Judgment :- 1. The question which arises for decision in this writ appeal is whether an appeal preferred by the Manager, Aravukad High School, against Ext. P2 order, refusing to approve the appointment of the 3rd respondent in the writ petition, was preferred in time as required by Chapter XIV [A] R.8 sub-rule [6] of the Kerala Education Rules. The appeal was not entertained by the educational authorities on the ground that it was out of time. The learned judge in the writ-petition preferred jointly by the Manager and by an aggrieved teacher of the institution, took the view that the appeal had been preferred within time. He therefore allowed the writ petition and quashed Ext. P2 order and directed the authority concerned to deal with the appeal on the merits and to dispose of it in accordance with law. The 3rd respondent in the writ petition has filed this appeal. (2) Chapter XIV[A] R.8 sub-rules [5] and [6] may conveniently be quoted: [S] an appeal shall lie against the order declining approval of appointment issued by the Assistant Educational Officer or the District Educational Officer to the District Educational Officer or the Regional Deputy Director as the ease may be. The decision of the appellate authority shall be final. [6] No appeal shall be entertained unless it is preferred within 15 days from the date of receipt of the order appealed against. It is common ground that the last date for filing the appeal was 20-11-1974; that the appeal was despatched through post by the Manager on 19-11-19 4. and that for some reason it took a longer time than usual for transmission, and reached the Regional Deputy Director of Public Instruction only on 21-11-1974, that is, one day beyond the last date for filing the appeal. The question, in the circumstances, is whether the appeal can be said to have been "preferred" within the time as required by the above rules. It will be noticed that sub-rule [6] contains an embargo against the entertainment of an appeal unless "preferred" within the 15 days contemplated by the Rules. What is the meaning of the expression "preferred" occurring in the Rule? It will be noticed that sub-rule [6] contains an embargo against the entertainment of an appeal unless "preferred" within the 15 days contemplated by the Rules. What is the meaning of the expression "preferred" occurring in the Rule? The learned judge took the view, on an analysis of certain cases, that the expression would mean and comprehend a case of transmission by post of an appeal, sufficiently early, so as to reach its destination ordinarily and normally before the expiry of the period prescribed by the Rule; and if, for reasons, and under circumstances, not within the control of the party, it did not reach the destination is time and the party was not at fault, the appeal is not beyond time, but should be regarded as having been 'preferred" as contemplated by the Rule. The learned judge has relied on certain decisions relating to tender notifications in another branch of the law. With respect, we have spared ourselves the need to examine these decisions in detail. We feel, having regard to the scope and the object of the Rule, that the matter essentially depends upon the meaning to be attributed to the expression 'preferred'. The learned judge has himself noticed that one of the shades of meaning given to the expression was: 'received' or 'to lay a matter before any one formally for consideration, approval or sanction'; 'to bring forward, present, submit (a statement, bill, indictment, information, prayer, etc); or to place or set before any one for acceptance'. These being the well-understood meanings of the term, we are of the opinion that the principle of the decision noticed by the learned judge in Narian Ram Chandra Kalkar v. Union of India (1961 All. Q. 983) is more appropriate to the context and to the circumstances, than the other decisions which the learned judge has noticed, namely, Chathurbhuj Ram Lal v. Secretary of State for India (AIR. 1927 All. 215), Union of Indian. Asharfit Devi (AIR. 1957 M. P. 114), and Joseph Varghese v. Annamma (171 (1) Kerala 495). It appears to us, that we shall be treading on dangerous ground if we are to invoke the principles of contract law and the rules regarding the construction of tenders in this sphere. 1927 All. 215), Union of Indian. Asharfit Devi (AIR. 1957 M. P. 114), and Joseph Varghese v. Annamma (171 (1) Kerala 495). It appears to us, that we shall be treading on dangerous ground if we are to invoke the principles of contract law and the rules regarding the construction of tenders in this sphere. Once we accept the principle that putting the appeal in the course of transmission by post within a period of time that should normally take it to its destination before the last date specified in the Rule, will amount to a'preferring' of the appeal, we feel we are bound to land ourselves in difficulties and complications. When, for reasons beyond the control of either party the appeal is lost in course of transit or otherwise delayed, or does not reach its destination, on what basis is the appeal to be regarded as filed, and how is it to be dealt with? How do we conclude that despite the appeal not having reached its destination it should be regarded as having been preferred' as contemplated by the Rule? How is such an appeal to be dealt with? In conceivable situations, there must, in appropriate cases, be grounds for excusing delay in preferring the appeal, if there be power to do so; but not, to regard the appeal as having been preferred within the time. We are of the opinion that the view taken by the learned judge that the appeal against Ext. P2 order which was rejected by Ext. P5 must be regarded as having been "preferred" within time, cannot be sustained. We allow the appeal and set aside the order of the learned judge. 3. Counsel for respondents 1 and 2 (who were the writ-petitioners before the learned judge) contended that while the view that we take may entail a dismissal of the writ-petition, in so far as it relates to the Manager, the writ-petition is still maintainable at the instance of the teacher, and his writ petition to quash Ext. P2 order should be beard and disposed of on the merits. We are unable to appreciate or to accept this contention. Chapter XIV(A) R.8 sub-rule (6) draws no distinction between the right of the Manager to prefer an appeal and of a teacher to do so. The right of appeal is available to both, against the order Ext. P2 order should be beard and disposed of on the merits. We are unable to appreciate or to accept this contention. Chapter XIV(A) R.8 sub-rule (6) draws no distinction between the right of the Manager to prefer an appeal and of a teacher to do so. The right of appeal is available to both, against the order Ext. P2 which falls within the purview of the Rule. Ext. P3 being such an appeal, both the Manager and the teacher had a right of appeal. The one had exercised it, but not within time and therefore his writ petition to challenge it is not maintainable and cannot be entertained. The other, namely, the teacher, had not at all exercised the statutory remedy of appeal, and without exercising the same, we see no ground bow he can be on a better footing than the former; and how the writ petition at his instance should be heard and disposed of on the merits. 4. While allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the learned judge, we direct that O.P. No. 1586 of 1975 will stand dismissed. We make no order as to costs. Allowed.