JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, M. - This is a revision against the order dated May 31, 1974 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Faizabad Division in Appeal No. 799 of 1972 of Faizabad, reversing the order dated October 27, 1970 passed by the Judicial Officer (Revenue), Akbarpur, district Faizabad in suit No. 707/18 under Section 229-B, U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the revisionist and have gone through the record. The opposite parties have not appeared to contest the revision in spite of due service. 3. The facts may be stated here. Kamta Prasad had instituted a suit on October 9, 1969 against Bhagwat and other for declaration of his Sirdari Rights in certain plots. Bhagwat filed his written statement on January 24, 1970. On May 5, 1970 Bhagwat was absent in spite of having been duly served and having been present on the earlier dates and the trial court ordered to proceed ex parte against him. ON the subsequent dates June 15. 1970. August 21, 1970 and September 10, 1970 only the plaintiff appeared. The Gaon Sabha and the State of U.P. did not appear in spite of due service. On September 10, 1970 the trial court after recording the evidence of the plaintiff decreed the suit ex parte. On November 30, 1970 Bhagwat moved an application for setting aside the ex parte decree. On October 27, 1971 the trial court rejected this application on the ground that the application has not been moved in time and sufficient cause has also not been shown. Bhagwat went up in appeal and the Additional Commissioner by his order dated May 31, 1974 set aside the ex parte decree and restored the suit to its original number. Kamta Prasad has now come up in revision before this court. 4. Bhagwat went up in appeal and the Additional Commissioner by his order dated May 31, 1974 set aside the ex parte decree and restored the suit to its original number. Kamta Prasad has now come up in revision before this court. 4. The learned counsel for the revisionist has contended that the lower appellate court has misinterpreted Article 123 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act and order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the limitation provided for setting aside an ex parte decree is thirty days from the date of decree where the summons had been served and the defendant had himself appeared and filed a written statement, and thus the application moved for setting aside the ex parte decree was beyond the time prescribed that the lower appellate court has failed to record any finding as to when the applicant had come to know of the ex parte decree and has lost sight of the fact that day to day delay has not been explained, and therefore, the finding of the lower appellate court is arbitrary. 5. A perusal of the trial courts record leaves no doubt at all that Bhagwat had been duly served with the summons. He had thereafter engage two counsels. Sri Rudrabhan Lal, Vakil and Surendra Kumar Tewari, Advocate and had filed his written statement on January 24, 1970. The order-sheets of the trial court show that on January 24, 1970, March 2, 1970 and April 2, 1970 the plaintiff as well as the defendant Bhagwat and his counsel were present in the case and on April 2, 1970 the case was adjourned to May 5, 1970. On May 5, 1970 Bhagwat was not present and thereafter he did not appear on any subsequent dates. Article 123 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act clearly provides that in such a case the period of limitation for moving an application for setting aside the ex parte decree is thirty days from the date of the decree. The ex parte decree having been passed on September 10, 1970. The period of limitation expired on October 10, 1970. Thus, the application moved by Bhagwat on November 30, 1970 was clearly beyond time. The ex parte decree having been passed on September 10, 1970. The period of limitation expired on October 10, 1970. Thus, the application moved by Bhagwat on November 30, 1970 was clearly beyond time. Further, the application does not disclose any sufficient cause either for the absence of Bhagwat in the trial court on May 5, 1970, June 15, 1970, August 21, 1970 and September 10, 1970, August 21, 1970 and September 10, 1970 or for condonation of delay in filing the application for setting aside the ex parte decree. The learned Additional Commissioner has gone astray in arguing that Bhagwat had no knowledge of the fact that the case was decreed ex parte on September 10, 1970 and, therefore, he was not at fault in filing an application earlier. Actual knowledge of the decree of the date of the decree is quite immaterial in the present case. Only the date of decree is material and the limitation shall be considered from the date of the decree. 6. The learned counsel for the revisionist has cited two decisions in his favour Baikunth Sahu v. Mohd. Sadique A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 27 and Ghulam Mohiuddin v. Jamal Shah A.I.R. 1968 J. & K. 56. In the former case the following observations have been made: "The period of limitation prescribed for filing an application for setting aside an ex parte decree is provided in Article 164 of the Indian Limitation Act, according to which such an application should be filed within thirty days from the date of the decree of where the summons was not duly served, from the date on which the applicant got knowledge of the decree. It is, thus manifest that, if summons had been served on the defendant, the application must be made within thirty days from the date of the decree itself. In the present case the application which was made under Order IX. Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the ex parte decree was not based on the ground that no summons had been served on the applicant. It was admittedly based on the only ground that the applicant, due to his illness, was prevented from appearing before the Court when the case was called out for hearing. The case, therefore, proceeded on the footing that summons had been served on the applicant. It was admittedly based on the only ground that the applicant, due to his illness, was prevented from appearing before the Court when the case was called out for hearing. The case, therefore, proceeded on the footing that summons had been served on the applicant. In that view of the matter, Part I of Article 164, which provides the counting of the period of thirty days from the date of the decree, will be applicable and not the other part which provides the period to be counted from the date of knowledge." 7. In the latter case, a question has also arisen whether a suit in which hearing had been fixed on a date being declared a holidays shall be taken up on the following day. The following view has been taken in this case: "In the present case the defendants put in appearance before the Court on May 9, 1962. The next date fixed in the suit was May 30, 1962 which was declare a public holiday. It was the duty of the defendants to find out as to what was the next date fixed for hearing in the suit. The case was taken up on May 31, 1962. The defendants were not present on that date and the court as a matter of abundant caution issued notice to the defendants informing them about the next date of hearing. That notice was not served. The defendants never took the trouble to find out the date fixed for hearing in the suit. Finally ex parte proceedings were taken on May 31, 1963 and ex parte decree was passed on March 4, 1964. Under these circumstances it cannot be said that the defendants had no knowledge of the suit. They put in appearance in Court soon after the suit was filed against them and then they absented themselves till the ex parte decree was passed against them. In the circumstances limitation would start against them from the date of the decree and under Article 164 referred to above they should have put in an application for setting aside the ex parte decree within 30 days form the date of the decree. The same view has been taken in A.I.R. 1953 Pat. In the circumstances limitation would start against them from the date of the decree and under Article 164 referred to above they should have put in an application for setting aside the ex parte decree within 30 days form the date of the decree. The same view has been taken in A.I.R. 1953 Pat. 399 in which it has been held that where summons is duly served, limitation of 30 days stats from the date of the decree and not from the date of the knowledge of the decree. The trial court had rightly dismissed the application filed by the defendant for setting aside the ex parte decree and the learned District Judge had erred in over setting that order." In the present case also, the case was fixed for hearing on March 1, 1970 but March 1, 1970 being a public holiday the case was taken up for hearing on March 2, 1970. Both the above decisions leave little doubt that the period of limitation for an application by the defendant to set aside an ex parte decree is thirty days from the date of the decree and not from the date of its knowledge where the summons had been duly served. There being no circumstances justifying either the absence of the defendants or the delay, the trial court had rightly dismissed the application, and the learned Additional Commissioner has erred in the exercise of his jurisdiction in setting aside the order of the trial court. 8. I hereby allow the revision, set aside the order of the lower appellate court, and restore the order of the trial court dated October 27, 1971.