure his interest or compel him for adjustment. In the absence of any corroboration by independent testimony of disinterested persons, we are unable to ‘accept the statement of P.Ws. 1 and 2 and rest our conclusion and find a case for the petitioning creditors for adjudicating the debtors as insolvents. 4. Even assuming that such a representation was made by the debtors as. In the absence of any corroboration by independent testimony of disinterested persons, we are unable to ‘accept the statement of P.Ws. 1 and 2 and rest our conclusion and find a case for the petitioning creditors for adjudicating the debtors as insolvents. 4. Even assuming that such a representation was made by the debtors as. spoken to by P.W. 1, or P.W. 2, the question is whether the said statements by themselves are sufficient to adjudicate the debtors insolvents. The stigma of insolvency on a debtor has to be home by him if, he cannot avoid it. But, if it is legally possible for him to oppose the imposition of such a stigma, he is always entitled to do so as the law permits him to do it. In P. Ramanujiah v. Seth Uttamchand Chellaram and others1 Dr. P. V. Rajamannar, CJ., and Ganapatia Pillai, J., dealing with a case almost similar to the one before us, after referring to the evidence stated thus:- “It is now well-established that a mere declaration of inability to pay debts does not amount to an act of insolvency. What is necessary is that the statement of the debtor taken with the other circumstances should produce an impression on the minds of the creditors that the debtor is going to suspend payment of his debts”. Time was when Courts were inclined to rest their conclusions and adjudicate lightly debtors as insolvents by accepting the stories of creditors who did not hesitate to swear that the debtors were attempting to suspend payment of debts or have actually suspended payment of debts. In the matter of David Sasoon and Co., Ltd.2, was a case where the Judicial Commissioner of that Court was of the view that a request by a person to his creditors not to press for payment till such times as the market improved or in the alternative to accept only 8 annas a rupee of their claim would be tantamount to a notice of suspension within the meaning of section 6 (g) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. In Veerabrdhman v. Jagannadhacharyulu3 our Court took the view that the intimation given by the debtors that they would be making reatable distribution among the unsecured creditors amounted to a notice that they had suspended or were about to suspend payment of their debts and such notice constituted an act of insolvency within the meaning of section 6 (g) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. In so far as the case reported in Veerabrahman v. Jagannadhacharyulu3 is concerned, there was demonstrative proof of the intention of the debtors to suspend payment of their debts because they had written to the creditors that they could only rateably distribute their available assets. But, in a case like the one under consideration, a mere expression of a desire to postpone the payment of debts because of circumstances connected with their business by itself would not be an act of insolvency within the meaning of section 9 (g) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. The view expressed by Rajamannar, CJ., in the. above appeal was approved by another Division Bench of this Court consisting of Ramachandra Iyer, CJ. and Ramakrishnan, J., in Ramakrishna Rice and Oil Milk v. Seth Daulatram Krishin Chand4. We are stressing these two decisions into the forefront only to bring home to ourselves not to be lightly guided by the tall stories of petitioning creditors in the witness box when they swear that they interviewed the debtor and that the debtor represented to them, that he was postponing payment of debts and that on that basis should adjudicate the concerned debtor as an insolvent and imprint the stigma of insolvency on him. The march of law and the progress made by the society all round after our independence do not prompt us to accept such bare statements of petitioning creditors act upon it so to adjudicate persons as insolvents. In our view some more evidence of an acceptable nature is negessary for a Court of law to imprint such a badge of insolvency over a common person. Apart from the fact that there is no corroboration of the testimony of of P. Ws. 1 and 2 who naturally help as between themselves, there is no follow-up action by either of them stating in writing that they did have a meeting as spoken to and that there was such an expression of opinion to postpone payment of debts by the debtors. 1 and 2 who naturally help as between themselves, there is no follow-up action by either of them stating in writing that they did have a meeting as spoken to and that there was such an expression of opinion to postpone payment of debts by the debtors. Admittedly, there was no notice of demand in writing: nor is there any record to show that there was an interview between the creditor and the debtor as alleged. There are of course, cases and cases wherein learned Judges have expressed different views as to what is an act of insolvency within the meaning of section 9 (g). In the above original side appeals the learned Judges cited with approval the observations of Bowen, L.J., in In re Lamb1 wherein he said: “I hope we are not going in the construction of this statute to be encumbered in the future with a mass of cases which are really decisions on fact, and which are to be cited hereafter as determining that special words used by a special debtor in a particular case do or do not amount as a matter of law to notice of suspension. That would be to enter a fatal groove as regards the construction of the statute”. As each case has to be decided on its own merits and as evidence let in this case is not sufficient or reasonably sufficient for us to hold that there was ana interview between the creditor and the debtor, and even assuming that there was such an interview, the words spoken toby the debtor are sufficient to constitute unequivocally the express intention on his part to suspend payment of debtscannot at all be gathered. We are unable to agree with Paul, J., that an act of insolvency within the meaning of section 9 (g) has been proved. 5. As early as 1905 the House of Lords in Clough v. Samuel and others2, took a liberal view of such situation. The: facts in that case were that a stockbroker, being hopelessly insolvent, told his Stock Exchange creditors that he would have difficulty in paying them at the approaching settlement and suggested that they should close their accounts with him. As early as 1905 the House of Lords in Clough v. Samuel and others2, took a liberal view of such situation. The: facts in that case were that a stockbroker, being hopelessly insolvent, told his Stock Exchange creditors that he would have difficulty in paying them at the approaching settlement and suggested that they should close their accounts with him. The majority of the Board held that the stockbroker had no intention in fact to give his creditors notice that he was about to suspend payment of his debts and that the notice, if any, given by him was not a notice of suspension of debts within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act. If that was the liberal view taken by the House of Lords nearly seven decades before, a fortiori, in India when the economic position of families are entirely different, it is necessary to have a more liberal view and Courts ought not to be too astute to accept the exaggerated claims of petitioning creditors and adjudicate persons as insolvents and place on their shoulders the stigma of insolvency for them and for their families for ever. 6. The second ground of insolvency on which the petition rests is that the father as partner of one of the debtor firms secluded himself so as to deprive his creditors of the means of communicating with him. We have, on the first, ground, expressed our view that P.Ws.. 1 and 2 were not speaking the truth. The discrepancy in their testimony inter se in the matter of their interview with the father is vet another circumstance. P.W. 1 is silent about his interview with the father on the 24th whilst P.W. 2 would say that he along with P.W. 1 went to the residence of the father both on the evening of the 24th and. on the morning of the 25th August, 1972. In Such cases the petitioning creditor should take the elementary precaution of having his conduct and act corroborated by the testimony of independent witnesses, and for this purpose, he should also take additional precaution of taking such witnesses along with him so that matters may not be doubted at a later stage when it comes up for scrutiny in Courts of law. Having regard to our opinion that the testimony of P.Ws. Having regard to our opinion that the testimony of P.Ws. 1 and 2 being very unimpressive and all the more for the reason that they stand alone without being corroborated by acceptable evidence, oral or documentary, we do not accept that the petitioning creditors did go to the father’s dwelling place to find out whether he was there or not. On the order hand, the evidence of the father examined as R.W. 1 that he was suffering from some illness and that even if P.Ws. 1 and 2 came to the house on the 24th or the 25th as alleged he was not there since he was visiting the hospital regularly for his semi-paralytic attack appears to be more convincing to us. It is not however necessary to harp any more on the nature of the evidence let in by the debtors as the burden of proof is always on the petitioning creditors. The burden not having been discharged by the petitioning creditors in a manner known to law, we are unable to accept that the second act of insolvency complained of, namely, that the father secluded himself so as to deprive his creditors of the means of communicating with him stands by itself, and is, therefore, not appealing or acceptable to us. We have already referred to the fact that there is abundant evidence in this case that the father and sons were served with summons in the other suits referred to by the petitioning creditors in the very same residential premises. It cannot, therefore, be said with any precision or certainty that the father deliberately secluded himself in order to avoid his creditors and incidentally to commit an act of insolvency. The appeal is, therefore,, allowed and there will be no order as to costs. 7. It is brought to our notice that as a result of the adjudication and as there was no stay of further proceedings pursuant thereto, the Official Assignee acted and administered the estate and brought to sale two items of properties arid attempted to sell the stock-in-trade, etc., belonging to the debtors. These steps were taken under orders of Court. All such acts of the Official Assignee and incidental matters relating to the administration of this estate as such till date shall stand ratified. The Official Assignee shall pay back a sum of Rs. These steps were taken under orders of Court. All such acts of the Official Assignee and incidental matters relating to the administration of this estate as such till date shall stand ratified. The Official Assignee shall pay back a sum of Rs. 1,000 (Rupees One thousand only) which the debtors themselves voluntarily paid to the creditors during the pendency of this insolvency petition, which the creditors brought back to the estate on a demand made by the Official Assignee.