Short Note : 1. The defendants contested the suit by alleging that they were shikmis of the deceased Gourishankar and not cultivating in partnership and as such by virtue of section 166 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1954 they had become ordinary tenants of the plaintiff and after coming into force of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 they had become occupancy tenants under section 185 (c) of the said Code, and subsequently they became Bhumiswamis. Held : The lower appellate Court duly posed points for consideration in terms of the directions from this Court and ultimately came to the conclusion on the basis of the evidence on record that the defendants were only cultivating the suit land in partnership with plaintiff and they did not acquire any status of ordinary tenants under section 166 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1954. 2. Then the finding was tried to be attacked by another way on the part of the learned counsel appealing for the defendants that the defendants having remained in possession of the suit land after coming into force of M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 they would be deemed to be lessees under clauses (a) or (b) of the Explanation appended to section 168 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 and there could be no presumption that they continued as partners. Clauses (a) and (b) both deal with the same term lease but in different set of facts which go to constitute a lease. Under clause (a) two conditions must exist to constitute a lease. There must be transfer of a right to enjoy land for a certain period in consideration of a price paid or promised or of money or any other thing of value to be given periodically and secondly acceptance of transfer by the transferee on anyone of such terms. It would suffice to mention here that the defendants did not plead their case in their written statements on this basis. On the other hand their case was of 'shikmi' and then becoming ordinary tenants of the plaintiff as they held the land after the year 1959. Thus what is now being tried to be urged is wholly without any pleadings and entirely a new case on the basis of a lease, which cannot be permitted to be urged at this stage for the first time. Thus what is now being tried to be urged is wholly without any pleadings and entirely a new case on the basis of a lease, which cannot be permitted to be urged at this stage for the first time. Learned counsel for the defendants also tried to bring the case of the defendants under clause (b) but the evidence in the instant case lacks proof that the defendants cultivated the suit land with their bullocks or procured ones by them. The finding of the lower appellate Court in that regard is that the defendants had been cultivating with the bullocks of the plaintiff and that finding would be binding in second appeal being finding of fact. As such even provisions of clause (b) are not attracted. That being so the submission of the basis of lease stands rejected. 3. Lastly, it was also contended that the present suit could not lie on the part of the respondents unless there had been dissolution of the partnership. Even this contention fails as objection was not taken at any stage below. It was only here that the point has been raised for the first time Such a point cannot be decided in this Court Without plaintiff having opportunity in this regard also by pleading on the pan of the defendants and framing of the issue whether there had been dissolution of the partnership or not and allowing the parties to examine their respective evidence on the said issue. If the defendants wanted to raise a controversy on that basis they could have done so earlier but not after a lapse of nearly 15 years of the filing of the suit. Appeal dismissed.