ORDER D.N. Jha, J. - Kanhaiya Bux and others have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for ouashing of the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 25-7-1970 contained in Annexure 3. 2. Briefly stated the facts are that between the petitioners and Smt. Abhairaji, who was opposite party No. 2 but died during the pendency of the writ petition, the dispute related to plots Nos. 404 and 58 situate in village Jamuna, pergana Pachhimrath, Tahsil Bikapur, District Faizabad. In the basic year Smt. Abhairaji was recorded over the disputed plots. On publication of the records under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the petitioners filed objections. They asserted that Smt. Abhairaji had only half share in the disputed plots and she having executed a sale deed in favour of the petitioners in 1928 the petitioners had become the sole grove holders and the name of Smt. Abhairaji deserved to be expunged. In the alternative the petitioners had also set up a case on the basis of possession and asserted that they had perfected their rights by virtue of adverse possession. The claim was resisted by Smt. Abhairaji. In the circumstances the dispute that had arisen between the parties was referred to the Consolidation Officer, who, vide his order dated 25-9-1962 allowed the objections preferred by the petitioners. Smt. Abhairaji preferred an appeal before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation which was allowed on 18-1-1963. The petitioners then preferred a second appeal and it was allowed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 18-4-1963. This order is Annexure 2 to the Writ petition. Smt. Abhairaji then went up in revision before the Director of Consolidation but the same was rejected on 29-7-1963. Smt. Abhairaji feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the Director of Consolidation preferred a writ petition in this court which was numbered as 677 of 1963 and it was finally allowed by a Division Bench on 4-10-1966. The case under orders of this Court was remanded to the Deputy Director of Consolidation to be decided in accordance with the old Section 48. The matter on remand by this court came up for consideration before the Deputy Director of consolidation who after hearing the parties allowed the revision vide order dated 25-7-1970. This order is Annexure 3 to the writ petition. The matter on remand by this court came up for consideration before the Deputy Director of consolidation who after hearing the parties allowed the revision vide order dated 25-7-1970. This order is Annexure 3 to the writ petition. It is in these circumstances that the present writ petition has been directed by the petitioners impugning the order dated 25-7-1970 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in exercise of revisional jurisdiction on the ground that Act No. 18 of 1968 had come into force in accordance with which an explanation in S. 48 of the Act had been added which clarified that the Deputy Director of Consolidation was not subordinate to the Director of Consolidation. It is, therefore, asserted that the Director of Consolidation had no revisional jurisdiction to upset the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 18-4-1963. The petition has been resisted on behalf of opposite party Ram Kumar whose name has been substituted in place of Smt. Abhairaji as she died during the pendency of the writ petition. It is asserted that the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is legal and the contentions of the petitioners are devoid of substance and call for no interference by this Court. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioners in the first instance contended that the order dated 25-7-1970 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation was wholly without jurisdiction in view of decisions of this court. It may be mentioned that the view expressed by a Full Bench of this court in Dr. Prem Chandra v. Deputy Director of Consolidation (1966 All LJ 641) was reviewed by a larger Bench of this Court in Gauri Shanker v. Sidh Nath Tewari ( 1968 RD 426 ). The majority view was : "The word `lay' in the proviso to S. 47 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1963 means `for which provision was made. `The proviso could apply to all second appeals and revisions in cases where the lis had commenced prior to March 8, 1963 and in which the unamended Act in force on the date of the commencement of this lis had provided for a second appeal or a revision. `The proviso could apply to all second appeals and revisions in cases where the lis had commenced prior to March 8, 1963 and in which the unamended Act in force on the date of the commencement of this lis had provided for a second appeal or a revision. In all such cases if the second appeal had not been instituted till March 7, 1963, it could not be instituted thereafter because the right of second appeal stood repealed on March 8, 1963. Only a revision could be instituted on or after March 8, 1963 in accordance with the amended S. 48." When writ Petition No. 677 of 1963 filed by Smt. Abhairaji was decided by a Division Bench of this Court the view that prevailed was that which was laid down by the Full Bench in Dr. Prem Chandra's (supra). The view expressed subsequently in Gauri Shanker's case was not before the Division Bench. The fact remains that the writ petition filed by Smt. Abhairaji was allowed and the matter was sent back to the Deputy Director Consolidation to dispose of the revision in view of S. 48 of the Act as amended by U.P. Act No. 8 of 1963. The position, however, changed by a subsequent amendment brought about in the principal Act by Act No. 18 of 1963. An explanation was added with retrospective effect changing the position. Under the explanation the Deputy Director of Consolidation was not an officer subordinate to the Director of Consolidation. With this retrospective change in the law the declaration of the unamended law, it is clear, would no longer hold the field. A similar situation had arisen in the case of Ram Niranjan Singh v. Ram Awadh Singh (1973 RD (HC) 446). The instant case, so far as the legal aspect is concerned, is identical. A Bench of this Court held : "Till S. 48 was amended by U.P. Act No. 18 of 1968 the construction placed upon that provision was that the Deputy Director of Consolidation was an authority subordinate to the Director within the meaning of S. 48 (1). The Explanation retrospectively changed that position. Under the explanation the Deputy Director of Consolidation was not an official subordinate to the Director. With this retrospective change in the law the declaration of the unamended law would no longer hold of the field. The Explanation retrospectively changed that position. Under the explanation the Deputy Director of Consolidation was not an official subordinate to the Director. With this retrospective change in the law the declaration of the unamended law would no longer hold of the field. In this view the Director had no jurisdiction to entertain or to decide the revision on merits." The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, is correct and by no authority of law it can be said that the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 25-7-1970 was passed in exercise of jurisdiction vested in the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The order, therefore, impugned in the writ petition cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed. 4. Learned counsel for the opposite party, however, urged that the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation passed in second appeal, dated 18-4-1963, which is Annexure 2, was manifestly erroneous and as such was liable to be quashed. The learned counsel contended that the sale deed, on which reliance was placed by the petitioners, was executed in 1928, when the Oudh Rent Act was in force. He, therefore, argued that Smt. Abhairaji had no right or title to transfer the land over which she herself did not have rights. It is well settled that in a grove the grove-holder's rights were limited to the trees standing on it. He had further the right of replantation as well as of cutting the trees. It is, therefore, clear that under the Oudh Rent Act no legal right or title vested in Smt. Abhairaji with respect to the disputed land. The learned counsel invited my attention to the sale deed itself which has been annexed as Annexure 1 to the writ petition. The learned counsel argued that there were only 72 trees standing on the plot which lay in the share of Smt. Abhairaji and were only intended to be transferred. In the circumstances the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation was manifestly illegal to the extent that he held that Smt. Abhairaji even intended to transfer her future rights, hence Smt. Abhairaji was not left with any right, title or interest in the half share transferred in 1928. He maintained that this finding was contrary to the law and, therefore, deserves to be quashed by this court in the interest of justice. He maintained that this finding was contrary to the law and, therefore, deserves to be quashed by this court in the interest of justice. This contention was strongly opposed by learned counsel for the petitioners who argued that the Deputy Director of Consolidation was correct in recording a finding of fact that Smt. Abhairaji intended to transfer her future rights in the land and since Smt. Abhairaji as early as in 1928 had transferred all rights, title and interest in favour of the petitioners and the petitioners by virtue of their possession over the disputed plots on coming into force of U.P. Tenancy Act became grove-holders and thereafter altogether new rights came to be conferred on them on coming into force of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The contention in brief is that by operation of law the petitioners became bhumidhars of the plots in dispute. He further argued that the dispute was as old as of 1962 and since against the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 25-7-1970 she had not taken any steps for seeking any relief against the order dated 18-4-1963, at this belated stage, she is not entitled for any discretion being exercised in her favour. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments advance by learned counsel for the parties. It may be mentioned that although Smt. Abhairaji had executed a sale deed in 1928 she continued to be recorded in the revenue papers. She was found recorded in the basic year when the consolidation operations had started in the village. It was the petitioners who had filed objections claiming sole grove-holders' right over the disputed plots. This claim was contested and when the order passed by the Consolidation officer went against Smt. Abhairaji, she challenged it by way of appeal before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). That appeal was allowed. Thereafter when the second appeal was allowed in favour of the petitioners on 18-4-1963 she challenged it by means of a revision before the Deputy Director of revision before the Director of Consolidation and having lost the re-means of the writ petition. The matter was remanded under orders of this Court and she again contested before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The matter was remanded under orders of this Court and she again contested before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. I, therefore, do not find myself in agreement with the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that Smt. Abhairaji had taken things lying down and had not fought for assertion of her rights. She had been pursuing her lawful remedies, that were available to her. She died during the litigation and her legal representative was brought on the record. He has also pursued the. litigation. It is, therefore, amply borne out from the facts stated above that Smt. Abhairaji was conscious of the transfer made in the sale deed. It is worthwhile to mention that no steps were taken by the petitioners after the execution of the sale deed for getting their names recorded over the entire disputed grove. In this court it is asserted that by virtue of coming into force of the U.P. Tenancy Act the petitioners had become grove-holders by virtue of their possession. If that was really so why no steps were taken by them for mutation of their names? I am, therefore, not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners on this score. 5. The sale deed has been brought on the record and I have carefully gone through it. The finding recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation relates to the interpretation of document. It is not a finding of fact but the interpretation of document is a question of law and, therefore, if the court while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction feels in the interest of justice that parties deserve to have a lawful settlement of their grievances in spite of lapse of time the parties would not be denied justice. This Court while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution did not feel satisfied with the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 18-4-1963 and hence quashed the same by order dated 4-10-1966 and remanded the same for adjudication of rights of the parties. I, therefore, feel that in the interest of justice it is necessary that there should be a final adjudication of rights between the parties over the disputed plots. I, therefore, feel that in the interest of justice it is necessary that there should be a final adjudication of rights between the parties over the disputed plots. In that view of the matter I feel that the order passed in appeal by the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 18-4-1963, copy of which is Annexure 2, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and deserves to be quashed. The matter will go back to the Deputy Director of Consolidation who will dispose of the matter in exercise of powers under S. 48 of the Act as it stands on the Statute book today. 6. The result is that in the light of the observations made above the orders dated 25-7-1970 and 18-4-1963 are quashed and I direct that the Deputy Director of Consolidation will restore the appeal and after treating it as a revision shall proceed to dispose it of in accordance with S. 48 as it stands on the Statute book today. Let mandamus issue accordingly. I further direct that the Deputy Director of Consolidation will interpret the document in the light of entire oral and documentary evidence, which unfortunately is not before this court. While deciding the dispute he shall not feel bound by the observation relating to the document. I, however , make no order as to costs.