JUDGMENT Anil Kumar Sen, J. 1. This is the plaintiff's appeal arising out of a suit for declaration and injunction which was dismissed by the learned Judge, 4th Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta, on 28.3.1972. In the suit the plaintiff sought for a declaration of his tenancy right in respect of a shop room at Premises No. 74, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road, and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 from executing a decree for eviction earlier obtained by them in ejectment Suit No. 1315/61. 2. The plaintiff's case shortly was that the defendant No.3 and another partner of his were carrying on a business in the firm name, M/s. Hindusthan Furnishers in the suit premises held in tenancy right under one late Surabala Mitra who died leaving a will in favour of the defendant No.2 making the defendant No.1 as the executor. The plaintiff, it is claimed, with the knowledge and consent of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 purchased the assets and goodwill along with the tenancy right of the above firm Hindusthan Furnishers from the two partners by a registered deed of sale dated 15.11.1965, and since such purchase he had been in occupation of the suit premises carrying on the business there on payment of rents to defendants Nos. 1 and 2. The plaintiff claimed that he paid 12 months' rent for the year 1966 in advance at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month to the said defendants Nos. 1 and 2 on 30.11.1965, and the same was accepted by the said defendants thereby acknowledging the plaintiff to be a tenant with effect from 1.1.1966. Since then he continued to pay rent to the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 up to the, month of January, 1969. But the rent for the month of February, 1969 being tendered, the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 did not accept the same and, on the other hand, he came to learn of the issue of a notice under Order 21, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the said defendants had started an execution case, being Execution Case No. 128/69 for recovering possessions of the suit premises. Hence, the plaintiff instituted the aforesaid suit for a declaration of his tenancy right in the suit premises and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 from proceeding with the execution. 3. Hence, the plaintiff instituted the aforesaid suit for a declaration of his tenancy right in the suit premises and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 from proceeding with the execution. 3. The suit was contested by the contesting respondents, defendants Nos. 1 and 2, who filed a joint written statement. They came with a bold defence that the suit is not a bonafide one and that the plaintiff did not purchase the firm from its partners. On the other hand, according to the defendants, they had earlier obtained a decree for possession on compromise in ejectment Suit No. 1315/61 against the partners of the firm, the alleged vendors of the plaintiff and on the terms of the said compromise decree they were entitled to recover possession on the expiry of 31.1.1969, and as such, the execution was started, but it is the judgment-debtors who in order to avoid delivery of possession in execution of the decree, had set up the plaintiff, who was none else than an employee of theirs as a purchaser of the firm, for instituting the aforesaid suit, the only object behind the same being to delay and defeat the execution. The defendants strongly denied the plaintiff's case that any rent was accepted by them from the plaintiff. They, however, acknowledged the receipt of a sum of Rs. 480/- on 30.11.1965, but that towards the damages for use and occupation, from the judgment-debtors and in terms of the decree. The subsequent amounts of Rs. 40/- that they had realized month by month up to January, 1969 were all so realized strictly in terms of the compromise decree as payment of damages for use and occupation from the judgment-debtors and none from the plaintiff. The defendants further denied the plaintiff's suggestion of they being parties to any fraud being practiced upon the plaintiff in inducing him to make the purchase, of the firm and the alleged tenancy right in the suit premises. 4. Defendant No.3, who was one of the judgment-debtors, filed a written statement acknowledging the sale in favour of the plaintiff but did not contest the suit. On the pleadings as aforesaid, three issues were raised:- "1. Has the plaintiff the alleged tenancy right in the disputed premises under the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 ? 2. Can the plaintiff get in order for injunction as prayed for ? 3. On the pleadings as aforesaid, three issues were raised:- "1. Has the plaintiff the alleged tenancy right in the disputed premises under the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 ? 2. Can the plaintiff get in order for injunction as prayed for ? 3. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ?" At the trial the plaintiff examined himself and relied on certain documentary evidence, more particularly, the alleged rent receipts, Ext.2 series and the deed of sale, Ext.1. The decree in the ejectment Suit No. 1315/61 was made an exhibit, being Ext.4. The contesting defendants also led evidence and had themselves examined in support of their defence. 5. The learned Judge on consideration of the evidence upheld the defence case of the sale in favour of the plaintiff to be a sham transaction. In any event, the learned Judge found that the alleged purchase was made on 15.11.1965, that is, long after the decree in the ejectment Suit No. 1315/61 as against the vendors of the plaintiff which decree having determined the tenancy, the plaintiff could acquire no tenancy in the suit premises by such purchase. So far as the plaintiff's case of he being accepted as a tenant by the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 by acceptance of rent from him is concerned, the learned Judge came to a positive finding that no such rent was ever realized from the plaintiff by either of the contesting defendants in respect of the suit premises. Even the receipts relied on by the plaintiff clearly established that all those realizations were realizations strictly• in terms of the compromise decree itself towards damages for use and occupation of the suit premises by the judgment-debtors. On the findings as aforesaid, the learned Judge answered the first issue against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2. 6. So far as the second issue is concerned, the learned Judge necessarily came to the conclusion that, when the plaintiff fails to establish his claim of tenancy right in respect of the suit premises and since no other ground could be made out, there is no reason why there could be an injunction restraining the defendants from proceeding with the execution of the decree in ejectment Suit No. 1315/61 which was put to execution in Title Execution Case No. 128/69. The second issue was accordingly answered against the plaintiff. 7. The second issue was accordingly answered against the plaintiff. 7. So far as the third issue is concerned, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that on the facts pleaded and proved the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief whatsoever. 8. The suit was accordingly dismissed with costs as against the contesting defendants. 9. It would, however, appear from the judgment that at the hearing of the suit an issue was sought to be raised which was not supported by the pleading to the effect that the decree for eviction having been passed on compromise, must be considered to be a nullity in view of the provisions of section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, which bars the jurisdiction of the Court to pass any decree except on the grounds specified therein. This point was, however, not allowed to be raised by the learned Judge in the trial court on the view that the plaintiff not being the judgment-debtor has no locus standi to challenge the decree. The learned Judge further observed that even if the decree be assumed to be a nullity, even then the plaintiff cannot get any relief in the suit since the transfer of the tenancy right in his favour was without the consent in writing of the landlord and as such, was not lawful. 10. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree of the trial court, the plaintiff has preferred the present appeal. Mr. Banerjee appearing in support of this appeal has not assailed the findings arrived at by the learned Judge in the court below except as regards the learned Judge's finding that the plaintiff is not entitled in law to challenge the decree as a nullity and got a declaration on the basis thereof and an injunction as prayed for. Mr. Banerjee has strongly contended that on the face of the decree Ext.4 it is quite evident that the Court which passed the said decree, did it merely on compromise and not on any consideration as to whether there existed any ground to support such a decree within the sanction of section 13 of the Act. Such a decree, Mr. Mr. Banerjee has strongly contended that on the face of the decree Ext.4 it is quite evident that the Court which passed the said decree, did it merely on compromise and not on any consideration as to whether there existed any ground to support such a decree within the sanction of section 13 of the Act. Such a decree, Mr. Banerjee contends, is on its face a nullity and the plaintiff as the purchaser of the firm itself in whose name the tenancy stood was entitled to challenge the decree as a nullity and claim an injunction as prayed for. 11. In our considered opinion, however, the point thus raised by Mr. Banerjee must fail on two fold reasons. In the first place, if we uphold the finding of the learned Judge of the trial court that the alleged purchase of the firm, its assets and the tenancy by the plaintiff was itself a sham transaction, then in that event, the plaintiff acquired no right, title or interest on the oasis whereof he could be entitled to challenge the decree which admittedly was passed against the partners carrying on the business in the firm named M/s. Hindusthan Furnishers. In our view, on the finding of the learned Judge in respect of issue No.1 he was right in his conclusion that the plaintiff had no locus standi to challenge the decree which could be challenged only by the judgment-debtors or their representatives. This being the position and the appeal being an appeal on facts, we must consider whether the findings of the learned Judge in this respect are correct or not. 12. The plaintiff in the plaint claims that such a purchase was made on 15.11.1965, on payment of consideration specified in the deed with the knowledge and consent of defendants Nos. 1 and 2. The defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have denied that they ever gave any consent and it would be highly improbable for the said defendants who had obtained earlier a decree for possession against the plaintiff's alleged vendors, to give any such consent. On the other hand, according to the defendants, the plaintiff is none else than an employee of the judgment-debtors who had been set up by the judgment-debtors themselves only at a late stage when the period specified in the decree has expired and the defendants became entitled to recover possession. On the other hand, according to the defendants, the plaintiff is none else than an employee of the judgment-debtors who had been set up by the judgment-debtors themselves only at a late stage when the period specified in the decree has expired and the defendants became entitled to recover possession. Moreover as has been rightly pointed to out by the learned Judge in the trial Court, there is a serious inconsistency between the case as made in the plaint on this point and the recitals in the said deed. There was material alteration as to date of execution in the deed and the recital in the deed goes to show that the consideration was paid on 6.9.1965, and on that date the firm with its assets and the tenancy right was sold off to the plaintiff. Obviously, 6.9.1965 was intended to be the date of such sale which, however, was executed long thereafter on 15.11.1965, and the only explanation given by the plaintiff in his evidence before the court for the delay is that the deed could not be executed earlier as the considerations could not be secured. This statement undermines the document materially and lands support to the defence case that the entire thing was not a genuine one. Moreover, if the plaintiff had really purchased the firm with its assets and the tenancy right on 6.9.1965, or even on 15.11.1965, it stands to no reason why even upon the plaintiff's own admission rent for the tenancy would be paid by the plaintiff only from January, 1966 and the rent upto December, 1965 would be paid by the original vendors. Moreover, the learned Judge in the trial court was perfectly justified in his finding that at no stage from November, 1965 till January, 1969 did the plaintiff ever pay any amount as rent. The relevant receipts in Ext.2 series would go to show in unequivocal terms that what was being paid and realized was damages in terms of the compromise decree itself. Upon the plaintiff's own case these amounts were paid by him and it would be difficult for the Court to accept the position that a bonafide purchaser as the plaintiff claims himself to be would ever accept receipts on such terms although what he paid is claimed to be payment of rent. Upon the plaintiff's own case these amounts were paid by him and it would be difficult for the Court to accept the position that a bonafide purchaser as the plaintiff claims himself to be would ever accept receipts on such terms although what he paid is claimed to be payment of rent. These circumstances and materials together with the fact that the plaintiff at no point of time for over 4 years did ever set up any claim of his tenancy as a purchaser of the firm assures the court in accepting the defence case and in holding that the alleged purchase itself is a sham transaction which had been created by the judgment-debtors with the ulterior object of delaying and defeating the execution which would follow on the expiry of the time specified in the compromise decree. We, therefore affirm the finding of the learned Judge that the alleged purchase by the plaintiff was not a bona fide transaction: it was purely a sham transaction. This conclusion of ours, therefore, furnishes the foundation for upholding the trial Judge's view that the plaintiff has no locus standi to challenge the decree even on the ground that the same is it nullity as claimed by Mr. Banerjee appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant. 13. The said objection must, in our opinion, also fail for another reason. Mr. Banerjee claims that when in the decree or in the petition of compromise there is nothing to show that there existed any ground within the sanction of section 13 of the Act for eviction of a tenant, the decree must be taken to be a decree passed merely on compromise and such a decree being contrary to the provisions of section 13, is a nullity. It is a nullity, according to Mr. Banerjee, because section 13 debars the court from passing any such decree where ground sanctioned by the said section is not in existence and when the Court does not satisfy itself about the existence of such a ground. Mr. Banerjee naturally relies on a number of decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Ferozi Lal Jain vs. Man Mal & another, AIR 1970 SC 794 , Sm. Mr. Banerjee naturally relies on a number of decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Ferozi Lal Jain vs. Man Mal & another, AIR 1970 SC 794 , Sm. Kaushalya Devi vs. K.L. Bansal, AIR 1970 SC 838 , K.K. Chari vs. R.M. Sashadri, AIR 1973 SC 1311 , Nagindas Ramdas vs. Dalpatram Echaram, AIR 1974 SC 471 and Roshanlal vs. Madan Lal, AIR 1975 SC 2130 . In our view, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in this respect are quite well settled on the very decisions relied on by Mr. Banerjee. It cannot be disputed for a moment that where there exists no ground within the sanction of section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 no decree could be passed by any Court, be it on contest or on compromise. If the court passes a decree where no such ground exists only because the landlord and the tenant had agreed between themselves to the passing of such a decree the decree would be a nullity. But what Mr. Banerjee fails to appreciate is that such a ground need not always appear on the face of the decree or on the petition of compromise itself and where it does not so appear the decree need not necessarily be considered to be a nullity. It has been settled beyond all doubts in the later decisions of the Supreme Court in Nagindas Ramdas vs. Dalpatram Echaram, AIR 1974 SC 471 and Roshanlal vs. Madan Lal, AIR 1975 SC 2130 , that if at the time of passing of the decree there exists some material before the Court on the basis whereof the Court could prima facie satisfy itself about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction apparently passed on the basis of the compromise would be a valid one. The mere fact that the decree has been passed on compromise would not render the decree a nullity. Now these materials, it has been clearly pointed out by the Supreme Court may take the shape of either evidence recorded or produced before the Court or it may partly or wholly be in the shape of admissions made in the petition of compromise. Now these materials, it has been clearly pointed out by the Supreme Court may take the shape of either evidence recorded or produced before the Court or it may partly or wholly be in the shape of admissions made in the petition of compromise. So, if in a particular case the admissions are not to be found in the petition of compromise or in the decree itself the Court can still go behind it to the records of the original suit to find out whether there existed any valid ground within the sanction of section 13 for granting of a decree which the parties are agreeing to suffer between them on settlement. Even in the last case in AIR 1975 SC 2130 the Supreme Court observed. The compromise must indicate either on its face or in the background of other materials in the case that the tenant expressly or impliedly is agreeing to suffer a decree for eviction because the landlord in the circumstances, is entitled to have such a decree under the law. 14. The legal position being as above on the decree itself, the court cannot decide the issue in either way. True in the present case in the decree or in the petition of compromise there is neither any admission as to existence of a valid statutory ground for eviction nor any indication thereof, but absence of such an admission or indication in the decree by itself would not clinch the issue. When the plaintiff came with a case that the decree was a nullity because it was passed merely on settlement without existence of any valid ground, the onus, on the pleading, lay on him to prove the entire thing. But unfortunately for the plaintiff in the present case no endeavour was made to prove the case sought to be made. No evidence was led as to the contents of the record in the suit which led to the passing of the decree. The Court, therefore, is not in a position to know whether any valid statutory ground for eviction did exist or not on the materials on record of the suit so that if the same exists and the settlement was arrived at only in the light of the existence of such a ground then the decree would be perfectly lawful. The Court, therefore, is not in a position to know whether any valid statutory ground for eviction did exist or not on the materials on record of the suit so that if the same exists and the settlement was arrived at only in the light of the existence of such a ground then the decree would be perfectly lawful. The only evidence, as we have indicated hereinbefore, is the decree and one sentence in the cross-examination of one of the defendant's witness, D.W.2 in cross-examination had merely stated that the ejectment suit was filed for default only and that the same was contested by the defendant. This evidence may well establish the fact that the original suit was instituted on the ground of default, but the mere fact that the suit was contested by the defendant does not go to establish that there was no sufficient default within the meaning of section 13 which could entitle the plaintiff to get a decree. Whether there was any such default or not and whether the defendants in that suit had failed to avail of their relief under section 17 or not were matters which were required to be proved by the plaintiff to sustain any case that the decree was passed merely on compromise and not on statutory ground. The said fact not having been proved by the plaintiff he cannot claim the decree to be a nullity solely on the basis of the decree itself as sought to be claimed by Mr. Banerjee in this appeal. For this reason also, in our view, the point thus raised by Mr. Banerjee must fail. 15. On the conclusions as above, since the only point raised by Mr. Banerjee in support of this appeal fails, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.