Judgment :- 1. Admittedly the 1st defendant constructed the dwelling house in the suit property with the permission of the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff, and is residing there with his wife, the 2nd defendant. The plaintiff-respondent sued for evicting them therefrom and the trial court decreed the suit. The lower appellate court confirmed that decree. Their claim for kudikidappu rights was repelled by the lower courts on the ground that the Ist defendant and his three brothers own a property in common, and that deducting 8 cents occupied by a kudikidappu that is on that property, the four brothers have 45 cents of land as co-ownership property, so that each of the four brothers is entitled to more than 10 cents of land. It was held that the Ist defendant is, therefore, not a kudikidappukaran as defined in S.2 (25) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. The correctness of this is canvassed before me on behalf of defendants 1 and 2. 2. S.2 (25) aforesaid, so far as it is material for this case, reads: "Kudikidappukaran" means a person who has neither a homestead nor any land exceeding in extent three cents in any city or major municipality or five cents in any other municipality or ten cents in any Panchayat area or township, in possession either as owner or as tenant, on which he could erect a homestead and " 3. To take a person outside the ambit of the above provision four things have to be established, and they are:- (i) he has a homestead, or has land in excess of the area specified therein; (ii) be possesses it; (iii) he has it and he possesses it either as owner or as tenant; and (iv) he can erect a homestead thereon. Under the Act, a tenant has fixity of tenure, and therefore, what the statute requires seems to be non-precarious title and possession of an alternate land where he could erect a homestead. In other words, if possession of the alternate land is not in his own right so that peaceful and undisturbed residence there is a matter of chance, it cannot be said that he is disqualified to be a kudikidappukaran. This is clear from the object, the statute has in view in enacting S.75 onwards in Chapter II of the Act. In other words, if possession of the alternate land is not in his own right so that peaceful and undisturbed residence there is a matter of chance, it cannot be said that he is disqualified to be a kudikidappukaran. This is clear from the object, the statute has in view in enacting S.75 onwards in Chapter II of the Act. These provisions confer on a kudikidappukaran fixity of kudikidappu or residential rights so that he may without fear of eviction continue to reside in the homestead or kudikidappu, and this is achieved by prohibiting his eviction; he can only be shifted to an alternate site on the same land or on another land belonging to the landholder or on a land acquired for that purpose, and that, after giving ownership of that alternate site to him (the kudikidappukaran). Therefore, when a kudikidappukaran is sought to be evicted on the sole ground that he has another land in his possession where he can erect a homestead, the statute requires that he should have it and he possesses it free of any risk of lawful obstruction and of disturbance to erect a homestead there and to reside there peacefully. In this connection it is worthwhile to note that unlike S.75 (2) (ii) of the Act wherein the emphasis is on the fitness of the alternate site offered by the landholder to shift a kudikidappukaran to that site, the stress here is on: he could erect a homestead. This means not only that the land he has should be fit for erecting a homestead but also that he should be able to erect a homestead thereon unhampered by any one. 4. It is well settled that co-owners have unity of possession, and that all of them have an equal right to be in possession of every part and parcel of the common property. No one co-owner can, therefore, lawfully resist another co-owner from entry on the common properly or any portion thereof, claiming exclusive possession in himself, though, however, if resisted the other co-owner's remedy lies in seeking partition and separate possession of his share and not, in claiming enforced joint possession. No one co-owner can, therefore, lawfully resist another co-owner from entry on the common properly or any portion thereof, claiming exclusive possession in himself, though, however, if resisted the other co-owner's remedy lies in seeking partition and separate possession of his share and not, in claiming enforced joint possession. Similarly, though a co-owner can make improvements on any portion of the common property and construct buildings thereon, he cannot compel another co-owner to join hands with him in improving the common property or constructing buildings thereon, with the result the co-owner improving the common property and erecting buildings thereon is not in the absence of agreement, entitled to compensation therefor from other co-owners. And in the face of resistance by other co-owners, he who wants to improve the common property or build thereon has to seek partition and get his share separated. No doubt, courts recognise an equity in his favour to have the portion he has improved or the portion where be has constructed buildings allotted to him, as far as possible and without prejudice to other co-owners, when the property is ultimately partitioned. See Mammathu v. Kathijumma Umma (1965 KLT. 655) and Kassinkunju v. Velayudhan Pillai (1972 KLT. 861). This is possible only when the common property is sufficiently extensive and improvements are made or buildings constructed only over a portion of it not extending over the share that may reasonably fall to his lot on partition by metes and bounds. In such cases a co-owner may, perhaps, with some sense of security from disturbance of possession by other co-owners at the time of partition, make improvements and construct buildings on a portion of the common property not extending over his legitimate share, provided there is no resistance from the other co-owners, but, not in other cases, as for instance the case on hand, where the extent of the common property is so small that it is difficult to postulate with any amount of certainty that a homestead can be put up on any portion of it without risking disturbance of possession at the time of partition, if not earlier, when the construction is attempted for. 5. Construing the words 'has neither a homestead' in S 2(25) Govindan Nair J. as he then was, in Pennamma v. St. Paul's Convent (1972 KLT. 5. Construing the words 'has neither a homestead' in S 2(25) Govindan Nair J. as he then was, in Pennamma v. St. Paul's Convent (1972 KLT. 12) said: A person can be said to have a homestead only when that person has a homestead of her (bis) 'own' (See para 5). In the same case Isaac J. said: "It appears to me that a person can be said to have a thing, only if it is h is own. If he has only a joint right in a thing, it is not his own; he has it only along with others." This statement of law was approved by another Division Bench of this court in Vasistha Vadhyar v Mohini Bai (1975 KLT. 365). There it was said as follows: "Isaac J. observed that a person can be said to have a thing only if it is his own. Though the section does not use the words 'his own, this is the only possible construction that can be given to the expression "in possession either as owner or as tenant." " It cannot be said by a co-owner that the common property is his own; to borrow the language used by Isaac J.: 'he has it only along with others.' 6. In the last mentioned case the Division Bench also said: "Whether the principle enunciated in the above decisions can be extended to tenants in common is a doubtful proposition since possession of a tenant-in-common is different from the possession of a coparcener or the member of a tarwad. However, we leave that question open since the question in that form is not before us." Since the matter is res integra and has been specifically left open I venture to say that no distinction can be drawn between possession of a joint-tenant and that of teaant-in-comtnon or co-owner, in so far as the minimum common requirement, of all kinds of ownership of a thing by more persons than one is 'unity of possession'. According to Freeman on Co-Tenancy and Partition (Second Edition P. 150 Para 86): "The several tenancies are best distinguished from one another by considering the unities of each. Beginning with tenancy by entireties, we find five unities, viz, a unity of possession of title, of estate, of time, and of person Next comes joint-tenancy with the same unities as tenancy by entirety, except that of person. Beginning with tenancy by entireties, we find five unities, viz, a unity of possession of title, of estate, of time, and of person Next comes joint-tenancy with the same unities as tenancy by entirety, except that of person. Then, next below joint-tenancy, as coparcenary, with its three unities, viz., of title, of possession, and of estate. And lastly, we have tenancy in common, which is different from the other tenancies in this, that it requires but one unity that of possession It is therefore a sufficient description of tenants in common to say that they "are persons who hold by unity of possession." Since a co-owner has only a share in the common property, he has no right to exclude the other co-owners from possession of it, and this rule applies to every part and parcel of the common property, so that, in law he can possess it only along with the other co-owners; even when a co-owner is not in physical possession of the common property and another co-owner is, in law the former possesses it constructively through the latter, of course, unless ouster; is established. 7. In Devaki Amma v. Kunhirama Marar (1974 KLT. 758) my learned brother Poti J said: "Therefore what is required is the possession of requisite area by the person claiming the right of kudikidappu with the further qualification that the possession should be such as would enable him to erect a homestead thereon. Any person who is not in 'possession' but has title to a property cannot erect a homestead on that property. The mere fact that he may be, at some future date, possibly entitled to possession of some area of land will not enable him to erect a homestead." No doubt this case related to a member of a tarwad who claimed kudikidappu rights and was resisted on the ground that the tarwad has lands. It appears to me that the same could be said of a co-owner, where the claim for kudikidappu rights is resisted on the ground that he has an undivided share in the common property. I hold that the first defendant is a kudikidappukaran in respect of the homestead on the suit property. He cannot therefore be evicted therefrom except as provided in the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. The judgments and decrees of the lower courts are set aside and this appeal is allowed. I hold that the first defendant is a kudikidappukaran in respect of the homestead on the suit property. He cannot therefore be evicted therefrom except as provided in the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. The judgments and decrees of the lower courts are set aside and this appeal is allowed. The suit is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall suffer their costs throughout. Allowed.