YOHANNAN v. THOMAS — 1977 DIGILAW 228 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. The question of law that falls for decision in this revision is whether the period of thirty days specified under sub-rule (2) of R.11 of the Kerala Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules, 1970, hereinafter called the Rules, is to be reckoned from the date of the original order passed by the Land Tribunal, or from the date of the order of the High Court passed on revision under S.103 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, Act 1 of 1964, as amended by Act 35 of 1969, for short the Act. 2. The facts are not in dispute. The petitioner was allowed to resume a portion of the holding held by respondents 1 and 3 under him, on an application filed by him under S.17 and 22 of the Act (as it stood before being amended by Act 35 of 1969, the amendment, however, having no bearing to the dispute). The order of the Tribunal dated 30 61971 provided, inter alia: "The applicant will deposit Rs. 1787.33 towards the value of improvements due to the respondents I and 2 within two months from the date of this order failing which this order will stand cancelled " The order of the Land Tribunal was confirmed in the appeals and revisions filed by the parties. The disposal of the revisions was on 18 91974. Thereafter, on 15101974, the petitioner deposited the value of improvements awarded, and prayed that he be put in possession of the portion allowed to be resumed. The Land Tribunal dismissed the application, holding that the deposit was not made in time, placing reliance on the ruling of this Court reported in 1972 KLJ. 719: KunhiPathu v. Ayshu (1972 KLT. 1014). The Appellate Authority has, in appeal, affirmed the views of the Land Tribunal. 3. Sri. N. Venkatarama Iyer, the counsel for the revision petitioner, submitted that on a harmonious and reasonable construction of he provisions contained in sub-section (2) of S.22 of the Act and sub-rule (2) of R.11 of the Rules, the period of two months allowed for deposit of the amount of compensation awarded is to be deemed to reckon from 18 91974 on which date, on dismissal of the revision, the order of the Tribunal became final, not from 30 61971 on which date the original order of the Tribunal was passed. The counsel also added that in fairness it has to be conceded that only thirty days from the date of the order could have been initially allowed by the Land Tribunal in terms of the relevant provisions; however, that is of little consequence, for the deposit made by the revision petitioner was on 15-10-1974, before the expiry of thirty days from the date of the dismissal of the revision by the High Court, and when the time was to be reckoned from the date of the order of the High Court, it was in time. The further contention of the counsel is that the observation contained in Para.9 of the decision in Kunhipathu v. Ayshu (1972 KLT. 1014), relied on by the Tribunal and the Appellate Authority, is obiter in nature, as that was a case in which the petitioner did rut deposit the amount within thirty days from the date of the disposal of the appeal, and that fact alone was sufficient to hold that there was no deposit within the stipulated period. 4. To support his contentions Sri. Venkatarama Iyer has cited two decisions of the Supreme Court: (1) Income tax Commr. v. Amritlal Bhogilal & Co. (AIR. 1958 SC. 868); and (ii) Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. (AIR. 1963 SC. 1124 =1963 (2) SCR. 563). The counsel also placed reliance on three decisions of this Court: (i) Parvathy Ammal v. Chakunny) 1962 KLT. 655): (ii) Kurien v. Saramma Chacko (1964 KLT. I. F. B) and (iii) Kanakamma v. Sivasankaran Nair (1976 KLT. 911). 5. It is true that the well settled principle is that the order of the Tribunal merges itself with the appellate judgment or revisional order, as the case may be, in cases where such appeal or revision is provided for; and the operative order is such appellate judgment or revisional order, irrespective of whether it affirmed, modified or set aside the order against which the appeal or revision was filed. It is, however, difficult to hold that the Supreme Court has, in the decisions cited, laid down, expressly or even impliedly, that where certain time limit has been fixed from the date of the order of the Tribunal, that time would invariably run from the date of the appellate judgment or revisional order, as the case may be, if such an appeal or revision has been provided for. That question, in fact, did not arise for consideration of the Supreme Court in either of the decisions cited. In the Income tax Case (AIR. 1958 SC. 868), the court while affirming the ruling given by the Bombay High Court in Tejaji's Case (Commr, of Income-tax, Bombay North v. Tejaji Farasram, 1953-23 ITR. 412: AIR. 1954 Bom 93 (A) when an appeal is provided from a decision of the tribunal and the appeal court, after hearing the appeal, passes an order, the order of the original court ceases to exist and is merged in the order of the appeal court; and although the appeal court may merely confirm the order of the trial court, the order that stands and is operative is not the order of the trial court but the order of the appeal court had no need to apply that principle to the facts of the case, as, according to the Supreme Court, an order granting registration to an assessee firm is an independent and separate order, and it merely affects or governs the procedure to be adopted in collecting and remitting the tax found due, and could be cancelled by the Commissioner by virtue of the provisions contained in S 33-B (1) of the Income - Act, 1922, as in the scheme of the Act no appeal could be filed by the Department against the order granting registration, whereas an appeal is provided against the orders passed by the Income tax Officer under S.23 (4) or S.26-A either refusing to register the firm or cancelling registration of the firm In the Custom's case (AIR 1963 SC. 1124:1963 (2) SCR. 563) the respondent's appeal to the Central Board of Revenue under S.188 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (Act 8 of 1878) against the order of the Collector of Customs ended in dismissal. Thereupon the respondent filed a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Calcutta. 1124:1963 (2) SCR. 563) the respondent's appeal to the Central Board of Revenue under S.188 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (Act 8 of 1878) against the order of the Collector of Customs ended in dismissal. Thereupon the respondent filed a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Calcutta. The questions were: (1) whether any writ could issue against the Central Board of Revenue which was a party to the writ petition and which was permanently located outside the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court, and (2) whether, if any writ could issue against the Central Board of Revenue, any writ could be issued against the appellant, which was the original authority to pass the order under challenge, when the appellate authority (namely, the Central Board of Revenue) had merely dismissed the appeal. The High Court held that it had no jurisdiction to issue a writ against the Central Board of Revenue in view of the decision in the case of Saka Venkata Subba Rao (AIR. 1953 SC. 210). On the second question, it held that as the Central Board of Revenue had merely dismissed the appeal against the order of the appellant Collector of Customs, Calcutta) the really operative order was the order of the appellant, which was located within the jurisdiction of the High Court, and therefore it had jurisdiction to pass an order against the Collector of Customs in spite of the tact that that order had been taken in appeal (which was dismissed to the Central Board of Revenue to which no writ could be issued. While disposing of the appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court, the Supreme Court observed as follows. "We have therefore no hesitation in holding consistently with the view taken by this Court in Mudaliar's Case (1955) 2 SCR. 1196 as well as in Messrs. Amritlal Bhogilal's case (1959) SCR 713 that the order of the original authority must be held to have merged in the order of the appellate authority in a case like the present and it is only the order of the appellate authority which is operative after the appeal is disposed of. 1196 as well as in Messrs. Amritlal Bhogilal's case (1959) SCR 713 that the order of the original authority must be held to have merged in the order of the appellate authority in a case like the present and it is only the order of the appellate authority which is operative after the appeal is disposed of. Therefore, if the appellate authority is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court it would not be open to it to issue a writ to the original authority which is within its jurisdiction so long as it cannot issue a writ to the appellate authority. It is not in dispute in this case that no writ could be issued to the appellate authority and in the circumstances the High Court could issue no writ even to the original authority." 6. No question as to whether the time fixed for the fulfilment of the obligations within a specified period from the date of the order of the Tribunal could be reckoned from the judgment of the Appellate Authority or the order of the revisional authority was considered or decided by the Supreme Court in these two cases. 7. There are indications that the Supreme Court did not subscribe to the view that in all cases where time is fixed for performance of certain obligations within certain specified period from the date of the order of the Tribunal, it should invariably be reckoned from the date of the appellate judgment or the revisional order, as the case may be. In the Custom's case (AIR. 1963 SC. 1124:1963 (2) SCR. 563) the respondent before the Supreme Court had placed reliance of the decision in the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Muhammed Nooh ( (1958) SCR. 595). That was a case where a public servant was dismissed on April 20,1948 before the Constitution had come into force. His appeal from the order on dismissal was dismissed in May 1949 which was also before the Constitution came into force. His revision against the order in the appeal was dismissed on April 22,1950, when the Constitution had come into force, and the question that arose in that case was whether the dismissed public servant could take advantage of the provisions of the Constitution because the revisional order had been passed after the Constitution came into force. His revision against the order in the appeal was dismissed on April 22,1950, when the Constitution had come into force, and the question that arose in that case was whether the dismissed public servant could take advantage of the provisions of the Constitution because the revisional order had been passed after the Constitution came into force. In that case, the Supreme Court bad held that the order of dismissal passed on April 20, 1948 could not be said to have merged in the orders in appeal and in revision. It was pointed out that the order of dismissal was operative on its own strength as from April 20,1948 and the public servant stood dismissed as from that date; therefore it was a case of dismissal before the Constitution came into force, and the public servant could not take advantage of the provisions of the Constitution, in view of the fact that his dismissal had taken place before the Constitution had come into force. The point raised was dealt with by Wanchoo J. who spoke for the Bench as follows: "... As was pointed out in Madan Gopal Rungta's case ( (1962) (Supp.) 3 SCR. 906) Mohammad Nooh's case ( (1958) SCR 595) was a special case, which stands on its own facts. The question there was whether a writ under Art.226 could be issued in respect of a dismissal which was effective from 1948. The relief that was being sought was against an order of dismissal which came into existence before the Constitution came into force and remained effective all along even after the dismissal of the appeal and the revision from that order. It was in those special circumstances that this Court held that the dismissal had taken place in 1948 and it could not be the subject-matter of consideration under Art.226 of the Constitution, for that would be giving retrospective effect to the Article. The argument based on the principle of merger was repelled by this Court in that case on two grounds, namely, (1) that the principle of merger applicable to decrees of courts would not be applicable to departmental tribunals, and (ii) that the original order would be operative on its own strength and did not gain greater efficacy by the subsequent order of dismissal of the appeal or revision. In effect, this means that even if the principle of merger were applicable loan order of dismissal like the one in Mohammed Nooh's case ( (1958) SCR 595), the fact would still remain that the dismissal was before the Constitution came into force and therefore the person dismissed could not take advantage of the provisions of the Constitution, so far as that dismissal was concerned. That case was not concerned with the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court where the original authority is within such territorial jurisdiction while the appellate authority is not, and must therefore be confined to the special facts with which it was dealing " 8. Sri V. N. Swaminathan, the counsel for respondents 1 and 2, submitted that it is absolutely wrong to conclude that the Supreme Court has laid down in the two decisions referred to by the counsel for the revision petitioner that the time within which certain obligations are required or ordered to be performed, when fixed within certain period from the date of the order of the Tribunal, shall run only from the date of the appellate judgment or the revisional order, and sought support for that position from the decision of the Supreme Court in Sital Parshad v. Kishori Lal (AIR. 1967 S. C. 1236) wherein, dealing with an appeal arising out of a mortgage suit, Wanchoo J., who spoke for the Bench, (as in the Customs case (AIR. 1963 S. C. 1124: 1963 (2) SCR. 563)) observed, in Para.14 of the judgment, as follows: "Further we are of opinion that in a case where an appeal from the preliminary decree is dismissed and the preliminary decree is confirmed in toto, it does not follow that the period of payment allowed in the trial Court's decree is extended automatically even though a final decree has been passed in the meantime. It seems to us that it is the duty of the appellate Court to indicate when dismissing the appeal from a preliminary decree in toto whether the time for payment is to be extended and if it does not do so, the original time granted for the purpose must stand. It seems to us that it is the duty of the appellate Court to indicate when dismissing the appeal from a preliminary decree in toto whether the time for payment is to be extended and if it does not do so, the original time granted for the purpose must stand. In the present case the decree passed in appeal from preliminary decree shows that after setting out the decree of the trial court, all that the appellate Court did was to say that the preliminary decree passed by the trial Court was amended to this extent that the plaintiff would also be entitled to interest at Rs. 6 per cent on the principal amount from the date of the suit till the date of the decree and also gave the plaintiff costs of the appeal. There was no direction for preparation of any fresh preliminary decree; nor was there any direction for changing the period fixed in the preliminary decree for payment of the amount. Where, therefore the appellate Court in an appeal from a preliminary decree says nothing about the time fixed for payment and confirms the preliminary decree in toto that time, in our opinion, stands and does not automatically get extended for six months or such other period as might have been fixed in the preliminary decree from the dot e of the decree in appeal from the preliminary decree-" (emphasis supplied). 9. Sri Swaminathan's reasoning is that the order for resumption is in the nature of a preliminary decree for redemption, and where the payment is not made within the stipulated period, the right to resume or redeem shall stand cancelled unless in cases where extension has been granted according to law prescribed in that behalf. In this connection he pointed out that the effect of nonpayment of the amount of compensation ordered under S.22(2) of the Act read with R.11(2) of the Rules would be the cancellation of the order for resumption, by virtue of the provisions contained in S.22(8) of the Act which lays down. "Where a landlord fails to deposit the amounts in accordance with the directions of the Land Tribunal, the order of resumption shall be treated as cancelled and the landlord shall have no further right for resumption." (emphasis supplied). "Where a landlord fails to deposit the amounts in accordance with the directions of the Land Tribunal, the order of resumption shall be treated as cancelled and the landlord shall have no further right for resumption." (emphasis supplied). Sub-s. (2) of S.22 reads as follows : "The Land Tribunal shall duly enquire into the application and pass appropriate orders thereon. Where the order allows resumption, it shall specify the extent and location of the land allowed to be resumed, the rent payable in respect of the portion, if any, that would be left after resumption and such other particulars as may be prescribed and directing the landlord to make, within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed, payments to extinguish the rights of the cultivating tenant and the intermediaries, if any, who would be affected by such resumption." (emphasis supplied) Rule 11(2) of the Rules provides "The order referred to in sub-rule (1) shall also specify the amounts to be paid by the landlord resuming the land, and the persons to whom the payments are to be made, and shall further direct that the amounts shall be deposited with the Land Tribunal within a period of thirty days from the date of the order; and on such deposit being made, the Land Tribunal shall pay the amounts to the parties and obtain receipt therefore' (emphasis supplied). Rule 11(3) of the Rules states "The order of the appellate authority against the order of the Land Tribunal under sub-s. (2) of S.22 shall, to far as may be, specify the particulars mentioned in the said subsection and also the particulars mentioned in sub-rules (1) and (2)." 10. Rule 11(3) of the Rules states "The order of the appellate authority against the order of the Land Tribunal under sub-s. (2) of S.22 shall, to far as may be, specify the particulars mentioned in the said subsection and also the particulars mentioned in sub-rules (1) and (2)." 10. The counsel also pointed out that if the revision petitioner was vigilant and keen to keep alive the order of the Land Tribunal passed under S.22(2) of the Act, without taking the risk of it being got cancelled by the operation of S.22(8) of the Act, he should have, before the expiry of the time specified, invoked sub-s. (3) of S.22, which provided: "The Land Tribunal may, for sufficient reasons, extend the time prescribed under sub-s. (2) for making payments by the landlord." The Appellate Authority, by virtue of the provisions contained in S.102(3) of the Act, is competent to exercise all the powers which a Court has, and shall follow the same procedure which a Court follows in deciding appeals from a decree of an original Court under the Code of Civil Procedure; and so also, by virtue of the provisions contained in S.103(2) the High Court has power to make necessary modifications to the order passed by the Land Tribunal or the Appellate Authority. It is therefore clear that the Land Tribunal could have extended the time under S.22(3) of the Act before the expiry of the period for deposit of the amount fixed under S.22(2); the Appellate Authority could have granted time which the Tribunal was competent to grant; and the revisional Court also could have modified the order in cases where the Appellate Authority had decided erroneously or failed to decide any question of law. When the Appellate Authority declined to give a fresh life of time in exercise of the power under S.102(3) of the Act, and the order of the revisional Court is silent about the time within which the deposit was to be made, the principle that the order of the Tribunal would get itself merged with the judgment of the Appellate Authority, and later with the revisional order, by itself could be of little use to justify the position that the the time fixed for deposit of the amount would run only from the date of the final order by the High Court. The Supreme Court has, in Sital Parshad's case (AIR. The Supreme Court has, in Sital Parshad's case (AIR. 1967 S.C.1236), in spite of the appellate decree varying the preliminary decree with respect to interest, held that, when a final decree had already been passed on the basis of the preliminary decree in the meanwhile, there was no need for passing a fresh final decree after the appellate decree, in the absence of specific direction therein in that behalf. The position is almost analogous here. Before the appellate authority as well as the revisional court disposed of the matter (confirming the order of the Tribunal in toto), the order of resumption stood cancelled, without being capable of being revived, by the operation of S.22(8) of the Act. It is doubtful whether even the appellate authority would have the power to grant time, or the grant of such time would be of any material consequence, when, in the meanwhile by operation of S.22(8) of the Act, the order passed under S.22(2) stood cancelled. It will not, however, be necessary here to consider such an extreme position, as admittedly the Appellate Authority or the revisional authority did not interfere with the order of the Land Tribunal in any respect, including the time for deposit of the amount fixed in that order. In other words, when the order of the Land Tribunal got itself merged with the judgment of the Appellate Authority and the order of the revisional court, that includes the time for payment fixed thereunder, as the Appellate judgment or the revisional order gave no positive indication that toe time fixed for deposit of the amount by the Land Tribunal was deleted, modified, or substituted by the Appellate Authority or the High court. The position, therefore, is that when the Appellate Authority and the High Court confirmed the order of the Land Tribunal, it includes the time fixed for the deposit of the amount of compensation as fixed by the Tribunal, in the absence of an order by the Appellate Authority or the revisional court that the time fixed by the Land Tribunal has been superseded. This is particularly so in this case, as I am informed by the counsel for the parties, that the operation of the order of the Land Tribunal was not stayed either by the Appellate Authority or by the High Court. 11. This is particularly so in this case, as I am informed by the counsel for the parties, that the operation of the order of the Land Tribunal was not stayed either by the Appellate Authority or by the High Court. 11. In Jaggar Nath Pande v. Jokhu Tewari (ILR.18 Allahabad 223) the facts were like this: A decree was given in favour of the plaintiff in a suit for pre-emption. The plaintiff paid in a portion only of the pre-emptive price within the time limited by the decree. The defendant appealed. Long after the time prescribed by the original decree for payment had expired, the defendant's appeal was dismissed, but the time for payment was not extended by the Appellate Court's decree. The plaintiff then, after the lapse of period from the date of the appellate decree in excess of that which had been given to him for payment by the decree of the first Court, paid in the balance of the pre-emptive price, which was accepted by the Court. On appeal by the defendant from the Court's order directing the balance of the pre-emptive price to be received, it was held that the order of the Court allowing the payment was without jurisdiction, the decree having, on the expiration of the time limited without payment by the plaintiff, become a decree in favour of the defendant. 12. In Chiranji Lal & others v. Dharam Singh (ILR.18 Allahabad 455) the Allahabad High Court has held as follows. "When a decree gives a right of redemption within a certain specified period with a certain specified result to follow if redemption is not made within such period, the mere fact of an appeal being preferred against it will not suspend the operation of such decree, and unless the appellate court extends the period limited by the original decree, the right -of redemption will be barred if not exercised within the period so limited." 13.In Mahant Ishwargar v. Chudasama Manabhai (ILR. XIII Bombay 106) a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, in an appeal arising out of a mortgage suit, held: "even if the Court bad power to enlarge time in the course of execution, the mere fact that the plaintiff had lodged an appeal, would afford no special ground for enlarging the time." 14. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Ali Mamud v. Miarish (AIR. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Ali Mamud v. Miarish (AIR. 1918 Calcutta 424) in an appeal arising out of a mortgage suit held: "In a decree for foreclosure the period of time allowed to the mortgagor to redeem runs from the date of the decree of the Court of first instance, unless in an appeal from the decree the appellate Court enlarges the time.". 15. I will now proceed to examine the applicability of the three decisions of this Court cited, to the facts of the case on hand. All the three decisions are seen to have been rendered in appeals or revisions arising out of proceedings for eviction under the particular Rent Control Acts, relevant for the respective cases. It is also noted that in the case of decisions reported in Parvathy Ammal v Chakunny (1962 KLT 655) and Kurien v Saramma Chacko (1964 KLT,1 F.B.) during the pendency of the proceedings legislation bad intervened to confer new or additional benefits on the tenants. The main question that fell for decision by Velu Pillai J. in Parvathy Ammal v. Chakunny (1962 KLT. 655) was whether the Appellate Authority had power to vacate the order of eviction in exercise of the power under S 11(2) (b) of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Ordinance (1959, Kerala). It was held by the learned judge as follows: "There is no express limitation on the exercise of the power by the appellate authority, but impliedly there must be a limitation which is inherent in its constitution or position as an appellate body. But the power of vacating an order for eviction on deposit being made, is a power which may well be exercised by the appellate authority. In this view the action of the appellate authority in vacating the order for eviction on the deposit being made cannot be impugned as devoid of jurisdiction." This decision, obviously, has no application to the facts of the present case, as nobody has a case that in the present case either the Appellate Authority or the revisional court has by a positive direction extended the period originally fixed by the Land Tribunal. There is also no controversy as to whether the Appellate Authority or the High Court was devoid of such jurisdiction. 16. There is also no controversy as to whether the Appellate Authority or the High Court was devoid of such jurisdiction. 16. In Kurien v. Saramma Chacko (1964 KLT 1 FB.) the tenant (appellant in the writ appeal) was confronted with a situation where he was threatened to be evicted from the building in his occupation, even though the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Ordinance III of 1959, and the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act XVI of 1959 which replaced it, conferred on the tenant the right to continue in occupation of the building in spite of there being an order of eviction against him on the ground of arrears of rent, provided he deposited the arrears of rent within one month of the order of eviction and got the said order vacated. In Para.4 of the judgment it has been stated as follows: "In the case before us the original order of eviction was passed on the 16th September, 1958, that is, before Act 16 of 1959 came into force. It was only under the new Ordinance and the new Act that the tenant obtained the right to deposit the arrears of rent, cost, etc., and to pray for vacating the order of eviction; and the revision petition filed by him against the order of eviction was pending when this new right was conferred. Within three days of the dismissal of the revision petition confirming the order of eviction the deposit contemplated by S.11(2)(b) was made. The question for consideration is whether that deposit was in time and the tenant was entitled to the benefits of that sub-section. If we give a strict construction to S.11(2) (b), the deposit should have been made within a month of the order of the original Rent Control Court. In this case when the original order of eviction was passed, the tenant had no right to deposit the arrears and claim to vacate the said order. If we give a strict construction to S.11(2) (b), the deposit should have been made within a month of the order of the original Rent Control Court. In this case when the original order of eviction was passed, the tenant had no right to deposit the arrears and claim to vacate the said order. That right was conferred on the tenant only by the new legislation and therefore, in such a case as the one before us, the tenant cannot get any relief if the section is strictly construed." After pointing out, in the previous paragraphs, the anomalies and absurdities that would result by adhering to a strict construction of the relevant clause, what has been said in Para.10 is "It cannot be seriously disputed that the intention of the legislature was to confer on tenants, whose only fault was to have kept rent in arrears, a right to deposit all arrears, cost, etc., and claim to vacate the order of eviction passed against them. There is no justification for thinking that the legislative intent was only to confer such rights on tenants against whom eviction orders were passed by the original Rent Control Court and not by the appellate or the revisional authorities. If that legislative intent of the statute is clear, we do not think there is any difficulty in not strictly adhering to the definition of the expression 'the Rent Control Court', especially if the definition conflicts with the context." Paragraph 13 at page 7 concludes with the following sentence: "Moreover, in a case where courts are dealing with a beneficial legislation intended for the protection of tenants, if there is any doubt about the meaning of a provision, it should be resolved in favour of the tenants, (Vide, for the last proposition Jivabhai Purshottam v Chhagan Karson AIR. 1961 S. C. 1491)." 17. The main question that came up for consideration in Kanakamma v. Sivasankaran Nair (1976 KLT. 911) was whether the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is confined to the tour corners of S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore the principle of merger that is usually applied in the case of orders and decrees passed in appeal is not available in the case of orders passed in revision. 911) was whether the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is confined to the tour corners of S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore the principle of merger that is usually applied in the case of orders and decrees passed in appeal is not available in the case of orders passed in revision. As has already been stated, this again is a case which arose out of proceedings for eviction of tenant under the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The question of law posed before this Court, as well as the provisions of the enactment involved, not being identical, I do not think that this decision also is of much assistance to the revision petitioner in this case. 18. As has already been noticed, the observations of Raghavan J. (as he was then) in the Full Bench case, Kurien v. Saramma Chacko (1964 KLT. 1), was that while construing the provisions of the statute, if the legislative intent is clear, it should prevail over the legislative definition which is found to be in conflict with is (legislative intent). The scheme and the legislative purpose of the Kerala Land Reforms Act is to confer fixity of tenure on cultivating tenants, making the tiller of the soil the owner. The provisions contained in S.14 to 22 of the Act are rather in the nature of a deviation from the professed object of the Act, and the intention of the legislature must have been to have the provisions contained strictly construed, so that the benefit conferred on the cultivating tenant by the other provisions of the Act should not be defeated by giving a liberal interpretation in favour of the landlord. This appears to be so particularly on a comparison of the provisions contained in S.22 (2) on the one hand, with the provisions contained in S.72H (2) and 80C (2) of the Act on the other,. This appears to be so particularly on a comparison of the provisions contained in S.22 (2) on the one hand, with the provisions contained in S.72H (2) and 80C (2) of the Act on the other,. In R.11 (2) of the Rules the expression used in regard to the deposit of the amount is: "shall further direct that the amounts shall be deposited with the Land Tribunal within a period of thirty days from the date of the order;" whereas in S.72H (2) the wording is as follows: "The amount of compensation payable under sub-section (1) in respect of a holding shall be paid in cash in lump within a period of one year of the date on which the order of the Land Tribunal under sub-section (5) of S.72F has become final." This expression'when the order became final' found in S.72H (2) is seen to have been employed in S.80C (2) also; and the absence of such an expression in R.11 (2) of the Rules (framed under S.22 of the Act) is of considerable significance. It is therefore reasonable to infer that the intention of the legislature was not to give to the landlord time for depositing the compensation awarded till the order becomes final The expression "such declaration or finding became final" is used also in clause (b) of second proviso to S.3 (I) (iv) of the Act. The legislature has also made a provision for getting the time enlarged at the discretion of the Land Tribunal before the time originally fixed expires as is seen in S.22 (3) of the Act. The reasonable inference to be drawn is that where the legislative intent was that the time fixed was to run from the date on which the order or declaration became final, it would have been specifically stated so; and in the absence of any such indication, it is to be presumed that the time fixed is to run from the date of the original order of the Tribunal. Therefore, when the landlord did not seek extension of time invoking S.22 (3) of the Act, or a stay from the Appellate Authority or the revisional court, as the case may be, but did allow the order of resumption passed by the Land Tribunal to be treated as cancelled, he did so at the peril of bis losing the right for resumption once for all. 19. 19. The scheme of the Rent Control Act and that of the Land Reforms Act in many respects are not the same. As far as S 11 (2) (b) of the Rent Control Act is concerned, the prohibition is against the landlord executing the order of eviction within one month from the date of the order. The requirement under S.22 (2) of. the Act read with R.11 (2) of the Rules is that unless the obligation regarding the deposit of the compensation amount is performed within thirty days from the order, the land owner was to lose the right of resumption. In the decisions reported in Parvathy Ammal v. Chackunny (1962 KLT 655) and Kurien v. Saramma Chacko (1964 KLT 1 FB.) this Court did not adhere to strict construction of the relevant clauses in order to give effect to the legislative intent, which was to provide relief to tenants threatened with the order of eviction on the ground of arrears of rent, provided that the arrears of rent ordered was paid or deposited within the stipulated period. 20. Sub-section (6) of S.72H lays down that when the amount of compensation is not paid on or before the period of one year specified in sub-section (2) of that Section, such amount shall bear interest at the rate of four percent per annum from the date of expiry of the said period of one year. Sub-section (6) of S.80C of the Act is to the effect that the instalments of the purchase price payable by the kudikidappukaran, if not deposited on the due date, shall be a first charge on the land to which purchase relates and shall be recoverable together with interest as provided under S.801) under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act for the time being in force, and S 80D provides that if any instalment of the purchase price payable by the kudikidappukaran is not deposited on the due date, the amount of such instalment shall bear interest at the rate of four and a half per cent per annum from that date till the date of the deposit of that instalment. There is, as it is, no provision for the automatic cancellation of the purchase order for default in payment of the instalment of purchase price in the case of purchase of landlord's rights under S.72B. or kudikidappu right under S.80C, sub-sec. There is, as it is, no provision for the automatic cancellation of the purchase order for default in payment of the instalment of purchase price in the case of purchase of landlord's rights under S.72B. or kudikidappu right under S.80C, sub-sec. (3) of S.80C having been omitted from 25-3-1976 by Act XV of 1976; and by providing the extreme penalty of cancellation of the resumption order and the deprival of the right to renew the application for resumption under S.22(8) of the Act, the legislature has clearly indicated that default on the part of the landlord should not be countenanced It has therefore to be concluded that unlike in the Rent Control case dealt with in Kurien v. Saramma Chacko (1976 KLT.1 F.B.) in the present case to give effect to the legislative intent the relevant provisions have to be construed strictly without leaning towards the landlord. 21. Viewed in the background of the legislative intent and the professed object of the land reforms, the provisions contained in sub-sections (3) and (8) of S.22 of the Act read with R.11(2) of the Rules, also bearing in mind that the resumption provisions are really in the nature of a deviation from the main trend of the legislative purpose of the Act, what emerges from the discussion above is that there is absolutely no justification for giving a liberal construction to these provisions in favour of the landlord, particularly so, when, with due diligence the resumption order could have been kept alive by resorting to the provisions contained in S.22(3) of the Act before the order got itself cancelled and/or also by obtaining appropriate interim orders and/or final directions from the Appellate Authority or the High Court, as the case may be, at the appropriate stages. This view I take is in accordance with the principles laid down in Sital Parshad & another v. Kishori Lal AIR. 1967 S. C.1236); Mahant Ishwargar v. chudasama ILR. XIII Bombay 106); Jaggar Nath Pande v. Jokhu Tewari (ILR. XVIII Allahabad 223); Chiranji Lal v. Dharam Singh (ILR. XVIII Allahabad 455); and Ali Mamud v. Miarish (AIR. 1918 Calcutta 424). The principle of merger of the order of the Tribunal with the appellate judgment as laid down by the Supreme Court in Income tax Commr. v. Amritlal Bhogilal & Co. (AIR. 1958 S. C. 868) and Collector of Customs, Calcutta v East India Commercial Co. XVIII Allahabad 455); and Ali Mamud v. Miarish (AIR. 1918 Calcutta 424). The principle of merger of the order of the Tribunal with the appellate judgment as laid down by the Supreme Court in Income tax Commr. v. Amritlal Bhogilal & Co. (AIR. 1958 S. C. 868) and Collector of Customs, Calcutta v East India Commercial Co. Ltd (1963 (2) SCR. 563) cannot be interpreted to mean that the time fixed in the original order fixed by the court for performance of certain obligations would stand deleted, modified or substituted, without the appellate authority or the revisional court giving any indication to that effect in the appellate judgment or revisional order. The ruling given in the rent control cases by this Court in Parvathy Ammal v. Chakunny (1962 KLT. 655), Kurien v. Saramma Chacko (1964 KLT.1 F. B.) and Kanakamma v. Sivasankaran Nair (1976 KLT. 911; will have no application as the relevant provisions considered, and the background and the circumstances in those cases, are not identical to those involved in the present case, and the legislative intent also is different. The observation in Para.9 in Kunhi Pathu v. Ayshu (1972 KLT. 1014) that the time for deposit of the amount within a specified period from the date of the order of the Tribunal cannot be constructed to run from the date of the judgment of the Appellate Authority, relied on by the Land Tribunal and the Appellate Authority, appears to be correct. In my view, the revision petitioner has not made out a case for reconsideration of the ruling relied on by the Land Tribunal and the Appellate Authority. For the foregoing reasons the revision fails, and is dismissed, however, in the circumstances of the, case without any order as to costs. Allowed.