JUDGMENT Hari Swarup, J. - These two petitions have been filed by certain employers,, disputes in respect of whose concerns have been referred to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 4.K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. The question in both the writ petitions is about the right of representation during the proceedings. As there are two references, two petitions have been filed. In Writ Petition No. 1376 of 1976 there are 30 petitioners while in Writ Petition No. 2156 of 1976 there are 17 petitioners. All these petitioners are co-operative-societies. They have all sought to sue through, the U.P. Co-operative Bank Ltd. which is an apex co-operative society. 2. These petitioners had sought to represent themselves through an officer of the-U. P. Co-operative Bank Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Bank). The Industrial Tribunal held that he was not entitled to represent the various employers whose cases bad-been referred for adjudication. Against the orders passed in two references the Bank filed, writ petition No 229 of 1976. This petition was dismissed on 27.1.1976. It was held that the Tribunal committed no error in holding that the apex body was not authorised to represent the various employers through its own-officer. It was further observed that the Tribunal will consider the application if an officer of the petitioner Bank is authorised to represent the various employers. The various' employers thereafter filed applications stating that they had resolved that Labour Law Officer of the U P. Co-operative Bank Ltd. is authorised to represent and contest the dispute before the Industrial Tribunal on behalf of the-employers whose cases were before the Tribunal. The Tribunal again considered the matter and held that because the nominee Sri R.S. Kela was not the officer of the concerns whose eases were before the Tribunal, he could not represent the employer. Against this order passed in the two references the present two-petitions have been filed. 3. Section 6-1 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act provides for representation of the parties before the Industrial Tribunal. Subsection (1) thereof runs as under: (1) "Subject to the provisions of sub-ss. (2) .and (3) the parties to an industrial dispute may be represented before a Board, Labour Court, or Tribunal in the manner prescribed." `The manner has been prescribed in Rule 40 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Rules. Subsection (1) thereof runs as under: (1) "Subject to the provisions of sub-ss. (2) .and (3) the parties to an industrial dispute may be represented before a Board, Labour Court, or Tribunal in the manner prescribed." `The manner has been prescribed in Rule 40 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Rules. The relevant portion thereof runs as under : "(ii) in the case of an employer, by (a) an officer of a union or association of employers of which the employer is a member, or (b) an officer of a federation of unions or associations of employers to which the union or association referred to in clause (a) above, is affiliated, or (c) by an officer of the concern, if so authorised in writing by the employer : Provided that no officer of a federation of unions shall be entitled to represent the parties unless the federation has been approved by the Labour Commissioner for this purpose." 4. The petitioner had earlier sought to get a representation under clause (a). That point was not accepted by the Division Bench in writ petition No. 229 of 1976. The learned counsel for the present petitioners has, however, contended that because there are new petitioners in the present writ petitions that order will not be binding on them. We are unable to accept the contention because in the earlier case also the Bank was the petitioner and in the present case also the employers have sought to file the writ petition through the Bank. However, to avoid any controversy on this technical point we treat the various employers as independent petitioners and proceed to re-examine the matter on merits. 5. Admittedly there is no `union of employers'. The contention of the learned counsel is that Mr. Kela is an officer of an `association of employers'. According to him the Bank is an association of employers. The reason given by him for this submission is that the Bank is constituted of various members including the petitioning co-operative societies and that the function of the Bank is to co-ordinate the functioning of its member societies and to facilitate their working. It is urged that for all intents and purposes the Bank is an association of its members which will include also the employers whose cases are pending before the Tribunal. We are unable to accept the contention. 6. The. It is urged that for all intents and purposes the Bank is an association of its members which will include also the employers whose cases are pending before the Tribunal. We are unable to accept the contention. 6. The. term `association of employers' has been used in the Industrial Disputes Act. In Section 2 (1) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act the word `Employer' has been defined as to include 'an association or a group of employer'. An association of employers should normally mean an association of employers in their capacity as employers and not in-any other capacity. When Rule 40 refers to representation by an officer of the association of employers it must also refer to an association of persons in their capacity as employers. The Bank is not such an association. In fact the Bank is not an association at all: it is a body corporate established in accordance with the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act. Section 4 of the Act provides: "4...........a society which has its object the promotion of the economic interest of its members in accordance with co-operative principles, or a society established with the object of facilitating the operations of such a society, may be registered under this Act with or without limited liability." Section 9 of the Act provides : ``9. The registration of a society shall render it a body corporate by the name under which it is registered, with perpetual succession and a common seal.............." The Bank which is an a per co-operative society can have as its members, the State Government, the Central Bank, any other cooperative society with a particular amount of share capital in the Bank and other apex bodies. Other co-operative societies which can be members of the Bank can even be consumers societies or producers societies without any object of performing banking functions. The Bank may have some cooperative societies as its constituent members, but it does not thereby lose its identity and become an association of members. The present employers may be some of the constituents of the Bank, which is itself a cooperative society, but the co-operative Bank merely by having them as its members does not become an association of employers for purposes of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act or the Rules. 7. The present employers may be some of the constituents of the Bank, which is itself a cooperative society, but the co-operative Bank merely by having them as its members does not become an association of employers for purposes of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act or the Rules. 7. Under the Industrial Disputes Act when the matter is referred for adjudication to the Tribunal, the dispute is between the employers and the workmen. The purpose of representation is to put forward before the Tribunal the case of the parties. The purpose of permitting an officer of the Union or association of employers is to see that the case of the employers similarly situated is similarly conducted. The representation has to be of the concern itself whose dispute is before the Tribunal. The association must, therefore, have some nexus with the functioning of the members as employers. The association contemplated by the Act and the Rales is the association of employers and not an apex cooperative society formed for the purpose of carrying on banking business. We cannot, therefore, hold that the Tribunal committed any error of law in not permitting the Labour Law Officer of the Bank to represent the employers before it under clause (a) of Rule 40. 8. Coming to clause (c) of the Rule, the representation can be made only by an officer of 'the concern'. In the petition it is stated that Mr Kela was an officer of the Bank. There is no assertion that he was an officer of any of the concerns whose case was before the Tribunal. Although the word `officer' has not been defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, It cannot include a person who is not its employee or otherwise connected with its functioning. The officer of a Co-operative Society has, however, been defined in section 2 of the Co-operative Societies Act. It means "The president, vice president, chairman, vice chairman, secretary, member of committee of management, treasurer, liquidator, administrator or any other persons employed by a co-operative society whether with or without remuneration to carry on the business of the society or to supervise its affairs." Mr. Kela was thus an officer of the Bank and was not an officer of the concerns whoso cases were before the Tribunal. 9. Kela was thus an officer of the Bank and was not an officer of the concerns whoso cases were before the Tribunal. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioners, however, contended that clause (c) in the rule means that a person can be an officer of any concern but he should be authorised by the employer whose dispute is before the Tribunal. We are unable to accept the contention. "Officer of the concern" in the Rule can refer only to officers of the industrial unit whose dispute has been referred to the Tribunal for adjudication. It cannot mean the authorisation of the officer of a `concern' which is not a party before the Tribunal. The parson must first be an officer of the concern whose dispute is before the Tribunal before he can be authorised by the concern. The Tribunal cannot, therefore, be said to have committed any error of law is not permitting Mr. Kela to represent the employers before it even under clause (c) of Rule 40. 10. In the result the petitions fail and are dismissed with costs.