Short Note : 1. Brief facts leading to the present appeal are that the respondent-plaintiff had entered into an oral contract with the appellant-defendant on 18-10-1961 in which he was to advance money to the appellant-defendant who in his turn would extract limestone from the respondent plaintiff's quarry and effect supply to him. 2. The appellant-defendant acted in terms of the contract till 24-7-1962 the date on which the last supply was effected by him. It is not in dispute that the respondent-plaintiff paid to the appellant-defendant Rs. 2,567.50 in all which was made up of payments made on different dates. The appellant-defendant in turn gave to the respondent-plaintiff goods and cash worth Rs. 958.02. Hence the respondent-plaintiff filed the present claim for the balance of Rs. 1,609.48 as principle and Rs. 265 as interest, total amount Rs. 1,874.48. 3. The suit was contested by the appellant-defendant on various counts including that it has been filed time barred. 4. The trial Court decreed the suit for the principal amount but declined to grant any interest. The appeal filed by the appellant-defendant before the lower appellate Court was dismissed. The plea of limitation raised on the part of the appellant-defendant was rejected by both the Courts below holding that the accounts were open, current and mutual accounts between the parties and as such the present suit was not barred by limitation in view of the provisions of Article 1 of the New Limitation Act (Art. 85 of the old Limitation Act) as the period of three years would be counted from the last supply of item which in the instant case was held to be on 24-7-1962 and the present suit having been filed on 7-5-1965, was well within time. Hence this second appeal by the appellant-defendant. 5. Held : I find from the evidence on record that there was only one oral contract and under that the respondent-plaintiff was to advance money to the appellant-defendant from time to time and the appellant-defendant was to extract and supply limestone from the quarry belonging to the respondent-plaintiff. Thus in substance it wall a sort of a work contract. There was no laxity of dealings nor independent obligations. The advances that were made from time to time were as prices of the goods to be delivered. The obligations that arose were from the contract and not from payments of the advances alone. Thus in substance it wall a sort of a work contract. There was no laxity of dealings nor independent obligations. The advances that were made from time to time were as prices of the goods to be delivered. The obligations that arose were from the contract and not from payments of the advances alone. It is further clear from the evidence in the instant case that even if the seller had failed to deliver goods, he would have been liable for refund of the money advanced on account of price and that is reflected when admittedly on 24-7-1962 the appellant-defendant returned the goods and some cash totalling worth Rs. 958.02 to the respondent-plaintiff. In the circumstances, differing from the Courts below, I am clearly of opinion that in the instant case the account was not open, mutual and current account and as such it was wrongly held that the suit would be governed by Article 1 of the New Limitation Act. I, therefore, hold that it is a case of ordinary account and the provisions of Article 23 of the New Limitation Act were applicable. That being so, the suit ought to have been filed within three years from each item of the advance and that was admittedly not done except with reference to only one item of Rs. 112.50 which was admittedly advanced on 19-6-1962 to the appellant-defendant and that alone falls within the period of three years from the date of filing of the present suit on 7-5-1965. Learned counsel appearing for the other side did not dispute the fact that if it is held that the account was not open, mutual and current account, the suit was wrongly held as having been filed within time. Therefore, differing from the Courts below, I hold that the respondent-plaintiff was entitled to a decree for Rs. 112.50 and the rest of his claim was liable to be dismissed as barred by time. AIR 1977 All. 259 and AIR 1959 SC 1349 relied on. Appeal partly allowed.