JUDGMENT-This is an appeal by an aggrieved wife against the decision of the District Judge, Nagpur dated 8th April 1971 whereby the order of the trial Court dismissing the husband's petition for divorce was set aside and the declaration was granted that the marriage between the appellant and the respondent stood dissolved. 2. The short facts are as follows: The appellant Shantabai and the respondent Prabhakar were married on 30-5-1955. It appears that they remained together till 1958, but on 31-5-1958tbere was a separation. Both the spouses charged the other spouse for being responsible for such a separation. On 4-8-1967 the wife applied for restitution of conjugal rights. That application bearing Hindu Marriage petition No. 89 of 1961 came to be decreed in her favour on 5-3-1968. In between, the respondent Prabhakar had given another application being Application No 96 of 1961 on 12-8-1961 asking for judicial separation. That application was reached hearing subsequent to the decree for restitution of conjugal rights and on 29-8-1968 the petition as withdrawn. On 30-4-1968 the appellant Shantabai had filed another proceeding bearing No. 77 of 1968 under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act for permanent alimony. Her claim was decreed in the sum or" Rs.40 per month on 10-3-1969. 3. Two years after the decree for restitution of conjugal rights dated 5-3-1968, on 7-3-1970 the husband applied for divorce under the amended provision of section 13 (1-A) of the Hindu Marriage Act. He had contended therein the inspite of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights the parties had not come near. In that application there was a preliminary enquiry regarding the payment of expenses. That was under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Shantabai appeared and gave evidence and she was granted certain sum. 4. The respondent prabhakar examined himself tater for the determination of other issues for the grant of divorce. He was cross-examined. Shantabai on that occasion did not enter into the witness-box. On the evidence before him, the learned Civil Judge, senior Division, Nagpur come to the conclusion that the husband-petitioner was taking advantage of his own wrong for seeking relief of divorce and although there was no cohabitation between the parties for a period of two years since after the decree for constitution of conjugal rights, be refused the relief for divorce. In the appeal before the District Judge that order was set aside and the present second appeal is directed against that order. 5. The learned First Appellate Judge commented that although the cause of action for asking a relief arose in. 1959, the petition for restitution of conjugal rights was made by the wife on 4th August 1967 and that was after a period of 8 years. The learned Judge deciding that petition, however, did not find any reason to reject the relief of restitution merely on the ground of delay because the husband bad not contested that proceeding. The learned Judge, however, has jumped up to the conclusion that it was patently clear that the wife was not earnest in joining the husband and she was more interested in asserting her right. One of the reasons given in support of these observations is that although the decree for restitution of conjugal fights was passed on 5th of Match 1968, soon thereafter on 30th of April 1968 she pursued her remedy under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act for getting permanent maintenance. According to the learned Judge, if the wife was really anxious to join her husband she would not have taken such a proceeding. On the contrary, she would have filed a petition in execution. Therefore, the learned Judge concluded that there was no possibility of the husband and wife ever uniting with each other, more so, when they had lived apart for more than a decade. 6. The learned Judge has also observed that there was not a word on behalf of the wife that after the passing of the decree a gesture to resume cohabitation with her husband was made. That, however, does riot appear to be correct inasmuch as in cross-examination there is an admission on the part of the husband that he had received notice from the wife asking him to take her to the marital abode. He says he did not care to reply. He refers to Exhibit-27 as that notice. Mr. Bhangade appearing for the respondent says that the contents of that notice are not formally proved, but I feel the admission given by the husband is sufficient for showing that subsequent to the decree for restitution of conjugal rights the woman had indicated by writing to the husband that she should be taken back to the marital home. 7. Mr. Bhangade appearing for the respondent says that the contents of that notice are not formally proved, but I feel the admission given by the husband is sufficient for showing that subsequent to the decree for restitution of conjugal rights the woman had indicated by writing to the husband that she should be taken back to the marital home. 7. While making good the point to get a divorce, the husband has stated that due to litigation, his family members have no sympathy or love for the wife. They had developed a sort of hatred for her due to her behaviour. Inspite of the efforts even if made it is impossible for the husband and the wife to live together. He has thus given his studied conclusion and amply shown his aversion to join the wife. It is worthwhile noticing that he does not speak of this attitude of his or of his family members subsequent to making attempts in obeying the decree augustly passed, but he speaks of it as the general impression since possibly the starting of the litigation between the two spouses. The learned District Judge calls this as a complete frustration on the part of the husband and says that it is impossible to expect him to give a fresh trial to the marriage which had already foundered. He calls it stubborn and unrelenting attitude of both the spouses and has remarked that the marriage which has thoroughly failed should not be allowed to subsist when there is no possibility of the couple ever coming together. He queries as to what is the point in keeping this marriage legally in existence because as far as we can visualise the couple could never be happy with each other. The husband will have no feeling or love or regard for his wife. He seems to hate her and wants to reject her and there can be no use foisting an unwilling husband on the wife. According to him, the scheme of the Hindu Marriage Act is to discourage divorce as far as possible and to encourage the warring couples to come to a truce and reconcile their differences, but in some cases hardship cannot be removed unless the marital knot is cut and the couple separated. According to him, the scheme of the Hindu Marriage Act is to discourage divorce as far as possible and to encourage the warring couples to come to a truce and reconcile their differences, but in some cases hardship cannot be removed unless the marital knot is cut and the couple separated. To keep them together by the bond of marriage would be cruel indeed and that the matter should not be considered strictly on a legalistic point of view. It is more or less· a social problem. According to his idea of social problem, he felt that granting divorce was the only way. 8. It appears to me, with respect to the learned Judge, that he has viewed the entire case more from the angle of the social needs as he conceives them ignoring the provisions of section 23 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. What is good for the society is always beneficial, but at the same time, the Society will and ought to spurn putting premium on one's own fault. Underlining this principle section 23 (1) of the Act inter alia lays down that if there is no collusion with the respondent, if there is no unnecessary or improper delay, if there is no legal ground to refuse the relief and if the party asking the relief is Dot any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong, then in such cases, but not otherwise, the Court shall decree the relief asked for. Our pointed discussion in this appeal would be in respect of finding out whether the petitioner husband was taking advantage of his own wrong. The learned trial Judge had framed a specific issue and had answered it in the affirmative. I do not find the learned District Judge dwelling on the extent or character of this concept which disentitles the petitioner to get a relief. He has given more stress on the social aspect and the felt need of the time according to his estimation. In this appeal we will have to find out the exact effect of the interplay of the provisions of section 13 (1A) entitling even a judgment debtor to file a petition and section 23 (1) (a) of the Act refusing relief to the parties taking advantage of their own wrong. 9. Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act lists the grounds on which divorce could be obtained. 9. Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act lists the grounds on which divorce could be obtained. There are certain grounds based on matrimonial offences or wrong, certain on disabilities which may either be self-inflicted or tortuous. As the clauses (viii) and (ix) of the unamended section 13 (1) existed, after the decree for judicial separation or the decree for restitution of conjugal rights only the party in whose favour the decree was passed had the right to present the petition for divorce. This position is substantially altered by reason of introduction of section 13 (1A) which entitles either party to the marriage to present the petition for dissolution of marriage, if a period of 2 years or upwards is passed after the decree for judicial separation or the decree for restitution of conjugal rights. Recently that period is reduced to one year, but we are not concerned with that amendment. 10. In the case of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights what the section requires is the proof of the non-resumption of co-habitation between the parties for the prescribed period. Mr. Bhangade appearing for the respondent in this appeal emphasises that this requirement is satisfied and as such a decree for divorce passed in favour of the respondent-husband is but proper. He could not of course ignore the effect of section 23 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act. He did not make an argument that the provisions of section 13 (1A) are overriding provisions, but he says that the entire concept of marriage law has been changed. The Legislature intentionally has been liberal, more so in recognising that the marriages which have in fact failed could not be kept existing or subsisting by legal provisions only and the parties should be able to move in a more free atmosphere. According to him, his client has not committed any wrong since after the passing of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, what he did was observing mere silence. That cannot be called doing any wrong subsequent to the decree for restitution of conjugal rights and hence there is no impediment in the way of his getting the relief for divorce. That cannot be called doing any wrong subsequent to the decree for restitution of conjugal rights and hence there is no impediment in the way of his getting the relief for divorce. The pertinent question for our determination would be whether on the facts of the case it could be said that the husband-respondent had committed wrong and that he cannot, therefore, he allowed to take advantage of his own wrong, thus disentitling him to get the divorce. 11. In this connection before going to the case law two things will have to be noticed. In the petition filed by him for divorce dated 7-3-1970, there is not a single averment that subsequent to the decree he had made any efforts to bring back the wife in obedience to the decree passed against him. He has stated that the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent as well as the subsequent events have polluted the clean atmosphere of the house and the entire home was uneasy; there was no other remedy except the dissolution of the marriage to put the petitioner to peace of mind and bring normalcy to his life. By such dissolution there could be no further bickerings and illwill against each other. There is also not a single averment blaming the respondent wife in not following the decree for restitution of conjugal rights. The third thing to be noticed on facts is the admission of the petitioner contained in his cross-examination. Subsequent to the passing of the decree against him, did not raise any grievance. He says that he is not willing to take back the respondent as enjoined by the decree. He denies that the respondent-wife had come to him 2-3 times. He, however, says that he did receive a notice from her asking him to take her back. He identifies that notice as Exhibit-27 and the receipt as Exhibit-28. He says that he did not reply such a notice nor did he make efforts to take her back. According to him, looking to his previous experience and the litigation he did not feel it necessary to reply the notice and finally, he adds that under any circumstances he does not desire to take back the woman. 12. He says that he did not reply such a notice nor did he make efforts to take her back. According to him, looking to his previous experience and the litigation he did not feel it necessary to reply the notice and finally, he adds that under any circumstances he does not desire to take back the woman. 12. Upon this background the short question would be whether in fact the respondent-husband can be said to have remained simply silent after the passing of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights or whether his attitude should be taken as wilful disobedience of the decree passed falling under section 23 (1) (a) of the Hindu Marriage Act so that relief asked under section 13 (1A) could be refused. 13. In this connection we may usefully refer to the decision reported in Laxmibai v. Laxmichand1. In that case also the effect of sections 13 and 23 was considered. There was a decree for restitution of conjugal rights obtained by the wife. There was no resumption of cohabitation between the parties for a period of two years. The husband had tiled a petition for a decree for divorce and it was held that the husband seeking to challenge the decree for restitution of conjugal rights passed against him was not entitled to decree for divorce by reason of the provisions of section 23 (1) (a) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The learned Judge of the City Civil Court had held that it was irrelevant to consider in such a case whether this or that party was to be blamed for non-compliance with the decree for restitution. According to the learned Judge the effect of the amending section 13 (1A) on the Statute was to confer an unqualified right on either party to a marriage to obtain a decree for divorce if there was no restitution of conjugal rights between the parties to the - marriage for a period of 2 years or upwards after the decree for restitution was passed. The correctness of this view was challenged and the view has not been approved so that it is held that in view of the provisions of section 23 (1) (a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, the Court has to consider whether the husband who had presented the petition for dissolution of the marriage by a decree for divorce is as mentioned in section 23 (1) (a) taking advantage of his own wrong. It is further held that as the husband was not prepared to accept the wife in spite of the decree passed for conjugal rights obtained by her and he made no attempt to comply with that decree but consciously defied it, it followed that in seeking divorce he was trying to take advantage of his own wrong, for it was because of his defiance of the decree for restitution that he was said to be able to seek the relief of divorce. It was further held that he could not be permitted to do this in view of the provisions of section 23 (1) (a) and for that reason, the petition for divorce was liable to be dismissed. 14. Mr. Paunikar for the appellant says that this authority applies on all fours and hence the learned District Judge ought to have maintained the dismissal of the petition ordered by the trial Court. As against this Mr. Bhangade is interested in distinguishing this case by saying that in the reported case there was material for coming to the conclusion that there was wilful refusal on the part of the husband. He maintains that the present respondent has not done. anything to be characterised as 'wilful refusal'. He has been simply remaining silent and hence looking to the progressive concept embodied in the amendments, in fact he referred to the 1976 amendments also, it is urged that the liberality of law should be brought into effect and the husband not held disentitled. 15. Even before going to the other cases certain observations of Chandrachud J. in Laxmibai v. Laxmichand (supra) could be looked into : "Suppose, as in the present case, a decree for restitution of conjugal rights is passed in favour of the wife. 15. Even before going to the other cases certain observations of Chandrachud J. in Laxmibai v. Laxmichand (supra) could be looked into : "Suppose, as in the present case, a decree for restitution of conjugal rights is passed in favour of the wife. The husband is expected to comply with the decree but greater his defiance of that decree the better his chances of success in a petition for divorce can be paved by an outright defiance of the mandate of the Court." It is further observed in paragraph 16 as follows: "For these reasons. I am of the opinion that the learned trial Judge was in error in taking the view that the considerations arising under sec1ion 23 (1) are not relevant in deciding a petition filed under sub-section (1A) of section 13 of the Act. The husband undoubtedly has a locus to file the present petition for that is the right which the amendment gives to either spouse. Such a petition was liable to be dismissed in limine prior to the amendments …... " 16. The maintainability of the petition by the husband by reason of the amended section 13 (1A) is not disputed, but there is dispute regarding whether the requirements for granting relief are satisfied, that is to say, whether the husband could be said to have committed a wrong so that the relief ought to be denied to him. 17. Mr. Paunikar for the appellant also relied upon the decision reported in Chaman Lal v. Mohinder Devi J. This was a decision after the amendment of section 13 and the citation as culled from paragraph 5 of the judgment is as follows: "In all proceedings under the Act, whether they are defended or not, the Court has to be satisfied under section 23 about the various matters detailed therein and if it is not so satisfied then it has to refuse relief to the petitioner. One of those matters is that the Court has to be satisfied before granting relief to a party that the party is not taking advantage of its own wrong for obtaining the said relief. Where a decree for restitution of conjugal rights has been passed against the husband it is his duty to make efforts to comply with the said decree. Where a decree for restitution of conjugal rights has been passed against the husband it is his duty to make efforts to comply with the said decree. He cannot avoid the restitution of conjugal rights for two years after the decree and then make a petition for divorce on that ground, thus taking advantage of his own wrong." Mr. Paunikar relies on the observations that it is the duty of the husband to make efforts to comply with the said decree. He cannot simply avoid the restitution of conjugal rights for two years after the decree and make a petition for divorce. In connection with these observations, he has also relied upon the earlier decision of the same High Court reported in Gulab Kaur v. Gurdev Singh3, showing in paragraph 1 that the compliance of the decree has to be by the judgment debtor. The decree-holder does not come in the picture at all. Therefore, the argument that the decree-holder had to be execute the decree or to otherwise seek its compliance is untenable. 18. Earlier to the decision reported in Madhukar v. Smt. Saral4, there was some doubt regarding the period in respect of which the conduct of the petitioner was to be taken into account. The decision lays down that under section 23 (1) (a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, it is the conduct of the petitioner after the passing of the decree for judicial separation that is to be taken into consideration in deciding whether the petitioner is or is not in any way taking advantage of his own wrong. That was a case which had come up after the decree for judicial separation was passed in favour of the wife-petitioner and the husband had given the application for divorce. At the trial stage, relief was disallowed holding the petitioning husband as having committed wrong due to which the decree for judicial separation was passed. It was, therefore, high lighted that the refusal to give relief under section 23 (1) (a) should only be after judging the conduct subsequent to the passing of the decree. In keeping with it are the observations in paragraph 15 of that ruling which run as follows: "The provision does not refer to a matrimonial offence or a wrong. It was, therefore, high lighted that the refusal to give relief under section 23 (1) (a) should only be after judging the conduct subsequent to the passing of the decree. In keeping with it are the observations in paragraph 15 of that ruling which run as follows: "The provision does not refer to a matrimonial offence or a wrong. It provides for maintenance of a true balance between respect for the binding sanctity of marriage and the social considerations which make it contrary to public policy to insist on the maintenance of a union which has utterly broken down and on preventing a party to the marriage from remarrying and living respeclab1y. I have no doubt that in granting relief under section 13 (1A) the Court will and must take into consideration section 23 (1) and consider the conduct of the petitioner subsequent to the passing of the decree for judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights and not grant relief to a party who is taking advantage of his own wrong," 19. Incidentally it may be noted that according to that decision where there is a decree for judicial separation the husband who happens to be the petitioner is held to be under no obligation to assure the other party that the previous cruelty would cease and that he would treat her well or to ask her to come and stay with him. It is said that there was no question of his being in the wrong by not carrying out such obligation such as to disentitle him to the relief of divorce. Hence in paragraph 13, it is observed : "If the decree is for judicial separation, all that is required is that there should have been no resumption of cohabitation as between the parties to the marriage for a period of two years or upwards." 20. The relevant -question for our determination, therefore, would be whether subsequent to the passing of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, the present petitioning husband had committed any wrong. If no effort to obey the decree is to be treated as wrong then certainly he would be within the prohibition of section 23 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act. The relevant -question for our determination, therefore, would be whether subsequent to the passing of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, the present petitioning husband had committed any wrong. If no effort to obey the decree is to be treated as wrong then certainly he would be within the prohibition of section 23 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act. This has also to be noticed on the evidence forthcoming that on his own he had not made any efforts to bring back the wife and at least one such attempt made by the wife was allowed to get frustrated by no response. In keeping with the observations made by the learned District Judge, Mr. Bhangade argues that as a matter of fact, the wife was unwilling to join the bus band and her sending notice etc. was only a formal attempt to assert her right. At the outset it may be remarked that assuming that the petitioning husband was to jump up to that gesture, there could have been obedience of the decree. It cannot, therefore, be said that the wife was cold. It more illustrates the attitude of the husband in remaining absolutely cold towards the reunion. If the ratio of the punjab case is to be applied, there is no obligation on the part of the person in whose favour the decree is obtained to make any efforts. The entire obligation rests will the judgment-debtor in this case, the husband, to make all efforts, for obeying the decree. The case of a decree for judicial separation stands on a different footing. Under the order of separation the previous desertion ends and the party against whom the decree is passed i~ prohibited to have the company of the party in whose favour the decree is passed. It could therefore be said that the party against whom the decree is passed could not be expected to have the diametrically opposite obligation indirectly nullifying the decree by making attempts to have such company, but that logic could not, in my opinion, be available when there is a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. 21. Mr. Bhangade relied upon the observations in paragraph 6 of Madhukar v. Smt. Saral (supra) to the following effect: " .. 21. Mr. Bhangade relied upon the observations in paragraph 6 of Madhukar v. Smt. Saral (supra) to the following effect: " .. enactment of section 13 (1A) in 1964 is a legislative recognition of the principle that in the interest of society if there has been a breakdown of the marriage, there is no purpose in keeping the parties tied down to each other." He also relied upon the observations in paragraph 15 which run as follows: “….. when the Legislature amended section 13 in 1964 by deleting clauses (viii) and (ix) of section 13 (1) which gave right to apply for divorce only to the party in whose favour a decree for judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights had been passed and not to the other party and by enacting section 13 (1A) which conferred a right on both the parties, the Legislature was giving expression to new and more liberal thinking on the subject of divorce. The amended section provides for divorce where the prospect for reconciliation has faded which is evidenced by non-resumption of married life for two years or upwards after the decree for judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights.' The amendment takes note of the interest of the community in not maintaining a union which has utterly broken down and the interest of the petitioner as regards allowing him to remarry and live respectably." 22. We must not however get swayed by these observations and feelings that these considerations are overriding the provisions of section 23 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act. As is apparent from the very decision, the learned Judge has looked into the ruling in Laxmibai v. Laxmichand, and has remarked that there was evidence before the Court to show that the husband had wilfully refused to comply with the decree for restitution of conjugal rights and after being called upon to do so. As is apparent from the very decision, the learned Judge has looked into the ruling in Laxmibai v. Laxmichand, and has remarked that there was evidence before the Court to show that the husband had wilfully refused to comply with the decree for restitution of conjugal rights and after being called upon to do so. The learned Judge further expressed himself by saying: “It is clear that what Chandrachud J., took into consideration was the conduct of the petitioner husband subsequent to the passing of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights inasmuch as he refused to comply with the decree of the Court and not his conduct which led to the passing of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights." Justice Nain in deciding Madhukar's case has said this for supporting the proposition that in proceedings under section 13 (1A) the subsequent conduct, of the applicant is to be taken into account. He has not shown any dissent from the view expressed in Laxmibai v. Laxmichand (supra) that section 23 (1) has to be considered before granting the relief. It has got to be noted that the Bombay judgment is not overruled. The observations of which Mr. Bhangade would like to take advantage quoted above, are, therefore, to be understood when considerations under section 23 (1) (a) are not intervening. 23. In paragraph 10 Nain J. has also stated as follows: "It is undoubtedly true that any relief granted by the Court will have to take into consideration the conduct of the party applying for divorce by virtue of section 23 (1). But such conduct must in any case after the amendment of section 13 in 1964 necessarily be the conduct subsequent to the passing of the decree for judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights, and not prior conduct." 24. My attention was also invited by Mr. Bhangade to the decision reported in Jethabhai v. Manabai5, a decision of the Division Bench consisting of Nathwani and Mukhi JJ. This was also a case where the decree was for judicial separation. The wife had obtained such a decree on the ground of desertion. It was held that the husband did not continue to remain under an obligation to cohabit with the wife. This was also a case where the decree was for judicial separation. The wife had obtained such a decree on the ground of desertion. It was held that the husband did not continue to remain under an obligation to cohabit with the wife. Therefore, if he did not make any offer to resume cohabitation, he did not commit a wrong under section 23 (1) (a), but as is expressly held in paragraph 5 in granting the reliefs under section 13 (1A) the Court must take into consideration section 23 (1). 25. Since somewhat queer result follows when there is a decree for judicial separation in trying to meet out the situation, the observations in paragraph 19 are as follows: "It may appear somewhat harsh that a party originally guilty of desertion should ultimately be in a position to obtain divorce in the circumstances like the present one. But such a result follows because the aggrieved party itself asks for and obtains a decree of judicial separation thereby putting an end to the desertion." In my opinion, these considerations would per force not arise when there is a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. Mr. Justice Mukhi has written a separate concurring judgment and some of his observations were relied upon by Mr. Bhangade for the respondent-husband. Before going to these observations, it must be borne in mind that even both the learned Judges of the Division Bench have categorically stated independently in their judgments that while granting the relief under section 13(1A), considerations under section 23(1) have to be looked into. Therefore, whatever be the observations, they will have to be applied when the considerations under section 23 (1) (a) do not intervene. 26. In paragraphs 53 and 54, Mukhi J. has said as follows: "53. The change introduced by the amendment Act of 1964 in my opinion clearly suggests that the concept of default of the offending party as furnishing the ground for divorce has been eliminated so far as the two grounds in sub-section (1A) are concerned that is why they fall in a somewhat separate category. In other words the concept of matrimonial wrong or disability as furnishing a ground for divorce although it continues to exist so far as section 13 (1) is concerned, stands excluded so far as the grounds in section 13 (1A) are concerned. 54. In other words the concept of matrimonial wrong or disability as furnishing a ground for divorce although it continues to exist so far as section 13 (1) is concerned, stands excluded so far as the grounds in section 13 (1A) are concerned. 54. In fact it is substantially clear that the real ground now for granting a divorce under the newly introduced sub-section (1A) is the reluctant realisation that the marriage has failed; that absence has not made the heart grow fonder and that if two or more years could pass without a reunion or reconciliation in sight, then it would be unrealistic to hope that the marriage would still survive." He has also relied upon the observations in paragraph 92 which are as follows: " .. But the scope of section 23 (1) (a) in relation to the grounds for divorce, as contained in section 13 (1A) must in my opinion, of necessity and logic be somewhat limited. It is not possible to envisage what kind of wrong or di~abi1ity would have to be taken into consideration. Human ingenuity being what it is there is no doubt that many cases will arise where notwithstanding that a ground for divorce exists, there may be something in the conduct of the petitioner which would be so reprehensible that the Court would deny to such a petitioner the relief by way of divorce on the consideration that the petitioner was taking advantage of his or her own wrong: He further pointed out in paragraph 108, the latter part of which is as follows: "If therefore the construction, as sought for the respondent was to be placed on the relevant provisions of the law, then it would only have the undesirable effect of putting a premium on pretence and untruthfulness so that by resorting to falsehoods a petitioner would avoid the effect of section 23 (1) (a) on his or her case. If it was to be insisted upon that even after the marriage has practically broken down and an order for judicial separation has been made, or for that matter, a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, then the petitioner would have to go throughout the pretence and mechanics of a purported reconciliation, otherwise the Court would not be able to bring to an end an unhappy and ill-started union." 27. It cannot, however, be suggested, and indeed cannot hold water, in view of the express observations of the very learned Judge in paragraph 92, first part, that the effect of this liberal concept towards the divorce laws is to allow the remedy of divorce even to a judgment-debtor who on his part has not made any efforts to obey the decree. The observations I have in mind from paragraph 92 are as follows: "It is thus to be noticed that when a petition for divorce is based on either of the two grounds mentioned in section 13 (1A), section 23 (1) will apply and it would be the duty of the Court to satisfy itself that not only does the ground for granting the relief for divorce exists but that the petitioner is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability if any, for the purpose of the relief of divorce." 28. The sole question, therefore, is whether on the facts of the present case it could be said that the present petitioner has committed a wrong subsequent to the passing of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights falling under section 23 (1) (a) and if that is so, he ought to be refused the relief of divorce. My answer to this question is in the affirmative so that he is not entitled to the decree for divorce. This is unconnected with the socialistic aspect referred to by the learned District Judge in paragraph 16 of his judgment. Considerations of social discipline, moral obligations and non-exploitation intervene. The cardinal principle should be that a man should not be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. There should not be any premium on his wrong doing. In the present case I have not found any inclination much less enthusiasm on the part of the respondent-husband to really obey the decree. This in my opinion, amounts to wilful disobedience of the decree passed. With respect, I would agree with the observations made by Chandrachud J. in Laxmibai v. Laxmichand (supra) which show that if such thing is allowed, the greater the defiance of the judgment-debtor in obeying the decree the better would be his chances in getting the decree for divorce. This in my opinion, amounts to wilful disobedience of the decree passed. With respect, I would agree with the observations made by Chandrachud J. in Laxmibai v. Laxmichand (supra) which show that if such thing is allowed, the greater the defiance of the judgment-debtor in obeying the decree the better would be his chances in getting the decree for divorce. I do not think, it is in the interest of the society or it fits in the liberal outlook of allowing a divorce that an attempt to disobey the decree should be encouraged. By remaining silent, that is by taking no action the decree for restitution of conjugal rights is nullified. It is ignored completely. This would in the circumstances of the case be recalcitrance and a person cannot be allowed to reap full advantage out of it. Amended section 13 (1A) gives right to the opposite party to the proceedings to apply for divorce. Suppose in a decree for restitution of conjugal rights obtained by a wife, the husband were to make efforts for reunion and the decree-holder wife was not responsive even then under the an amended law, the husband bad no right to ask for divorce. Such a right is now provided to the judgment-debtor. 29. It appears in this case that the petitioning husband was disgusted with the wife, but surely there was a decree enjoining on him to ask for her company. He has not done it. He has not even averred that he made any efforts for it. Simply saying that because the woman presented a petition for maintenance some 55 days after obtaining the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, she was unwilling to join him would be of no avail to him. Circumstances could be conceived when after waiting for 55 days in vain she was compelled to ask for maintenance, without simply remaining hopelessly hopeful for their union. That certainly would not amount to showing any mental attitude on the part of the husband to obey the decree. When in express terms he has admitted that even after receiving the communication from the wife to take her back, he did not move, I suppose, the case falls under section 23 (1) (a) and the order passed by the District Judge, Nagpur will have to be set aside. 30. Consequently, this appeal is allowed. When in express terms he has admitted that even after receiving the communication from the wife to take her back, he did not move, I suppose, the case falls under section 23 (1) (a) and the order passed by the District Judge, Nagpur will have to be set aside. 30. Consequently, this appeal is allowed. The order of the District Judge granting declaration is set aside. The decree of the trial Court is revived. The respondent to bear his own costs and pay the costs of the appellant. 31. At this stage, oral request is made for leave to file letters patent appeal. This is the case decided on the judgments referred to. I do not think any complicated question arises. Hence leave refused. Appeal allowed.