Short Note : 1. The plaintiff applicant filed a suit for ejectmeni. The number of this suit was 101-A of 1970, 30.6.1972, was fixed as date for arguments and evidence of the parties. Neither the plaintiff appeared on that date nor any of his two counsel appeared. Consequently, the suit was dismissed in default. 2. On the same day, Shri Ram Bhuwansingh Kushwah one of the Advocate for the plaintiff filed an application for restoration of the suit stating that he was busy before the Motor Vehicle Tribunal in case No. 2/71 Civil Miscellaneous Kailash Narain v. Lajjaram). Senior counsel for the applicant Shri Brijendrasingh had gone to Bhopal in connection with some important work. Being busy in that case he could not appear when the case was called. The witnesses of the plaintiff were duly summoned and were also present in the Court. This application was opposed by the defendant on the ground that no sufficient cause was made out. 3. In support of the application for restoration on behalf of the plaintiff his counsel Ram Bhuwansingh Advocate filed an affidavit on 24-2-1973, but no counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the defendants. 4. The trial Court by its order dated 9-3-1973, dismissed the application for restoration. Aggrieved by that order the plaintiff preferred an appeal which has been dismissed. Hence this revision. 5. Shri H.B Mangal, learned counsel for the plaintiff-applicant has contended that the application for restoration of the suit has been dismissed illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction. There was no ulterior motive of the plaintiff in getting the suit dismissed and when application was moved the same day, the suit ought to have been restored. Shri M.C. Jain, learned counsel for the defendant-non-applicants argued in support of the impugned order and contended that:- (1) the application for restoration was made by the counsel of the plaintiff whose power stood exhausted with the dismissal of the suit. (2) that it was necessary to explain the plaintiff's absence. (3) the fact that one of the counsel of plaintiff was busy in another Court cannot constitute a sufficient cause within the meaning of Order 9, rule 9 C.P.C. Held : So far as the first contention goes, Shri M.C. Jain, learned counsel for the defendant-non-applicant replied on AIR 1975 Goa. (3) the fact that one of the counsel of plaintiff was busy in another Court cannot constitute a sufficient cause within the meaning of Order 9, rule 9 C.P.C. Held : So far as the first contention goes, Shri M.C. Jain, learned counsel for the defendant-non-applicant replied on AIR 1975 Goa. 30 (Ananta Pandu Prabho Desai and others v. Smt. Lalita) and contended that with the dismissal of suit power of Advocate stands exhausted, Therefore, the application for restoration having been submitted by Shri Ram Bhuwansingh is without any authority and the same should be dismissed. Goa case does not lay down a good law. In 1978 (2) SC cases, (Ananta Pandu v. Smt. Lalita) it has been held that; "Mr. Vineet Kumar who appears on behalf of the respondent has not been able to contest the position that the very same advocate who appeared in the suit on behalf of the plaintiff could file an application for restoration of the suit on the authority of the original Vakalatnama executed by the plaintiff in his favour." 6. Running contrary to the Supreme Court dictum, the principles laid down in the Goa case cannot hold water. Hence reliance on that is of no avail. 7. This brings me to the next point in the case viz, whether it was necessary to explain the absence of the plaintiff. The case was fixed for arguments and evidence on 30-6-72. There is unrebutted affidavit of Shri Ram Bhuwan Singh to the effect that the witnesses for plaintiff were duly summoned and were present in the Court. The suit is not shown to be based on the ground under section 12 (1) (e) or 12 (1) (f) of the Accommodation Control Act, 1961, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The suit is stated to be based upon ground of default in payment of arrears of rent. In this view of the matter, absence of the plaintiff need not have been explained. 8. In 1977 JLJ Short Note 1 Mirabai and others v. Patiram and anothers the suit was dismissed in default of the plaintiff's appearance. The plaintiff of that case had gone out of station. His counsel appeared at 11.00 AM when the Court was busy in another case. Later on when the counsel again appeared at 1.30. PM he found the suit to be dismissed in default. The plaintiff of that case had gone out of station. His counsel appeared at 11.00 AM when the Court was busy in another case. Later on when the counsel again appeared at 1.30. PM he found the suit to be dismissed in default. Thereafter restoration application was submitted on that very day. These facts were held to constitute sufficient cause for purposes of Order 9, rule 9 and restoration of the suit was ordered. The very fact that plaintiff counsel moved application that very day shows that at the time when the suit must have been called, he was busy in another Court. Therefore, it was not within his control to have left that case and he attended the Court in which this suit was pending. The Division Bench of this Court in a case reported in 1975 RN 84 Ram Rao and others v. Narayan and others had held that : "It is the interest of justice that ordinarily a Court of law should not dismiss the case in default of appearance in the early part of the day. Even if a case is dismissed in default in the early part it should ordinarily be restored when application is made on the same day particularly when no mala fide can be attributed to the applicant for his absence at the time when the case was called for hearing." 9. The ratio of this case is on all fours to the present case. Shri M.C. Jain, placing reliance on the case reported in 1972 JLJ 317 Sitabai v. Vidyawati contended that counsel was busy in another Court cannot constitute sufficient cause. Reliance on this case is not available in the facts of the case of Sitabai (Supra) were totally different. Firstly in that case it was held that application under Order 9, rule 13 was not maintainable because in that case the trial Court had proceeded to decide the suit on material before it and passed decree in favour of the non-applicant plaintiff. Thus the Court in that case proceeded under provisions of Order 17, rule 3. As such it was held that no order was passed under Order 9 of the Code and, therefore, there was no occasion for filing an application under rule 13 of Order 9 of the CPC. Thus the Court in that case proceeded under provisions of Order 17, rule 3. As such it was held that no order was passed under Order 9 of the Code and, therefore, there was no occasion for filing an application under rule 13 of Order 9 of the CPC. After that application which was in law untenable upon its dismissal in default an application purporting to section 151 CPC was filed to restore it. But this application was also dismissed in default and the application purporting to be under section 151 of CPC was made. This last application was dismissed by the learned ADJ for reason given by him. A bare recital of the aforesaid facts amply shows that latches in the conduct of the case by the applicant-defendant were writ large on the proceedings. After stating these facts the judgment in the case of Sitabai (Supra) proceeded to hold that under those circumstances the defendant-applicant was not entitled to any discretionary indulgence under the provisions of CPC. In view of this finding the further questions whether absence of counsel due to his being busy in other Court constituted a sufficient cause within the meaning of Order 9, rule 13 was not necessary to be decided in that case. Any how, Sitabal's case (Supra) cannot be regarded as an authority of universal application and it is an authority for the facts of that case. 10. As to the value of precedents their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case, reported in AIR 1968 SC 647 State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and others held that ;- "A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. It is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it. (1001) AC 495 Relied on." 11. At this juncture, Shri M.C. Jain, learned counsel for the defendant applicant advanced another argument to the effect that the affidavit is no evidence. Suffice it to say that this contention is devoid of any force in view of the ratio of the case reported in AIR 1954 Nag. 260. 1978 (2) SCC 1 , AIR 1938 Nag. At this juncture, Shri M.C. Jain, learned counsel for the defendant applicant advanced another argument to the effect that the affidavit is no evidence. Suffice it to say that this contention is devoid of any force in view of the ratio of the case reported in AIR 1954 Nag. 260. 1978 (2) SCC 1 , AIR 1938 Nag. 272, 1972 JLJ SN 96, 1977 JLJ SN 1, 1975 RN 84, AIR 1968 SC 647 and AIR 1954 Nag. 260 relied on, AIR 1975 Goa 30 dissented from, 1972 JLJ 317 distinguished. Revision allowed, case restored.