Short Note : 1. The revision was against the preliminary order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate under section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, directing the applicants to show cause as to why the preliminary order should not be made absolute. The applicants had also moved an application for converting the revision into an application under section 482 of the Code in case High Court Was of the view that the order of the S.D.M. was an interlocutory order. Held : Under section 397 (2) of the new Code no revision lies against an interlocutory order but section 482 provides that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or effect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. Therefore overriding powers have been given under section 482 to this Court by which this Court can set aside any illegal order in order to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice and section 397 (2) cannot be a bar. The inherent powers can only be exercised at an interlocutory state and if section 397 (2) is to be a bar then this Court will not be able to exercise inherent powers at all and this provision would become redundant and ineffectual. It is unlikely that inherent power would, be invoked against final orders and judgments against which remedies of revision and appeal are provided. So this Court is not prevented from exercising its inherent powers even if the impugned order is an interlocutory order. It is well settled that the preliminary order passed under section 133 by the S.D.M. is an interlocutory order and no revision lies against such an order. It may be mentioned that a second revision was preferred before this Court which was further barred under section 397 (3) of the Code. This Court has observed. “There is no reason why this Court should invoke its inherent powers under section 484 when there are other remedies open to the applicant to agitate the matter before the S.D.M. which is the proper forum for deciding the matter after enquiry. This Court has observed. “There is no reason why this Court should invoke its inherent powers under section 484 when there are other remedies open to the applicant to agitate the matter before the S.D.M. which is the proper forum for deciding the matter after enquiry. If the applicant is able to satisfy the S.D.M. that no such nuisance or disturbance is being caused, the preliminary order is liable to be modified”. In that case there were proper materials before the S.D.M. to initiate a proceeding under section 133 but in the present case if there was no material for taking action under section 133 and if the S.D.M. has passed the impugned order mechanically without applying his mind, the same is liable to be quashed under section 482 of the Code. Normally a preliminary order passed under section 133 is nothing but an interlocutory order but if the order is passed by overlooking the requirements of the section, it is not a preliminary order under the section. When there is no basis or material for taking action under section 133 and still preliminary order is passed calling upon the appellants to face enquiry without proper application of mind, such an order cannot be deemed to be an interlocutory order. Dulichand v. Dr. Shikharchand, Cr. C. No. 1270 of 1976, decided on 5-7-1977 referred to. 2. The provisions of section 133 cannot be invoked so as to stop the applicants from carrying on their business of running a hotel which is in existence for the last 20 years. Moreover, the allegation that the person visiting the hotel are causing great nuisance is vague and the non-applicant has not mentioned the nature of nuisance caused. So far as the objections that the constructions carried on by the applicants are not in accordance with the terms and conditions of sanctioned plan and also not in accordance with the provisions of Town Planning Act are matters which can only be looked into and action taken by the Municipal authorities or the authorities under the Town Planning Act. The S.D.M. under section 133 is not made the forum for deciding these matters. The S.D.M. under section 133 is not made the forum for deciding these matters. The non-applicant has also produced a certified copy of the order of Nazul Tahsildar dated 25-6-1977 whereby penalty has been imposed on the applicants for encroachment on the Nazul land by construction of balconies, in all there is an encroachment of 38 sqft. The non-applicant has not alleged nor he has stated that the construction of these balconies are obstructing the right of passage of the general public using the lane. In fact, no case of unlawful obstruction or nuisance to the public lane as required under section 133 (1) (a) has been made out. Construction of any building can only be stopped under section 133 (1)(c) if the construction is likely to occasion conflagration or explosion which should be prevented or stopped. There is no such allegation in the application. The S.D.M. therefore had no power to stop the construction. So far as the allegations of the non-applicant about discharge from the septic tank and latrines are concerned, they are mere apprehensions and at present there is no such discharge. It is well settled that future apprehension of nuisance is no cause for interference under section 133 of the Code it can be invoked only in case of imminent danger. If the applicants have committed breach of the sanctioned plan or breach of the Town Planning Act they would be suitably dealt with by the authorities under the Municipalities Act or the Town Planning Act, but that cannot be ground for invoking section 133. No action under this section can be taken if the applicants can be proceeded with under other pro• visions. No prima facie case has been made out for initiating proceedings under section 133 of the Code and the order of the S.D.M. is illegal and without jurisdiction and is liable to be quashed. Revision allowed.