JUDGMENT V.P. Gopalan Nambiyar, C. J. 1.The assessee, M/s Marikar Motors Limited, Trivandrum is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act. In respect of the assessment years 1964-65, 1966-67 and1967-68 it was assessed to income tax. The orders of assessment were carried up in appeal and in further appeal to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. In respect of the latter two years, viz., 1966-67 and 1967-68, the orders of the Appellate Tribunal were passed after 1st April 1971, viz., on 30th November 1971. (The significance of the date 1st April 1971 will presently appear). Bat, for the assessment year 1954-65, with which we are concerned in this reference, the order of the Tribunal was passed on 22nd August 1970. After the Tribunal passed the said order, the Surtax Officer, acting under the provisions of S.14 of the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964, read with S.13 thereof, proceeded to take action by way of recomputation of the assessment and amendment of the assessment order. S.13 and 14 of the said Tax Act are as follows:- "13. (1) With a view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record, the Commissioner, the Income Tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal may, of his, or its, own motion or on an application by the assessee in this behalf, amend any order passed by him or it in any proceeding under this Act within four years of the date on which such order was passed. (2) An amendment which has the effect of enhancing the assessment or reducing a refund or otherwise increasing the liability of the assessee shall not be made under this section unless the authority concerned has given notice to the assessee of its intention so to do and has allowed the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (3) Where an amendment is made under this section, the order shall be passed in writing by the authority concerned. (4) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, where any such amendment has the effect of reducing the assessment, the Income Tax Officer shall make any refund which may be due to such assessee. (5) Where any such amendment has the effect of enhancing the assessment or reducing the refund already made, the Income Tax Officer shall serve on the assessee a notice of demand in the prescribed form specifying the sum payable. 14. (5) Where any such amendment has the effect of enhancing the assessment or reducing the refund already made, the Income Tax Officer shall serve on the assessee a notice of demand in the prescribed form specifying the sum payable. 14. Where as a result of any order made under S.154, 153, 250, 254, 260, 262, 263 or 264 of the Income Tax Act, it is necessary to recompute the chargeable profits determined in any assessment under this Act, the Income Tax Officer may proceed to recompute the chargeable profits, and determine the surtax payable or refundable on the basis of such recomputation and make the necessary amendment and the provisions of S.13 shall, so far as may be, apply thereto, the period of four years specified in sub-s.(1) of that section being reckoned from the date of the order passed under the aforesaid sections of the Income Tax Act." S.254 (and a few of the other sections which, it is unnecessary to notice) was introduced into S.14 by S.73 of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 1970, with effect from 1st April 1971. The question which, therefore, falls for determination in this reference is whether in respect of an order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, passed prior to 1st April 1971, when alone an order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal under S.254 was brought within the purview of S.14, the right of action under that section and the consequential provision under S.13 of the Surtax Act, would be attracted on the ground that the period of 4 years from the date of the order for taking action had not expired when the Amendment Act came into force. The question of law referred for our determination is: "Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the Income Tax Officer cannot invoke S.14 of the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964 as amended with effect from 1st April 1971 by S.73 of Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970, to recompute chargeable profits in a case where the order under S.254 of Income Tax Act, 1961 as a result of which order it became necessary to recompute the chargeable profits is passed prior to 1st April 1971." The Tribunal was of the opinion that, action, under S.14 read with S.13 of the Surtax Act, was not permissible or possible with respect to an order of the Appellate Tribunal given prior to 1st April 1971. It referred the question of law for determination and opinion by this Court. 2. We think, the Tribunal was right in its view. On the terms of S.14 itself there are a few things which stand out clear: First, that the right of action with respect to an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal under S.254 of the Act was itself granted for the first time only by the Taxation (Amendment) Act of 1970 with effect from 1st April 1971. Next, the right conferred is only to recompute the chargeable profits determined in any assessment under the Surtax Act; and third, that the said right of recomputation springs from any order, inter alia, under S.254 of the Income Tax Act. Subject to these, the Income Tax Officer is to recompute the chargeable profits and determine the surtax payable and take consequential action by way of amendment under S.13 of the Surtax Act. The period within which action has to be taken is 4 years from the date of the order, passed -- in this case by the Tribunal -- under S.254 of the Act. It appears to us, on principle and to the extent to which we can gather from the provisions of the section that the right itself, vis a vis an order of the Tribunal having been conferred upon the officer only on and from 1st April 1971, it would not be permissible or possible to get at the orders passed prior to that date, on the mere ground that, since the period of 4 years for taking action, from the date of the order had not expired when the amendment came into force, the right could operate even on orders passed prior to the conferment of the right. To so hold would enable the officer to net in all orders passed on and from 2nd April 1967 and subject them to recomputation under S.14 and consequential amendment under S.13 of the Act, Such, we thinks was not the result either intended or provided for by the amendment effected by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970, 3. Counsel for the revenue cited to us the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Freny Rashid Chewai v. Assistant Controller of Estate Duty 90 ITR 31and of the Supreme Court in Mahendra Mills Ltd. v. P. B. Desai, A. A. C. 99 ITR 135. Counsel for the revenue cited to us the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Freny Rashid Chewai v. Assistant Controller of Estate Duty 90 ITR 31and of the Supreme Court in Mahendra Mills Ltd. v. P. B. Desai, A. A. C. 99 ITR 135. The former of these decisions has no application to the facts of this case. The only question which there arose was whether the award passed by the Assistant Controller, which was modified on reference by the Civil Court would entitle the Estate Duty Officer to treat the Civil Court's order as part of "record" for the purpose of S.61 of the Estate Duty Act. It was held that it could be so treated as part of the "record". The complicating feature in this case of the power itself having been conferred only on and from a certain date, and of the officer seeking to rectify the order passed on an anterior date, did not arise for consideration and was not dealt with in the judgment, 4. In the next decision in Mahendra Mills Limited v. P. B. Desai, A. A. C. 99 ITR 135 the concept of the term "record" with respect to S.35(1) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, was expounded in a comprehensive sense so as to include not merely the order, but all proceedings on which the assessment is based. By reference to this decision, counsel for the revenue argued that there was a right of amendment under S.13 of the Act with respect to any order passed by the Income Tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and the Appellate Tribunal, with regard to, "any mistake apparent from the record". The "record", within the meaning of this section, would, the argument ran, include an order passed by these authorities under the Income Tax Act, as the surtax had to be levied on the income computed under the Income Tax Act, This may well be so, but, in our opinion this would not enable the revenue to get at orders passed by the Tribunal prior to the date on which the right of action under S.14 itself was conferred on the authorities. Therefore, the decision relied on by counsel for the revenue is unhelpful, 5. Therefore, the decision relied on by counsel for the revenue is unhelpful, 5. More appropriate, and to the point, appear to be the decisions of the Supreme Court in Income Tax Officer v. T. S. Devinatha Nadar 68 ITR 252 and C.I T. v. S. Rashid 85 ITR 118. These were concerned with the familiar controversy which had occasioned great divergence of judicial opinion in regard to the scope and ambit of the provisions of S.35(5) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. We do not propose to deal with the history or the background of the controversy, as that is, by now, a matter of familiar knowledge. But, we would extract, the following passage from the majority judgment in the earlier of these decisions: "After giving very anxious consideration to the views expressed by the learned Judge, we still hold that by sub-s.(5) of S.35 the legislature intended that rectification should be made on the finding as to the incorrectness of the assessment of the firm after the provision was introduced in the statute book, viz., 1st April 1952 There would have been nothing unjust or inequitable in the legislature directing that rectification of the assessment of the partner should always follow the assessment or reassessment of the firm made finally. On the other hand, we think rectification of the partner's assessment should logically follow the reassessment or modification of the firm assessment. Otherwise, there would be an unaccounted for divergence between a person's assessment as an individual and his assessment as a partner of a firm. But the legislature, in our opinion, did not intend to disturb completed assessment of partners except within the period of time indicated earlier in this judgment and unless the finding as to the incorrectness of the firm's assessment was made after the terminus a quo above mentioned". (The learned Judge, to whose views the Court gave its anxious and respectful consideration is Hidayatullah, J., and the reference was to the views expressed by the learned Judge in an earlier pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Habibulla's case). It appears to us that the principle of the above decision bears similarity to the point that we have to tackle in this reference. That principle was affirmed and restated in the later decision of the Supreme Court in C.I. T. v. S. Rashid 85 ITR 118. 6. It appears to us that the principle of the above decision bears similarity to the point that we have to tackle in this reference. That principle was affirmed and restated in the later decision of the Supreme Court in C.I. T. v. S. Rashid 85 ITR 118. 6. Both on the construction of the section and in the light of the principle of the judicial decisions noticed supra, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Tribunal was correct. We answer the question of law referred in the affirmative, that is, is in favour of the assessee and against the Department. We make no order as to costs.