( 1 ) THIS revision petition is instituted by the tenant aggrieved by the order passed by the Third Additional Civil Judge, Bangalore City, on 27. 9. 1977 in HRCNo. 1371 of 1977, dismissing the petition of the tenant instituted under Sec. 43 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ). ( 2 ) THE tenant in his application before the learned Civil Judge alleged that the landlord had failed to restore the supply of power for his industry, viz, plywood factory, in the suit premises. He prayed that the landlord should be called upon to restore the amenity. ( 3 ) THE landlord contesited the petition. He contended that Sec. 43 of the Act is not attracted on the facts of the case. According to him, the power supply for the factory would not be the subject matter of the lease of a building contemplated under the Act. The learned Civil Judge upheld the contention of the landlord and dismissed the petition of the tenant. This Revision Petition is directed against that order. ( 4 ) THE learned Advocate appearing for the revision petitioner vehemently contended that the learned Civil Judge was not justified in holding that the lease in question did not attract the provision of Sec. 43 of the Act. He relied upon two decisions of this Court, viz. , H. V. Rajan v. C. N. Gopal, AIR 1961 Mys. 29. and Ratilal Bros. v. I. A. Patel, 1962 Mys. L. J. 611. In both these cases, it was held that lease of a cinema theatre fell within the purview of the Act. As against this, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent-landlord relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Uttamchand v. S M. Lalwani, AIR 1965 SC. 716 , wherein the Supreme Court held that the lease of a Dal mill did not fall within the purview of the Act. ( 5 ) THE short question, therefore, that arises for my consideration is whether the lease of machinery for running a plywood factory would fall within the purview of the Act. The landlord has given on lease to the lessee sheds and open space by a registered lease deed dt. 1-5-1959. The rent stipulated is Rs. 100 per month. ( 5 ) THE short question, therefore, that arises for my consideration is whether the lease of machinery for running a plywood factory would fall within the purview of the Act. The landlord has given on lease to the lessee sheds and open space by a registered lease deed dt. 1-5-1959. The rent stipulated is Rs. 100 per month. On the same day, the parties entered into an agreement for hiring of machinery in the shed. The machinery consisted of Saw Mill Krichner, Saw Bench Krichner, Circular saw Bench Krichner, Drum Sander, Band Saw, small size, etc, worth about Rs. 40,000/ -. The hire amount stipulated was Rs. 275 per month. It is obvious that these two agreements formed the subject matter of the same lease. ( 6 ) IN a case like this, the Court must apply the test of the dominant intention of the parties and determine the character of the lease. On the facts of this case, it becomes obvious that the dominant intention of the lessee was to run the timber industry. The lessee is Dr. M. N. S. Naidu, the sole proprietor of Ashok Timber Industries. The lease is not of building as such with fittings which would enable the better enjoyment of the building, but, the lease is of the factory to run Ashok Timber industries in the factory. It is mainly of the machinery fixed in the sheds lor running the factory. Therefore, though two agreements were entered into, it becomes obvious that they constitute the same subject matter and the dominant intention of the lessee was to run the factory in the sheds with the help of the machinery hired. So, it cannot be said that the lease is merely of the building. The term 'building' is defined as any building or hut or part of a building or hut, other than a farm house, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purpose. It includes among other things any furniture or fittings affixed to such building or part of the building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. The machinery in this case cannot be considered as fittings done for the more beneficial enjoyment of the sheds. In fact, the machinery is more dominant here and the sheds are only to house the machinery. It includes among other things any furniture or fittings affixed to such building or part of the building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. The machinery in this case cannot be considered as fittings done for the more beneficial enjoyment of the sheds. In fact, the machinery is more dominant here and the sheds are only to house the machinery. ( 7 ) IN the case of Uttamchand v. S. M. Lalwani (3), it was held after consideration of the terms of the lease that the factory, viz. , Dal mill was not a building within the meaning of Sec. 3 (a) and therefore, was outside the purview of the Act. The Supreme Court further observed that the fittings of the machinery could not be said to be fittings which had been fixed for the more beneficial enjoyment of the building. Hence, it was observed that the fittings in question did not fall under Sec. 3 (a) (y) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act. The same reasoning holds good on the facts of the present case also. That being so, the learned Civil Judge was perfectly justified in coming to the conclusion that the facts of the present case did not attract the provisions of sec. 43 of the Act. ( 8 ) EVEN assuming for moment that the building as such, would fall within the purview of the Act, it cannot be said that the supply of power for running the machinery required for the wood industry would fall within the purview of Sec. 43 of the Act. Sec. 43 of the Act states that no landlord either himself or through any person acting or purporting to act on his behalf, shall, without just or sufficient cause cut off or withhold any essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant in respect of the building let to him. Thus, it is obvious that the essential supply of service must have been enjoyed by the tenant in respect of the building let to him. I have already observed above that the machinery cannot be termed as fittings of the building so as to fall within the definition of the term 'building'. They form the subject of an independent hire agreement. Therefore, the supply of power to run the machinery cannot be considered as an essential supply in respect of the building let. I have already observed above that the machinery cannot be termed as fittings of the building so as to fall within the definition of the term 'building'. They form the subject of an independent hire agreement. Therefore, the supply of power to run the machinery cannot be considered as an essential supply in respect of the building let. It may be pointed out in this connection that even according to the tenant, the normal electric supply is not disturbed. What is disturbed is the power supply to run the machinery. That being so, it is obvious that the said supply does not fall wihin the purview of Sec. 43 of the Act. ( 9 ) THOUGH it is true that one must take a sensible and broad view of the words ' essential supply or service' having regard to all those matters which are reasonably necessary to use the building, one is not justified in extending the scope of the essential supply contemplated under S. 43 of the Act, beyond the express provision contained in S. 43 of the Act and Sec. 43 of the Act specifically contemplates the essential supply or service in respect of the building let. Sec. 43 of the Act has to be construed strictly in accordance with the words actually used by the legislature. They cannot be given an extended meaning for the reason that the remedies provided make inroads upon the landlord's freedom of action. ( 10 ) THAT being so, I hold that there is no merit in the revision petition and the same is liable to be dismissed and I dismiss the same. No costs. --- *** --- .