JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, M. - This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree dated December 31, 1973 passed by the Addl. Commissioner, Faizabad Division in Appeal No. 2031 Sultanpur reversing the order dated February 1, 1973 passed by the Assistant Collector, First Class, Amethi in case No. 27/177 of 1970 under sections 229/209 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. The appellants, Ram Anjore, Ram Kripal and Ram Anjore had filed a suit seeking declaration of their rights and the ejectment of the defendant-respondents Nos. 1 and 2 Haushila Prasad and Bindadin as trespassers. The trial court decreed the suit. Haushila Prasad and Bindadin filed an appeal which was allowed by the lower appellate court and the case was remanded to the trial court for retrial. The second appeal has been filed against this order of the lower appellate court. 4. The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the lower appellate court has mis-interpreted Sections 61, 62, 64 and 65 of the Evidence Act and provisions contained under Order VI, Rules 2, 3 and 4, Civil Procedure Code. According to the learned counsel, no objection was raised in the trial court regarding admissibility of the sale executed in favour of the plaintiff, and the objection as to admissibility could not be raised for the first time before the lower appellate court. Further, the trial court had recorded a finding that the original sale deed had been lost and, therefore, it admitted the secondary evidence as to the existence and contents of the document as required under the law, and the lower appellate court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the discretion exercised by the trial court on the point of admissibility of the sale deed. 5. The learned counsel for the respondents has, on the other hand contended that the secondary evidence of the sale deed would not be admissible unless primary evidence is proved to have been lost or destroyed. 6. Section 64 of the Evidence Act reads as follows: "64. Proof of documents by primary evidence. Documents must be proved by primary evidence, except in the cases hereinafter mentioned." 7. Section 65 of the Evidence Act reads as follows: "65. 6. Section 64 of the Evidence Act reads as follows: "64. Proof of documents by primary evidence. Documents must be proved by primary evidence, except in the cases hereinafter mentioned." 7. Section 65 of the Evidence Act reads as follows: "65. Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given-Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document in the following cases: (a) When the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power- of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the court, or of any person legally bound to produce it, and when after the notice mentioned in Section 66, such person does not produce it; (b) When the existence condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative in interest; (c) When the original has been destroyed, or lost or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default of neglect produce it in reasonable time. (d) When the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable; (e) When the original is a public document within the meaning of Section 74; (f) When the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in India, to be given in evidence; (g) When the originals consist of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot conveniently be examined in court and the fact to be proved is the general result of the whole collection. In cases (a), (c) and (d), any secondary evidence of the contents of the document is admissible. In case (b), the written admission is admissible. In case (e) or (f) a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence is admissible. In case (g), evidence may be given as to the general result of the documents by any person who has explained them, and who is skilled in the examination of such documents. 8. In case (e) or (f) a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence is admissible. In case (g), evidence may be given as to the general result of the documents by any person who has explained them, and who is skilled in the examination of such documents. 8. This matter has been discussed by the Privy Council in M. Ihtisham Ali v. Jamna Prasad 1927 Privy Council 56, in which their Lordships held that the evidence of a witness, who deposes to the loss of a deed which should be in his custody, is sufficient to allow secondary evidence. 9. In Pandappa v. Shivalingappa A.I.R. 1946 Bom. 193, the following observations have been made: "As held in 19 I.A.R. 79 and 5 Bombay L.R. 708 the discretion exercised by the trial court in admitting secondary evidence on the ground that the original is lost should not be interfered with in appeal. But it is urged that the certified copy should not have been exhibited without proof of its execution. From the application and the Roznama it appears that the trial court exhibited it under Section 90, Evidence Act, on the ground that it was more than 30 years old. In the lower appellate court the admissibility of the document does not appear to have challenged. It is urged that as held in 44 Bom. 192 the erroneous omission before the lower courts to object to the admission of evidence does not make that evidence relevant. The principle of that ruling, however, applies only where the document is per se irrelevant or inadmissible and no objection was taken to its admissibility; 8 Pat. 783. Where evidence is admitted in the trial court without any objection to its reception, and the evidence is admissible and relevant, then no objection will be allowed to be taken to its reception at any stage of the litigation on the ground of improper proof." "By parity of reasoning the certified copy of the mortgage-deed in this case also is admissible in evidence, as it bears the requisite endorsement of the Sub-Registrar regarding the admission of its execution by the executant. It is true that the decision of the Privy Council is subsequent to the case in 55 Bom. 103. But there is no conflict between them. It is true that the decision of the Privy Council is subsequent to the case in 55 Bom. 103. But there is no conflict between them. The document which the Privy Council was dealing with had not been registered, and all that the ruling lay down is that there can be no presumption under section 90 Evidence Act, when only a certified copy of a document is produced and therefore, the execution of the original has to be proved, whereas ruling in 55 Bom. 103 lays down that such proof can be afforded by the Sub-Registrar's endorsement appearing on the certified copy." 10. In Sangita Bapuji v. Ambabai A.I.R. 1953 Nag. 266 the following observations have been made: "It has been held in a series of cases that where copies of documents are admitted in the Court of first instance without objection, no objection to their admissibility can afterwards be taken in a court of appeal. The admission of secondary evidence without proof of loss of original is not worse than an irregularity and an appellate court cannot treat it as a ground for reversing the decree or remanding the case. The contention regarding admissibility of secondary evidence falls." 11. Further in Ajjarapu Subba Rao v. Pulla Venkata Rama Rao A.I.R. 1964 A.P. 53 the following observations have been made: "Now, one legal aspect deserves to be pointed out at some length. The learned Single Judge has, in respect of the majority of documents mentioned above, stated that they are inadmissible on account of the provisions of Section 65 of the Evidence Act. This view does not appear to us to be tenable. The rule in Section 65 excluding secondary evidence is not so rigid as to be enforced even if no objection was taken at the trial by the party against whom the secondary evidence was offered. When a party has waived proof of circumstances justifying the giving of secondary evidence, he cannot raise the objection in appeal, vide Bacharbhai v. Mohanlal A.I.R. 1956 Bom. 196. A document can be treated as duly admitted where its admission without being proved is not objected to by the party affected, vide Latchayya Subuli v. Seetharamayya 84 Ind. Cas. 921=A.I.R. 1925 Md. 257. 196. A document can be treated as duly admitted where its admission without being proved is not objected to by the party affected, vide Latchayya Subuli v. Seetharamayya 84 Ind. Cas. 921=A.I.R. 1925 Md. 257. Where the objection to be taken is not that the document is in itself inadmissible, but that the mode of proof out forward is irregular or insufficient, it is essential that the objection should be taken at the trial before it is marked as exhibit and admitted. A party cannot lie by until the case comes in appeal. A strictly formal proof might have been forthcoming had it been insisted on at the trial. The question of proof of a document is a question of procedure and can be waived. On the other hand, questions of relevancy of documents are questions of law and can be raised at the appellate stage as well. There was thus no justification for the learned Judge to have rejected the documents on the mere ground that they are certified copies and not the originals when, as a matter of fact, no such objection was ever taken in the trial court or even in the memorandum of appeal before the learned Judge. 12. Thus, the legal position that emerges is that where a registered sale deed cannot be produced in original because of its being destroyed or lost, secondary evidence of the existence, condition and contents of the sale deed is admissible. In the present case, the sale deed dated September 25, 1969 said to be executed by Srimati Indrani, sole Bhumidhar of the land in suit, was duly registered and a copy certified by the Sub-Registrar had been filed. The trial courts has rightly held the secondary evidence to be admissible and has relied upon its contents. The learned Additional Commissioner has erred in law in setting aside the trial court's order and remanding the case to the trial court for recording a finding about the loss of the original sale deed and thereafter considering the oral evidence of the execution of the sale deed by Srimati Indrani. Further, no objection about the admissibility of the certified copy of the sale deed being taken before the trial court, this objection could no longer be taken in the appellate court. 13. Further, no objection about the admissibility of the certified copy of the sale deed being taken before the trial court, this objection could no longer be taken in the appellate court. 13. Since the learned Additional Commissioner has not considered the first appeal on merits at all but has allowed it on an erroneous view of sections 64 and 65 of the Evidence Act. I hereby allow the second appeal and so aside the impugned order of the learned Additional Commissioner. The learned Additional Commissioner shall now proceed to hear and decide the first appeal on merits after giving notice to the parties.