Judgment :- 1. The question raised in this civil revision petition, which a learned judge of this Court felt should be decided by a Full Bench, is short and interesting, and involves essentially an interpretation of the Explanation to S.2 (52) of the Land Reforms Act 1 of 1964). Counsel for the respondents would claim that the question has been decided in his favour by the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in C. R. P. No. 909 of 1965, by two Full Bench decisions of three judges each, in C. R. P. No. 898 of 1966 and CRP. 935 of 1966, and by a Full Bench ruling of Five Judges in Sankara Guputan v. Padmanabhan (1976 KLT. 547). We think that none of these decisions deal with the precise controversy raised in this civil revision petition. One of them- C.R.P. 898 of 1966-was overruled by 1976 KLT. 547. 2. The petitioner before us is a tenant against whom the 1st respondent, claiming to be a "small holder" as defined by S.2(52), filed an application fur resumption under S.16A of the Act. S.2(52) of the Act reads: "small holder" means a land-lord who does not have interest exceeding eight standard acres or (ten acres) in extent, whichever is less, as owner, intermediary, or cultivating tenant, or in two or more of the above capacities, so however that the extent of non-resumable land in his possession as owner, or as cultivating tenant, or partly as owner and partly as cultivating tenant, does not exceed [i] [two and a half standard acres]; or [ii] four acres in extent, whichever is greater. Explanation-For the purposes of this clause, a person who was in possession of, or had interest in, land exceeding the limits specified in this clause immediately before the 18th December, 1957, but such extent of land was reduced to the said limits or below by partition or transfer effected after the date mentioned above, shall not be deemed to be a small holder; not shall such partition or transfer entitle the allottee or transferee to exercise the rights of a small holder in respect of the land allotted or transferred to him". The land had been demised by the Paliam family - next in affluence only to the Cochin Royal family in the Cochin State (now part of this State)- to one Rama Shetty, the predecessor of the defendant-petitioner. The land had been demised by the Paliam family - next in affluence only to the Cochin Royal family in the Cochin State (now part of this State)- to one Rama Shetty, the predecessor of the defendant-petitioner. In a partition of the Paliam family, the Jenm right in this property was allotted to dw. 2, who had, on 18-12-1957, (the material date under the Explanation) more than two hundred acres of land in his possession. The date mentioned is the date on which the Agrarian Relations Bill was first published in the Gazette. dw. 2 conveyed it under Ext. P1 dated 25-3-1959 to the 1st respondent who filed the application for resumption The question is whether the disqualification enacted by the Explanation to S.2 clause (52) will attach to the 1st respondent or not. 3. The "small holder" enjoys certain special privileges and concessions under the Act. Under S.27 clause (2), as it stood till it was deleted by the amendment Act 35/1969, be was entitled to certain concessional benefits in the matter of claiming fair rent from the tenant; under S.17, he is entitled to resume under certain circumstances and conditions, an extent not exceeding one half of the land in the possession of a tenant; under S.6A, be is entitled under certain circumstances to resume possession of the whole land in occupation of the tenant. The plea of the revision petitioner is that the Paliam Estate was in possession of, and had interest in, land exceeding the limits specified in S.2(52), and had transferred after the 18th December, 1957, although the extent of lands in its possession was not reduced to the said limit or below, by such transfer. Nevertheless, according to the petitioner, the transferee would be disqualified to exercise the rights of a small-holder as provided in the Explanation to S 2(52). For the respondent the argument was that in order to attract the Explanation, two conditions must be satisfied, viz. (I) that the transfer should have been after 18-12-1957 and (2) that it should have the result of reducing the area of the holding to the limit (or below) required to entitle a person to the status of a small-holder. While the petitioner would state that only the first of the conditions had to be satisfied to disqualify the transferee, the respondent would assert that both the conditions should be made out. While the petitioner would state that only the first of the conditions had to be satisfied to disqualify the transferee, the respondent would assert that both the conditions should be made out. The Land Tribunal accepted the petitioner's contention and found that the 1st respondent was disqualified to claim the status of a "small holder" and dismissed the application for resumption On appeal, the appellate authority reversed the decision of the Tribunal holding that it is not enough to show that the transfer was made beyond the date indicated in the Explanation, but, in addition, it should have the result of diminishing the extent of the holding to the limit fixed for a 'small-holder', or below the same. 4. Counsel on both sides treated us very fully to the treatises and authorities on the principles of interpretation. Our difficulty, we should think, is not so much to search for principles as to apply them. Yet we may stress some of the common place principles of interpretation which are sometimes likely to be ignored. The competing claims as between the grammatical and legal interpretations have received sufficient attention in the leading Text Books as well at is judicial decisions (See for instance Craies On Interpretation of Statutes (7th Edn.) pages 83 to 86) In the course of the discussion it is noted that where the grammatical construction is clear and manifest, and without doubt, that construction has to prevail unless there be some strong and obvious reasons to the contrary. At page 84 the position is stated thus: "This rule was perhaps better stated by an Irish Judge, Burton J., in Warburton v, Lovelaud, in terms quoted with approval by Lord Fitzgerald in Bradlaugh v. Clarke, viz. ((1883) 8 App. Cas. 354, 384) viz: "I apprehend it is a rule in the construction of statutes that in the first instance the grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any expressed intention or declared purpose of the statutes, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended, or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further". And substantially the same opinion is thus expressed by Lord Selborne. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any expressed intention or declared purpose of the statutes, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended, or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further". And substantially the same opinion is thus expressed by Lord Selborne. "The mere literal construction of a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intentions of the legislature as apparent by the statute, and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction by which that intention can be better effectuated". At page 86, the learned Author states: "It is clear that "if," as Jervis C. J. said in Abley v. Dale, ( (1850) 20 L. J. C. P. 33, 35) "the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it does lead to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied where their is port is doubtful or obscure, but we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning". And 100 years later Finnemore J. said. "The mere fact that the results of a statute may be unjust or absurd does not entitle this court to refue to give it effect, but if there are two different interpretations of the words in an Act, the court will adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of those things". We refrain from quoting the passages at pages 64 to 67, 70 and 71 ail of which, and much more, were freely cited in the course of the arguments. We may extract the following passage from page 90: "Where the language is explicit, its consequences are for Parliament, and not for the courts to consider. In such a case the suffering citizen must appeal for relief, to the lawgiver and not to the lawyer. The rule is thus laid down by Cotton L. J. in Reid v. Reid ((1883) 31. Ch. D. 402 & 407). In such a case the suffering citizen must appeal for relief, to the lawgiver and not to the lawyer. The rule is thus laid down by Cotton L. J. in Reid v. Reid ((1883) 31. Ch. D. 402 & 407). In considering the true construction of an Act, I am not so much affected, as some judges are, by consequences which may arise from different constructions. Of course, if the words are ambiguous, and one construction leads to enormous inconvenience, and another construction does not, the one which leads to least inconvenience is to be preferred". The courts will not lightly impugn the wisdom of the legislature, and if any alternative construction, although not the most obvious, will give a reasonable meaning to the Act and obviate the absurdities or inconveniences of an absolutely literal construction, the courts deem themselves free to adopt it. This view was thus stated by Lord Esher M. R. in R. v. Commissioners under the Boiler Explosions Act 1882: (1891) 1 Q. B. 703, 716)". In Maxwell, 12th Edition page 28 occurs the following passage: "The first and most elementary rule of construction is that it is to be assumed that the words and phrases of technical legislation are used in their technical meaning if they have acquired one, and otherwise in their ordinary meaning, and the second is that the phrases and sentences are to be construed according to the rules of grammar. "The Length and detail of modern legislation" wrote Lord Evershed M.R., "has undoubtedly reinforced the claim of literal construction as the only safe rule". If there is nothing to modify, alter or qualify the language which the statute contains, it must be construed in the ordinary and natural meaning of he words and sentences. "The safer and more correct course of dealing with a question of construction is to take the words themselves and arrive if possible at their meaning without, in the first instance, reference to cases.". "The safer and more correct course of dealing with a question of construction is to take the words themselves and arrive if possible at their meaning without, in the first instance, reference to cases.". The rule of construction is "to intend the Legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed," The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, 'but the intention of Parliament must be reduced from the language used," for "it is well accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law." Much the same thing is stated by Crawford at page 256, Para.164 and by Halsbury, 3rd Edition, Vol. 35, page 392 para 586 and pages 407 and 408 Para.616 and 617 Judicial precedents are too many. We might note the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Narayana Swami v. Pannerselvam (1972 (3) SCC 717: AIR. 1972 SC. 2284). 5. With the above norms for construction, let us approach our task of construing the Explanation to S.2 clause (52). The controversy hinges on whether the words 'such partition or transfer" occurring in the latter part of the Explanation signify a partition or transfer not only effected after 18-12-57 but also having the effect of reducing the extent of the transferor's holding as indicated in the earlier part of the clause. There was no controversy before us that the relative preposition 'such'-or call it a demonstrative adjective as Counsel for the respondent preferred to call it - must be related back to the relevant part of the clause preceding. What then is the relevant part. Looking to the earlier part, it appears to us that the words' effected after the date mentioned above" in the earlier part of the clause are the only words descriptive of partition or transfer. The words "such extent of land was reduced to the said limit or below" which precede the expression 'partition or transfer' only specify the consequence of the partition or transfer and are not descriptive of these transactions. On the grammatical construction therefore, it seems to us that only the descriptive portion will be taken in by the expression "such", and not the portion providing for the consequence. Therefore the disqualification attaches to every transfer or partition and to every transferee and allottee after 18th December 1957. 6. On the grammatical construction therefore, it seems to us that only the descriptive portion will be taken in by the expression "such", and not the portion providing for the consequence. Therefore the disqualification attaches to every transfer or partition and to every transferee and allottee after 18th December 1957. 6. The above construction seems to possess the advantage or merit that it catches in the net. transfers and partitions made subsequent to the specified date, and disqualifies the transferees or allottees, and does not fasten upon that transaction alone, which reduces the extent of the holding to the limit specified in S.2(52)or below. Counsel for the petitioner stressed that it would be irrational to single out one transaction alone (or those transactions alone) which brings,/bring down the extent of the holding to, or below, the specified limit, and leave the other transactions to pass muster. It was stressed that the object of the Land Reforms Act was to confer fixity of tenure (vide S.13); that all voluntary transfers after the date of publication of the Land Reforms Bill 1963 were to be invalid under S.84 of the Act; that transfers effected between 18-12-1957 and the date of publication of the Kerala Land Reforms Bill 1963 were to be ignored for the purpose of enforcing the surrender of excess laud under S.85(1) (Explanation) of the Act; and that in such circumstances it would be irrational to attribute to the legislature the intention to disqualify only transfers which bring about a diminution to and below, the limit indicated by S.2(52), and leave unpunished transfers effected after the specified date which do not have that effect. We are impressed by the argument. We put to Counsel for the Respondent, why only such transfers effected after 18-12-1957, as have the specified effect have been singled out for visiting a disqualification on the transferee, and whether such an interpretation would not be irrational The only reply was, where the language of the statute is clear it is not our province to iron out irrationality. We do not think the language is so clear. We feel it is capable of an interpretation which avoids this irrationality. We do not think the language is so clear. We feel it is capable of an interpretation which avoids this irrationality. We put it to Counsel for the respondent as to what would be the position where a resourceful and affluent person with extensive lands, executed on one particular date after 18-12-1957, a series of transactions which cumulatively brought about the diminution of extent to, or below, the specified limit. Counsel for the respondent replied that in such cases the vice of the Explanation would attach to the transfer or transfers which, in point of time of execution had the required diminishing effect. We are extremely reluctant to attribute to the legislature an intention to locate the offending transaction by splitting seconds. 7. Our learned brother Vadakkel J. put the illustration of a partition in a Christian family simultaneously disintegrating the extent of the holding to the limits indicated by the Explanation. In such a case, it was asked: would all the allotments stand tarred by the same brush of the provision in the Explanation?; or only any particular allotment/ allotments, which, by splitting seconds in regard to its/ their taking effect, can be said to have the required effect? Counsel had perforce to take the stand that all the allotments effected by one transaction of partition would offend the provisions of the Section. These appear to us to introduce refinements and anomalies, which, we should steer clear of if possible. Faced with such a situation, we might usefully remind ourselves of the well-settled principle of interpretation to opt in favour of the more reasonable and rational construction of a statutory provision. There is enough authority for following this course. It is enough to refer to two recent decisions of the Supreme Court in Jagir Singh & Others v. State of Bihar & Another (AIR. 1976 S.C. 497), and The State of Gujarat v. Chaturbhuj Maganlal (AIR. 976 SC. 1697). On these considerations, we thumb down in favour of the view that any transfer effected on and after 8-12-1957 irrespective of its effect in bringing down the size of the holding will have the disqualifying effect specified in S.2 clause (52). 8. We next turn to the question whether in so interpreting the section, we are on virgin soil or on trodden ground. 8. We next turn to the question whether in so interpreting the section, we are on virgin soil or on trodden ground. We were strongly pressed by Counsel for the respondent that the question had been decided in his favour by the decisions referred to by us in the opening paragraph of the judgment. We shall proceed to consider the same. In C. R. P. No. 909 of 1965 a Division Bench of this Court in a terse judgment observed: "This is a case where the transferor did not become a small-holder by reason of the transfer made by him after 18-12-1957 in favour of the 2nd respondent within the meaning of the first part of the Explanation to S.2 (52) of Act I of 1964, and so the latter part of the Explanation is not attracted. It has therefore to be held that the respondent is a small-bolder. In this view the order fixing fair rent is right and cannot be disturbed. The CRP. is dismissed; no costs." 9. The judgment is unmistakably in favour of the respondent. But from its terseness, we are by no means satisfied that the aspects involved in the construction of the provision which have been highlighted before us, were placed before the Division Bench or considered by it. In the circumstances we cannot accept the said decision as a considered pronouncement on the scope and the amplitude of the Explanation to S.2 clause (52); and it it were, in the light of the aspects now presented for consideration, we would disagree with the said decision and overrule the same. 10. Next we turn to the judgment in C. R. P. 898 of 1966, which was by a Full Bench of three Judges. The question was whether the sakha of the revision petitioner to whom the property in question was allotted in Ext. P1 partition of their tarwad in 1961 would cease to be a 'small holder'. Prior to Ext. P1 the tarwad was not a small-holder. The allotment to the petitioners did not exceed or make up the limit for a small holder indicated in S.2 clause (52) of the Act. The learned judges observed that the Explanation had no application. It was said: "The object of the Explanation is only to prevent fraudulent partition or transfer executed solely to defeat the rights of the tenants under Act I of 1964. The learned judges observed that the Explanation had no application. It was said: "The object of the Explanation is only to prevent fraudulent partition or transfer executed solely to defeat the rights of the tenants under Act I of 1964. When members of a tarwad bonafide partition tarwad properties among themselves it will not be hit by the Explanation to S.2 (52) of the Act. We are therefore of the view that the decision of the court below that the petitioners are not small holders cannot be sustained The petitioners are therefore entitled to the benefit of S.27 (2) (b) of Act 1 of 1964." 11. The question raised and decided was quite different from what confronts us in the present case. Besides, the decision in so far as it laid down that only fraudulent transfers and partitions were within the purview of S.2 (52), was overruled by a Full Bench of Five Judges in 1976 KLT. 547 to be noticed presently. 12. The decision in CRP. 935 of 1966 again did not concern itself with this question. The question there arose on an application filed for fixation of fair rent under S.27 (2) of the Act. The property belonged to a Mana which leased to the revision petitioner in 1120 M. E. It was alleged on partition of the Mana to a member, whose sons, after his death, gifted the same to the respondents in 1958. The donees were small holders and the donors were not, on the date of the gift. The learned judges observed: "When it is admitted that even after the execution of Ext. D1 the donors therein have not become small holders, the inference is that Ext. D1 was not executed by the donors with the object of becoming small holders to defeat the claims of the revision petitioner under Act 1 of 1964 The Explanation to S.2, sub-section (52, of Act I of 1964 is intended to protect tenants only from such fraudulent transactions. Three conditions have to be satisfied for the applicability of the Explanation to Section 2 (52) of the Act. They are: (i) the document is subsequent to 18th December 1957. (ii) that the transferors were persons in possession or had interest in land exceeding the limits mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) of S.2(52) of the Act. Three conditions have to be satisfied for the applicability of the Explanation to Section 2 (52) of the Act. They are: (i) the document is subsequent to 18th December 1957. (ii) that the transferors were persons in possession or had interest in land exceeding the limits mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) of S.2(52) of the Act. (iii) that by such transfer the extent of the transferor's land was reduced to the limit prescribed in clauses (i) and (ii) of S.2(52) of the Act". In the case before us the third condition is not satisfied. The said Explanation is not intended to affect transferees of transactions which are not intended to defeat the rights of the tenants by the transferors becoming small holders because of the transfer. The words 'nor shall such partition or transfer' in the Explanation bring out clearly that the partition or the transfer should satisfy the conditions mentioned in the Explanation A similar view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in CRP. No. 909 of 1965 which we respectfully accept as correct." The decision again, was really concerned with the element of bona fides being a necessary requirement of the partition or transfer contemplated by S 2(52). No doubt, it listed the three ingredients which had to be satisfied before the provision can be attracted. But the aspects now presented were never considered before expounding the scope and amplitude of the provision. We cannot therefore accept the decision as a direct authority on the question of the interpretation of the provision. 13. The decision of the Full Bench of Five Judges in Sankara Guptan v. Padmanabhan (1976 KLT. 547) is undoubtedly binding on us But the same, again, was not directly concerned with expounding the scope of the definition in S.2(52) or highlighting its nuances. It was really concerned, once more with the question whether a fraudulent intention was necessary to vitiate the partition or transfer mentioned in S.2(52), and in particular, with the observations to that effect in CRP. 898 of 1966, which was overruled. 14. For the above reasons, we do not think that precedents fetter our interpreting the concerned provision in the present case. 898 of 1966, which was overruled. 14. For the above reasons, we do not think that precedents fetter our interpreting the concerned provision in the present case. We are of the opinion that a transfer or a partition effected after 18-12-1957 will have the disqualifying effect provided by the Explanation to S.2(52), irrespective of whether it does or does not reduce the extent of the holding to the limits indicated in the said provision. 15. We wish to record our appreciation of the stand taken by the learned Advocate General to whom notice was given, and who supported the stand taken by Counsel for the petitioner which we have accepted. 16. We accordingly allow this Civil Revision Petition, set aside the order of the appellate authority and restore that of the Land Tribunal. We make no order as to costs. Allowed.