Short Note : 1. Indrani Parwar claimed possession of the house in suit from Garibdas Parwar on the ground that he was granted a licence to live in it for a period of three years, with an option to extend the period for another one year, and in the meantime to find another suitable accommodation for himself and his family. That Garibdas did. not vacate the house after the period of four years though the licence was revoked. That in a family partition amongst the members of Amritlal Parwar's unit (Amritlal was the person who had granted licence) the house in suit fell to Indrani's share and she alone, therefore could bring this suit. 2. The defence of Garibdas was that he was a lesser and not a licensee of the premises, and that he could not be evicted unless one of the grounds enunciated in section 12 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act was made out. Besides. Indrani Parwar alone could not sue because the story of partition in the family of Amritlal was not true. The alleged partition was disputed by other members of the family. 3. At a very late stage when the plaintiff was already examined asa witness and So Was her husband Amritlal, the defendant, Garibdas sought leave of the Court to amend the. written statement. That having been disallowed, he has come up in revision. Held : The learned counsel tried to convince this Court how the amendment was necessary and why it should have been allowed to be in corp. orated. Let me say at the outset that the real controversy is already put in two issues. whether Indrani alone could sue and whether the defendant was a licensee or a lessee. These two issues cover the entire field of enquiry. Now by amendment to para 1 and para 5 the defendant wanted to reiterate his stand that there had been no partition amongst the members of Amritlal Parwar’s family. Amritlal still continued to be the Karta, he had been receiving rent even after the alleged partition and that the partition was disputed even by his son Rajendra Kumar. All these facts need not necessarily be incorporated in the written statement. They come within the domain of evidence rather than pleadings. The question 1 asked was, had the defendant been prohibited in leading evidence to disprove partition? All these facts need not necessarily be incorporated in the written statement. They come within the domain of evidence rather than pleadings. The question 1 asked was, had the defendant been prohibited in leading evidence to disprove partition? Had he been restricted in his cross-examination in this regard for want of pleadings? If that was not done, the Court was alive to the controversy that the de fen dent did not recognize Indrani to be the sole owner and was keen to prove that she alone could not sue. 4. In the same way, the question whether the defendant was a licensee or a lessee was a matter of construction of two documents, one dated 31-12-1970 and the other dated 1-1-1971. The defendant omitted to plead earlier that the document dated 1-1-1971 superseded the terms contained in the document which was executed a day earlier. Amritlal Par war was confronted with the later document. It is marked Ex. D-1. The Court has permitted evidence to be led on it. Whether it superseded the earlier contract or was in terms and substance the same as was executed a day earlier, has yer to be decided by the Court. The subsequent conduct, exchange of notices, admissions contained in various documents are yet to be evaluated to. find whether the defendant was a lessee or a licensee. The question is, should the document Ex. D-1 already introduced in evidence be made a part of pleadings? Or should the Court be left to construe the document for its terms and contents end decide the issue whether it could be read as creating a lease for an indefinite period, the period depending on the discretion of Garibdas to find an alternative suitable accommodation if and when he desired. Contents of the documents and their implications need riot necessarily be pleaded. The Court while framing issues looks into material documents as well. That is the requirement of Order 14, rule 3, C.P. C. Material documents in them-selves constitute pleadings sometimes. 5. There is no. suggestion made that the Court has already expressed or. indicated that Ex. D-1 would not be looked into. The counsel for the other side submitted that the Ex. D-1 was very much a part of the record now and had been marked as an exhibit. The Court was bound to read and cons-true it. 6. 5. There is no. suggestion made that the Court has already expressed or. indicated that Ex. D-1 would not be looked into. The counsel for the other side submitted that the Ex. D-1 was very much a part of the record now and had been marked as an exhibit. The Court was bound to read and cons-true it. 6. As I said earlier, the amendment if permitted to. be in introduced would make the pleadings prolix and verbose. All that which should remain in the domain of evidence need not be pleaded. That is what the Court has refused to do. Let the defendant not prejudice the mind of the Court that Ex. D-1 is going to be overlooked or section 92 of the Evidence Act would bar the in introduced of any evidence. That contmgency has not yet arisen. Revision dismissed.