JUDGMENT Uday Sinha, J. – This is an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing Annexures-1, 5 and 6 to this application. Annexure-1 is an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner (District Magistrate), Singhbhum dated 10.8.1976 whereby the house of the petitioners on holding No. 129, Ward No.8 within Chaibassa Municipality was requisitioned in terms of the provisions contained in section 23 (1) of the Defence of India Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Annexure-5 to this application is the complaint filed by the Deputy Collector-in-charge, Legal Section, Chaibassa, respondent No.2 dated 17.1.1976 in respect of the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioners in terms of section 28 of the Act. Annexure-6 is the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chaibassa, respondent No.3 dated 28.8.1976 by which cognizance of an offence under section 28 of the Act was taken. The order of requisition of the house in question was passed against both the petitioners. The complaint (Annexure-5) was only against petitioner No. 1 Balgovind Prasad and processes also were issued only against him. 2. It appears that Shri Ramdeo Ojba, an Executive Magistrate, respondent No. 4 was posted at Chaibassa. Inspite of the best efforts made by him to obtain rented accommodation for himself and his family, he could not get any accommodation. The District Magistrate, therefore, in exercise of the powers vested in him by section 34 (2) of the Act, requisitioned the petitioners’ house. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary to quote the relevant portions of the requisitioning order (Annexure-1) which runs thus – “To (1) Shri Balgovind Prased S/O Late Babulal Prasad. (2) Shri Mandan Prasad S/O Late Jadu Nath Prasad, of Municipal Holding No 129, Ward No.8 of Chaibassa, Municipal Area, Chaibassa. Whereas Shri Ram Deo Ojba, a senior Executive Magistrate, has joined recently at Chaibassa and his services are required by the District Administration in connection with the Maintenance of Public Order during this period of National Emergency, and. Whereas it has been represented to me that the said Shri Ram Deo Ojha, Executive Magistrate has not been provided with any Govt. Whereas it has been represented to me that the said Shri Ram Deo Ojha, Executive Magistrate has not been provided with any Govt. quarter nor could he be able to get any private building on rent up till now, and, Whereas in the aforesaid circumstances it is necessary for the purpose of securing the maintenance of the public order to requisition your house described in Schedule A below for the residential accommodation of Shri Ram Deo Ojha, Executive Magistrate, Chaibassa. xxx xxx xxx xxx Schedule ‘A’ House and premises in Holding No.1148, Plot No. 2777 in Ward No.8 of the Chaibassa Municipality, bearing municipal holding No. 129 Chaibassa Town. Forwarded to the Officer incharge, Sadar P.S. for causing service and return. Sd/- Illegible. 10.8 District Magistrate, Singhbhum” The premises in question stood on holding No. 129, Ward No.8 within Chaibassa Municipality and was used mainly by the petitioners as business godown. The requisition of the petitioners’ premises was challenged by them in this application. The main grounds on which the order has been challenged arc that the requisition of the home had no nexus with securing the maintenance of public order. It was contended that neither was there any situation which had affected the public order at Chaibassa nor was the requisition connected with any public purpose. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, respondent No. 4 Sri Ramdeo Ojba, for whom the house had been requisitioned, had been posted at Chaibassa on normal transfer. Learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, contended that the requisition was done on grounds extraneous to those mentioned in section 23 of the Act. Learned Government Pleader No.3, un the other hand, contended that the requisition of the house in question had been done for the purpose of securing the maintenance of public order and that there were sufficient materials before the District Magistrate to pass the impugned order (Annexure-1). Learned counsel for the petitioners drew our attention to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1, 2, 4 and 5. The counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondents was not sworn by the District Magistrate himself, who had passed the order of requisition, but it has been sworn by an Upper Division Assistant in the Legal Section of the Office of the Deputy Commissioner. The counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondents was not sworn by the District Magistrate himself, who had passed the order of requisition, but it has been sworn by an Upper Division Assistant in the Legal Section of the Office of the Deputy Commissioner. The facts stated in the counter-affidavit have been averred to be true to the knowledge of the deponent, who, as stated earlier, was an Upper Division Assistant. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the requisition in question had not been done for the purpose of maintenance of public order. but that it had been done for the purpose of law and order. In the counter-affidavit in paragraph 7, it has been stated that respondent No.4 Shri Ramdeo Ojba had been drafted to district headquarters. i.e. Chaibassa from Jamshedpur by the Deputy Commissioner for utilising his services for the maintenance of jaw and order. In this paragraph at places law and order has been mentioned and as well as public order. It is, therefore, necessary to quote this paragraph in extenso to ascertain the grounds which led to the requisition of the house in question. “7. That it is wrong on the fact of the petitioner to say in paragraph 11 of the writ petition that the house in question was requisitioned by the District Magistrate for some extraneous purpose. Shri ramdeo Ojha, a Senior Executive Magistrate was originally posted at Jamshedpur vide Bihar Govt. in Personal (Departments) Notification No. 503 dated 5.3.76 and he was drafted to District Headquarter by the Deputy Commissioner for utilizing his services in the maintenance of Law and Order in view of his experience in the work and posting but Shri Ojha was specially drafted to Chaibassa for the purpose mentioned in the requisition order. Deputation of Shri Ojha to any corner of the district at any moment for the purpose of maintenance of law and order may arise to deal effectively during the National Emergency and as such provision of a residence for him at the headquarters to leave his absence is a must. The order of requisition clearly mentioned that the purpose of requisition was to provide accommodation to Shri Ram Deo Ojha, Executive Magistrate, Chaibassa who had been placed in charge of maintenance of public order during the period of National Emergency. This purpose is specifically covered by sec. 23 of the D.I. Act. The order of requisition clearly mentioned that the purpose of requisition was to provide accommodation to Shri Ram Deo Ojha, Executive Magistrate, Chaibassa who had been placed in charge of maintenance of public order during the period of National Emergency. This purpose is specifically covered by sec. 23 of the D.I. Act. It is not probably within the scope of the writ proceedings to engage into an enquiry as to whether the purpose mentioned in the order is factually true or not unless of course there are facts to indicate that the action of the administration was motivated by any malafide intention. It is the subjective satisfaction of the Collector regarding existence of this situation mentioned in section 23 of the Act which authorises him to requisition a building and the issue of subjective satisfaction is probably not justifiable in a court of law. The decision to the requisition of the house is well within scope u/s 23(1) or the D.I. Act and the District Magistrate has rightly taken decision for the requisition of the house for maintenance of public order.” It will be observed that in this paragraph the position on behalf of the respondents is that Shri Ramdeo Ojha, a senior Executive Magistrate was posted originally at Jamshedpur in March, 1976. Subsequently he was drafted by the District Magistrate to Chaibassa. The drafting of his services to Chaibassa was for the maintenance of law and order. This drafting was done in view of the experience of Shri R.D. Ojha in the work of maintenance of law and order. Subsequently it has been stated that the deputation of Shri Ojha to any corner of the district for the maintenance of law and order which may arise led to the drafting of services of Shri Ojha. It has also been mentioned in that very paragraph that the order of requisition stated clearly that the house was meant to provide accommodation to Shri Ramdeo Ojha, who had been placed incharge of maintenance of Public order during the National Emergency. The entire paragraph leaves no manner of doubt in my mind that the special drafting of the services of Shri Ram Deo Ojha was in the interest of maintenance of law and order and not for securing the maintenance of public order. The entire paragraph leaves no manner of doubt in my mind that the special drafting of the services of Shri Ram Deo Ojha was in the interest of maintenance of law and order and not for securing the maintenance of public order. The mere use of the expression “maintenance of public order” in paragraph 7 in relation to the context of requisition order (Annexure-1) is not enough. There is no averment in this paragraph or in any other paragraph that the District Magistrate had considered it necessary to draft the services of Shri Ramdeo Ojha for the purpose of securing the maintenance of public order. Learned Government Pleader contended that the last sentence in paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit contained the averment that the District Magistrate had taken the decision to requisition the house for maintenance of public order. In my view, this statement is a statement on a question of law and not an assertion of fact. In my view, therefore, it is a difficult to hold that what is contained in Annexure-1 in regard to maintenance of public order was the real reason for requisitioning the house in question. 4. Learned Government Pleader stated that the satisfaction enjoined upon the District Magistrate by section 23(1) of the Act was a subjective satisfaction and if there were materials which had a nexus with object in view, the sufficiency of those materials was not justiciable by this Court. The proposition put in its bald terms is unexceptionable nor has learned counsel for the petitioners contended that if there are materials which could form the basis for the satisfaction required of the District Magistrate, the quantum of evidence required for that purpose was not open to scrutiny by this Court. Learned Government Pleader stated that Paragraph 1 of the requisition order (Annexure-1) provided the necessary materials which could from the basis for the District Magistrate to come to the satisfaction that in the Interest of maintenance of public order the house could be requisitioned. He submitted that the materials in paragraph 1 of the order were firstly that Shri Ramdeo Ojha was a senior Executive Magistrate, secondly that be had recently joined at Chaibassa and thirdly, that his services were required by the District Administration in connection with the maintenance of public order. After having given my careful consideration to the grounds mentioned in this paragraph. After having given my careful consideration to the grounds mentioned in this paragraph. I am of the view that none of these grounds are in any way connected with securing the maintenance of public order. Shri Ramdeo Ojha may be a senior Executive Magistrate-I dare say, there are a number of senior Magistrates in the State or in district of Singhbhum. Therefore, this in my, view is no ground why a building or a house should be requisitioned in the interest of maintenance of public order. The second ground mentioned in order is that he had joined recently at Chaibassa. That again is a normal process of functioning of the State or district administration. Transfers and postings are necessary for Civil servants. In that view of the matter, this ground also could not provide any basis for coming to the conclusion that provision for a house was necessary in order to secure maintenance of public order. The order also recites that the services of Shri Ojha were required by the district administration in connection with the maintenance of public order. In order to make this a ground for requisitioning a house, it has to be seen whether the public order at Chaibassa was disturbed. In the long counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents there is no, avernment that the public order at Chaibassa was disturbed at any point of time when Mr. Ojha had been drafted to Chaibassa. The mere fact that the, District Magistrate had considered it necessary to draft the services of Shri Ojha from Jameshedpur by itself cannot lead to the inference that the Public order was disturbed at Chaibassa, Some thing more was, required to be stated by the, respondents. Learned Government Pleader, therefore, only submitted that there must have been something which may have led the District Magistrate to take this extraordinary step, but the problem of problems is that what that something was has not been disclosed. I appreciate the handicap in which the learned Government Pleader was placed, but that cannot induce me to hold that the public order at Chaibasa was disturbed. I appreciate the handicap in which the learned Government Pleader was placed, but that cannot induce me to hold that the public order at Chaibasa was disturbed. If there had even been an averment in the counter-affidavit that the public order was disturbed at the relevant time, it may have been of some consequence, but in the absence of any statement in that behalf the mere declaration in Annexure-1 that the services of Shri Ojha were required in connection with the maintenance of public order can not persuade me to hold that the posting of Shri Ojha had any nexus with the maintenance of public order. 5. It is well known that “law and order” and “public order” are entirely different concepts. It was stated in Shri Amiya Kumar Karmakar v. State of West Bengal (A.I.R. 1972 Supreme Court 2259) that the concept of Public order as distinguished’ from Jaw and order and security of State must be clearly differentiated. In the words of their Lordships of the Supreme Court such differentiation was illustrated in some cases by means of three imaginary concentric circles, the narrowest of them being that relating to the security of the State, the next being that pertaining to public order, and the third, the largest, being that pertaining to law and under. I cannot do better than to quote the observations of Shelat, J. in the Supreme Court case in paragraph 6 which are as follows : “6. As to the proper connotation and the scope of the concept of public order, as distinguished from the concepts of law and order and security of State, the Act furnishes no dictionary. But these three concepts have by now been matters of discussion in several judgments of this Court wherein a clear differentiation of one from the other has been elucidated. Such differentiation was illustrated in some cases by means of three imaginary concentric circles, the narrowest of them being that relating to the security of the State, the next being that pertaining to public order, and third, the largest, being that pertaining to law and order (See Lohia v. State. (1966) 1 SCR 709 ( AIR 1966 SC 740 ). Such differentiation was illustrated in some cases by means of three imaginary concentric circles, the narrowest of them being that relating to the security of the State, the next being that pertaining to public order, and third, the largest, being that pertaining to law and order (See Lohia v. State. (1966) 1 SCR 709 ( AIR 1966 SC 740 ). In other cases, the differentiation was sought to be made on the basis of the degree of disorder affecting, in one case the community at large, and in other specify individuals, and only in a secondary sense public order, in other words, between crimes against specific individuals and crimes against the public. Such a distinction appears at first sight attractive by reason of the simplicity of its test, but on a closer examination of it fails to cover cases which are marginal and sometimes overlapping. As pointed out in Arun Ghosh v State of West Bengal, (l970) 3 SCR 288 : ( AIR 1970 SC 1228 ) the true distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Acts similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and circumstances, might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only, and therefore, touches the problem of law and order only, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself, there fore, is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from other simlar acts, but in its potentiality, that is, in its impact on society, it may be very different. On the basis of such a distinction, an attack on an educational institution, in the course of which its registers and other papers were destroyed by acts of arson, was held to fall within the area of public order although it was aimed at an Individual entity. (See Nagendra Nath Mondal v. State of West Bengal. (1972) 1 SCC 498 ; ( AIR 1972 SC 665 ). (See Nagendra Nath Mondal v. State of West Bengal. (1972) 1 SCC 498 ; ( AIR 1972 SC 665 ). The criterion thus being the potentiality of the act in question or the degree of its impact on members of the community in the locality in which the act in question is committed, examination of ground No. 2 from that angle would appear to be more appropriate.” It is not necessary to multiply decisions on question of the scope of ‘Law and order’ and ‘public order’. Suffice it to say the two concepts do not cover the same field. ‘Public order’ must previal in every civilized society and unless the usual smooth tenor of life is disturbed there can be no question of securing the maintenance of public order. Shri Ramdeo Ojha's posting at Chaibassa may well have been in the in serest of public order, but there is nothing to show that it had any nexus with the maintenance of public order. The satisfaction required of the District Magistrate was no doubt a subjective satisfaction, but it had to be based on concrete objective considerations. Those objective facts are completely wanting in the present case. If the services of Shri Ramdeo Ojha was required at Chaibasa for securing the maintenance of public order, there should have been some averment on behalf of the respondents that Government had failed to provide him with accommodation (which has been stated) and that there was no accommodation available. There is no averment that the inspection bungalows or Circuit house or any other Government building could not have been placed at the disposal of Shri Ramdeo Ojha if his services were of that importance in the interest of public order. There is no averment further that the public order continues to be disturbed at Chaibasa. If at any particular time it was disturbed, although there is no such averment, its continuance also should have been stated. If the situation is not the same, there was no reason why he could not have been sent back to Jamshedpur. Instances are not unknown where civil servants have to go from one station to another in cases of emergency leaving their families behind. The needs of family can by no stretch of imagination be said to be the needs of State or of the public. That is the private need of the officer concerned. Instances are not unknown where civil servants have to go from one station to another in cases of emergency leaving their families behind. The needs of family can by no stretch of imagination be said to be the needs of State or of the public. That is the private need of the officer concerned. In that view of the matter, I for one have failed to appreciate that providing family accommodation to Shri Ojha had any nexus with the maintenance of public order. 6. If the requisition of the house of the petitioners was not connected with the maintenance of public order, it must be accepted that it was resorted to for other considerations. If it was done on other considerations, the order of requisition has to be held to be a colourable exercise of powers by the District Magistrate. In my view, therefore, Annexure-1 has to be quashed. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged other grounds for holding that the requisition was Dot for a public purpose. He contended in this behalf that where the requisition is to be done for a public purpose, the compensation must be paid out of the public exchequer unlike the present case where Shri Ojha had to pay the rent of the house. In my view, it is not necessary to decide this aspect of the matter since I have already held that the requisition had no nexus with the object of maintenance of public order. It was also contended on behalf of the petitioners that no order had been passed in regard to payment of compensation to the petitioners which also indicated that the requisition was a colourable exercise of jurisdiction. For the reasons, stated earlier, I do not propose to decide this question as well. 8. Since I have come to the conclusion that the order of requirement (Annexure-1) was passed in colourable exercise of jurisdiction and it had no nexus with the object in view and since it bas to be quashed, the complaint and the order taking cognizance must also be quashed. If the order of the District Magistrate (Annexure-I) was without jurisdiction, there was no basis for filing of the complaint (Annexure-5) and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, respondent No. 3 had no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of petitioner No. 1. Annexures-5 and 6 also, therefore, must be quashed. 9. If the order of the District Magistrate (Annexure-I) was without jurisdiction, there was no basis for filing of the complaint (Annexure-5) and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, respondent No. 3 had no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of petitioner No. 1. Annexures-5 and 6 also, therefore, must be quashed. 9. For the reasons, stated above, the application is allowed. Annexures 1, 5 and 6 are hereby quashed. Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 will take steps for handing back possession of the house in question to the petitioners within one month from the date of receipt of the writ. There will be no order as to costs. Application allowed. C.S.S. Sinha, J : – I agree.