A. K. SEN, J. ( 1 ) THESE two revisional applications have been heard together since one of the points involved in common to both of them. The point so involved is as to whether an offence under Section 16 (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act), if committed prior to the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Act (No. 34 of 1976) (hereinafter referred to as the Central Amendment of 1976) would be punishable and triable in the manner prescribed by the Central Amendment of 1976 as aforesaid, or in accordance with the provisions of the Principal Act as they stood applicable to West Bengal prior to such amendment. It would be necessary to refer to the facts of the two cases to appreciate how the point arises and they are shortly set out as hereunder. ( 2 ) IN the case of Banshidhari Manna, the said petitioner had a grocery shop at Village Bahadurpur, Poice Station Garbeta, District Midnapore. On November 22, 1974, a food-inspector visited his grocery shop and purchased a quantity of mustard oil and sent the same to a public analyst for analysis. On such analysis the mustard oil was found to be adulterated. On September 6, 1975, a complaint was lodged as against the petitioner for having committed an offence under Section 16 (1) of the said Act. The petitioner was summoned by the learned sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate who ultimately committed him to the Court of Sessions since at the relevant time on the West Bengal Amendment of the Principal Act, such an offence being punishable with imprisonment which may extend to life as exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. The learned Judge in the Court of Sessions framed a charge which being read over and explained to the accused-petitioner he pleaded not guilty. In the meantime, the Central Amendment of 1976 came into effect with effect from April 1, 1976. The learned Judge in the Court of Sessions framed a charge which being read over and explained to the accused-petitioner he pleaded not guilty. In the meantime, the Central Amendment of 1976 came into effect with effect from April 1, 1976. Since by this amendment there was material alteration of the quantum of penalty for offences under Section 16 (1) of the said Act, and since a new procedure was prescribed for trial of such offences by a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government or by a Metropolitan Magistrate, the petitioner raised an objection by filing a petition that the case can longer be triable by the Court of Sessions and must be sent back for trial by the Judicial Magistrate. ( 3 ) THIS objection was overruled by the learned Sessions Judge on the view that when the petitioner had not raised any such an objection prior to the framing of charges he cannot do so at that stage and he further accepted the contention of the Public Prosecutor that in any event, the petitioner's trial before the Court of Sessions would not result in any prejudice to him. The objection of the petitioner having been thus overruled by the order, as aforesaid, the petitioner is challenging the said order in a revisional application before this Court contending once more that after the Central Amendment of 1976, as aforesaid, the maximum penalty for such offences having been reduced to three to six years the case is no longer triable by the Court of Sessions and if at all, it would be triable by a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class specially empowered by the State Government. ( 4 ) IN the case of Nityananda Shaw, he was running a grocery-cum-stationery shop at 60 B. T. Road, Police Station Chitpur, District 24 Parganas. On July 19, 1965, on a visit to his shop the food inspector found Jeera (whole) exposed for sale in his shop. The food inspector drew samples in accordance with the Act and seized the Jeera and sent a sample for analysis by the public analyst. On such analysis the Jeera was found to be adulterated. On July 19, 1965, on a visit to his shop the food inspector found Jeera (whole) exposed for sale in his shop. The food inspector drew samples in accordance with the Act and seized the Jeera and sent a sample for analysis by the public analyst. On such analysis the Jeera was found to be adulterated. On October 1, 1975, the food inspector with the consent and under the direction of the Health Officer of the Corporation of Calcutta lodged a petition of complaint in the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Calcutta (Municipal Magistrate ). The learned Magistrate on consideration of the complaint so filed took cognizance and summoned the accused-petitioner. The accused-petitioner having appeared, the learned Magistrate by an order dated February 18, 1977, committed him to the City Sessions Court at Calcutta for trial. In so doing he overruled the objection raised on behalf of the accused-petitioner that in view of the Central Amendment of 1976, the case is no longer triable by the Court of Sessions but must be tried by the learned Magistrate himself. The learned Magistrate overruled such an objection taking the view that the Central Amendment of 1976, was not retrospective in its operation, and as such, could have no application to offences committed prior to April 1, 1976, on which date the Amendment came into effect. ( 5 ) THE correctness of the view so taken by the learned Magistrate is being challenged in the revisional application wherein two other points have been also raised, namely, (i) the cognizance in the present case was not lawfully taken when it was taken on a petition of complaint lodged by the food inspector without examining him under section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code; in the result all orders passed on such cognizance are clearly without jurisdiction and (ii) the offence alleged having been committed at a place beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the City Sessions Court, commitment to the said court for trial is clearly illegal. ( 6 ) THE answer to the principal question thus raised would turn round the determination of the true effect of the Central Amendment of 1976, i. e. , whether because of such amendment, offences under the Principal Act if committed prior to such amendment would be punishable and triable in accordance with the provisions of the Act as amended by the Central Amendment of 1976, or would continue to be punishable and triable as if the amendment has not come into effect. For deciding this point it would be necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the Principal Act and the amendments thereto. On the provisions of the Act, as it stood on March 1, 1972, the material provisions were as follows: -"16 (1) : if any person - (a)whether by himself or by any other person on his behalf imports into India for manufactures for sale, or stores, sells or distributes any article of food - (i)which is adulterated or misbranded or the sale of which is prohibited by the Food (Health) Authority in the interest of public health; (ii)other than an article of food referred to in sub-clause (i), in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule made thereunder; * * * * * he shall, in addition to penalty to which he may be liable under the provisions of section 6, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to six years, and with a fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees: provided that - (i)if the offence is under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) and is with respect to an article of food which is adulterated under sub-clause (1) of clause (i) of section 2 or misbranded under sub-clause (k) of clause (ix) of that section; or (ii)if the offence is under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a), the court may for any adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months or of fine of less than one thousand rupees or of both imprisonment for a term of less than six months and fine of less than one thousand rupees. * * * * * 20 (1): No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of (the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority): provided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to in section 12, if the produces in court a copy of the report of the public analyst along with the complaint. (2)No court inferior to that of a Presidency Magistrate or a magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act. * * * * * 21. Notwithstanding anything contained in section 32 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, it shall be lawful for any Presidency Magistrate or any Magistrate of the first class to pass any sentence authorised by this Act, in excess of his powers under section 32 of the said Code. " ( 7 ) ON these provisions, the maximum penalty which could be imposed for committing any offence under section 16 (1) (a) was imprisonment for 6 years and fine. Such an offence not being an offence under the Indian Penal Code was triable not exclusively by the Court of Sessions on the provisions of section 29 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, read with Schedule II thereunder. To avoid the limit imposed by section 32 of the said Code, on sentences which a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class could impose section 21 as above, was incorporated in the said Act. In the result, such offences were rendered triable by a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class. Such was the law applicable to whole of India (after its amendment by Act 41 of 1971 ). ( 8 ) THE said Act, however, in its application to the State of West Bengal was amended by the Prevention of Adulteration of Food, Drugs and Cosmetics (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1973 (West Bengal Amendment of 1973 ). Section 6 of this West Bengal Amendment provided as follows: - "6. ( 8 ) THE said Act, however, in its application to the State of West Bengal was amended by the Prevention of Adulteration of Food, Drugs and Cosmetics (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1973 (West Bengal Amendment of 1973 ). Section 6 of this West Bengal Amendment provided as follows: - "6. Amendment of Act 37 of 1954 - In the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 - (ii)in section 16, - (a)in sub-section (1) for the words "a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to six years, and with fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees" the words "life and shall also be liable to fine" shall be substituted; (b)in the proviso to sub-section (1), for the words "the Court may for any adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months or fine of less than one thousand rupees or of both imprisonment for a term of less than six months and fine of less than one thousand rupees", the following words shall be substituted, namely: - " (ii)if the Court thinks that for any adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment a lesser sentence would serve the ends of justice. the Court may impose a sentence which is less than a sentence of imprisonment for life"; * * * * * (iv)after section 19, the following section shall be inserted, namely, - 19a. "burden of proof - When any article intended for food is seized from any person in the reasonable belief that the same is adulterated or misbranded the burden of proving that such article intended for food is not adulterated or misbranded shall be on the person from whose possession such article intended for food was seized. "; (v)for section 20, the following section shall be substituted. 20. "cognizance of offences and arrest without warrant.- (1) All offences punishable under this Act shall be cognizable and non-bailable. (2)Any police officer not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector of Police may arrest without warrant any person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made or credible information has been received of his having been concerned in any of the offences punishable under this Act. (2)Any police officer not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector of Police may arrest without warrant any person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made or credible information has been received of his having been concerned in any of the offences punishable under this Act. " ( 9 ) THE West Bengal Amendment, as aforesaid, brought about a material change so far as the said Principal Act is concerned in its application to West Bengal. The maximum penalty for an offence under section 16 (1) (a) when committed in West Bengal could go upto imprisonment for life so that on the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, referred to hereinafter such an offence became exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions and ceased to be triable either by a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class. It is only for that reason that section 20 of the said Act was also materially changed. Moreover, by introduction of section 19a the burden of proof that the article sized is not adulterated or misbranded was shifted from the prosecution to the accused in the circumstances prescribed by that section. The said West Bengal Amendment having been reserved for consideration by the President and having had his assent did override the corresponding provisions of the Principal Act in their application to West Bengal. ( 10 ) IT is not in dispute that the offences under section 16 (1) of the said Act as alleged to have been committed by the two petitioners in the present cases were so committed within West Bengal and at a time when the said Act stood amended in its application to West Bengal by the provisions of the West Bengal Amendment of 1973, as aforesaid. If the law continued to stand as it stood on the date of the offences were so committed there would have been no difficulty because the maximum penalty would be imprisonment for life and fine: and as such, the offences would be exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. But a difficulty was brought about by the enactment of the Central Amendment of 1976 (Central Act 34 of 1976 ). It was an Act to amend the provisions of the Principal Act, that is, the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. But a difficulty was brought about by the enactment of the Central Amendment of 1976 (Central Act 34 of 1976 ). It was an Act to amend the provisions of the Principal Act, that is, the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The scheme of section 16 of the Principal Act was materially altered by section 12 of the Amending Act. The material provisions of the amending Act are set out hereunder: 12. It was an Act to amend the provisions of the Principal Act, that is, the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The scheme of section 16 of the Principal Act was materially altered by section 12 of the Amending Act. The material provisions of the amending Act are set out hereunder: 12. In section 16 of the Principal Act, - (a)for sub-section (1), the following sub-section shall be substituted, namely; - " (1)Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1a), if any person - (a)whether by himself or by any other person on his behalf, imports into India or manufactures for sale, or stores, sells or distributes any article of food - (i)which is adulterated within the meaning of sub-clause (m) of clause (ia) of section 2 or misbranded within the meaning of clause (ix) of that section of the sale of which is prohibited under any provision of this Act or any rule made thereunder or by an order of the Food (Health) Authority; (ii)other than an article of food referred to in sub-clause (i), in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule made thereunder; * * * * * he shall, in addition to the penalty to which he may be liable under the provisions of section 6, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to three years, and with fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees: provided that - (i)if the offence is under sub-clause (a) and is with respect to an article of food, being primary food, which is adulterated due to human agency or is with respect to an article of food which is misbranded within the meaning of sub-clause (k) of clause (ix) of section 2; or (ii)if the offence is under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a), but not being an offence with respect to the contravention of any rule made under clause (a) or clause (g) of sub-section (1a) of section 23 or under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 24, the court may, for any adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three months but which may extend to two years, and with fine which shall not be less than five hundred rupees: provided further that if the offence is under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) and is with respect to the contravention of any rule made under clause (a) or clause (g) of sub-section (1a) of section 23 or under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 24, the court may, for any adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months and with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees"; (b)sub-section (1a) shall be re-numbered as sub-section (1aa) and before that sub-section as so re-numbered, the following sub-section shall be inserted, namely: - " (1a)if any person whether by himself or by any other person on his behalf, imports into India or manufactures for sale, or stores, sells or distributes, - (i)any article of food which is adulterated within the meaning of the sub-clauses (e) to (l) (both inclusive) of clause (ia) of section 2; or (ii)any adulterant which is injurious to health, he shall, in addition to the penalty to which he may liable under the provisions of section 6, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to six years and with fine which shall not be less than two thousand rupees: provided that if such article of food or adulterant, when consumed by any person is likely to cause his death or is likely to cause such harm on his body as would amount to grievous hurt within the meaning of section 320 of the Indian Penal Code, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to term of life and with fine which shall not be less than five thousand rupees"; * * * * * 13. After section 16 of the Principal Act, the following section shall be inserted, namely: - "16a. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, all offences under section (1) of section 16 shall be tried in summary way by a Judicial Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of sections 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as far as may be, apply to such trial: provided that in the case of any conviction in a summary trial under this section, it shall be lawful for the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year: provided further that when at the commencement of, or in the course of, a summary trial under this section, it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed or that it is, for any other reason, undesirable to try the case summarily, the Magistrate shall after hearing the parties, record an order to that effect and thereafter recall any witness who may have been examined and proceed to hear or rehear the case in the manner provided by the said Code". * * * * * 16. In section 20 of the Principal Act, - (a)in sub-section, (1) - (i)for the words "no prosecution for an offence under this Act", the words, figures and letter "no prosecution for an offence under this Act, not being an offence under section 14 or section 14a", shall be substituted; (ii)the words "or a local authority", at both the places where they occur, shall be omitted; (b)for sub-section (2) , the following sub-sections shall be substituted, namely: -" (2)NO court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act. (3)Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973, an offence punishable under sub-section (1aa) of Section 16 shall be cognizable and non-bailable". (3)Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973, an offence punishable under sub-section (1aa) of Section 16 shall be cognizable and non-bailable". ( 11 ) THERE is a sharp difference of opinion as between the learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the accused-petitioners on the one hand and the learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the State and the Corporation of Calcutta on the other as to the effect of this Central amendment of 1976 on the law as it stood applicable to West Bengal prior to such amendment. According to the learned Advocates for the accused-petitioners the West Bengal Amendments of 1973 stood abrogated altogether and as such the petitioners can no longer be subjected to any penalty as prescribed by the West Bengal Amendment nor tried as such. According to them the West Bengal Amendment stood obliterated and if at all the accused-petitioners could be tried in accordance with and subjected to such penalty as is prescribed by the Central Amendment of 1976. Mr. Roy, the learned Advocate appearing for the State has, however, contended on the other hand that the Central Amendment of 1976 had only the effect of repealing the West Bengal Amendment of 1973 but such repeal will invoke the provisions of Section 8 of the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899, which corresponds to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act of 1897. Accordingly it is contended by Mr. Roy that under the provisions of Section 8 (c) the liability for the punishment as provided by the West Bengal Amendment of 1973 would subsist and that liability being imprisonment which may extend to life such an offence could be tried exclusively by the Court of Sessions. Mr. Ghosh appearing on behalf of the Corporation of Calcutta has fully supported Mr. Roy on this point. ( 12 ) GIVING anxious considerations to the rival contentions put forward before me, I have come to the conclusion that the effect of the Central Amendment of 1976 is in substance repeal of the West Bengal Amendment of 1973. The Central Amendment of 1976 has not expressly repealed the West Bengal Amendment nor has it expressly dealt with the amending Act of West Bengal in any manner. Section 25 of the Principal Act can have no application since that has reference to the Principal Act only and not subsequent amendments thereto. The Central Amendment of 1976 has not expressly repealed the West Bengal Amendment nor has it expressly dealt with the amending Act of West Bengal in any manner. Section 25 of the Principal Act can have no application since that has reference to the Principal Act only and not subsequent amendments thereto. But it should be remembered that the subject matter of legislation was "adulteration of food-stuffs" within the meaning of relevant entry in List III that is the concurrent List of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution. As indicated hereinbefore the West Bengal Amendment had the effect of overriding the material provisions of the Principal Act in its application to West Bengal as the same was enacted in terms of Article 254 (2), namely, having been reserved for consideration by the President and having had received his assent. Under the proviso to Article 254 (2) the Parliament, however, still retained the power to enact at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law made by a State legislature under sub-article (2 ). Therefore, the Central Amendment of 1976 is an enactment as contemplated by the aforesaid proviso to Article 254 (2) and though it may not have been an Act either to amend or repeal expressly the West Bengal Amendment of 1973 yet it being an enactment in respect of the same subject matter as was covered by the West Bengal Amendment itself, it would prevail over the West Bengal Amendment in view of the provisions of Article 254 (1) of the Constitution. In my view there can be no dispute that the two enactments covered the same field, namely, provide punishment for trading in adulterated foodstuff. The effect of such overriding of a State law by a law made by the Parliament under Article 254 (1) of the Constitution was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of (1) Zaven Bhai Amari Das v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 752 relied on by Mr. The effect of such overriding of a State law by a law made by the Parliament under Article 254 (1) of the Constitution was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of (1) Zaven Bhai Amari Das v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 752 relied on by Mr. Roy where it was observed "it is true, as already pointed out, that on a question under Article 254 (1) whether an Act of Parliament prevails against a law of the State, no question of repeal arises; but the principle on which the rule of implied repeal rests, namely, that if the subject matter of the later legislation is identical with that of the earlier, so that they cannot both stand together, then the earlier is repealed by the later enactment, will be equally applicable to a question under Article 254 (2) where the further legislation by Parliament is in respect of the same matter as that of the State law. "therefore it must be held that West Bengal Amendment of 1973 was repealed by necessary implication by the Central amendment of 1976. That even in cases of such implied repeal as a consequence of the provisions of Article 254 (1) of the Constitution, the provisions of the General Clauses Act would be attracted is now well settled. Reference may be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of (2) Deepchand v. State of U. P. , AIR 1959 SC 648 and (3) State of Orissa v. M. A. Tulloch, AIR 1964 SC 1284 . It is also well settled that the General Clauses Act would apply not only in cases of repeal simplicitor but even in cases of repeal with a simultaneous enactment unless a contrary intention can be gathered from the new enactment. See (4) Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of Enemy Property, AIR 1956 Sc 77 and (5) State of Punjab v. Mohor Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84 . On the application of this principle therefore it is clear that the effect of the Central Amendment of 1976 is implied repeal of the West Bengal Amendment of 1973 which would ordinarily attract the provisions of Section 8 of the Bengal General Clauses Act. On the application of this principle therefore it is clear that the effect of the Central Amendment of 1976 is implied repeal of the West Bengal Amendment of 1973 which would ordinarily attract the provisions of Section 8 of the Bengal General Clauses Act. The contention of the learned Advocates for the petitioners to the effect that the Central Amendment of 1976 totally abrogates or obliterates the West Bengal Amendment cannot be accepted and necessarily I must accept the contention of the learned Advocates for the State and the Corporation of Calcutta that the Central Amendment only had the effect of repealing the State Amendment and unless any contrary intention is made out from the provisions of the Central Amendment of 1976 such repeal will not wipe out the liabilities incurred under the West Bengal Amendment prior to the Central Amendment of 1976. ( 13 ) THIS leads me to consider a limited question as to whether the provisions of the Central Amendment of 1976 are really intended to be retrospective in its operation so that it would cover cases of offences committed even prior to the enactment itself. It had been strongly contended by the learned Advocates for the petitioners that when the Parliament mitigated the punishment in respect of the same offence it really intended that the punishment so provided would apply to all cases irrespective of when the offences were so committed unless it is concluded by a final order of conviction and sentence. ( 14 ) TO find an answer to this question I shall have to find out the rules of construction applicable to a case like the present one and decide on application of such principle whether the Central Amendment of 1976 was really intended to retrospective so that the provisions thereof would cover cases of offences committed even prior to the enactment. It is obvious that the Central Amendment has not expressly made the amendment retrospective. ( 15 ) THERE are cases where the question as to whether a law which mollifies the rigour of the criminal law could have any retrospective effect on the teeth of the constitutional inhibition that "no State shall pass any ex-post-facto law" was considered and it was held that giving retrospective effect to such mitigating enactment would not come within the constitutional inhibition. The leading decision is in the case of (6) Calder v. Bull 1 L. Ed, 648 where Chase, J. observed, "every ex-post facto law must necessarily be retrospective; but every retrospective law is not ex-post-facto law. The former only are prohibited. Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested agreeably to existing laws is retrospective and is generally unjust and may be oppressive; and it is a good general rule that a law should have no retrospect; but there are cases in which laws may justly and for the benefit of the community, and also of individuals, relate to a time antecedent to their commencement; as statutes of oblivion or of pardon. They are certainly retrospective and literally both concerning and after the facts committed. But I do not consider any law ex-post-facto within the prohibition that mollifies the rigour of the criminal law, but only those that create or aggravate crime or increase the punishment or change the rules of evidence for the purpose of conviction". The above observation is quoted with approval in Craise on Statute Law. 7th Edition, page 388 and had been followed in some of the English cases like (7) Philips v. Eyer, 1870 LR QB page 1. These decisions, however, are authorities for a proposition that it is permissible for the legislature to make a law giving it retrospective effect if the law is intended to mollify the rigour of criminal law and they must not be read as authority for a proposition that such a law must always be construed to be retrospective. ( 16 ) THE true rule of construction, in my view, would be as was laid down in (8) Moon v. Durden, 2 Ex. 23 and quoted with approval in (9) Pardo v. Bingham, (1869) LR IV CH App. 735 where it was observed "baron Park did not consider it an invariable rule that statute could not be retrospective unless so expressed in the very terms of the section which had to be construed and said that the question in each case was whether the legislature had sufficiently expressed that intention. In fact, we must look to the general scope and purview of the statute and at the remedy sought to be applied and consider what was the former state of law and what it was that the legislature contemplated. In fact, we must look to the general scope and purview of the statute and at the remedy sought to be applied and consider what was the former state of law and what it was that the legislature contemplated. " It is therefore always a matter of construction in each case to find out what was the true intention of the legislature while enacting such a law. Such an intention is to be judged having regard to the circumstances prevailing and the object of the statue. The court is also to take into account the effect that may ensue from giving retrospective effect to such a statute and considering all aspects the court is to decide if the statute can consistently be given retrospective effect. A construction giving retrospective effect may be favoured where the statute mollifies the rigour of the existing criminal law. This is what Crowford pointed out in his treaties when he observed "nor should the statute be given retrospective operation, unless its language clearly makes such a construction necessary, even though it favours the defendant, either by leaving him wholly or partially from punishment previously provided for or by condoning the offence created by the former law. But if the criminal statute is subject to a strict construction, as it generally is, it would seem that where retroactive effect favours the defendant, the statue should be liberally construed in favour of retroactivity. ( 17 ) APPLYING the above rule of construction let us now find out whether the legislature in enacting the Central Amendment of 1976, intended the same to be retrospective and whether such retrospective effect can be given consistently in view of attending facts and circumstances. The first difficulty which one faces in this regard is in the terms used by the Legislature and the syntax. Unlike many other statutory provisions creating similar offences and providing punishment therefore, in this enactment the material provisions are not in terms like "any person guilty of an offence of manufacturing, storing, selling or distributing any article of food which is adulterated shall be punishable with. . . . . . . . . . On the other hand, the terms of Section 16 (1) are "if any person. . . . . . manufactures for sales, or stores, sells or distributes any article of food which is adulterated he shall be. . . . . punishable with. . . . . . . . . . On the other hand, the terms of Section 16 (1) are "if any person. . . . . . manufactures for sales, or stores, sells or distributes any article of food which is adulterated he shall be. . . . . punishable with. . . . . . ". On the words used and on its terms only consistent implication is that such manufacture, storing, selling or distributing is done after the enactment and not prior thereto. ( 18 ) THE second difficulty which one faces in giving the amendment retrospective effect is the fact that under the new clause (b) to Section 16 (1) manufacturing for sale or storing or selling or distributing any adulterant is a new offence which was not in the parent Act at any time before and Article 20 of the Constitution would stand in the way of giving the said clause retrospective effect and thus render the act which was otherwise innocent at the time when it was done to be an offence by the later enactment. That could never have been the intention of the legislature nor is it possible to give retrospective effect to other parts of Section 16 (1) excluding the aforesaid new clause. ( 19 ) THE more fundamental difficulty which one faces in giving the said amendment retrospective effect is in the scheme itself. As has been pointed out hereinbefore the Central Amendment of 1976, was effected only with reference to and having regard to the provisions of the Principal Act as it stood on Central amendments thereto on the date of such Amendment of 1976. Such amendment was not made with any express reference to any of the prevailing State Amendments though such State Amendments stood repealed by necessary implication in view of the constitutional provisions of Article 254 (1 ). By the Amendment of 1976, the legislature introduced varying grades of offences with regard to adulteration and also prescribed varying penalties therefore which were not there in the Principal Act. Though the penalty prescribed for offences contemplated by Section 16 (1) (a) to (g) had been reduced so far as the maximum limit is concerned from 6 years to 3 years, some of the offences which were previously within the aforesaid clauses were taken out therefrom and the penalty prescribed therefore had been enhanced. Though the penalty prescribed for offences contemplated by Section 16 (1) (a) to (g) had been reduced so far as the maximum limit is concerned from 6 years to 3 years, some of the offences which were previously within the aforesaid clauses were taken out therefrom and the penalty prescribed therefore had been enhanced. Similarly, some of the penalties prescribed for some of the offences referred to in some of the clauses of the parent Act had also been enhanced. Such being the position, to accept the contention of the learned Advocates for the petitioners and giving retrospective effect to these provisions incorporated by the Central Amendment of 1976, for mollifying the rigour of the law as was in force in West Bengal would result in increasing the rigour of the same offences in other States which would be direct violation of the constitutional inhibition in Article 20 of the Constitution nor can we ascribe such an intention to the legislature. ( 20 ) MY attention has been drawn to a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of (10) Shyamlal v. The State, AIR 1968 Allahabad 392. In this case what was being considered was the amendment to section 16 by Central Act 49 of 1964 which came into effect on March 1, 1965, and whereby the rigour of the law was somewhat mollified when court was given discretion to impose a penalty lesser than what was prescribed by the statute. The question which arose for consideration was as to whether a person who had committed such an offence prior to such amendment could avail of the said benefit and the learned Judges held in his favour. This decision, however, would not help the petitioners in the present case for two-fold reasons. Firstly, in this case the court was considering the effect of an alteration of the law by amendment not having the effect of repeal as in the present case. That such amendment stands in a position different from repeal had been clearly emphasized in several English cases like (11) Director of Public Prosecutor v. Lamb, (1941) 2 KB 89, (12) Buckman v. Button, (1943) 1. KB 405 and (13) Rex v. Oliver, 1944 KB 68. That such amendment stands in a position different from repeal had been clearly emphasized in several English cases like (11) Director of Public Prosecutor v. Lamb, (1941) 2 KB 89, (12) Buckman v. Button, (1943) 1. KB 405 and (13) Rex v. Oliver, 1944 KB 68. Secondly, giving retrospective effect to the amendment thereunder consideration by the Allahabad High Court did not raise difficulties or inconsistencies of the nature as they arise in giving the present Amendment retrospective effect as indicated hereinbefore. ( 21 ) ON the conclusions as above, I must, therefore, overrule the contention raised by the learned Advocates for the petitioners that the Central Amendment of 1976 being retrospective, the West Bengal Amendment of 1973 stands so abrogated that even in respect of offences already committed when the West Bengal Amendment was in force the offender cannot be subjected to the penalties prescribed thereunder. On the other hand, I accept the contention of Mr. Roy and Mr. Ghosh that though as a result of the Central Amendment of 1976, the West Bengal Amendment of 1973 stood repealed by necessary implication yet the liabilities incurred thereunder would survive and can be enforced so that persons committing offences thereunder can be subjected to penalties prescribed by the law since repealed. This conclusion of mine is well supported by a decision of this Court in the case of (14) Nishi Kanta v. Calcutta Corporation, AIR 1953 Cal. 401 relied on by Mr. Ghosh. This disposes of the fundamental objection and the point which is common to both the revisional applications. So far as the case of Bansidhari Manna is concerned, no other point had been raised. ( 22 ) SO far as the case of Nityananda Shaw is concerned, the learned advocate appearing in support of the revisional application has raised two other points referred to hereinbefore. I now proceed to consider those two points. The first of the said two points is that in the present case cognizance having been taken on a petition of complaint lodged by the Food Inspector without, however, examining him under section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the cognizance cannot be said to have been validly taken. I now proceed to consider those two points. The first of the said two points is that in the present case cognizance having been taken on a petition of complaint lodged by the Food Inspector without, however, examining him under section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the cognizance cannot be said to have been validly taken. It is not disputed that the Food Inspector is a public servant yet it is claimed that proviso (a) to section 200 would not be attracted because in lodging the complaint, the Food Inspector was not acting in discharge of his official duties as lodging of a complaint is not a duty assigned to him by the Act, strong reliance is placed by the learned Advocate for the petitioner on a decision of this Court in the case of (15) Shyama Prasanna Dasgupta v. State, 1976 (32) Criminal Law Journal 1517. But the said decision in my view is clearly distinguishable on facts. In that case it does not appear as to whether the public servant was filing the complaint under the direction of any of his office superiors as in the present case when it was so done under the direction of the Health Officer. Official duties of a public servant cannot always be prescribed by a statute. Such duties include not only those assigned by a statutory provision but those which a public servant is required to discharge under the administrative set up in which he is serving and would certainly include the duties he is directed to discharge under the orders of his superior. Mr. Ghosh has rightly pointed out that this position has been made clear by the Supreme Court in the case of (16) Dattatrai v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1975 SC 1685 . Section 200 (a) speaking of 'a public servant nothing or purporting to act in discharge of his official duties' was really excluding private complaints or complaints having no relation to bearing with his duties as a public servant when lodged by him. That was also the view expressed by this Court in the Bench decision in the case of (17) Ram Gopal v. The Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1930 Cal. That was also the view expressed by this Court in the Bench decision in the case of (17) Ram Gopal v. The Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1930 Cal. 222 where the question considered was whether a Building Surveyor of the Corporation of Calcutta who was lodging a complaint for demolition of a structure, was so doing in discharge of his official duties or not and this Court answered the question in the affirmative and held that the Building Surveyor in lodging the petition of complaint was doing so in discharge of his official duties though lodging of such a complaint was not enjoined as a duty by the statute. Similar was the view expressed in two other decisions of this Court in the case of (18) S. C. Nandi v. Corporation of Calcutta, 34 CWN 449 and (19) Corporation of Calcutta v. Bhagat Oil Mill, 74cwn 164. A Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case of (20) Public Prosecutor v. Ratnavelu Chetty, AIR 1926 Madras 865 also supports the conclusion to which I have arrived at. ( 23 ) THE other point raised by the learned Advocate for the petitioner appears to have no answer. Mr. Ghosh appearing on behalf of the Corporation of Calcutta has failed to give any answer to the point so raised. Admittedly the offence was committed at a place beyond the local jurisdiction of the City Sessions Court and as such under section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure such Court would not ordinarily have jurisdiction to try such a case. No such jurisdiction being shown to have been specifically conferred on such a Court, the said Court cannot obviously try the offence commitment to the said Court for trial of such an offence committed beyond the territorial jurisdiction of that Court is clearly erroneous. ( 24 ) IN the result, the revisional application of Bansidhari Manna fails and is dismissed and all interim orders passed thereon are vacated. The revisional application of Nityananda Shaw succeeds and is allowed; the order of commitment impugned is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court of the learned Magistrate for proceeding afresh with the commitment proceeding in accordance with law. Before making any order of commitment the learned Magistrate must comply with the requirement of Section 202 (2) proviso of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Before making any order of commitment the learned Magistrate must comply with the requirement of Section 202 (2) proviso of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Revisional application of Banshidhari Manna fails but that of Nityoaanda Shaw succeeds.1