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Gauhati High Court · body

1977 DIGILAW 25 (GAU)

Satish Chandra Baishya v. Pannalal Jain

1977-08-11

K.LAHIRI

body1977
Judgement This is an appeal directed against an Order passed by Shri N. Hazarika, Assistant District Judge, Gauhati, dated 14-6-1974, whereby in a proceeding under O. 38 of the Civil P. C., the learned Judge did not accept the security offered by the defendant and also made the conditional order of attachment before judgment absolute. 2. Counsel for the respondent has raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the appeal. According to the counsel, the appeal should have been filed before the District Judge in view of the amendment made in the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, by Assam Act 17 of 1974 (hereinafter to be referred as "the Amending Act"). According to the counsel though "the Amending Act" came into force on the 6 th day of May, 1974, it is retrospective in operation and as such, the forum of the appeal, which is valued less than Rupees 15,000/-, is and was at all relevant time, the Court of the District Judge, Gauhati. 3. Counsel for the Appellant resists the contention on three-fold grounds. Firstly the Counsel submits that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to call upon the defendant to furnish security or issue order of conditional attachment before judgment inasmuch as ex facie the application of the plaintiff made under O. 38, R. 5 of the Civil P. C. did not contain the pre-requisites empowering the Court to issue such an order. According to the Counsel if the said application is devoid of any averment or allegation that the defendant had the requisite intent to obstruct or delay the execution of any decree that might be passed against him or did anything as contemplated under O. 38, R. 5 (1) (a) (b). Accordingly, the Counsel submits that the defendant has filed a composite appeal cum application under Art. 227 of the Constitution. I find the statements of the Counsel to be true. 4. However, Shri B. N. Sarma, Counsel for the respondent has very rightly pointed out that determination of the question touches the merits of the appeal and the impugned order is a composite order of rejection of security and making the conditional order of attachment before judgment absolute. I find sufficient force in the contention and hold that in fact this is a composite order and the appeal has been preferred against the said composite order passed on 14-6-1974. I find sufficient force in the contention and hold that in fact this is a composite order and the appeal has been preferred against the said composite order passed on 14-6-1974. Accordingly, I hold that there is no scope of applicability of Article 227 of the Constitution. 5. The second contention of the Counsel for the Appellant is that the appeal pertaining to the order making the conditional order absolute may be converted to revision under S. 115 of the Code. 6. I hold that the said order is appealable under O. XLIII, R. 1(q) of the Code. Counsel for the parties admit the position. Under these circumstances I hold that I have no jurisdiction to convert an appeal into revision when there is an existing vested right of appeal. I reject the contention of the Appellant. 7. The third contention of the Counsel for the Appellant is that the "Amending Act" is not retrospective in operation and the suit having been filed long before the "Amending Act" came into force the provisions contained in the "Amending Act" are not applicable in the instant appeal. The suit was filed on 17-12-1973. Valuation of the suit is Rs. 7,100/- for the purposes of jurisdiction and court-fees. The appeal has been valued accordingly. The appeal is directed against the impugned order dated 14-6-1974 and filed on 12-7-l974. It is also indubitable that the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judges for the purposes of appeals have been raised from Rs. 7,000/- to Rs. 15,000/- by the "Amending Act" (Assam Act 17 of 1974). The Act was published on 6-5-1974 in the Assam Gazette, it was extended throughout Assam and came into force at once. 8. The Counsel for the Appellant submits that such a law taking away or abridging or affecting a vested right must be interpreted as prospective in operation. In support of the contention the Counsel relied on Taramoni Dasi v. Kalidasi Majhi ( AIR 1977 Cal 43 ) and particularly referred to a (passage reading as under:- "We have gone through the provisions of Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts (Amendment) Act and we do not find that there is any provision by which the vested right of appeal has been taken away either expressly or by necessary intendment". 9. However, that is the view expressed in respect of West Bengal Amendment Act of the very same Act. 9. However, that is the view expressed in respect of West Bengal Amendment Act of the very same Act. But let me consider as to whether such vested right of appeal has been taken away either expressly or by necessary intendment. Relevant provision of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts (Assam Amendment) Act, 1973 (Assam Act XVII of 1974) reads as under:- "3. (1) The provision of Cl. (a) of sub-sec. 21 of the Principal Act as amended by this Act shall apply irrespective of the fact that suits, proceedings, decrees or orders out of which the appeals referred to therein arise, were instituted or made prior to the commencement of this Act. (2) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Limitation Act, 1963, an appeal from a decree or order made between the commencement of this Act, which but for the provision of this Act, would have been preferred before the High Court within ninety days from the date of such decree or order, shall be preferred to the District Judge, within the said period". 10. Therefore, there is no escape from the conclusion that the amendment introduced in S. 21 (1) (a) has been expressly made retrospective in operation. As such, I hold that the proper forum of appeal against the impugned order was and is District Judge at Gauhati and the appeal ought to have been preferred before the said Court. I hold that the appeal is not maintainable in this Court. 11. In the result, I hold that the appeal has been wrongly preferred in this Court, which is written large from the entire proceedings itself and accordingly direct that the Memorandum of Appeal along with the enclosures shall be returned to Appellant with proper and adequate endorsement as required under the Law, to enable the Appellant to present the same before a competent Court. 12. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. Order accordingly.