JUDGMENT : Hari Swarup, J. This petition is directed against the appellate order passed u/s 23 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The Petitioner was a tenant of the building. The landlord applied for eviction u/s 21 of the Act on the ground of bona fide need. The Prescribed Authority allowed the application for eviction of the tenant. The appeal has been dismissed by the III Addl. Distt. Judge. 2. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the court below has not considered the relevant material produced before it while deciding the appeal. According to the Petitioner the landlord's need was not bona fide. The Petitioner urged that the landlord had already demolished and constructed the major portion of the building and there was no longer any bona fide need of the applicant for the accommodation in dispute. The tenant applied for the issue of a commission before the Prescribed Authority but the prayer was refused. In appeal again an application was moved and the appellate Court allowed the application. A commission was issued. The Commissioner filed his report about the accommodation in possession of the landlord. It is this evidence which according to the learned Counsel was relevant for the purposes of deciding if the landlord required the accommodation bona fide, and the omission to consider the same vitiated the finding of the court below that the landlord's need was greater than the need of the tenant. 3. The judgment of the learned III Addl. Distt. Judge shows that he has not at all considered the Commissioner's report or any other material relevant for determining if the landlord's need for the accommodation was bona fide. The only sentence which would be pointed out by the learned Counsel for the Respondent in the judgment of the court below is: It is admitted that the Appellant has got two residential houses one, in which he himself is living and the other in which the tenants are living. Thus on assessing the comparative need of the parties, the need of the applicant-Respondent appears to be greater as he has a growing family. 4. The question of comparing the need could have arisen, if at all, if the landlord's need was bonafide. Thus on assessing the comparative need of the parties, the need of the applicant-Respondent appears to be greater as he has a growing family. 4. The question of comparing the need could have arisen, if at all, if the landlord's need was bonafide. Section 21 of the Act permits the eviction of a tenant only when the Prescribed Authority is satisfied that the building is bona fide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation for himself or any member of his family or any person for whose benefit it is held by him either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust for the objects of the trust. It is thus necessary that before the order of eviction is passed the Prescribed Authority and the appellate authority should be satisfied that the landlord required the building bonafide. The question of determining whether a landlord needs the accommodation bona fide will depend upon the accommodation in possession of the landlord and the need of the landlord for additional accommodation. This will require the consideration of the material that is placed before the court by the parties concerned. The Commissioner's report was a relevant material and it had to be considered by the appellate court while deciding the appeal. 5. Learned Counsel for the Respondent contended that as the judgment of the appellate authority was only a judgment of affirmance he need not have discussed or mentioned the evidence. This principle even if correct as an oxism, applies only when the evidence before the Prescribed Authority is the same as the evidence before the appellate authority. The appellate authority in the present case had permitted the issue of commission and the Commissioner's report had come. This was an addl. material which had come before the appellate authority and in such circumstances if the appellate authority intended even to affirm the judgment of the Prescribed Authority he had to consider the addl. material which had come before it, along with other material on record. 6. The learned Counsel for the Respondent also urged that as it was a case of a residential building the tenant had no right to raise objections by reason of Explanation contained in Section 21. material which had come before it, along with other material on record. 6. The learned Counsel for the Respondent also urged that as it was a case of a residential building the tenant had no right to raise objections by reason of Explanation contained in Section 21. The question, however, about raising objection does not arise unless the primary condition exists about the bonafide need of the landlord. It is, therefore, not necessary for me to go into the controversy whether the accommodation is a residential accommodation or not or whether the Explanation is applicable in the present circumstances or not. 7. The learned Counsel also contended that Explanation (iv) in Section 21 was applicable in the present case. The court below has not relied upon it. According to the learned Counsel for the Petitioner this had already been deleted and was not in the statute book when the appeal was decided. As the Distt. Judge has not relied upon this explanation it is not necessary for me to go into this controversy particularly when its applicability depends, on findings of facts. 8. The judgment of the appellate court as already seen, does not show the application of mind to the relevant material on record nor is there any specific finding given by the appellate court about the bonafide need of the landlord. The appellate judgment, therefore, must be held to suffer from manifest errors of law. 9. The Writ Petition is allowed. Let a Writ in the nature of certirorari be issued to quash the appellate judgment. Let a direction be issued to the appellate court to readmit the appeal to its original number and to decide it afresh according to law after affording the parties opportunity of hearing. The writ petition having been disposed of the interim order stands exhausted.