Judgment :- 1. In a proceeding under the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, started by the respondent-landlord the Appellate Authority passed an order on June 3, 1976 on the ground of arrears of rent under S.11(2)(b) directing the petitioner-tenant to put the respondent in possession of the building in question. The order contained a rider that the petitioner could got the order vacated by depositing the arrears of rent, interest and costs within one month. On an application made by the petitioner on July 3,1976 the Appellate Authority extended the time for depositing the amounts till August 5, 1976 On July 7, 1976 he deposited Rs. 1000/- towards the amount. On August 5 he did not deposit the balance or make any application for extension of the time. However on August 19,19 6 he filed an application I.A. 2081 stating that he had deposited the balance and praying that time might be extended and the order of eviction set aside. The Appellate Authority dismissed the application in the view that as the application had not been made before expiry of the time it had become functus officio and that the application was therefore not maintainable. This dismissal has been confirmed by the learned District Judge in revision. 2. S.11 (2) (c) reads: "The order of the Rent Control Court directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building shall not be executed before the expiry of one month from the date of such order or such further period as the Rent Control Court may in its discretion allow; and if the tenant deposits the arrears of rent with interest and cost of proceedings within the said period of one month or such further period, as the case may be, it shall vacate that order." 2. It is undisputed and is also settled (Vide Kuriakose Kurian v. Saramma Chacko,1964 KLT.1 (F.B.)) that the expression "Rent Control Court" in S.11(2) (b) to which clause (c) is related covers the Appellate Authority and Revisional Court as well. Likewise it is not in dispute and it is also settled (Vide Bava Cheriyan v. Mahadeya Iyer, 1971 KLT. 199) that as contrasted with the words "such other period" which previously occurred in the Act, the expression "such further period", by which they were replaced by Act 7 of 1966. Likewise it is not in dispute and it is also settled (Vide Bava Cheriyan v. Mahadeya Iyer, 1971 KLT. 199) that as contrasted with the words "such other period" which previously occurred in the Act, the expression "such further period", by which they were replaced by Act 7 of 1966. entitles the concerned authority to enlarge the period of one month during which the order of eviction is made inexecutable by clauses (c). S.23 confers on the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority inter alia, the power as in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit in respect of "enlargement of time originally fixed or granted." It follows that the Appellate Authority was competent in the present case to enlarge the time originally granted. What has however been held by the Appellate Authority and the revisional judge and what is sought to be sustained by the respondent is that their power must be invoked before expiry of the period initially granted and that after such expiry the court becomes functus officio and thus incompetent to entertain an application for enlargement of time. That is the question for decision in the revision. 3. In Mahanth Ram Das v Ganga Das. AIR. 1961 SC. 882, the High Court of Patna allowed the appeal filed by the appellant but with a direction that he would pay additional court fee as calculated by the office within three months of the intimation given to his counsel and that "if the amount is not paid within the time given the appeal will stand dismissed." The office of the High Court gave intimation to his counsel on April 8,1954. On July 8, which was the last day of the period given, the appellant made an application requesting that be be allowed to pay Rs 1400/- immediately and the balance of Rs. 587-80 within a month thereafter. The High Court dismissed the application on July 13,1954 in the view that by virtue of the order in the appeal, "the appeal has already stood dismissed as the amount was not paid within the time given". The appellant then filed an application under S.151, CPC. and this was dismissed on September 2,1954 by another Bench which felt that the proper remedy was review. Then be filed another application under S 151 read with 0.47, R.1, CPC. The appellant then filed an application under S.151, CPC. and this was dismissed on September 2,1954 by another Bench which felt that the proper remedy was review. Then be filed another application under S 151 read with 0.47, R.1, CPC. setting out the reasons why he was unable to find the money and offering to pay the deficit court-fee within such further time as the High Court might fix. the High Court held that the application did not fall within 0.47, R.1 and it also rejected his prayer for extension of time under S.148 or S.149, CPC. on the ground that these Sections applied only to cases which were not finally disposed of and that time under them could be extended only before the final order was actually made. For the same reason the High Court also refused the request to extend the time under the inherent powers of the Court. On appeal the Supreme Court held in the first place that the High Court could have allowed the first application filed on July 8,1954 before the time fixed for the payment of deficit court fee had run out, for though it came up for hearing on July 13, 1954 after expiry of the time, S.148 CPC. in terms allowed extension of time even if the original period fixed has expired and that the order though passed after the time originally fixed would have operated from July 8, 1954. Their Lordships proceeded to observe that the High Court could also have exercised its inherent powers when the two petitions under S.151, CPC. were filed and concluded: "If the High Court bad felt disposed to take action on any of these occasions, S.148 and 149 would have clothed them with ample power to do justice to a litigant for whom it entertained considerable sympathy, but to whose aid it erroneously felt unable to come." The Supreme Court accordingly set aside the order of July 13,1954 and the subsequent orders and allowed the appellant further time to pay court fees. 4. I might also refer to a later decision of the Supreme Court, B. C. Kame v. Nemi Chand, AIR. 1970 SC. 4. I might also refer to a later decision of the Supreme Court, B. C. Kame v. Nemi Chand, AIR. 1970 SC. 981, of which the relevant facts are the following: S.12 [1] [a] of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 entitled a landlord to sue for eviction of his tenant on the ground that he was a defaulter in the payment of rent and sub-s. [3] enacted a proviso that no order for such eviction could be made if the tenant made payment or deposit under S.13. Sub-s. (1) of S.13 provided, so far as material, that the tenant shall within one month of the service of summons or within such further time as the Court may on application made to it allow, deposit in the Court or pay to the landlord the arrears of rent and thereafter continue to deposit or pay the future rent on the 15th of each succeeding month. Sub-s. (5) prohibited the court from passing any decree for recovery of possession on the ground of default in the payment of rent, if the tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub-s (1) or sub-s. (2). Sub-s. (6) provided that in default of payment or deposit of rent as required by the Section, the Court may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and that it should proceed with the hearing of the suit. The appellant who was the defendant in a suit for eviction did not deposit or pay the rent due by him within one month and even when he made the deposit after the time he filed no application and obtained no order extending the time. Two years after he made an application for extension of time and this the Court rejected. Before the Supreme Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the trial court and on appeal the District Court committed an error in holding that they had no jurisdiction to extend the time for payment of rent after the suit was instituted. Before the Supreme Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the trial court and on appeal the District Court committed an error in holding that they had no jurisdiction to extend the time for payment of rent after the suit was instituted. After analysing S.12 and 13, their Lordships pointed out that it the tenant pays the amount of rent in arrears within one month he is immune from liability to be evicted for default in that behalf and concluded: "If however, he does not pay the amount or deposit it in Court, any subsequent payment made by him will come to his aid only if on an application made by him the court extends the time." After thus holding that even after the prescribed time the court has power to extend the time, obviously by virtue of the expression "within such further time as the court may allow" in S.13(1), their Lordships found that the District judge had held that be has jurisdiction to extend the time but on the merits no case was made out for an order extending the time. 5. Now S.23(1)(i) of the Kerala Act empowers the Rent Control Court and Appellate Authority to enlarge the time originally fixed or granted as a Civil Court is empowered to do while trying a suit and this power corresponds to the power under S.148, CPC. In Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das the Supreme Court made it clear that when moved in that behalf even after expiry of the time, the Court bad power to grant extension of time under S.148 and 149. The reference to S.149 which relates exclusively to the Court's power to allow parties, at any stage, to pay up deficiency in Court-fees, in no way takes away the force of their statement about the scope of S.148. This means that the Court has power to extend time in a procedural matter, even on a motion made after the time originally fixed or granted has run out. This is how the Supreme Court decision has been understood in Gobardhan v. Barsati, AIR. 1972 Allahabad 246 (FB.), and with great respect, correctly understood. The position would of course be different where the time is fixed by a statute or as the Supreme Court itself pointed out, by a conditional decree. This is how the Supreme Court decision has been understood in Gobardhan v. Barsati, AIR. 1972 Allahabad 246 (FB.), and with great respect, correctly understood. The position would of course be different where the time is fixed by a statute or as the Supreme Court itself pointed out, by a conditional decree. Here the case is different as time was fixed by an order of the Appellate Authority under S 11(2)(c). The Appellate Authority and the revisional judge were therefore wrong in denying themselves power to extend time unless moved before expiry of the time or in thinking that after the time has run out they become functus officio. This conclusion finds support in B. C Kame v. Nemi Chand, AIR. 1970 SC. 981, where their Lordships laid down that payment or deposit made by the tenant even after the time fixed by S.13(1) would come to his aid if on an application made by him the Court extended the time and that the District judge dismissed the appellant's application made long out of time only on the merits and not because he thought that be had no jurisdiction as contended by the appellant. As I stated earlier their Lordships decided in favour of the power to extend time, even after its expiry, on the strength of the expression "within such further time as the court may... allow" which bears close resemblance to the corresponding expression "such further period as the Rent Control Court may in its discretion allow" in S.11(2)(c). In this context it is worth pointing out that there is no such corresponding provision in S.12(3) which entitles the Rent Control Court to stop the proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if the tenant fails to pay or deposit the rent during the pendency of the proceeding as required by sub-sections (1) and (2) or to show cause to the contrary. There with the order under sub-section (3), the Rent Control Court loses seizin of the case and becomes functus officio unlike an order S.11(2)(c). Whether an application for extension of time should be allowed has to be considered, as clause (c) itself provides, in exercise of the discretion of the Authority - of course in the manner in which all discretion has to be exercised by judicial or quasi-judicial authorities. 6. Whether an application for extension of time should be allowed has to be considered, as clause (c) itself provides, in exercise of the discretion of the Authority - of course in the manner in which all discretion has to be exercised by judicial or quasi-judicial authorities. 6. The revision therefore succeeds, but that will not finally conclude the case as the authorities below have not considered, in view of the opinion about their power, the merits of the application. This necessitates a remand of the application. I set aside the orders and remand 1. A. 2081 of 1976 to the Appellate Authority for disposal on the merits. Parties will bear their costs.