JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, M. - This is a reference made by Sri G.P. Pandey, Commissioner, Faizabad Division, Faizabad, recommending that the revision filed by Dharmraj against the order dated January 22, 1972 passed by the Judicial Officer (Revenue, Gonda) in case Dharmraj v. Sukhraj and others under section 229-B/209, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act may be rejected. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. The division is directed against the order of the Judicial Officer dated May 17, 1972 allowing the application of Ram Lakhan and Ram Ujagir sons of Sukhraj deceased for substitution in his place in appending litigation to which Dharamraj the revisionist as well as Sukhraj were parties. It would appear that a compromise between the parties is alleged to have been entered into and the trial court had ordered, for a decree to be issued in terms of the compromise. But the alleged compromise is missing from the file, and the opinion of the Finger print expert which had been obtained to ascertain whether the finger print was of Sukhraj or some one else, is also missing. On July 16, 1960 an application was moved before the trial court on behalf of Sukhraj that the compromise was fraud practised upon the court that he has not entered into any compromise and that he did not even appear before the court. The trial court held that it was a fit case under section 151, Civil Procedure Code that the wrong done by fraud practised upon the court should be set aside and the case should be heard on merits. 4. The grounds taken in the revision are firstly that the compromise decree was passed on the basis of settlement between the parties which was presented before the court and was duly verified by them secondly, that the application for setting aside the compromise decree had been filed much beyond the prescribed period of limitation thirdly that the judgment and decree passed in the case can only be set aside by regular suit, fourthly that the trial court had no jurisdiction to sit upon judgment against its own orders, and fifthly that the trial court had wrongly assumed jurisdiction under section 151, Civil Procedure Code. 5. 5. Had the alleged compromise been put up before this court before the learned Commissioner or even before the trial court when the application under section 151, Civil Procedure Code was moved it would have been possible to say that the compromise was a lawful settlement and the compromise decree was final. However it is strange that the alleged compromise is now missing. Further the report of the finger print expert is now missing. This lends credence to the allegation that the alleged compromise was a fraud practised upon the court and that some person other than the real Sukhraj was produced before the court at the time of the alleged compromise. 6. The learned counsel for the revisionist has referred to three decisions regarding the scope of section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The first is Ram Yagya v. Jagannath Prasad AIR 1965 Allahabad 64. In this case the following observations have been made: "If there is a clear provision in the Civil Procedure Code itself and a particular case falls fairly and squarely within such provision than it will not be possible to invoke the inherent powers under Section 151 merely to get over the bar of limitation. Order XLI, Rule 19 in a provision within which the present case clearly fell inasmuch as it was an application for the setting aside order dismissing an appeal for default. On the ground of sufficient cause. Sufficient cause was found to exist but the application itself was found to have been filed beyond the period of limitation. In such circumstances can it be said that there is no provision in the Civil Procedure Code to remedy the wrong and therefore in the interests of justice resort must be had to section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is undoubtedly a hard case but it is impossible to say that no remedy is provided by the Civil Procedure Code itself when Legislature in its wisdom has provided a period of limitation whatsoever for pressing into service the inherent powers of the Court in order to get over the bar of limitation". 7. It is undoubtedly a hard case but it is impossible to say that no remedy is provided by the Civil Procedure Code itself when Legislature in its wisdom has provided a period of limitation whatsoever for pressing into service the inherent powers of the Court in order to get over the bar of limitation". 7. The next case is Hukam Chand v. Sukhbir 1968 R.D. 15 in which a learned Member has held that if a compromise filed under Order 23, Rule 3 is challenged on the ground of fraud, the remedy lies only by a regular suit to set the proceedings aside. 8. The third decision is Shanker v. Bhulot 1970 R.D. 323 in which another learned member has similarly held that the trial court had on jurisdiction to set aside a decree either under section 151, Civil Procedure Code or in the continuation of proceedings under Order 23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code. 9. The learned counsel for the opposite party has referred to Dina v. Majid Khan 1957 R.D. 9 in which R.N. Singh and S.N. Mitra have taken the view that if a fraud was committed on the court the decree passed is liable to be set aside under Section 151. Civil Procedure Code. 10. Likewise in Kauleshar v. Ajodhya 1957 R.D. 275 A.N. Sapru and S.H. Zahur have also held that where fraud is committed upon the court itself, the court may use its inherent powers under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code to set aside a previous decree on the ground that it was obtained fraudulently. 11. Though there seems to be some divergence of opinion on this point the correct legal position to my mind, is that where fraud is practised upon the court and consequently a fraudulent decree is obtained, the court has not only the jurisdiction under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure but also the duty cast upon it to undo the fraud. The aim of the court is to further the ends of justice and not to let injustice prevail. No period of limitation is provided for exercise of powers under section 151, Civil Procedure Code. 12. This the trial court has not committed any error illegality or material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction in proceeding under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code or in allowing the substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased. 13. No period of limitation is provided for exercise of powers under section 151, Civil Procedure Code. 12. This the trial court has not committed any error illegality or material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction in proceeding under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code or in allowing the substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased. 13. Agreeing with the recommendation made by the learned Commissioner, I hereby dismiss the revision.