( 1 ) THIS revision petition is by the tenant and is directed against the order dt. 3-1-1977 passed by the First Addl Civil Judge, Bangalore City, on IAs.-III and IV in HRC 2020 of 1976. ( 2 ) THE tenant in this cade filed an application before the learned civil Judge under S. 43 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') by which he submitted that the respondent in the application, his landlord, had removed electrical wires of the pumpset and had stopped supply of water through well on 14-11-76 to the suit shop paralysing the business of the petitioner. He prayed that the landlord should be directed to restore the same. The application was instituted on 16-11-1976 and the Court issued interim order directing the landlord to restore the amenity. The landlord filed IA-III lor vacating the interim exparte order passed on IA-I in the case directing him to restore the supply of water. ( 3 ) THE applicant-tenant further submitted IA-IV praying for permission to get restoration of water supply to the premises done by himself at the cost of the landlord. ( 4 ) THE learned Civil Judge heard both the IAs and passed the order dt. 3-1-1977 by which he allowed IA-III and dismissed IA-IV. The ex parte order made on IA-I thus came to be dismissed. Aggrieved by the said order the tenant has come up in revision before this Court. ( 5 ) THE learned Civil Judge, in the course of his order, held that there was prima facie no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The premises were admittedly taken on lease by one Nagap payya and after his death, a partnership firm was established. The landlord contended that the partnership was not a tenant under him. The learned Civil Judge upheld this contention. The same is. challenged before me by the tenant. It was pointed out that the landlord was regularly receiving the rental even after the death of the original tenant nagappayya and the tenants were legal representatives of Nagappayya. So the learned Advocate for the tenant submitted that there was prima facie relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The same is. challenged before me by the tenant. It was pointed out that the landlord was regularly receiving the rental even after the death of the original tenant nagappayya and the tenants were legal representatives of Nagappayya. So the learned Advocate for the tenant submitted that there was prima facie relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The learned Civil Judge, however, relied on the definition of the term 'tenant' under Sec. 3 (r) of the Act and held that there could not be transmission of tenancy in the case of a non-residential premises. But, as rightly pointed cut by the learned Counsel for the petitioner the learned Civil Judge failed to notice that the tenancy was contractual and a contractual tenancy could be inherited by the legal heirs of the tenant. S. 3 (r) of the Act comes into force in" the transmission of tenancy in the case of statutory tenants. So, the learned Civil judge was obviously in error in coming to the conclusion that there was prima facie no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. ( 6 ) THE learned Civil Judge has further held that the amenity, viz, supply of well water was not co-extensive with the lease and 'that it was a special amenity obtained by the tenant by a separate agreement dt. 8-3-1965. Besides, in the agreement it was specifically stipulated that the arrangement of the supply of water was only for a period of two years in the first instance. That being so, the learned Civil Judge held that it could not be considered as ' an essential supply ' contemplated under S. 43 of the Act. This finding is challenged by the learned counsel for the petitioner before me. ( 7 ) SEC. 43 of the Act contemplates that the landlord shall not cut off, without just or sufficient cause, or withhold any essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant in respect of the building let to him. In the explanation to that section, it is no doubt stated that essential supply or service includes supply of water, electricity, lights in passages and on staircases, lifts and conservancy or sanitary service. In the explanation to that section, it is no doubt stated that essential supply or service includes supply of water, electricity, lights in passages and on staircases, lifts and conservancy or sanitary service. The learned Adovcate appearing for the landlord invited my attention to the fact that what was contemplated in the section was essential supply or service in respect of the building and not any other amenity got by the tenant from the landlord by a separate agreement subsequent to the commencement of the lease. There is force in the submission so made. It is not as if the entire water supply to the building is cut off. Regular Corporation water supply to the building is not withdrawn or cut off. What is cut off is the special supply of water through well. That arrangement was got made by the tenant for his business in the year 1965. The agreement itself makes it very clear that at that time, lease was already existing for several years. The agreement inter alia, states "whereas the Second Party has been a tenant under the First Party for the past several years and running a hotel business styled as 'raghavendra Prasanna' at premises bearing Nos. 104, 105 and 106. . . . . . That makes it clear that this agreement was entered into between the parties after several years of tenancy. ( 8 ) THE agreement allows the tenant to construct a well and take the water from the well situated in a different premises for his busi- ness. The agreement further states that this arrangement should be only lor a period of two years in the first instance. It also stipulates that after the period, the tenant should not claim any right in the well or the apparatus. That being so, it is obvious that the arrangement is not co-extensive with the lease. The supply of water, which was at the commencement of the lease, still continues. What is stopped is only the facility given la'. er to the tenant under a separate agreement. ( 9 ) IT was pointed out by the Supreme Court of India in the case of kanyalal v. Indumathi AIR. 1968 SC. 444. that the provisions regarding essential supply or service are enacted to curtail the proprietary rights and freedom of the landlord and hence, they should be construed strictly. er to the tenant under a separate agreement. ( 9 ) IT was pointed out by the Supreme Court of India in the case of kanyalal v. Indumathi AIR. 1968 SC. 444. that the provisions regarding essential supply or service are enacted to curtail the proprietary rights and freedom of the landlord and hence, they should be construed strictly. These provisions make inroads upon the landlord's freedom and action and that therefore, they are to be construed strictly. Keeping that in mind, it becomes necessary to examine the meaning of ' essential supply. It is not every supply that is cut off that falls within the purview of S. 43 of the Act. It must be an essential supply which the tenant enjoyed at the time of lease. It should pertain to the building let. The section states " essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant in respect of the building let to him. In the instant case as pointed out above, the supply of well water was not contemplated at tne commencement of the lease. Supply of municipal water in respect of the building which was enjoyed by the tenant at the time of the lease is not disturbed. Subsequently the parties entered into a special agreement to facilitate the business of the tenant to supply him well water. Hence, this cannot be considered as essential supply in respect of the building let. It is only a supply got at a later stage by the tenant to facilitate his business. It cannot also be considered as an essential supply of water, for, the essential supply of water by the Corporation is not disturbed. The supply of well water is not co-extensive with the lease. The agreement itself contemplates that the arrangement of supply of well water is only for a period of two years in the first instance. That being so, it is obvious that the application of the tenant under Sec. 43 of the Act is misconceived. ( 10 ) IN the circumstances, there is every justification for the order of the learned Civil Judge vacating the ex parte interim order passed by him directing the landlord to restore that facility. Hence, I hold that the revision petition has no merit and I dismiss the same. No costs. --- *** --- .