JUDGMENT : Yashoda Nandan, J. Two questions have been referred to this Bench for opinion by a learned single Judge of this Court in the Civil Revision which came up for hearing before him. 2. The material facts giving rise to this Civil Revision and the Reference are that the opposite party instituted a suit against the applicant for his ejectment from the shop in dispute and for recovery of a certain amount as arrears of rent. The claim was based on the allegations that the applicant was in arrears of rent for not less than four months and had failed to pay the same to the opposite party within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand and further that the applicant had sub-let the premises in suit without the permission in writing of the landlord. These pleas fell within the purview of Section 20(2)(a) and (e) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 hereinafter referred to as the Act. The suit was instituted sometime in September, 1972. It was decreed ex-parte on the 16th August, 1973, but subsequently the ex-parte decree was set aside and the suit was restored to its original number on the 8th December, 1973. On the 10th December, 1973, after restoration of the suit the court passed an order to the effect that the written-statement be filed by the 7th January, 1974 and fixed 28th February, 1974 as the date for final hearing of the suit. No written statement was filed by the applicant on the date fixed. On the 28th February, 1974 an application was made by the Defendant-applicant for extension of time for filing written-statement. The application was allowed and the 4th April, 1974 was fixed as the date for filing of the written-statement. On the 4th April, 1974 the applicant filed his written-statement and on the same date filed a tender for the amounts contemplated by Section 20(4) of the Act. The tender was passed by the court on the 23rd April, 1974 and the applicant deposited the money on the same day. Evidence was recorded on the 6th February, 1975 and since it was a suit of the nature of small causes no issues were separately framed on any particular date, except during the dictation of the judgment. The tender was passed by the court on the 23rd April, 1974 and the applicant deposited the money on the same day. Evidence was recorded on the 6th February, 1975 and since it was a suit of the nature of small causes no issues were separately framed on any particular date, except during the dictation of the judgment. The suit was resisted on the pleas that the applicant was not in arrears of rent as alleged by the Plaintiff, that he had not sub-let the premises in dispute and consequently was not liable to ejectment from the premises in dispute or for a decree for arrears of rent. The Judge, Small Cause Court, believed the Plaintiff's case and decreed the claim for the ejectment of the applicant as also for arrears of rent. Aggrieved by the order of the Judge, Small Cause Court, the applicant preferred a revision u/s 25 of the Small Cause Court Act. The revisional court took the view that the applicant was entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act and was not liable to eviction on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent. The court below, however, maintained the decree of the trial court since it upheld the finding that the applicant was liable to ejectment on the ground mentioned in Section 20(2)(e) of the Act. The applicant preferred a revision to this Court. When the revision came up for hearing before a learned single Judge of this Court, he found the finding recorded by the court below with regard to the plea of sub-letting by the Defendant unsustainable and consequently reversed that finding. The opposite-party supported the decree of the court below and contended that the view taken by the learned District Judge on the interpretation of Section 20(4) of the Act was erroneous and deserves to be reversed. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Respondent placed reliance before the learned Single Judge on the decision of K.C. Agrawal, J. in Bhola Nath v. Pyare Lal 1975 AWC 489 in support of his contention. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Respondent placed reliance before the learned Single Judge on the decision of K.C. Agrawal, J. in Bhola Nath v. Pyare Lal 1975 AWC 489 in support of his contention. The learned single Judge was not inclined to agree with the view expressed by K.C. Agrawal, J. in Bhola Nath v. Pyare Lal since in his opinion it was in conflict with the decisions of this Court in Jagannath Prasad v. Smt. Chandrawati 1969 ALJ 881, Ganesh Prasad v. Smt. Saraswati Devi 1973 ALJ 268, Kamta Prasad Jain v. Om Prakash 1966 ALJ 1108 and Mewa Ram v. Ablak 1936 ALJ 1401. The learned Single Judge also noticed a conflict of views on the question as to which is the first date of hearing of a suit within the meaning of Section 20(4) of the Act. The cases brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge have been mentioned in the Referring order. None of the cases which were cited before the learned single Judge had taken note of the Explanation introduced in Section 20(4) of the Act by the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976 (U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976) hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act. He consequently referred the following two questions for decision by a larger Bench: (1) Whether the deposit of money contemplated by Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 by tender in Court is sufficient to give the Defendant the benefit of Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act? (2) Whether the 'first hearing' of the suit, when the case is adjourned from time to time, is the date when the written statement is filed or the date on which the issues are framed or any other date?” While framing the second question apparently the learned tingle Judge had in mind the Explanation added to Section 20(4) of the Amending Act since he has specifically made a mention of it in the Referring Order. After we had heard this Reference for sometime on the questions referred, counsel for the parties agreed that since admittedly In the present case a tender for the amount contemplated by Section 20(4) of the Act was made by the Defendant-applicant on the date for filing of written statement, the question as to whether the date on which issues are framed or any other date is the date of first hearing did not arise for consideration in the case. They consequently made a joint request that the second question as referred be reframed in the following terms: Whether the explanation added by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 to Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is retrospective in its operation. We consequently have reframed the second question as above and propose to answer the question as reframed. 3. As far as the first question is concerned, in our opinion in view of Rule 275 of the General Rules (Civil), 1957, there is no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that a tender, which is in fact a credit of some kind upon the treasury, is a deposit in court made by the Defendant of the amount mentioned in Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act as it stands amended by the Amending Act. Rule 275 of the General Rules (Civil) to which a reference has been made is in the following terms: Payments of money to, or through a civil court shall be made in cash or by postal money-order or by cheques drawn on a recognised bank or by credit of some kind upon the treasury. Currency notes of any circle in the Union of India shall be received in payment of Government dues, e.g., sums payable to the Government under decrees and order, sums deposited u/s 379(1) of Act No. XXXIX of 1925 and duties and penalties paid u/s 35 of Act No. II of 1899. It shall not be obligatory to receive a currency note of any circle if it is necessary to give change. The rule equates a “credit of some kind upon the treasury” with cash, postal money-order and cheques drawn on a recognised bank. A tender drawn on the treasury or the State Bank has been put on a par with other various kinds of payments mentioned in Rule 275 as quoted above. The rule equates a “credit of some kind upon the treasury” with cash, postal money-order and cheques drawn on a recognised bank. A tender drawn on the treasury or the State Bank has been put on a par with other various kinds of payments mentioned in Rule 275 as quoted above. The fact that the court passed an order accepting the tender on a later date and the money was deposited on the same dale will make no difference and the deposit in court shall be deemed to be on the date when the tender was presented before the court. If the tender was a bona-fide one and there was no allegation or proof that the applicant was not in a position to deposit the money on the tender being passed by the court the deposit in court must be deemed to be on the date when the tender was presented in court. This is the view that has been taken by this Court in various decisions, which we shall presently advert to, though no specific mention has been made in Rule 275. 4. A Division Bench of this Court in Mt. Gomti Vs. Lachman Das Champa Ram and Another held that, According to the rule of practice which has been made with due regard to the administrative convenience of the court cash is not received by the Court, but is to be deposited in the treasury. Tender is merely an offer to the Court of payment or if it is prepared to accept the amount therein entered. If for its own convenience the Court directs the person offering payment to deposit elsewhere, the person liable to pay should be deemed to have done his part of the undertaking when he offered to pay. 5. Allsop and Ganga Nath, JJ. in Mewa Ram v. Ablak Singh 1936 ALJ 1401 held as follows: The whole question is whether it should be deemed that the money was paid in on the date when the tender was made to the court or upon the date when the actual deposit was made in the Imperial Bank. 5. Allsop and Ganga Nath, JJ. in Mewa Ram v. Ablak Singh 1936 ALJ 1401 held as follows: The whole question is whether it should be deemed that the money was paid in on the date when the tender was made to the court or upon the date when the actual deposit was made in the Imperial Bank. There is the authority of two cases of this Court, namely Bahadur Lal's case 1933 ALJ 207 and the case of Gomti v. Lachman Das Champa Ram 1934 ALJ 71 which are authorities for the proposition that a tender, if it is a valid tender, shall be evidence that the money has been deposited. The validity of the tender will depend upon the fact whether it is a real tender in the sense that the applicants are able and willing to pay in the money at the time when the tender is made. If the tender is fictitious in the sense that there is either no intention on the part of the applicants or no possibility on their part to pay the money then the tender will not be valid and will not amount to a deposit of the sum which has to be paid. 6. Again in Kamta Prasad Jain v. Om Prakash 1966 ALJ 1108, Satish Chandra, J. repelled the contention that since the Plaintiffs had the option of making the payment to the Defendants directly, they could comply with the condition within the time fixed; and they not having done so, they were not entitled to choose the other option of depositing the money in court and for that purpose rely upon the laches of the office of the court in not returning the tender to him within time. He held that, Payment can be made in several ways. It may be made by delivery of coins or currency notes or by a negotiable instrument which represents and produces cash. When payment has to be made in Court, it is, in view of the prevailing practice, made by filing a tender and delivering the money to the treasury or bank in accordance with the order passed by the court on the tender. The tender, therefore, is like a negotiable instrument, it represents and produces cash and is treated as such by courts. The tender, therefore, is like a negotiable instrument, it represents and produces cash and is treated as such by courts. Referring to certain observations made by the Supreme Court in The Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay South, Bombay Vs. Ogale Glass Works Ltd., Ogale Wadi, AIR 1954 SC 429 , the learned Judge held that, On a parity of reasonings, cash having been deposited in accordance with the directions made on the tender, the payment related back to the date of the filing of the tender, and in law the date of payment was the date when the tender was presented to the court. 7. In our judgment if the Defendant of a suit makes a tender drawn on a treasury or the State Bank before the court at the first hearing of the suit, the fact that the court postpones passing any orders thereon cannot disentitle the Defendant to the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act as it stands amended by the Amending Act because delay by the Court cannot act to the detriment of a party to the suit. 8. The decision of K.C. Agrawal, J. in Bhola Nath v. Pyare Lal (Supra) on which reliance was placed by the opposite party before the learned single Judge as well as before us has no relevance because it was decided before the coming into force of the Amending Act which substantially amended Section 20(4) of the Act. Section 20(4) of the Act as it originally stood was in the following terms: In any suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) if at the first hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally pays or tenders to the landlord the entire amount or rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and the landlord's costs of the suit in respect thereof, after deducting therefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under Sub-section (1) of Section 30, the Court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground: Provided that :- 9. The Amending Act came into force on the 5th July, 1976. The Amending Act came into force on the 5th July, 1976. Section 13 of the Amending Act, as far as relevant for our purpose, runs as follows: Amendment of Section 20 - In Section 20 of the Principal Act- (a).... (b) in Sub-section (4)- (i) for the words “tenders to the landlord”, the words “tenders to the landlord or deposits in Court” shall be substituted and be deemed always to have been substituted. (ii) at the end, the following Explanation shall be inserted, namely- Explanation- For the purposes of this Sub-section- (a) the expression 'first hearing' means the first date for any step or proceeding mentioned in the summons served on the defendent; (b) the expression 'cost of the suit' includes one-half of the amount of counsel's fee taxable for a contested suit;... The judgment in Bhola Nath v. Pyare Lal (supra) was rendered on the 25th April, 1975 before the Amending Act had come into force and consequently the tenant in this decision had no option of making a deposit in court as was available to the applicant in the instant case. On the law as it stood at the time when Bhola Nath v. Pyare Lal was decided, the view taken by K.C. Agrawal, J. cannot be taken exception to. 10. As far as the second question as reframed by us is concerned, it may be profitably noticed that Section 20(4) does not use the words “date of first hearing”. On the other hand, it provides for the tenant being relieved of the liability for eviction if he deposits the requisite amount mentioned in that sub-section “at the first hearing of the suit.” This leads, in our opinion, to the inevitable conclusion that if on a date fixed for hearing of a suit no hearing has in fact taken place and the case is adjourned for one reason or the other, the failure of the Defendant to deposit the amount on that date does not disentitle him to the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act as it stands amended. Observations to the same effect have been made by M.N. Shukla, J. sitting at Lucknow Bench in Balmukund Agrawal v. District Judge, Rae Bareilly Misc. case No. 8 of 1974 decided on 23rd December, 1976 since reported In 1977 AWC 225 at wherein he has observed that, (at page 228 col. Observations to the same effect have been made by M.N. Shukla, J. sitting at Lucknow Bench in Balmukund Agrawal v. District Judge, Rae Bareilly Misc. case No. 8 of 1974 decided on 23rd December, 1976 since reported In 1977 AWC 225 at wherein he has observed that, (at page 228 col. 2): In this context I would also like to say that mere fixing of a date for framing of issues does not make it a date of first hearing. If on the date fixed, the case is adjourned for one reason or the other such as when the Presiding Officer himself is absent and no issues are actually struck then it would not be the date of first hearing. It is only when the pleadings of the parties are actually gone into by the court and it has applied its mind to the case of the parties and issues are actually framed that the date of first hearing can be said to have been reached and not otherwise. In our judgment, the Explanation added to Section 20(4) of the Act by the Amending Act does not have retrospective effect and can have no impact in a situation where a suit had commenced prior to the coming into force of the amending Act and the first hearing had already taken place. 11. Learned Counsel for the opposite party contended that the Explanation is merely explanatory in character and must consequently be considered as being retrospective in operation. Learned Counsel for the applicant countered this contention by submitting that an examination of the various provisions of the Amending Act leaves no room for doubt that the legislature never intended the Explanation added to the Amending Act having retrospective effect and being applied to a case in which the first hearing had already taken place before the coming into force of the Amending Act. The legislative practice adopted by the legislature while enacting the Amending Act can certainly be looked into for finding out the intention of the legislature in respect of the retrospectively or otherwise, of the Explanation. The legislative practice adopted by the legislature while enacting the Amending Act can certainly be looked into for finding out the intention of the legislature in respect of the retrospectively or otherwise, of the Explanation. It is significant that while introducing an amendment to Section 20(4) of the Act by substituting the words “tenders to the landlord or deposits in Court” for the words “tenders to the landlord” the legislature makes the amendment retrospective by specifically providing that the newly added words “shall be substituted and be deemed always to have been substituted” it employs no such device while providing for addition of the Explanation, though it has been introduced as part of the same sub-section of Section 20. This is indicative of an intention on the part of the legislature to impart retrospective to a part of the amendment while keeping the other part prospective. An examination of the various provisions of the Amending Act shows that where the legislature desired to give restrospective effect to any Explanation added to any existing provision in the Act, it has made its intention clear by explicitly so providing. To take an example, Section 4 of the Amending Act provides that, In Section 3 of the Principal Act. (i) in Clause (a), the following Explanation shall be inserted, and be deemed always to have been inserted, namely: .... Thus Section 4 of the Amending Act explicitly makes the Explanation added to Clause (a) of Section 3 retrospective in its operation. On the other hand, Section 10 of the Amending Act which adds an Explanation to Section 17(2) of the Act does not provide that the Explanation shall be deemed always to have been inserted as has been provided for by Section 4 of the Amending Act which has been referred to earlier. We again find Section 14 of the Amending Act which amended Section 21 of the Act providing in Clause (c) that, in the Explanation thereto- (1) in Clause (i), after the words “any member of his family”, the words and brackets “(who has been normally residing with or is wholly dependent on him)” shall be inserted and be deemed always to have been inserted, and at the end, the following note shall be inserted, namely- .... This provision again while amending the Explanation already existing in Section 21 of the Act specifically provided that the words inserted shall be deemed always to have been inserted, thus giving retrospective effect to the amendment. Taking into account the legislative practice adopted in the Amending Act we see no reason to hold that the Explanation added to Section 20(4) by the Amending Act has any retrospective operation. 12. The contention that the Explanation is declaratory in character and consequently must be given retrospective effect is, in our opinion, unsound. The preamble of the amending Act is as follows: An Act further to amend the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 and the Uttar Pradesh Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupations) Act, 1972. The preamble does not disclose that the Act is a declaratory or explanatory Act as such. It purports to be merely an Amending Act, and, as already noticed, wherever any provision of the Amending Act was intended to be retrospective the legislature has in an unambiguous terms stated so. It has been stated by Crates on Statute Law, Fifth Edition, pp. 56-57 that. For modern purposes a declaratory Act may be defined as an Act to remove doubts existing as to the common law, or the meaning or effect of any statute. Such Acts are usually held to be retrospective. The usual reason for passing a declaratory Act is to set aside what Parliament deems to have been a judicial error, whether in the statement of the common law or in the interpretation of statutes. Usually, if not invariably, such an Act contains a preamble, and also the word 'declared' as well as the word 'enacted'. This passage has been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in The Central Bank of India Vs. Their Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 12 . Therein the Court went on to observe that, A remedial Act, on the contrary is not necessarily retrospective; it may be either enlarging or restraining and it takes effect prospectively, unless it has retrospective effect by express terms or necessary intendment. As already noticed the preamble of the Amending Act does not use the words “declared and enacted”. Therein the Court went on to observe that, A remedial Act, on the contrary is not necessarily retrospective; it may be either enlarging or restraining and it takes effect prospectively, unless it has retrospective effect by express terms or necessary intendment. As already noticed the preamble of the Amending Act does not use the words “declared and enacted”. Like any other remedial Act as would appear from the various sections of the Amending Act mentioned in an earlier part of this judgment, wherever the legislature intended to give it retrospective effect to any amending provision, it has done so in express terms. A similar view was taken by Satish Chandra, J. in Nyota Ram v. Kartar Singh Civil Revision No. 2037 of 1976 decided on 18th April, 1977 wherein it was held that the Explanation added to Section 20(4) by the Amending Act is not retrospective and the amendment is merely remedial in character. 13. There seems to be consensus of judicial opinion that the date for filing written-statement is not a date for hearing. We would mention here only two decisions of this Court. In Smt. Jaggi v. Bhagwan Das 1969 AWR 834 while construing Rule 1 of Order 8 Code of Civil Procedure, K.B. Asthana, J. (as he then was) held that. Rule 1 of Order 8 itself distinguishes between the date of hearing in the suit and the date of filing of the written statement. The Phraseology of Rule 1 of Order 8 itself militates against this argument. The date of filing of the written-statement cannot be confused with the date of hearing of the suit. 14. Rule 5 added to Order XV of the CPC by Act No. 37 of 1972 provides that, (5) Striking off defence on non-deposit of admitted rent, etc. The Phraseology of Rule 1 of Order 8 itself militates against this argument. The date of filing of the written-statement cannot be confused with the date of hearing of the suit. 14. Rule 5 added to Order XV of the CPC by Act No. 37 of 1972 provides that, (5) Striking off defence on non-deposit of admitted rent, etc. - In any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee from any immovable property after the determination of his lease, and for the recovery from him of rent in respect of the period of occupation thereof during the continuance of the lease, or of compensation for the use or occupation thereof, whether instituted before or after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972, the Defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, (or in the case of a suit instituted before the commencement of the said Act, the first hearing after such commencement) deposit the entire amount of rent, or compensation for use and occupation, admitted by him to be due, and thereafter throughout the continuance of the suit, deposit regularly the amount of monthly rent, or compensation for use and occupation, due at the rate admitted by him, and in the event of any default In this regard, the court may unless after considering any representation made by him in that behalf it allows him further time on security being furnished for the amount, refuse to entertain any defence or, as the case may be, strike-off his defence.... While discussing the scope of this rule a Division Bench of this Court consisting of G.C. Mathur and K.N. Seth, JJ. in Ladly Prasad Vs. Ram Shah Billa and Others, AIR 1976 All 261 held as follows: Order XV relates to disposal of suit at the first hearing. This stage is arrived after the Defendant has filed his written statement, the parties have been examined under Order X, if considered necessary, to clarify the points in controversy, documents on which parties rely have been produced and-admission and denial obtained; and necessary issues framed as provided under Order XIV. After the framing of the issues the case is ready for hearing. This is the stage when Rule 5 of Order XV comes into play. This is anterior to the stage when the parties examine their witnesses. After the framing of the issues the case is ready for hearing. This is the stage when Rule 5 of Order XV comes into play. This is anterior to the stage when the parties examine their witnesses. At the stage of Rule 5 of Order XV the court is not required to record finding on disputed questions of fact which can be done only after the parties have led evidence in support of their conflicting claims. It is conceivable that the date of filing written statement may also be the date of the hearing but that will be so only because the summons issued to the Defendant fixing the date for filing written statement discloses that it is also the date for hearing. In such a case the date becomes the date for hearing not because It is the date for filing the written statement but because it is also the date fixed for hearing. 15. In the present case no such situation arises because 4th April, 1974 when the tender was made by the applicant in court was only the date for filing written statement and nothing further was to be done. Before the coming into force of the Amending Act, the tenant applicant was at liberty to deposit the amount contemplated by Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act at the hearing of the suit. There could be no hearing, in our view, on the date merely fixed for filing written statement. As a result of the Explanation alone, the date for filing written statement becomes a date for hearing by legal fiction. This legal fiction, in our opinion, as already stated has no impact on the suit giving rise to the present revision. 16. Our answer to question No. 1 as referred by the learned single Judge is in the affirmative and our answer to question No. 2 as reframed by us is in the negative. 17. Our opinion shall be placed before the learned single Judge along with the revision.