JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. ( 1 ) THIS case raises a short but important point which turns on the proper interpretation of S. 18 (3) of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation act, 1957 (Act No. 35 of 1957), called shortly 'the Act'. ( 2 ) THE facts are simple and not in dispute. They may be stated as follows: The petitioner is an agriculturist. He has a tractor-trailer which wag designed and used for his agricultural operations. It was exempted from payment of tax under the provisions of S. 16 (3) of the Act. On 20th October, 1972, the Inspector of Motor Vehicles, Tumkur found that that vehicle was carrying stones for road works which was not for agricultural purposes. Accordingly, he submitted a report to the Regional transport Officer, who called upon the petitioner by a notice to explain why 'he exemption 'from payment of tax should not be cancelled. The petitioner in his reply, did not dispute the facts alleged against him. He admitted the misuse of the vehicle, but pleaded that it was not with his knowledge. He, accoordingly, prayed for continuance of the exemption from payment of tax. The RTO did not accept the contention. He cancelled the exemption granted with effect from 1st Octr, 1972 and directed the petitioner to pay the tax at the rate of Rs. 400 per quarter with effect from the said date and onwards. The appeal preferred by the petitioner against that order was dismissed by the Deputy Transport Commissioner, bangalore. The appellate authority has held that since the petitioner has committed the offence, he was not entitled to any exemption provided under Section 16 (3) of the Act. In this Rule, the petitioner wants to quash the aforesaid orders. ( 3 ) THE argument put forward for the petitioner can be briefly stated in this way the exemption from payment of tax is provided under. S. 16 (3) of the act and the vehicle cannot be deprived of that exemption, unless it is found that the vehicle has been substantially used for non-agricultural purposes. ( 3 ) THE argument put forward for the petitioner can be briefly stated in this way the exemption from payment of tax is provided under. S. 16 (3) of the act and the vehicle cannot be deprived of that exemption, unless it is found that the vehicle has been substantially used for non-agricultural purposes. Alternatively it was contended that even if there was a misuse of the vehicle, the owner could only be prosecuted in the Criminal court under Rule 37 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, and cannot be held liable to pay the tax which has been otherwise statutorily exempted ( 4 ) WE now turn to the statutory provisions which have a bearing on the above contentions. By S. 3 of the Act, tax is levied on all motor vehicles suitable for use on roads. S. 16 (3) provides for an exemption from payment of tax. It reads: 16 (3 ). All motor vehicles designed and used solely for carrying out such agricultural operations as may be prescribed shall be exempt from the payment of tax. The agricultural operations are prescribed under Rule 36, to mean tilling, sowing, weeding, harvesting, etc. Rule 37 provides for penalties for the contravention of Rule 36 and some other rules. Every such contravention shall, on conviction, be punishable with fine which may extend to rs. 50. If Rules 36 and 37 are read together, it is clear that the petitioner, tor the misuse of his vehicle, is liable for the prosecution. But, in our view, the prosecution contemplated under Rule 37, has nothing to do with the demand of tax on the ground that the exemption provided under S. 16 (3) is no longer available to the vehicle. The said two provisions and the two actions provided thereunder are independent of each other. The prosecution contemplated under Rule 37, is for the contravention of Rule 36, whereas the withdrawal of exemption from payment of tax is for non-compliance with the requirements of Section 16 (3 ). Thus the action under one provision even if taken, is no bar to the proceedings under the other. We, therefore, reject the second contention urged for the petitioner. ( 5 ) WE now revert to the first contention. The vehicle has been exempted from payment of tax on the ground that it has been designed and used for agricultural operations. Thus the action under one provision even if taken, is no bar to the proceedings under the other. We, therefore, reject the second contention urged for the petitioner. ( 5 ) WE now revert to the first contention. The vehicle has been exempted from payment of tax on the ground that it has been designed and used for agricultural operations. The RTO has withdrawn the exemption on the sole ground that the vehicle has been used once for non-agricultural operations. The point that is required to be considered herein is whether it is necessary to establish that the vehicle has been substantially used for non-agricultural operations, and one or two such incidents may not be sufficient to withdraw the exemption. The Act by S. 3, imposes tax on all motor vehicles suitable for use on roads. The Act also provides for an exemption. The exemption is provided to a certain class of vehicles which are designed and used for agricultural operations. The key words in S. 16 (3) are ___vehicles designed and used solely for carrying out such agricultural operations. . . The requirement of the section therefore, is that the vehicle must be used solely for agricultural operations. The language used in the section, is so compelling that there is no scope for interpreting it in the manner suggested by learned Counsel for the petitioner. The primary or the "golden rule" of statutory construction is that the intent of the law maker is to be found in the language that has been used. He is presumed to know the meaning of the words and the rules of grammar. Where 'the language is clear, the Courts must adhere to its grammatical and ordinary sense, unless as Lord Wensleydale observed in Grey v. Pearson (1857) VI HLC. pp. 61 at 106 that the grammatical and ordinary sense would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument. In this context it may also be useful to remember what Benjamin N. Cardoza observed (2) : the Judge, even when he is free is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecreted principles. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecreted principles. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, relied upon the decision in Parry v. Anglesey Assessment Committee 1948 (2) All. E. R. 1960. In that case. Lord Goddard, Chief Justice, while considering the definition of similar words found in the Rating and Valuation (Apportionment) Act, 1928, observed "that a building which garages a car which is used substantially for private domestic purposes and not merely for agricultural purposes cannot be regarded as a building used solely in connection with agricultural operations". The learned Counsel on the strength of this decision, submitted that unless the tractor trailer is held to have been substantially used for non-agricultural purposes, it cannot be denied of exemption. The decision in Parry's (3) case has been followed by the court of Appeal in Thompson v. Milk Marketing Board 1952 (2) All. E. R. 344. and also in other cases. But, we do not think that that could be the correct approach to a case like this. We are dealing with a provision relating to an exemption created under the statute. It is a settled rule. that such exemption must be construed strictly and not liberally. See Union of India v. Commercial tax Officer, WB. AIR. 1956 SC. 202 at 207. and Akot Municipality v. Manilal Manekji pvt. Ltd. AIR. 1967 SC. 1201 at 1204,. Therefore, if the words "solely used" are strictly construed it excludes, in our view, the use of the vehicle for two different operations. The misuse of the vehicle is still a use of the vehicle. It may be on one occasion or two occasions, or ordinarily for agricultural operations and exceptionally for other purposes. In all such cases, the fact remains that the vehicle is used for combined operations. It seems to us that in order to claim exemption from payment of tax under sec. 16 (3), there should be no evidence to suggest that the vehicle has been used otherwise than for agricultural operations. Our view coincides with the decision of the House of Lords in W and J. B. Eastwood Ltd. v. Herrod (Valuation Officer) 1970 (1) All. E. R. 774 at 780. . 16 (3), there should be no evidence to suggest that the vehicle has been used otherwise than for agricultural operations. Our view coincides with the decision of the House of Lords in W and J. B. Eastwood Ltd. v. Herrod (Valuation Officer) 1970 (1) All. E. R. 774 at 780. . In that case, the decision in Thompson v. Milk Marketing Board (4) was overruled. Lord Reid observed at page 780 :"but it is a logical fallacy to say that therefore the definition must apply wherever there is a combined agricultural operation. " ( 7 ) WE may, in this context, refer to the apprehension of the learned counsel for the petitioner. He argued that the above view, if it is logically extended to every case it may lead to great injustice. He also submitted that a vehicle which has been designed and solely used for years together for agricultural operations, would be deprived of the exemption for all time to come, if it is found to have been used on a solitary day for any other purpose. We do not think that the apprehension is justified by the language of S. 16 (3 ). It cannot be the intention of the legislature that the vehicle once misused should be perpetually deprived of' the exemption. Such an interpretation, in our view, would destroy what the section is intended to explain and confer. The statutory exemption is provided to the vehicle so long as it is designed and used solely for agricultural purposes. But that exemption will not be available when the vehicle is used for any other purposes. But again that exemptoin would revive automatically when it is solely put to use for agricultural operations. That appears to be the inevitable result by the operation of the statute. The problem, however, is how to get these thing's done in actual practice. Here again, we do not find any difficulty. The tax in respect of the vehicle is payable once in a year. If the vehicle has been used for combined operations at any time. Sec. 16 (3) does not provide exemption in respect of that vehicle. The owner, therefore, has to pay the tax in that year. But the Act does not prevent the owner from claiming again the exemption if that vehicle is thereafter used solely for agricultural operations. The taxing authority cannot deny the exemption in such cases. Sec. 16 (3) does not provide exemption in respect of that vehicle. The owner, therefore, has to pay the tax in that year. But the Act does not prevent the owner from claiming again the exemption if that vehicle is thereafter used solely for agricultural operations. The taxing authority cannot deny the exemption in such cases. ( 8 ) IN the result and with the above observations, the rule is discharged without an order as to costs. --- *** --- .