Punnayya, J.-This appeal is preferred by the State against the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of murder. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Cuddapah, acquitted the respondent of the offence punishable under section 302, Indian Penal Code, but convicted him under section 304, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years. 2. The learned Public Prosecutor contends that the reasons given by the learned Sessions Judge for acquitting the respondent of the offence of section 302, Indian Penal Code, are contrary to law and the rulings of the Supreme Court. 3. To examine whether there is substance in the contention of the learned Public Prosecutor, it is necessary for us to mention the essential facts of the prosecution case. The deceased was stabbed by the accused on 3rd August, 1974 near the house of the deceased at Ooragayalagutta village, hamlet of Dudyala village, Rayachoti Taluk, Cuddapah District. The deceased has two daughters, Nagamma and P.W. 3 and also a son. P.W. 1 is the wife of the deceased. Right years prior to the occurrence, Nagamma was given in marriage to P.W. 1’s brother Chennaiah. Four years prior to the occurrence the accused eloped with Nagamma to some other village. The accused is no other than the brother of the husband of P.W. 3. Three months prior to occurrence, the accused and Nagamma returned to the village and hey were living as wife and husband. The deceased and P.W. 1 did not like the accused and Nagamma living in the village. They, therefore, demanded the accused not to stay in the village but to live in some other village. Resenting the demand of the deceased, the accused threatened to kill them and would leave the village and till then he would stay in the village itself. On 3rd August, 1974, at 5 p.m., P.W. 3 and Nagamma the daughter of the deceased and P.W. 1 were quarrelling over a blouse at the house of the deceased. Just at that time, the deceased and his brother, P.W. 4, returned from their work. P.W. 1 came out of her hut. P.W. 5 another brother of the deceased, P.W. 6 the sister of the deceased were also present. The accused came there armed with sickle, M.O. 1 and attempted to attack the deceased. Just at that time, the deceased and his brother, P.W. 4, returned from their work. P.W. 1 came out of her hut. P.W. 5 another brother of the deceased, P.W. 6 the sister of the deceased were also present. The accused came there armed with sickle, M.O. 1 and attempted to attack the deceased. P.W. 2 (the husband of P.W. 3) and the deceased managed to snatch away M.O. 1 from the hands of the accused. In that souffle the deceased received a simple injury on his right ear. Then, the accused ran towards his house and brought a goraka and stabbed the deceased with it below the abdomen. Even after the deceased was stabbed, the deceased caught hold of the tuft of the accused and both of them struggled for some time until the deceased collapsed. When the deceased fell down, the accused ran away leaving the goraka M.O. 2, there itself P.Ws. 1 to 6 brought the deceased to his house and laid him on a cot. P.W. 7 went to the Sarpanch, P.W. 10, and informed him as to what had happened. The Sarpanch came to the deceased and asked him as to how he received the injuries. The deceased stated to him that the accused stabbed him with M.O. 2. A short while thereafter the deceased died. P.W. 8, a cousin of the deceased proceeded to the Village Munsif, P.W. 11, who was residing at Dudyala which is one mile away from the village of the deceased. On the next morning, P.W. 11 came at about 7 a.m. to the deceased. P.W. 1 told P.W. 11 as to what had happened. At about 8-30 a.m., P.W. 11 recorded the statement of P.W. 1 which is Exhibit P-1 and prepared copy of Exhibit P-1 and two printed reports, Exhibits P-11 and P-12. He sent Exhibit P-1 and Exhibit P-11 to the Police Tsundupalle and Exhibits P-10 and P-12 to the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Rayachoti through village servants. Tsundupalle police station is ten miles away from the village. P.W. 12 reached the police station at about 4-15 p.m. and handed over Exhibits P-1 and P-11 to the Sub-Inspector, P.W. 15. P.W. 15 recorded a statement from P.W. 12 as to why the delay was caused. He registered the case as Crime No. 51 of 1974 and issued express F.I.Rs. P.W. 12 reached the police station at about 4-15 p.m. and handed over Exhibits P-1 and P-11 to the Sub-Inspector, P.W. 15. P.W. 15 recorded a statement from P.W. 12 as to why the delay was caused. He registered the case as Crime No. 51 of 1974 and issued express F.I.Rs. to the concerned and then he proceeded to the scene of offence. He reached the. scene of offence at about 7 p.m. He held inquest and examined P.Ws. 1, 2 and 4 to 6 during the inquest and despatched the dead body to P.W. 13, the Civil Assistant Surgeon, Government Hospital, Rayachoti, for the post-mortem examination. P.W. 15 examined P.Ws. 3, 7. 8, 10 and 11 and two others after the inquest. He also seized M.Os. 1 and 2 and bloodstained clothes under a panchanama. P.W. 13, the Civil Assistant Surgeon, Government Hospital, Rayachoti conducted the autopsy at about 11 a.m. on 5th August. 1974 and found the following external injuries. "1. A lacerated wound 1/3"x¼" muscle deep just below the right ear-blood clots around the wound present. 2. A stab injury of ¾"X½"X4", blood clots around the wound 2" above the right ingural region. Penetrating the muscles and cutting the famoral artary-external edges are clean cuts and injuries is downwards and medially. Blood clots around the injured area present. 3. Multiple abrasions 1½" above the No. 2 wound." He issued Exhibit P-16 the postmortem certificate. He was of the opinion that the deceased could have died of shock and haemorrhage as a result of injury No. 2 which could have been caused by sharpedge weapon like M.O. 2. He was also of the opinion that injury No. 3 could have been caused during a struggle while trying to take out the weapon from the injury No. 2. According to him, injuries 2 and 3 could have caused the death of the deceased in the ordinary course of nature. 4. The learned Additional Sessions Judge accepted the evidence of the eyewitnesses, P.Ws. 1 and 3 to 6 and also the oral dying declaration spoken to by P.W. 10 and held that the prosecution proved its case with regard to the incident beyond reasonable doubt. But instead of holding the accused guilty of the offence punishable under section 302, Indian Penal Code, he took the view that the accused committed culpable homicide not amounting to murder. But instead of holding the accused guilty of the offence punishable under section 302, Indian Penal Code, he took the view that the accused committed culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The following reasons are given by the learned Sessions Judge in support of his view: ". . . .However, in this case, there is no evidence of premeditation. There is also no evidence of intention of the accused to kill the deceased. It cannot be also held that he is aware of the consequences of his action. He gave only one blow that too below the abdomen and not on any vital part of the deceased." He, therefore, has chosen to convict the accused under section 304, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced him as stated above. 5. The learned Public Prosecutor contends that the evidence is so cogent and satisfactory to show that the accused murdered the deceased with the Deliberate intention, as the accused ran towards his bouse, even after M.O. 1 was snatched away by the deceased and P.W. 2 from the hands of the accused and came back with M.O. 2 and stabbed the deceased below his abdomen. The learned Public Prosecutor therefore contends that the offence comes under thirdly of section 300,Indian Penal Code. 6. We find substance in the contention of the learned Public Prosecutor. To say that the attack is not premeditated is to say something contrary to the evidence brought on record. As stated above, the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 3 to 6 is clear enough to show that the accused first came armed with a sickle (M.O. 1) and attempted to cut the deceased with it. But his attempt was foiled by the deceased and P.W. 2 when they managed to snatch away the sickle from his hand. Then the accused became wild and ran towards his house and came back with ‘goraka’ and stabbed the deceased below abdomen. All those circumstances under which the accused stabbed the deceased unequivocally establish that the accused acted intentionally and stabbed the deceased with determination to cause his death. 7. The learned Sessions Judge is therefore erroneous in thinking that there is no premeditation when the accused stabbed the deceased. He appears to think that there should be prior deliberations or prior plans when he says that there is no evidence of premeditation. 7. The learned Sessions Judge is therefore erroneous in thinking that there is no premeditation when the accused stabbed the deceased. He appears to think that there should be prior deliberations or prior plans when he says that there is no evidence of premeditation. Premeditation does not mean or imply a long labouring of design to kill. Premeditated act means a determined act or an act deliberately intended, but not sudden or accidental. If the accused reflects with a view to determine whether he should kill the deceased or not and if he committed the act in pursuance of that reflection, the act which caused the death of the deceased is a premeditated one. In other words, if the accused did the act intentionally, the act of the accused comes under premeditated act. When the accused ran towards his house after his attempt to cut the deceased with M.O. 1 was frustrated by the deceased and P.W.2 when they snatched away M.O. 1 from his hands and came with M.O. 2, it is clear that he was determined to kill the deceased and with that determination he came and stabbed the deceased. The accused therefore acted intentionally and deliberately in stabbing the deceased. The accused dealt the blow with M.O. 2 so forcibly that it penetrated 4“deep into the abdomen of the deceased and cut the femoral artary, as could be seen from the evidence of P.W. 13 the doctor who conducted the autopsy. As the nature of the injury is so grievous and grave P.W. 13 stated unequivocally that the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Thus it is clear that the accused not only stabbed he deceased with the deliberate intention to kill him, but also caused the injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Thus it is clear that the accused not only stabbed he deceased with the deliberate intention to kill him, but also caused the injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Where the prosecution succeeds in proving that the injury inflicted by the accused to the deceased is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and that the accused caused the particular injury intentionally but not accidentally the offence comes within the mischief of Clause Thirdly, section 300, Indian Penal Code In this connection it is useful to quote the observations of the Supreme Court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, where no evidence or explanation is given about why the accused thrust a spear into the abdomen of the deceased with such force that it penetrated the bowels and three coils of the intestines came out of the wound, it would be perverse to conclude that he did not intend to inflict the injury that he did. In this case the Supreme Court authoritatively laid down certain tests to be established by the prosecution. Their Lordships held as follows: ”The prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under section 300 “thirdly”; First, it must establish, quite objectively that a bodily injury is present: Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type, just described, made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution the offence is murder under section 300 "thirdly". This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution the offence is murder under section 300 "thirdly". It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death, or that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, or even that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death." This view was reaffirmed in Anda v. State of Rajasthan1, by their Lordships of the Supreme Court when they held thus: "The third clause of section 300, Indian Penal Code, views the matter from a general stand point. It speaks of an intention to cause bodily injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Here the emphasis is on the sufficiency of the injury in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The sufficiency is the high probability of death in the ordinary way of nature. When this sufficiency exists and death follows and the causing of such injury is. intended, the offence is murder." The view enunciated by the Supreme Court in the above two decisions is reiterated in a very recent decision of the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. R. Punnayya2. When this sufficiency exists and death follows and the causing of such injury is. intended, the offence is murder." The view enunciated by the Supreme Court in the above two decisions is reiterated in a very recent decision of the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. R. Punnayya2. Their Lordships held thus: "The sufficiency spoken of in clause (thirdly), as already noticed is the high probability of death in the ordinary course of nature, and if such sufficiency exists and death is caused and the injury causing it is intentional, the case would fall under clause 3rdly of section 300." Viewed from the deliberate intention with which the accused, in the case on hand, stabbed the deceased and from the nature of the injury which is sufficient to cause death of the deceased in the ordinary course of nature, we entertain no doubt to hold that the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in the above cited case are established and the accused committed the offence of murder punishable under section 302, Indian Penal Code. We, therefore, hold that the learned Sessions Judge misdirected himself in not applying provisions of section 300, Indian Penal Code. 8. Sri Narasimha Reddi, the learned Counsel for the respondent, strenuously contended that before the accused caused the injury to the deceased, the accused and the deceased were struggling and in the course of that struggle, the accused caused such an injury. But, he was not able to place before us any material from the evidence brought on record in support of it. We have gone through the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 3 to 6 carefully to find out whether there is any material to support the plea taken by the learned Counsel for the respondent but we did not find any material to that effect. On the other hand, the evidence of these witnesses makes it abundantly clear that there was no struggle between the accused and deceased before the accused gave the stab injury, nor did the accused stab the deceased in the course of the struggle between the accused and the deceased. On the other hand, the evidence of these witnesses makes it abundantly clear that there was no struggle between the accused and deceased before the accused gave the stab injury, nor did the accused stab the deceased in the course of the struggle between the accused and the deceased. The evidence is to the effect that after the attempt of the accused to cut the deceased with M.O. 1 was foiled by the deceased and P.W. 2 who snatched away M.O. 1 from his hand, the accused ran towards his house and came with ‘goraka’ and stabbed the deceased, below the abdomen and then the deceased caught hold of the tuft of the accused and there was some struggle between them till the deceased collapsed. It is thus clear that there was struggle between the accused and the deceased alter the accused stabbed the deceased. Hence we find no merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent. 9. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the learned Sessions Judge erred gravely in acquitting the accused of the offence under section 300, Indian Penal Code. We, therefore, set aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge in this regard and convict the accused under section 302, Indian Penal Code. 10. With regard to the sentence, we heard the Counsel for the respondent. The learned Counsel for the respondent urges that penalty of death cannot be imposed as the deceased and P.W. 1 demanded the accused to leave the village and live in some other village and it is this conduct of the deceased that hurted the feelings of self-respect of the accused who is a young man and who desired to live in the village with his wife. We accept this submission. In the circumstances of the case, we hold that the ends of justice would be met if the sentence of imprisonment for life is awarded. Accordingly, we convict the accused for an offence punishable under section 302, Indian Penal Code, and sentence him to undergo imprisonment for life. 11. In the result, the appeal preferred by the State is allowed.