AMIYA KUMAR MUKHERJI, J. ( 1 ) THIS Rule is directed against an appellate order dated 8. 4. 70 passed by the Joint Commissioner of Police, Calcutta confirming the order of dismissal of the petitioner from the police service, passed by the Disciplinary Authority. ( 2 ) THE petitioner was a Traffic Police Constable in the Calcutta Police Force. While on leave, he went to his village - Goshandaypur in Gazipur district. There he was involved in a criminal case. He was convicted and sentenced to RI along with others for three months under Section 147 I. P. C. as also Sections 323/149 and 325/149 of the same Code. On appeal, he was acquitted of the charges under Sections 325/149 of the Code but his conviction under Sections 147 and 323/149 of the Indian Penal Code was upheld. As a result thereof a disciplinary proceeding, being Proceeding No. 38 dated 8. 4. 70, was started against the petitioner on a charge that his involvement in the incident leading to the aforesaid conviction constituted moral turpitude. Such a charge sheet was issued on 7. 4. 70. A supplementary charge sheet was added on 17. 4. 70 to the effect that the petitioner left the Barrack without permission from the appropriate authorities during the period from 5. 4. 70 to 6. 4. 70 and absented himself from the Suspension Guard without any permission. The petitioner replied to the charges wherein he admitted the fact that he was convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment. He also stated therein that the conviction was the result of a false prosecution by the complainant, who was related to him. There was a long-standing enmity and dispute with him over a piece of land. He further pleaded that even on the conviction it was a simple case of assault not involving any moral turpitude. On the supplementary charge he admitted having left the Barrack without permission but he pleaded that he did so under compelling circumstances. ( 3 ) AN enquiry was held by an Assistant Commissioner of Police. The Enquiring Officer on evidence found that the petitioner's conviction on a charge under Sections 147 and 323/149 of the Indian Penal Code have been established. But he did not come to any finding that such conviction involved moral turpitude. ( 3 ) AN enquiry was held by an Assistant Commissioner of Police. The Enquiring Officer on evidence found that the petitioner's conviction on a charge under Sections 147 and 323/149 of the Indian Penal Code have been established. But he did not come to any finding that such conviction involved moral turpitude. He also found that the petitioner left the Barrack and failed to attend the Suspension Guard without any previous permission. ( 4 ) THE findings so arrived at by the Enquiring Officer was forwarded to the Disciplinary Authority, viz. the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner issued the second show-cause notice dated July 25, 1970 after recording his own findings on both the charges. He too, like the Enquiring Officer, found that the conviction of the petitioner have been established by the evidence so also the charge of leaving the Barrack not attending the Suspension Guard without any permission. On 5th of August, 1970 the petitioner showed cause. On 5th of September, 1970 he was dismissed on the ground of first charge only viz. that the offence amounted to moral turpitude. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred an appeal on October 3, 1970 under Paragraph 11 of the Calcutta Police Regulations. When the appellate authority did not dispose of his appeal within one year even after several reminders sent by him, the petitioner moved this Court on or about December, 1970 under Art. 226 of the Constitution and obtained a Rule, being Civil Rule 5622 (w) of 1971. On the 6th of July, 1974, the said Rule was disposed of by Anil Kumar Sen, J. with certain directions upon the appellate authorities. The learned Judge observed - 'it is open to the appellate authority to review the facts and on assessment of evidence to decide for himself how far the disciplinary authority is correct in his conclusion that the conduct which led to the petitioner's conviction amounts to an act of moral turpitude". On the 28th of May, 1976 the appellate authorities rejected the petitioner's appeal and affirmed the order of the disciplinary authority. According to the appellate authority, moral turpitude is the absence of that minimum degree of moral fibre which enable the person concerned to resist temptation, threats or inducements to conduct. "misbehaviour" or "moral turpitude" would appear to be what the disciplinary authority considers it to be so. According to the appellate authority, moral turpitude is the absence of that minimum degree of moral fibre which enable the person concerned to resist temptation, threats or inducements to conduct. "misbehaviour" or "moral turpitude" would appear to be what the disciplinary authority considers it to be so. It is observed that as discipline is a very core of police service, the widest possible interpretation has to be attached to the expression, oral turpitude. A Police Officer who is to enforce the law of the land and who take an oath to uphold the law and the Constitution cannot therefore be heard to say that there is nothing immoral if he breaks the oath of his office and commits a breach of peace which is his secred duty to prevent by all lawful means within his power. The law itself enjoins on him to do so by virtue of Section 149 Criminal Procedure Code. Thus, in the context of the oath of his office that in the case of a law enforcement officer like a Police Office, it is both immoral and illegal for him to commit an offence involving a breach of peace. That Police personal being members of a disciplined force have to be treated on a different footing. The Appellate Authority held that the conduct of the delinquent in the instant case not only amounted to an offence for which he has already been convicted by a Court of Law, but also amounted to an act involving moral turpitude. ( 5 ) THE petitioner being aggrieved by the said appellate order moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and obtained the present Rule. ( 6 ) MR. Dutt, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, contended that even accepting that the conviction on the charges under Sections 147 and 323/149 of the Indian Penal Code had been established but that did not constitute an act of moral turpitude. Mr. Dutt referred to the facts and circumstances of the case lading to the conviction of the petitioner. He contended that the petitioner was involved in a family dispute over a landed property which resulted in a conviction as aforesaid. It was an isolated incident under exceptional circumstances which could never constitute to be an act of moral turpitude. According to Mr. He contended that the petitioner was involved in a family dispute over a landed property which resulted in a conviction as aforesaid. It was an isolated incident under exceptional circumstances which could never constitute to be an act of moral turpitude. According to Mr. Dutt the expression "moral turpitude" implies depravity and weakness of character and disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. My attention was drawn to Paragraph 5 in Chapter 19 of the Police Regulations, Calcutta. The Paragraph lays down that only in the case of conviction for an offence implying moral turpitude dismissal should follow as a matter of course unless otherwise directed by the Commissioner. The Regulation further provides that in case of other conviction if the delinquent concerned is to be dismissed, it has to be so done on specific reasons being recorded for the purpose. ( 7 ) IT appears that the disciplinary authority proceeded on the 1st part of Paragraph 5 in Ch. 19 of the Regulations when it concluded that the petitioner's conviction implied moral turpitude. According to Mr. Dutt as the case falls under second part of the said Paragraph in Ch. 19 of the Regulations, the disciplinary authority could not have proceeded under the 1st part. It is urged that the appellate authority failed to appreciate that the conviction and sentence not being on the ground of dishonesty or opposed to good morals could not be equated with moral turpitude for which the petitioner could be punished. ( 8 ) IN (1) Baleshwar Singh v. District Magistrate and Collector of Banaras, AIR 1959 All 71 , a question arose as to whether conviction under Section 182 IPC for making a false report was in respect of an offence involving moral turpitude and in answering the question Tandon, J. observed: "the expression 'moral turpitude' is not defined anywhere but it means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and weakness of character and disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. " ( 9 ) IN (2) Shiva Nand v. Sub-divisional Officer, Chunar, 1961 RD (HC) 186, a question arose whether a conviction under Section 13 of the Public Gambling act was a conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude. There was a difference of opinion between Mootham, C. J. and Dayal, J. on that question and reference was made to Mr. There was a difference of opinion between Mootham, C. J. and Dayal, J. on that question and reference was made to Mr. Justice Mukherji. The learned Judge observed "ideas of morals" often undergo changes in different periods of a country's history. It is also true that different people of the world sometimes differ as to whether a particular act is moral or immoral. Whenever a question has to be considered whether a certain act is moral or immoral one has to consider as to how that act is viewed by the society or the community, as the case may be, and if the society or the community views such act as involving moral turpitude, then even though some particular individual may not consider it so will not make the act a moral one, or a praise worthy-act. Therefore, whether an act involves moral turpitude or do not, has to be determined not necessarily on abstract notions of the rights and wrongs involved or the harm or the good coming out of the act but how that act is looked upon in the society where the act has been committed. The phrase "moral turpitude" refers to act of baseness; acts which have an element of vileness or acts which are harmful to society in general or contrary to accepted rules of rights and duties between man and man, it may be that some acts involve moral culpability in a larger degree than other acts but, nevertheless, such acts do involve moral culpability". ( 10 ) IN (3) Durga Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 Punjab 97, Bishan Narain, J. observed that the term "moral turpitude" is rather a vague one and it may have different meanings in different contexts. The term has generally been taken to mean to be a conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals and contrary to what a man owes to a fellow man or to society in general. ( 11 ) IN (4) Mangali v. Chhakki Lal, AIR 1963 All 527 , Srivastava, J. considered the above two cases referred to hereinabove. The term has generally been taken to mean to be a conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals and contrary to what a man owes to a fellow man or to society in general. ( 11 ) IN (4) Mangali v. Chhakki Lal, AIR 1963 All 527 , Srivastava, J. considered the above two cases referred to hereinabove. The learned Judge observed "with great respect, it appears to me that some of the observations made in these decisions have been too widely stated and if followed literally may make every act punishable in law an offence involving moral turpitude, that, however, could not be the intention with which those observations were made. From consideration of the dictionary meaning of the words, "moral" and "turpitude" as well as the real ratio decidendi of the cases, the principle which emerges appear to be that the question whether a certain offence involves moral turpitude or not will necessarily depend on the circumstances in which the offence is committed, it is not every punishable act that can be considered to be an offence involving moral turpitude. Had that been so, the qualification "involving moral turpitude" would not have been used by the Legislates and it would have disqualified every person who had been convicted of any offence. The tests which should ordinarily be applied for judging whether a certain offence does or does not involve moral turpitude appear to be; (1) whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience of society in general (2) whether the motive which led to the act was a base one and (3) whether on account of the act having been committed the perpetrator could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society. ( 12 ) MR. Mukherji, appearing on behalf of the respondents contended that the tests as have been laid down in the above Allahabad case are not exhaustive. According to him each case has to be considered on its own facts and circumstances. In the instant case it is a duty of a Police Officer to prevent breach of peace. ( 12 ) MR. Mukherji, appearing on behalf of the respondents contended that the tests as have been laid down in the above Allahabad case are not exhaustive. According to him each case has to be considered on its own facts and circumstances. In the instant case it is a duty of a Police Officer to prevent breach of peace. Under Section 149 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, every Police Officer is required to interpose for the purpose of preventing, and shall, to the best of his ability, prevent the commission of any cognizable offence. Mr. Mukherji supported the reasons of the appellate authority that the police personnel being members of a disciplined force are to be treated on a different footing. ( 13 ) THE appellate authority, it appears, relied upon the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of (4) Hari Prasad Raghura v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 Gujarat 283. In that case a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court construed Section 25 (1) of Bombay Police Act. The learned Judges of the Division Bench held that the act of going on hunger strike of a police constable while he was on casual leave amounted to a breach of discipline in terms of Section 25 (1) of the Bombay Police Act. ( 14 ) IN my opinion, that decision has got no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. ( 15 ) ANY criminal conviction perse does not amount to moral turpitude in terms of Paragraph 5 of Chapter 19 of the Calcutta Police Regulations, 1968. Paragraph 5 says, that every Police Officer sentenced by a Court for an offence implying moral turpitude shall, unless the Commissioner of Police otherwise orders, be dismissed. So, unless an offence implies moral turpitude there could not be any dismissal under the first part of Paragraph 5 of the Regulations. ( 16 ) SECTION 149 of the Criminal Procedure Code is in Chapter 13, which lays down "preventive action of the police". It is true that Section 149 of the Code of Criminal Procedure imposes an obligation upon a police officer fails to discharge that cognizable offence. Assuming that a police officer fails to discharge that obligation, does not failure involve any moral blame? In my view, it does not. ( 17 ) MR. It is true that Section 149 of the Code of Criminal Procedure imposes an obligation upon a police officer fails to discharge that cognizable offence. Assuming that a police officer fails to discharge that obligation, does not failure involve any moral blame? In my view, it does not. ( 17 ) MR. Dutt further contended that the Appellate Authority ought to have held that non-consideration of mandatory provisions of Paragraph 9 (6) (b) of Chapter 19 of the Police Regulations by the Disciplinary Authority while imposing punishment of dismissal to the petitioner was illegal. ( 18 ) MR. Mukherji pointed out that in view of sub-clause (a) of proviso to Art. 311 of the Constitution, it was not at all necessary to hold any enquiry in the present case inasmuch as the petitioner was not entitled to the protection under clause 2 of Art. 311 of the Constitution. ( 19 ) SUB-PARAGRAPH (2) of paragraph 9 (6) of the Regulations provides that the Enquiring Officer or the Authority empowered to award punishment to the person charged, as the case may be, shall, after considering such case as may be shown by the person charged against the proposed penalty and after considering the previous character of the person charged, award such punishment to the person charged as he thinks fit. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the Enquiring Officer or the Disciplinary Authority before imposing penalty did not consider the previous character of the petitioner. It is true that the proviso (a) to Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution completely dispenses with all the three stages of departmental enquiry when an employee is convicted on a criminal charge. The reason is that, in a criminal trial the charges are framed, witnesses are examined and cross-examined in the presence of the accused and the accused is given an opportunity to produce his evidence and after hearing the arguments of the complainant and the defence, the Court passes the final order of conviction or acquittal. In these circumstances, another full-fledged departmental enquiry is not required. In these circumstances, another full-fledged departmental enquiry is not required. ( 20 ) IN (6) Divisional Personnel Officer v. T. R. Challapan, AIR 1975 SC 2216 , the Supreme Court observed that proviso (a) to Art. 311 (2) is merely an enabling provision and it does not enjoin or confer a mandatory duty on the disciplinary authority to pass an order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank the moment an employee is convicted. This matter is left completely to the discretion of the disciplinary authority and the only reservation made is that departmental enquiry contemplated by this provision as also by the departmental rules is dispensed with. ( 21 ) SO, it follows that when a Government servant is convicted on a criminal charge, his dismissal cannot be automatic, unless there is a specific rule for such automatic termination of service on conviction of criminal charge. ( 22 ) IN the instant case the disciplinary authority would have dispensed with the departmental enquiry. But in view of the fact that the disciplinary authority held a departmental enquiry by framing charges and the petitioner was given opportunity to show-cause in that case, the mandatory provisions of the Regulations cannot be dispensed with. ( 23 ) FROM the trend of the decisions of different High Courts referred to hereinabove, it appears that it is not possible to lay down any abstract standard which constitutes moral turpitude. ( 24 ) THERE are certain criminal offences such as theft, robbery, criminal breach of trust, misappropriation of property, which directly involve moral turpitude. In such cases, no elaborate investigation is required to find out the depraved conduct of the delinquent. But where the offences do not show any element of vileness, depravity and weakness of character of the offender the disciplinary authority is required to consider the facts and circumstances of the case to find out whether the motive which led to the conviction was deprave. Although, conduct and conviction are closely related but they are not inseparable. ( 25 ) THE concept of morality is well recognized. It does not vary from one class to another. In the absence of any specific rule regulating the conduct of the employees the standard of morality cannot be applied differently to a member of a disciplined force. Indiscipline cannot be equated to immorality. ( 25 ) THE concept of morality is well recognized. It does not vary from one class to another. In the absence of any specific rule regulating the conduct of the employees the standard of morality cannot be applied differently to a member of a disciplined force. Indiscipline cannot be equated to immorality. ( 26 ) WHETHER a particular act constitutes moral turpitude or not, that does not depend upon the subjective satisfaction or discretion of the disciplinary authority. Every case has to be judged and decided on its own facts and circumstances in the context of the conduct of the delinquent. In a given set of facts a particular offence may not constitute moral turpitude but in another context it does. ( 27 ) THE Appellate Authority fell into an error that in case of an officer of police service the term moral turpitude is to be applied in its widest term. In spite of clear directions and indications given by this Court in Civil Rule No. 5522 (w) of 1971, the Appellate Authority failed to consider how far the disciplinary authority was correct in its conclusion that the conduct which led to the petitioner's conviction amounted to an act of moral turpitude. ( 28 ) THE judgment of the criminal appeal was placed before me, wherein it appears that the accused person wanted to compromise a case pending before the Additional District Magistrate, Gazipur. That case was fixed on 22nd March, 1968. But the complainant did not agree to settle the matter. On 22. 3. 68 at about 5. 45 P. M. when the complainant reached near the Thakurbari of the village, the accused attacked the complainant with lathies. The learned Session Judge observed that it could not be fixed who caused the grievous injury amongst the five accused. Section 147 of the IPC deals with punishment for rioting. Section 149 deals with an offence for an unlawful assembly. Section 323 is for punishment for voluntarily causing hurt. ( 29 ) THE three tests as laid down by Srivastava, J. in AIR 1963 All. 527 , in my view, should be taken as a guideline. These are general tests which in most cases are sufficient for enabling one to arrive at a correct conclusion on the question. Section 323 is for punishment for voluntarily causing hurt. ( 29 ) THE three tests as laid down by Srivastava, J. in AIR 1963 All. 527 , in my view, should be taken as a guideline. These are general tests which in most cases are sufficient for enabling one to arrive at a correct conclusion on the question. ( 30 ) APPLYING these tests to the facts and circumstances of the present case, in my opinion, the conduct of the petitioner which led to his conviction under Sections 147 and 323/149 IPC does not constitute moral turpitude, so a to attract the first part of Paragraph 5 in Chapter 19 of the Police Regulations, Calcutta, 1968. ( 31 ) THE findings of the Appellate Authority are vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of record and accordingly it must be quashed by a Writ of Certiorari. ( 32 ) IN the result, this Rule is made absolute. The impugned orders of the appellate authority as well as the disciplinary authority are quashed. The matter is remitted back to the disciplinary authority to reconsider the matter afresh. In deciding the matter, he is required to take into account particularly the provisions of second part of Paragraph 5 and of paragraph 9 (6) (b) of Chapter 19 of the Police Regulations, 1968. There will be no order for costs. Rule made absolute.