JUDGMENT V.P. Gopalan Nambiyar, C.J. 1. Although the matter caused us some amount of anxiety and required some amount of consideration, we are satisfied that the learned Judge was right and that his judgment should be affirmed. 2. The question raised in this writ appeal is whether the writ Petitioner-Respondent was entitled to be appointed as Village Assistant. He was appointed as Chainman by Ext. P-1 order, dated 6th August 1973. That order shows on its face that the Government had reserved 25 per cent of the vacancies of Village Assistants to be filled up by qualified last grade servants and attenders of the Revenue Department who had put in a minimum period of five years of service in the Revenue Department. 15 per cent of the vacancies of Village Assistants were set apart for appointment of qualified villageman and 10 per cent of the vacancies of Village Assistants were left for appointment of qualified last grade servants and Attenders of the Land Revenue, Survey and Land Records Department as Village Assistants. The remaining 50 per cent was to be filled up by direct recruitment. Therefore, on the basis of Ext. P-1, the Petitioner's claim for promotion as Village Assistant must satisfy two conditions; (1) that he was in the Revenue Department and (2) that he was a last grade servant in that Department. Both these were contested. The learned Judge overruled the objections raised against the Petitioner's claims and held that his representations Exts. P-2 and P-4 ventilating his claims for promotion as Village Assistant had been wrongly rejected by the Government by Ext. P-5 order. 3. The learned Judge rightly noticed that despite certain unsatisfactory and unhappy averments made in the Petitioner's petition which may suggest that his appointment as Chainman was in the Survey and Land Records Department, there was ample material to show that he was appointed as Chainman only in the Revenue Department. His original selection and appointment order is not produced. For the Government, reliance is placed on Ext. R-1 which is a copy of the proceedings of the Secretary of the Board or Revenue, dated 6th January 1971. It shows that the Government had directed that the existing contingent and daily rated Chainman will be provisionally promoted to vacancies of Chainman under the Land Tribunals. For the Government, reliance is placed on Ext. R-1 which is a copy of the proceedings of the Secretary of the Board or Revenue, dated 6th January 1971. It shows that the Government had directed that the existing contingent and daily rated Chainman will be provisionally promoted to vacancies of Chainman under the Land Tribunals. Item 35 of the enumerated Chainmen is the Petitioner; and in the column showing the office in which he was working the entry is: 'Special Tahsildar's Office, Nedumkandam'. It is difficult to see that this office was part of the Survey and Land Records Department. On the other hand, as contended by counsel for the writ Petitioner, the inference is fairly strong that it was part of the Land Revenue Department. The learned Government Pleader relied on Ext. R-1 to show that that would explain the basis and the real reason for Ext. P-7 order produced with the reply-affidavit to show that the Petitioner was working in the Land Revenue Department. Ext. P-7 order, dated 27th January 1971 are proceedings of the District Collector posting 16 daily rated Chainmen to the Kozhikode District in the existing vacancies. One of them was the writ Petitioner and he is seen posted as temporary Chainman in the Office of the Special Tahsildar, Nedumkandom. While the writ Petitioner would rely on Ext. P-7 to show that he was working in the Land Revenue Department, the Government Pleader would explain it away by relying on Ext. R-1 on the basis of which Ext. P-7 was issued. We are of the opinion that Ext. R-1 does not clearly or conclusively show that the Petitioner was not selected to the Land Revenue Department. On the other hand, as we said, there are sufficient indications that the selection was to that Department. The learned Judge was therefore right in his inference that the Petitioner satisfied one of the conditions of being in the Revenue Department. 4. The next question is: was he a last grade servant? There is acute controversy in regard to this aspect of the matter again. Attention was called to the definition of last grade service in Clause 16A of Rule 12 of Part I, K.S.R. The said rule reads as follows: 16-A. Last grade service. 4. The next question is: was he a last grade servant? There is acute controversy in regard to this aspect of the matter again. Attention was called to the definition of last grade service in Clause 16A of Rule 12 of Part I, K.S.R. The said rule reads as follows: 16-A. Last grade service. -- Last grade service includes all service in the following appointments unless otherwise declared by the Government: (a) Service as Peon, Head Peon, Mochee and Duffadar. (b) Service in posts, the pay or the maximum pay of which does not exceed Rs. 85. (c) Any service which has been specifically classed as last grade service by the orders of Government. For the Government Pleader, it was argued that the Petitioner would not fall within the category (b) which alone would be applicable to him as the maximum pay of his post, exceeded -- as was admitted -- Rs. 85. For the writ Petitioner it was argued that Clause (b) of Sub-rule 16A of Rule 12 of the K.S.R. as it appears, represents an impossible and an inconceivable state of affairs, as there are no last grade servants in the State today whose maximum pay does not exceed Rs. 85. It was pointed out that by G.O.P. 91/74 the pay of last grade servants had been revised to Rs. 196-3-229-4-245. It is surprising and we should think indeed regrettable that a Government publication like the K.S.R. (1976 Edition) which was placed before us, should still contain Clause (b) worded in this misleading and anachronistic fashion. We trust steps would be taken at the earliest, to have the clause corrected or suitably amended. In order to show whether the writ Petitioner would fall within the last grade service as known to the Rules of this State, attention was called to the Special Rules for the Kerala Last Grade Servants. Rule (1) of the said Rules has constituted the service which is as follows: 1. Constitution. -- The service shall consist of the following categories of posts namely: Category 1: Chowkidar, Line Maistry, Line Attendant, Care, taker, Packer, Counter and Janitor. Category 2: Duffadar, Mochee, Gasman, Guard, Helmsman, Dispensary Attendant, Field Workers, Ayah, Court-keeper, Dresser, Head-keeper, Field Assistant, Turn Cock (Keeper) and Last Grade Attenders. 3. Constitution. -- The service shall consist of the following categories of posts namely: Category 1: Chowkidar, Line Maistry, Line Attendant, Care, taker, Packer, Counter and Janitor. Category 2: Duffadar, Mochee, Gasman, Guard, Helmsman, Dispensary Attendant, Field Workers, Ayah, Court-keeper, Dresser, Head-keeper, Field Assistant, Turn Cock (Keeper) and Last Grade Attenders. 3. Any other post in the last grade service as defined in Clause 16A of Rule 12 in Part I of the Kerala Service Rules and who has not been included in any other service. 4. The learned Government Pleader stressed that the Chainman does not find specific enumeration. This is so. But category 3 is a residual, unenumerated category. The question still remains: Is a Chainman included in that category? Counsel for the writ Petitioner drew our attention to Rule 5 which is as follows: 5. Appointment. -- (a) Appointment to the various categories or posts shall be made as follows: Categories 1 and 2: By promotion from a lower post or category within the jurisdiction of the appointing authority concerned; If suitable and qualified persons are not available within such jurisdiction, by promotion from a lower category or post outside such jurisdiction; or By direct recruitment. Category 3: By direct recruitment. (b) All promotions shall be made in accordance with seniority, unless the promotion of a member has been withheld as a penalty. Note. -- In view of the arduous and special nature of the duties and responsibilities attached to the posts specified in the Table below, only male candidates shall be eligible for appointment under this rule to the said posts: Table 1. Peon 2. Watchman 3. Duffadar 4. Cleaner-cum-Conductor 5. Gate Keeper 6. Court Keeper 7. Process Server 8. Messenger 9. Villageman 10. Chainman 11. Maistry 12. Plumber. Counsel for the writ Petitioner-Respondent argued that enumeration of the twelve categories of last grade service -- and among them Chainman -- even for the limited purpose of exclusion of women, was sufficiently indicative of the fact that the enumerated posts fall within the residual category No. 3 of Rule 1. The argument is sound and we would accept the same. We are of the opinion, that Rule 5 affords clear indication that the Chainman, among others, stands included in the residual category No. 3 of Rule (1) of the Last Grade Service Special Rules. The argument is sound and we would accept the same. We are of the opinion, that Rule 5 affords clear indication that the Chainman, among others, stands included in the residual category No. 3 of Rule (1) of the Last Grade Service Special Rules. Therefore both the conditions necessary for promotion of the writ Petitioner as Village Assistant stand satisfied and the Government were wrong in rejecting Exts. P-2 and P-4, representations of the Petitioner. The learned Judge was right in his conclusion. We affirm the said judgment. 6. Our attention was called in the course of the argument, to a judgment of a learned Judge of this Court in O.P. No. 4793 of 1976 by which the learned Judge dismissed, in limine, the writ petition challenging the termination of the provisional promotion granted to the Petitioners under Rule 31(a)(1) of the K.S. and S.S.R. to the category of Village Assistants in view of the orders issued by the Government, clarifying that Chainmen are not eligible for promotion as Village Assistants in the quota reserved for appointment by transfer of last grade servants. We are unable to see from the judgment, that any of the aspects which we have dealt with and considered, or which the learned Single Judge in this case has dealt with and considered, were either presented to, or dealt with by the learned Judge. The said judgment has therefore no application. We dismiss this appeal with no order as to costs.