JUDGMENT 1. THIS Rule challenges proceedings in B. R. Case nos. 423,429,430,431 and 432 of 1970 before the Revenue Officer, Taki, under section 6 (1) of West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953. 2. THE said five proceedings were started against the respondent nos. 4 to 8 as the Revenue Officer found that they did not file B form return. The Revenue Officer allowed the respondent nos. 4 to 8 to retain some lands and allowed the petitioners land to be vested. The petitioners state that they purchased by a registered deed 99 decimal of lands in mouza Sandesh khali, touzi no. 2981, R. S. 133, lot no. 139 J. L. No. 52, Joygopalpur in Dag Nos. 1018, 1017 and 1014 belonging to respondent nos. 4 to 8. They claim that they are entitled to retain lands as the same were within the ceding limits of the said respondents. On hearing on the 14th June, 1972 that the lands of the petitioners would be settled and that the same vested in the State they made enquiries and learnt that the Revenue Officer considered representation by some other vendees of the respondent nos. 4 to 8 and their lands were taken out from respondent nos. 4 to 8. But the petitioners had no knowledge and could not represent their cases. The petitioners claim to be bonafide purchasers for value by a registered document and hold rent receipts. Their names were mutated and the State Government accepted them as raiyats. The impugned B. R. Cases were heard on the 30th of April, 1971 by the Revenue Officer, Taki who gave the order of vesting of the petitioners land without giving them any hearing. The petitioners further state that they have been all along in possession and have [been cultivating and residing in the said land since purchase. The question of the fights of purchasers after the date of vesting has in different forms been adjudicated from time to time in this High court, the facts and circumstances, of course, varying in each individual case. Mr. Mukherjee, learned advocate appearing in support of the rule cited several decisions some of which are apparently against him and some in his favour. Mr. K. B. Ganguly on behalf of the State contended that there was hardly any dispute with regard to the position in law about transfers after the date of vesting. Mr. Mukherjee, learned advocate appearing in support of the rule cited several decisions some of which are apparently against him and some in his favour. Mr. K. B. Ganguly on behalf of the State contended that there was hardly any dispute with regard to the position in law about transfers after the date of vesting. The transferees, according to him, are never entitled to any notice. 3. SOME of the decisions are in respect of section 6 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act and some under section 44 (2a. Under the west Bengal Estates Acquisition Act on appropriate notification under section 4 all estates and rights of intermediaries vested in the State free from all encumbrance. Under section 6 there are ceiling with regard to certain kinds of land while others are not subject to the same. Section 6 (5) authorizes an intermediary to exercise his choice for retention of land but if no choice is exercised by him during the prescribed period it is for the Revenue Officer after giving him opportunity of being heard to allow him to retain so much of the lands as do not exceed the limits specified in clauses C. D and J of the subsection. Section 6 (5) has been described as a machinery for exercise of choice by the intermediaries. Section 6 has been read "as proviso to Section 4 which provides that notwithstanding the absolute vesting certain other consequences follow-consequences being the statute itself entitling the erstwhile intermediary to retain certain lands but in totally different character and with different incidence as provided for by section 6 itself". It has been held that there is absolute vesting of all the rights of the intermediary with merely a right conferred upon him to exercise choice under section 6. The intermediary retains no more interest as an intermediary in any part of the estate after the vesting and could convey no such interests in favour of transferee. The aforesaid view was taken by Sen, J. in the case of M. Mondal vs. Special Revenue Officer, reported in 78 C. W. N. 281. He drew support from a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sahib Shanker vs. Baikunth reported in A. I. R. 1969 S. C. 971. 4. RELIANCE was strongly placed by Mr. The aforesaid view was taken by Sen, J. in the case of M. Mondal vs. Special Revenue Officer, reported in 78 C. W. N. 281. He drew support from a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sahib Shanker vs. Baikunth reported in A. I. R. 1969 S. C. 971. 4. RELIANCE was strongly placed by Mr. Ganguly on behalf of the State on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Pijus Kanti Roy reported in 79 C. W. N. 556. That was a decision relating to section 44 (2a) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. In that case one Amalendu Sarkar was recorded as a raiyat in respect of a plot of land. The petitioner purchased the said plot, from Amalendu by a registered deed and paid rent to the State mar pat Amalendu. Proceedings were started under section 44 (2a) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. Notice was given to Amalendu but none to the petitioner. The entry in the name of Amalendu was car celled and the petitioner challenged the order of cancellation on the ground that no notice was served upon him, although he was "a person interested". S. K. Dutta, J. who delivered the judgment, held that the Revenue Officer in exercise of his Jurisdiction under section 44 (2a) was to take into consideration the stale ox affairs at the date of vesting. He is not to take into consideration any transfer of interest subsequent to the date of vesting. Relevant consideration in the aforesaid judgment, of course, related to who was the "person interested" in terms of section 44 (2a. Moreover, the facts disclose that in that case payment was made as an agent (marphat)Therefore it was not possible for the revenue Officer to know who actually the transferee was. 5. MR. Mukherjee contends that in the present case the question relates not to making entry in the record but to determine the retention of land according to ceiling. The dead line is the same in both cases namely the date of vesting. But, according to Mr. Mukherjee, while the preparation of record is only a question of fact as to who at a particular date owns particular lands, in determining the question of retention, however, other Considerations are relevant. Section 6 (5), Mr. The dead line is the same in both cases namely the date of vesting. But, according to Mr. Mukherjee, while the preparation of record is only a question of fact as to who at a particular date owns particular lands, in determining the question of retention, however, other Considerations are relevant. Section 6 (5), Mr. Mukherjee points out requires that the Revenue Officer shall after giving him an opportunity of being heard allow him to retain certain lands as do not exceed the limits. The expression "him", according to him, must necessarily include the successor-in-interest and in that category would come the transferees. Mr. Mukherjee argued that if a person dies by the time the Revenue Officer determines the question of retention he has to give notice to the heirs and legal representatives. He also argued that no bar is imposed on a sale and as sale is not void after vesting there is no reason why the transferees should suffer for no fault of theirs when they are bonafide purchasers for value. 6. BUT even when the question of retention is decided the ownership on the date of vesting is the relevant consideration. It may be that by the time ex-intermediary is asked to make his choice he had made some transfers but the officer transports himself backward at the date of vesting. In that sense the post vesting transfers cannot enter into consideration just as in under section 44 (2a. It is true if the person dies his heirs may be notified. But that is not for the purpose of taking into consideration any event posterior to the date of vesting. The transferees after vesting have nothing to do with the intermediary's interest as such. In this respect I am unable to up hold Mr. Mukherjee' s contention that the decision of the Division Bench with regard to section 44 (2a) has no relevance to determination of question under section 6. Mr. Mukherjee, also argued that the definition of intermediary is not exhaustive. It involves the concepts of 'tenure holder' and 'raiyats' which categories of persons under the Bengal Tenancy Act would include their successor-in-interest. He also points out that under section 5 subsection (7) (iv) 'transferred and 'transferee' include successors-in-interest of transferor or transferee. Mr. Mukherjee, also argued that the definition of intermediary is not exhaustive. It involves the concepts of 'tenure holder' and 'raiyats' which categories of persons under the Bengal Tenancy Act would include their successor-in-interest. He also points out that under section 5 subsection (7) (iv) 'transferred and 'transferee' include successors-in-interest of transferor or transferee. But then the scope of section 5 (A) is quite different and it relates to bonafide nature of transactions between the 5th of May, 1955 and the date of vesting. This was obviously enacted with retrospective effect to prevent evasion of ceiling. Mr. Mukherjee, however, strongly relied on a Supreme Court that transferees did not furnish even the particulars of the purchase made by them, much less did they pass preference expressed by the landowner being accepted by the Collector. In the circumstances there was no equity in favour of the transferee. Mr. Mukherjee strongly relies on the observation of the Supreme Court that the Collector is bound to give notice to the landowner and the transferees from him, if known. In this case the facts that the purchases by the petitioners were registered ones, that there were mutations of their names and rent receipts were granted, make it clear that the authorities concerned must have known about their existence. Mr. Ganguly on behalf of the State stated that the observation of the Supreme Court in that case was in the nature of 'pious wishes' and that the fact that the transferee in that case happened to be present before the enquiry made a difference. But the observation of the Supreme Court is clear that the landowner and the transferees from him, if known, have to be given notice. 7. THERE is also an unreported decision of Anil Kumar Sen, J. in Civil Rule No. 2488 (w) of 1970 in which the transferee was accepted as a tenant by the state and rents were realised from her for more than 10 years. That being so, the petitioner according to Sen, J. had acquired independent tenancy under the State apart from her title derived by purchase. In another case C. R. No. 4944 (w) of 1972 Murari Mohan Dutt, J. held that while finality must be attached to order of retention passed by the Revenue Officer as in that case the petitioners seem to be a bonafide purchaser for value and he should not suffer. Mr. In another case C. R. No. 4944 (w) of 1972 Murari Mohan Dutt, J. held that while finality must be attached to order of retention passed by the Revenue Officer as in that case the petitioners seem to be a bonafide purchaser for value and he should not suffer. Mr. Ganguly rightly points out that although the petitioner was given relief the point of law was not discussed by Dutta, J. 8. IT is urgent that the laws relating to land and the pronouncements of the courts should be clear and intelligible to all and sundry. The urgency is all the more as land is an important factor of production and ours is an underdeveloped country. The process of law is inevitably slow as, even in an attempt at expedition, it is to be consistent with preservation of order. Yet it cannot without peril to the democratic set up of our constitution, afford to lag much behind the pace of rapid socio-economic development. Obscurity mare erode and defeat the: very object and purpose of legislation in the field of land laws. The thing which puts the whole problem in perspective is the cardinal fact that the determination of retention is a post vesting event. It is an exercise in future in relation to a date in the past. The problem that concerns us stems from the events of transfer that take place in between. If A, the ex-intermediary has more lands that he is entitled to retain (Say X Area) he is to make a choice of what plots the X-area should consist of. Failing that it is to be determined by the Revenue Officer on notice to him. If A has transferred since the date of vesting to B and C would they be exposed to the risk of a malafide choice by A excluding the portions sold to B and C ? Is the problem to be regarded essentially and for all purposes as one of equities between A on the one hand and B and C on the other ? (so that it is for B and C to take steps against A in appropriate cases)or when under some circumstances the Revenue Officer comes to know of the transfers, should he not enter into this question of equities when he determines the choice of A ? (so that it is for B and C to take steps against A in appropriate cases)or when under some circumstances the Revenue Officer comes to know of the transfers, should he not enter into this question of equities when he determines the choice of A ? The latter process would have two merits to comment it (1) equitable consideration and (ii) expedition. 9. IT may be noted that the facts that give rise to an inference of independent status under the State as referred to by Sen, J. are also the kinds of facts that would include a case within the category of "known" transferees who are entitled to notice in terms of the Supreme Court decision. One way of harmonizing the decisions up to date on this question may be to hold that ordinarily either for the purpose of section 44 (2a) (with which we are not concerned here) or section 6 of the W. B. E. A. Act transferees after vesting are entitled to no notice but when the names of such transferees are known to the authorities on account of reason such as, mutation of their names and rents being accepted by the State they should be given notice even though primarily equities between the transferors and transferees are to be confined interests. 10. IN the light of what is stated above, on consideration of the facts that the petitioners in this case were recognised as tenant after mutation of their names and after acceptance of rents by the State they must be deemed to have acquired independent status apart from their rights as transferees in view of earlier decisions of this Court, e. g, Sen, J. 's decision discussed above. The facts also show that the positions of the petitioners were within the knowledge of the Revenue Officer and that also in terms of supreme Court decisions entitled them to notice. In view of all that is considered aforesaid the petitioners succeed. The Rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs.