Judgment :- 1. This writ appeal arises against the judgment of a learned judge who allowed the writ petition filed by a kudikidappukaran, against whom an order of shifting had been passed under S.75(2) of the Land Reforms Act. The applicant for shifting was the Secretary of the Tha-Ali Mul Islam Madrassa, Padoor. The Land Tribunal found the requirements of S.75(2) had been made out and directed the shifting of the kudikidappukaran on the terms and conditions specified in its order Ext. P1. In the writ petition, a learned judge of this Court quashed Ext. P1 order on the only ground that the Madrassa is not a "person" entitled to the relief contemplated by S.75 of the Act. The learned judge made it clear that he had not considered the case on the merits. 2. We are unable to sustain the ground on which the learned judge quashed Ext. P1 order of the Land Tribunal. The expression "person" as defined in S.2 clause (43) of the Act, is as follows: "'person' shall include a company, family, joint family, association or other body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, and any institution capable of holding property." The definition is wide and comprehensive, and seems to us to be ample enough to cover a Madrassa within its wide sweep. It is unnecessary to labour the point further, as the matter has received judicial consideration and exposition at the hands of a Division Bench of this Court in Thrikkaruva Kuttyazhikom Devaswom v. Aliyummer Asan (1976 KLT. 111) which held that a Devaswom is a'person' as defined in S 2(43) of the Act. The decision of a learned judge of this Court in Rev. Fr. Mathew Fabian v. Addl. Land Tribunal, Quilon (1973 KLT. 423) which was susceptible of an interpretation contrary to the view that we have expressed, and which the earlier Division Bench in Thrikkaruva Kuttyazhikom Devaswom v. Aliyummer Asan (1976 KLT. 111) also expressed, was regarded as not having laid down correct law. Fr. Mathew Fabian v. Addl. Land Tribunal, Quilon (1973 KLT. 423) which was susceptible of an interpretation contrary to the view that we have expressed, and which the earlier Division Bench in Thrikkaruva Kuttyazhikom Devaswom v. Aliyummer Asan (1976 KLT. 111) also expressed, was regarded as not having laid down correct law. The Division Bench also referred to a ruling of the learned judge who rendered the judgment now under appeal before us, in Akhila Kerala Vala Samudhaya Samithy v. State of Kerala (1975 KLT 123) where the learned judge himself had spoken that the definition of the term "person" is wide and comprehensive and would include an association of persons or a body of individuals whether incorporated or not, of the type concerned in this case. We are therefore clear that the reasoning and the conclusion of the learned judge in this case cannot be sustained. 3. Counsel for the respondent invited our attention to the fact that the merits of the case had not been gone into. This is quite so. But the Land Tribunal had allowed the application for shitting on the terms and conditions contemplated by S.75(2). Although, in any event, counsel for the respondent is entitled to attack this conclusion, we are satisfied that no grounds at all have been made out to disclose either any jurisdictional error or any patent illegality in regard to this part of the order of the Tribunal. 4. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned judge and direct that O.P. No. 2354 of 1973 will stand dismissed. We make no order as to costs.