ANIMA MUKHERJEE v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL — 1977 DIGILAW 258 (CAL)

M. N. RAO, J. ( 1 ) IN this Rule the petitioner has impeached a notice dated July 14, 1973 (Annexure A), intimating thereby that the name of Lokenath Pharmacy, bearing Code No. PAR Chem, an approved Chemist Shop under the E. S. I. (M. B.) Scheme, West Bengal, should not be removed from the approved Chemist Shops under the said Scheme with effect from September 1, 1973. ( 2 ) UNDISPUTEDLY the petitioner is a proprietress of ?lokenath Pharmacy? Chemists and Druggist, and had been carrying on the business of medicine shop and was subsequently appointed and approved as a Chemist shop by the respondents in the year 1964 under the Employees' State Insurance (Medical Benefit) Scheme, West Bengal (hereinafter referred to as the said Scheme ). Such appointment was admittedly made on the basis of terms and conditions of service of approved Chemist Shops under the said Scheme. The clauses of the agreement aforesaid herein relevant for the present purpose are the following :clause-19 : If the services of an approved Chemist Shop under the Scheme are considered to be not satisfactory in the opinion of the prescribed authority he may ask the said approved Chemist Shop to stop functioning forthwith pending thorough investigation into the matter. The approved Chemist Shop shall not be entitled to claim any compensation, loss or damage for the period of such suspension of business under the Scheme and shall not dispute the order of the prescribed authority in any Court of law. CLAUSE-20 : The owner (s) of an approved Chemist Shop is/are entitled at any time, to give notice to the prescribed authority that he/she/they desire/desires the name of his/her/their shop to be withdrawn from the list of approved Chemist Shops under the Scheme and the name of the said Shop shall be removed from the said list within 30 (thirty) days from the date of such notice. Similarly, the prescribed authority is entitled at any time to give notice to an approved Chemist Shop intimating that the name of the said shop shall be removed from the list of approved Chemist Shop under the Scheme after expiry of 30 (thirty) days from the date of such notice. Similarly, the prescribed authority is entitled at any time to give notice to an approved Chemist Shop intimating that the name of the said shop shall be removed from the list of approved Chemist Shop under the Scheme after expiry of 30 (thirty) days from the date of such notice. CLAUSE-21 : If the prescribed authority is satisfied that the continued inclusion of a Chemist Shop in the list of approved Chemist Shops under the Scheme would be prejudicial to the efficiency of the services, he may remove the name of such shop from the list after giving a notice of 1 (one) month to the approved Chemist concerned provided that under special circumstances the service of notice may be dispensed with and the name of the approved Chemist Shop removed forthwith by the prescribed authority form the approved list if he is satisfied that such a course of action is necessary for maintaining efficiency of services. CLAUSE-23 : the decision of the prescribed authority in all matters relating to these terms and conditions of services shall not be disputed in any Court of Law. ( 3 ) IT has been alleged that the petitioner as owner of the aid Chemist Shop duly possessed the necessary license under the Drugs Act, 1940 and other required licenses for the said shop and after enquiry and investigation, the appointment as mentioned hereinbefore was made and Code No. PAR-IV-57-Chem was allotted to the said Shop. It has also been stated that in terms of such appointment at all material times, the petitioner duly supplied the necessary medicines without any complaint form anyone including the respondents. It further appears from the petition that during the tenure of service under the said terms and conditions of services, the petitioner was also authorized to supply medicines on the prescription of the insurance medical practitioners who are approved panel Doctors of the respondents and prescribed for insured persons and their family members. It also appears that the petitioner was supplied with list of Doctors in the panel as appointed by the respondents. It also appears that the petitioner was supplied with list of Doctors in the panel as appointed by the respondents. ( 4 ) THE petitioner has stated further that as such approved Chemist Shop she as proprietress of the said approved shop, she duly complied with all the terms of the conditions of services as referred to hereinbefore and regularly supplied the prescriptions and possessed all costly medicines required to be supplied to the patients as per approved list of medicines under the said terms and conditions of services and as directed by the respondents. In fact, it has been stated that there was and has been stated that there was and has been no failure or any departure from the conditions as embodied or contained in clauses 8 (i), (ii) and (iii ). She has further alleged that she duly produced all cash memos and vouchers in respect of the purchase of medicines under the said terms and conditions of services whenever asked for and in fact such documents and records were inspected by the person duly authorized by the respondents and there was not a single complaint against her shop. She has averred that her Shop always had sufficient stocks of all types of costly and special medicines, drugs, dressings and appliance as prescribed and as stated hereinbefore and she duly supplied the insured and their family members with all types f prescribed medicines and that too without any complaint from them and in fact to their satisfaction. In any event, it has been stated that there was no latches or negligence on the part it the petitioner to effect the necessary supplies to the insured persons at any time whatsoever in terms of clause 11 (i) to (iii ). ( 5 ) THE petitioner has stated further that after the expiry of the moth she used to prepare bills for the medicines and drugs etc. , and to send them to the Administrative Medical Officer concerned, respondent No. 3 for necessary payment of those bills which incidentally were prepared in accordance with the direction as contained in clause 12 of the terms and conditions of services. , and to send them to the Administrative Medical Officer concerned, respondent No. 3 for necessary payment of those bills which incidentally were prepared in accordance with the direction as contained in clause 12 of the terms and conditions of services. She has further stated that in terms of the said terms and conditions of services she was entitled to get 14?% over the total amount of bills as incidental expenses and costs of all taxes and after submission of the monthly bills, the payments were required to be made to her or to the approved Shop under the said terms and conditions of services by the respondents within 60 days from the submission of such bills. ( 6 ) THE petitioner has alleged that in spite of due inspection and checks and filing of the necessary bills and records for supplying all medicines as aforesaid, the Accounts Officer concerned, respondent No. 4 failed, refused and neglected to pass her bills and one some alleged complaint he deducted the bills and also withheld some payments over which dispute arose and as such the petitioner had to file Commercial Suit No. 217 of 1972 in the City Civil Court at Calcutta and the said suit is still pending before the learned Second Bench of the said Court. It may be mentioned here incidentally that the said suit was filed in respect of bills from the 1969 to November 1971 and for the sum of Rs. 42,000/ -. Even thereafter, the petitioner has stated to have regularly supplied the medicines and served the prescriptions in respect of the insured persons and their families as per the prescriptions of the panel Doctors of the said terms and conditions of services and although the monthly bills since December, 1972 had been regularly submitted to the respondents concerned but they have not passed any of such bills. It may also be recorded that such bills should have been passed by the Accounts Officer, Respondent No. 4 after the approval of the Administrative Medical Officer, Respondent No. 3 and the petitioner has alleged that since those respondents became biased for the reason of the filing of the suit as aforesaid they have acted in collusion to withheld payments to her. Such act, on the part of the said respondents, the petitioner has contended to be irregular, void and arbitrary and bad, apart form being unauthorised. Such act, on the part of the said respondents, the petitioner has contended to be irregular, void and arbitrary and bad, apart form being unauthorised. That apart, the petitioner has contended such act on the part of the said respondents to be malafide and she has further imputed the motive as mentioned hereinbefore. It has also been contended by the petitioner that those respondents instead of resorting to or proceeding in terms of clause 19 of the agreement as referred to hereinbefore have asked the petitioner by the impugned notice in Annexure ?a? the particulars whereof have been mentioned hereinbefore to stop functioning in purported use of power under clause 21 as aforesaid and have further informed him that unless the petitioner acts on the basis of such notice her shop would be removed from the list with effect from September 1, 1973. ( 7 ) IT appears that under clause 21 of the terms and conditions of services the prescribed authorities who are respondents herein are satisfied that the continued inclusion of a Chemist shop in the list of approved Chemist shops under the said terms and conditions of services would be prejudicial to the efficiency of the services, they may remove the name of such Shop from the list after giving a notice of one month to the approved Chemist Shop concerned provided that under special circumstances the services of notice should be dispensed with and the name of the approved Chemist shop removed forthwith by such authority from the approved list, if such authority is satisfied that such course of action is necessary for maintaining efficiency of services. The impugned notice in Annexure A is dated July 14, 1973 and the same has been directed to be effective from the September 1, 1973 and was issued under clause 21 as aforesaid, and the said notice as stated by the petitioner, was served on August 8, 1973. It has been contended by the petitioner, that although in terms of clause 21 as aforesaid the authorities concerned thereof removed the name of the Shop in question on service of one month's notice but such term has not admittedly been satisfied in the instant case as the notice was admittedly served on August 8, 1973. The respondents appearing through Mr. Datta had of course denied the insufficiency of the notice as alleged. The respondents appearing through Mr. Datta had of course denied the insufficiency of the notice as alleged. ( 8 ) ALTHOUGH the respondents on being duly served had filed their affidavit-in-opposition on May 26, 1975 but I have not been in a position to refer to the said affidavit or relying on the statements as made therein because the same stands rejected for non-filing of the Vokalatnama in terms of the Court's order dated December 18, 1976. The respondents, however filed another affidavit-in-opposition dated September 10, 1973 against the petitioner's application for injunction but the said affidavit cannot be looked into because no power at the relevant time by the respondents has been filed. However, when this matter was taken up for hearing Mr. Datta informed the Court that subsequently a memo of appearance has been filed by the respondents but it cannot be looked into for the circumstances as mentioned hereinbefore, but that will not mean the arguments as advanced by them cannot be taken into consideration. It has been contended by the respondents that the issue of the instant notice in Annexure ?a? has got nothing to do with the filing or pendency of the Commercial Suit in the City Civil Court at Calcutta as aforesaid and in fact all steps were taken duly and bonafide. It has also been submitted by Mr. Datta that the notice removing the Shop in question of the petitioner from the list of approved Chemist Shops were sent by registered post with acknowledgement due long before 1 month but the same was returned with the postal remarks ?not claimed? on July 26, 1973 and that when approved valid services of the notice as act or the action on the part of the petitioner in not claiming the notice in question was nothing but a device to avoid service of the same. It has also been contended that under clause 21as aforesaid the prescribed authority has jurisdiction, authority and right to remove the name of the approved Chemist Shop from the list, he is otherwise satisfied and in terms of the prescribed conditions there is no provision for nay show cause notice to be served upon the petitioner or the holder of such Chemist Shop before removing the name from the approved list of Chemists. It was further submitted by the appearing respondents that since the steps in the instant case were duly taken in terms of the conditions as prescribed through the agreement as referred to hereinbefore, even for any violation of such agreement or in terms of the same writ proceedings would not be maintainable and if at all other maintainable and in fact in support of such submission reference was made to the cases of Mahabir Prosad Bansal Vs. State of West Bengal, 1976 (2) C. L. J. 79 and Jaskaran Singh Vs. Sub-divisional Controller of Food and Supplies, Coochbehar, 1977 (1) C. L. J. 80 wherein this Court had held on a question arising out of the cancellation of a M. R. distributorship in terms of the connected agreement and wherein it has been held that when the respondents are authorized under the agreement in question and steps have been taken in terms of those agreement, no writ would be available against such action in view of the nature and character of the right and no interference could be made in the writ jurisdiction. I short, when the distributorship as prescribed in terms agreement, herein in the instant case the petitioner's shop, is cancelled in terms of the agreement as aforesaid no writ would be available. It was thus submitted that in that view of the matte the principles of natural justice, violation whereof have been alleged, by the petitioner would not also be available. In short, it has been contended by the respondents that when petitioner's shop has been sought to be removed from the list of approved shops in terms of the contract which is not a statutory one, no interference in this jurisdiction should be made. It was also submitted that since the relevant conditions as aforesaid do not grant a status to the petitioner and there has been no violation of any statutory right. The instant petitioner must also be considered as not maintainable. ( 9 ) MR. It was also submitted that since the relevant conditions as aforesaid do not grant a status to the petitioner and there has been no violation of any statutory right. The instant petitioner must also be considered as not maintainable. ( 9 ) MR. Mukherjee appearing in support of the rule placed the clauses as mentioned hereinbefore and more particularly clauses 19, 20 and 21 and he in his usual fairness argued that ordinarily in the case of ordinary contracts or agreements which are not under any statute or are not statutory contract or agreements and in view of the law as laid down in the case as referred to hereinbefore it would be very difficult for his client to succeed. But he submitted that here in the instant case the contract should not be considered as an ordinary contract between two private parties and the principles of natural justice would be applicable as the contract in the instant case gives a right to public employment to the petitioner or a right in the nature thereof. ( 10 ) IT was submitted by Mr. Mukherjee that in view of the terms and conditions relevant for her appointment, the petitioner was not an independent Contractor. Her terms and workings under the contract in question, are in fact directed and controlled by the principal and as such ordinary contracts of Master and Servant or the principles underlying therein would have no application. In support of the distinctions as aforesaid, Mr. Mukherjee referred to the determinations of the Supreme Court in the case of Lakshmi Narayan vs. Government of Hyderabad. A. I. R. 1914 S. C. 364. That apart, relying on the determinations in the case of Union of India vs. Motilal, A. I. R. 1962 Patna 364, for the distinction between a servant and an independent contractor, it was submitted by him that while a servant has to obey the Master's orders from time to time and work under the supervision and direction of the employer, an independent contractor can exercise his own discretion as to the mode and time of doing would for which he has been engaged. He is bound by his contract but not by his employer's orders. It was submitted by Mr. He is bound by his contract but not by his employer's orders. It was submitted by Mr. Mukherjee that thus in the facts of the present case and the more so, in view of the terms of the contract in question, the petitioner derived a status in public employment and as such the determination in the cases of Mahabir Prasad Bansal vs. State of West Bengal (supra) and Jaskaram Singh vs. Sub-divisional Controller of Food and Supplies, Coochbehar (supra) would have no application in the instant case. It was further submitted by him that when the petitioner had and has a right to such public employment or the character as aforesaid, she would be entitled to the necessary protections of the principles of natural justice, before cancellation or suspension f such public employment or if it is so as the effect of the cancellation or suspension of the agreement. In support of his contentions, on the question of determination of an employee's status of public employment, the necessary ingredients thereof, and whether principles of natural justice has application, Mr. Mukherjee relied on the determinations in the case of United Commercial Bank and Anr. vs. V. J. T. Vyas and Ors, 1977 (1) C. L. J. 498. In that case Sri Vyas joined the services under the then United Commercial Bank Ltd. , in 1948. In January, 1973 he was transferred to the Silchar Branch. While at Calcutta he was provided with accommodation in the staff quarters at Alipore. He was asked to vacate his quarters repeatedly, on his transfer. He did not do so. In the premises, by a letter dated March 6, 1974, his service were terminated by the Bank with immediate effect with notice. In the mean time, the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer or Undertakings) Act 1970 came into force on March 31, 1970. On coming into operation of the said Act, the United commercial Bank Ltd. , became the United Commercial Bank and was commonly considered as a nationalized Bank. Being dissatisfied with the order of termination of his services with the Bank, Sri Vyas moved a writ application before this Court and obtained a Rule nisi. The Rule was made absolute, whereupon the Bank preferred a Letters Patent Appeal. Being dissatisfied with the order of termination of his services with the Bank, Sri Vyas moved a writ application before this Court and obtained a Rule nisi. The Rule was made absolute, whereupon the Bank preferred a Letters Patent Appeal. ( 11 ) THE primary question in the appeal was whether the petitioner was entitled to make any grievance, under Article 226 of the Constitution, regarding the termination of his services without compliance with the principles of natural justice. The nest question was whether there was any violation of such principles of natural justice, and it has been held that : ?the 1970 Act is a social legislation intended to take over the business and management of a commercial bank. The employees of such banks came within the purview of public employment. Regulation apart, the employment under the nationalized bank is public employment and such an employee gets a status. Termination of contracts which affect the status of employees in public employment must therefore be in consonance with the principles of natural justice. In other words, the termination of service of an employee in public employment or interference with the status of an employee in public employment, even in the absence of any specific rule, must be in conformity with the principles of natural justice. Natural justice has no straight jacket. The application of the principles of natural justice would depend up the facts and circumstances of a prticular case. The basic concept of natural justice so far as relevant for the present purpose is that no man should be condemned unheard, he should be informed of the allegation or the basis upon which action detrimental to him is proposed to be taken and he is given an opportunity of making representation or presenting his view point to those allegations and consideration of such representation or view point before action detrimental to him is taken. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be said that the writ petitioner has been condemned unheard, though no formal charge sheet or show cause notice had been issued and no formal enquiry held. In the premises, it cannot be said that there has been any violation of the principles of natural justice. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be said that the writ petitioner has been condemned unheard, though no formal charge sheet or show cause notice had been issued and no formal enquiry held. In the premises, it cannot be said that there has been any violation of the principles of natural justice. This conclusion is quite apart form and independent of the question whether on the alleged ground (not vacating quarters) and under the terms of employment of the writ petitioner there could have been lawful termination of the employment of the writ petitioner. ? such determination was made, having regard to the determinations of the Supreme Court in the case of Sukhadeb Singh vs. Bhagatram, A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 1331 and the more so when it was found that on such determination, after the nationalization of the Banks, the petitioner acquired a status as a public servant and when the termination of the service of such public servant meant affecting his status of public employment, steps should be taken in consonance with the principles of natural justice. ( 12 ) THE necessary tests to find out whether and under what circumstances, the employment of person can be regarded as one of public employment have been laid down in the case of Sukhdeb Singh vs. Bhagatram (supra) and they are whether : (1) the employer or the authority concerned is owned by the Government, (2)is it a statutory body or a Company, (3)has it the exclusive privilege of performing the acts under the statute, (4)who manages the same, (5)can the same be dissolved only by the Government, (6)can any authority exercise the functions or carry on the business and, (7)whether public can hold any share in the authority. That apart, it has been observed in that case that whenever a man's rights are affected by decision taken under statutory powers, the Court would presume the existence of a duty to observe the rules of natural justice and compliance to the rules and regulations imposed by statute. ( 13 ) THE agreement in the instant case, which deals with, governs or controls the terms of service and conditions of employment of approved Chemist shops, is admittedly one under the Employees' State Insurance (Medical Benefit) Scheme West Bengal. ( 13 ) THE agreement in the instant case, which deals with, governs or controls the terms of service and conditions of employment of approved Chemist shops, is admittedly one under the Employees' State Insurance (Medical Benefit) Scheme West Bengal. The Employees' State Insurance Corporation is established under and in accordance with the said Act for the administration of the Scheme of Employees' State Insurance. The said Corporation is a body corporate, having perpetual succession and a common seal and may be the said name sue or be sued. The Corporation is consisted of persons or authorities as mentioned in section 4 and the terms of office of the members of the same are regulated by section 5. An outgoing member f the Corporation under section 6 would be entitled to be re-nominated or re-elected as the case may be. All orders and decisions of the Corporation are to be authenticated under section 7 by the signature of the Director General of the Corporation and so also all other instruments issued by the Corporation. Such powers may also be exercised by such other officer of the Corporation as may be authorized by the Director General. That apart, under section 8 a Standing committee of the Corporation is to be constituted with persons and authorities as mentioned therein and the terms of office of those members are regulated by section 9. The Fund of the Corporation which comes from the contributions paid under the said Act and all moneys received by the said Act and all moneys received by the same compose and form the Employees' State Insurance Fund, which is held and administered by the Corporation for the purposes of the said Act. The Corporation under section 26 (2) may accept grants, donations and gifts from the Central or State Government, local authority, or any individual or body whether incorporated or not, for all or any of the purposes of the Act. The Corporation under section 26 (2) may accept grants, donations and gifts from the Central or State Government, local authority, or any individual or body whether incorporated or not, for all or any of the purposes of the Act. Such fund under section 26 (3) is of course, subject to the other provisions of the said Act and to any rules or regulations made in that behalf, shall be paid into the Reserve Bank of India or such other bank as may be approved by the Central Government to the credit of an account styled the amount of the Employees' State Insurance Fund and under section 26 (4), such account shall be operated by such officers as may be authorized by the Standing Committee with the approval of the Corporation. The purpose for which such fund may be expanded are mentioned in section 28 (i) to (xii) and are subject to the provisions of the said Act and of any rules made by the Central Government in that behalf. It has also been specifically stipulated in section 30 that all properties acquired before the establishment of the Corporation shall vest in the Corporation and all income derived and expenditure incurred in this behalf shall be brought into the books of the Corporation. For budget estimates, under section 32 the Corporation shall in each year frame a budget showing the probable receipts and the expenditure which it possesses to incur during the following year and shall submit a copy of the budget for the approval of the Central Government before such date as may be fixed by it in that behalf. The budget shall contain provisions adequate in the opinion of the Central Government for the discharge of liabilities incurred by the Corporation and for the maintenance of a working balance. That apart, the Corporation is to maintain correct accounts of its income and expenditure in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed by the Central Government and to have its accounts audited, at times and in such manner as may be prescribed, by auditors appointed by the Central Government. That apart, the Corporation is to maintain correct accounts of its income and expenditure in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed by the Central Government and to have its accounts audited, at times and in such manner as may be prescribed, by auditors appointed by the Central Government. The audit or the accounts of the Corporation, in terms of section 34, is to be made at times and in such manner as may be prescribed, also by the auditors appointed by the Central Government and under section 35, the Corporation is required to submit the annual report and its works and activities to the Central Government. Such report together with the auditors report thereon under section 34 of the said Act, and the budget as finally adopted by the Corporation is required under section 36 of the said Act to be placed before Parliament and also to be published in the official Gazette. That apart under section 95, the Central Government may after consultation with the Corporation and subject to the condition f previous publication, make rules not inconsistent with the said Act, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions and in respect of provisions therein mentioned. Similarly, State Government under section 96 has also got the same power and under section 97, the Corporation has power to make regulations for the administration of their affairs and for carrying into effect the provision of the said Act. ( 14 ) THUS the tests for determining whether a person is under a statutory body or authority like the Employees' State Insurance Corporation, as enunciated in the case of Sukdeb Singh vs. Bhagatram (supra), are fully satisfied in the instant case. So the employees under he said Corporation, may in some cases claim to have the benefits of the principles of natural justice as held in that case and also in terms of the principles as laid down in the case of United Commercial Bank and Anr. Vs. V. J. T. Vyas and Ors (supra ). ( 15 ) THE terms and conditions, which are involved in this case, as mentioned hereinbefore were framed under the Employees' State Insurance (Medical Benefit) Scheme, West Bengal. Vs. V. J. T. Vyas and Ors (supra ). ( 15 ) THE terms and conditions, which are involved in this case, as mentioned hereinbefore were framed under the Employees' State Insurance (Medical Benefit) Scheme, West Bengal. Since the said Scheme related to State Government the same was framed in terms of or under section 97 and because of such Scheme and the subsequent framing of the terms of the agreement governing the terms and conditions of service, the petitioner as stated hereinbefore may be entitled to the protections of the principles of natural justice. ( 16 ) NOW the question is how far and whether such principles of natural justice would be available in the facts of the present case. Admittedly, the conditions as incorporated and referred to hereinbefore, are the contract of service or employment of the petitioner and if there is any violation f the same or any of the terms, she could maintain an application in this jurisdiction. In view of the law as it stands now on judicial interpretations. Thus we shall have to see and find out next whether there has been any violation of the terms for the purpose of enabling the petitioner to claim the protections of the principles of natural justice. No writ would be available it the termination of service is in terms of the contract or a termination simpliciter. In cases where the appointment is guided by contract or the stipulations as in the instant case, it the service is terminated in violation of the contract, there would be no violation of any constitutional provisions but would be simply a breach of the Contract and in such no writ would ordinarily be available and the more so when services are terminated after notice in terms of the contract and as such in those cases an application under Article 226 would not be maintainable as there would be in that case no legal grievance at all. Clause 21 of the agreement in the instant case that in the happening of incidents as mentioned therein, the name of the shop in question from the approved list can be removed by one month's notice. Admittedly, the action has been taken under the said clause. The notice is dated July 14, 1973 and the same was to be effective form September 1, 1973. Admittedly, the action has been taken under the said clause. The notice is dated July 14, 1973 and the same was to be effective form September 1, 1973. Thus, if the said notice has been served or is deemed to have been served in the facts of the case then the petitioner would not be in a position to contend any violation of the terms of the contract or any violation of the principles of natural justice. The notice, as appears from the affidavit-in-opposition, was duly sent through registered with acknowledgement due post much ahead of time as the same appears to have been returned to the authority concerned with a note ?not claimed? dated July 26, 1973. Such return of the notice with the said endorsement would prove and has established valid and due service of the same on the petitioner. When such endorsement was made on July 26, 1973, that would prove and establish that either on that date or any date prior to that the notice was tendered for service and the same was not accepted. Thus there was admitted compliance with the requisite time for the notice in the instant case as the termination was due to be effective from September 1, 1973. So the petitioner would not ordinarily be entitled to the advantage or the principles of natural justice. ( 17 ) IF principles of natural justice is required to be followed and complied with in cases where the termination is according to the contract or a termination simpliciter then natural justice would become the mot unnatural thing or concept and would also make the same illusory artificial, and the very purpose and effect of the same would also be lost and frustrated. ( 18 ) I have previously used the word ?ordinarily? in the instant case, and more particularly while determining on the tests and to the facts whether the petitioner would be entitled to the benefits. There is no doubt or dispute and that too in accordance with the celebrated decisions both of the Supreme Court and this Court that principles of natural justice would not be available to a petitioner if his services are terminated in terms of the contract or when the order of termination is an order simpliciter and without any stigma. There is no doubt or dispute and that too in accordance with the celebrated decisions both of the Supreme Court and this Court that principles of natural justice would not be available to a petitioner if his services are terminated in terms of the contract or when the order of termination is an order simpliciter and without any stigma. Clause 21 of the agreement is not one of such ordinary clauses in a contract and the language of the same presupposes that even if action is taken in terms of the same, there would become stigma attached to the character and dealings of the person against whom the said order is made. So, although the order in the instant case was made in terms of the contract but the same cannot be said to be an order of termination simpliciter but the same is one with some stigma viz. , the continuation of the shop of the petitioner would be prejudicial to the efficiency of the service under the E. S. I. (Medical Benefit) Scheme and as such the principles of natural justice was available and could be imported and no opportunity having been admittedly offered in terms of such principle of natural justice, for the purpose of explaining the allegations and conduct, the impugned order in Annexure ?k'? cannot be sustained and as such the same is quashed. ( 19 ) THE application thus succeeds, so also the Rule and the same is made absolute. There will be no order for costs. ( 20 ) THIS order will not, however, prejudice the Respondents from proceeding afresh against the petitioner and to make appropriate determination in accordance with law. Stay of operation of the order as prayed for, is refused. Application succeeds and the Rule made absolute.