Judgment :- 1. The short point that falls for decision in this revision under S.103 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, for short the Act, is whether, what was a kudikidappu, would cease to be one if and when the but or the homestead which was in existence there was destroyed or demolished after 1-1-1970, and, whether, for that reason, the kudikidappukaran would be deprived of his right to purchase the kudikidappu under S.80-A of the Act The Land Tribunal had allowed the application of the first respondent filed under S.80 B of the Act repelling the contentions of the revision petitioner that the application was not maintainable inasmuch as the but forming part of the kudikidappu was not in existence as on the date of the application; and the Appellate Authority has confirmed the decision of the Land Tribunal. 2. It is the admitted case that the 1st respondent is the widow of one Kunhimon, to whom the revision petitioners had entrusted the but which formed part of the kudikidappu and that they were in occupation of it till 3-6-1970. The Land Tribunal and the Appellate Authority have disbelieved the version of the revision petitioners that the said Kunhimon had on 3-6-1970, as per Ext. D-1 receipt, surrendered the kudikidappu to them. It is not necessary here to investigate the case of the 1st respondent that the but was got demolished by the revision petitioners as a vindicative measure, with ulterior motives, when they bad temporarily left it on account of the illness of Kunhimon; the fact remains that the but which formed part of the kudikidappu was admittedly in their occupation till 3-6-1970. It was as the legal heir of deceased Kunhimon that the 1st respondent filed the application for purchase of the kudikidappu under S.80-B of the Act. 3. Mrs. It was as the legal heir of deceased Kunhimon that the 1st respondent filed the application for purchase of the kudikidappu under S.80-B of the Act. 3. Mrs. Sumathi Dandapani, the counsel for the revision petitioners, submitted that "kudikidappu" as defined in clause (b) of S.2 (25) of the Act means not only the land, but also the homestead or the but permitted to be erected or occupied, together with the easements attached thereto; and in this case the admitted case being that the but occupied by the 1st respondent bad ceased to exist at the time when the application under S.80-B of the Act was made by her, the application could not have been treated as one for purchase of kudikidappu as defined in S.2 (25) of the Act. 4. Reliance was placed by the counsel on the following passage appearing in the last par graph at page 352 in Karunakaran Nair v. Ramakrishnan Nair (1966 KLT. 351): "It follows that the expression "has constructed buildings" in S.106 connotes buildings that have been completed in construction and are continuing in existence at the relevant time." This passage, in my view, has no relevance to the point in issue. What came up for decision before Madhavan Nair J. in the case cited was whether the provisions of S.106 would apply to cases where the building in question was not. in existence when the relevant provisions came into force. Going by the grammatical construction of the expression "has constructed buildings" occurring in S.106(1) of the Act, the Court held that in order to attract the relevant provisions of the Act the building should have been completed in construction and should also have been continuing in existence at the time when those pro visions came into force. It is the undisputed case here that the dwelling house was in existence on 1-1-1970 on which date Act 35 of 1969 came into force; and the dispute centres round the further question as to whether the 1st respondent had lost her right as kuclikidappukari for the reason that the but had ceased to be in existence by the time the purchase application was filed by her under S.80-B of the Act. 5. 5. Sri M. V. Joseph, the counsel for the first respondent, would go to the extent of submitting that there is no express bar against a person claiming kudikidappu right with respect to the dwelling bouse which came into existence even after 1-1-1970. It is not, however, necessary in this revision to resolve the controversy as to whether kudikidappu right can spring up even after 1-1-1970; it is said so, because, on admitted facts, it could be seen that the test laid down by Madhavan Nair, J. in the decision cited, namely, the existence of a completed building on the date of the coming into force of the relevant provision, is satisfied in the instant case also. That means, that the passage cited could be of no assistance to advance the case of the revision petitioners. 6. The counsel for the revision petitioners then cited the following passage occurring in Para.4 of the Full Bench decision in Muhammed v. Imbicihibi (1974 KLT. 738) at page 740: 'Hut' it normally understood as a very small house complete in itself and low in cost." This passage, again, has no relevance to the point in issue. The question that came up before the Full Bench was whether part of a building, used as a separate apartment for residence, could constitute a "hut" within the meaning of S.2(25) of the Act. No such question arises in the present case, and therefore this decision also has no application to the facts of the present case. 7. Sub-section (1) of S.75 of the Act provides that no kudikidappukaran shall be liable to be evicted from his kudikidappu except on the grounds enumerated in clauses (i) to (iv) thereof, and destruction or demolition of the but forming part of the kudikidappu, on a future date, is not included as one of the grounds on which eviction could be sought by the owner of the land. It is also to be noticed that under S.79 of the Act the kudikidappukaran has the right to maintain, repair and reconstruct with the same or different materials the but belonging to the person who permitted occupation by the kudikidappukaran; and that would suggest that the right of the kudikidappukaran would not be lost as and when the but that was in existence disappeared from the scene, as reconstruction of the structure may involve the complete demolition of the but which was previously in existence. In fact, Explanation II to S 2(25) of the Act makes it clear that "hut" will include any dwelling house reconstructed by the kudikidappukaran in accordance with the provisions of S.79 of the Act. Merely for the reason that reconstruction has not yet taken place, the kudikidappukaran cannot be deprived of his right over the kudikidappu; and if he was found to be a kudikidappukaran as on 1-1-1970, his right to purchase the kudikidappu under the relevant provisions contained in S.80 to 80-G of the Act cannot be denied to him. Clause (e) of S.108 of the Transfer of Property Act provides as follows: " If by fire, tempest or flood or violence of any army or of a mob, or other irresistible force, any material part of the property be wholly destroyed or rendered substantially and permanently unfit for the purpose for which it was let, the lease shall, at the option of the lessee, be void:" Though the provisions contained in S.108 clause (e) of the Transfer of Property Act quoted above may not have direct application to the facts of the case, the principle that where any material part of the property is wholly destroyed or rendered substantially and permanently unfit for the purposes for which it was let, the option to terminate the lease rests with the lessee, could be extended to the present case. In other words, it is for the kudikidappukaran to exercise the option whether he would continue to be a kudikidappukaran or not when the but terming part of the kudikidappu ceased to exist. Otherwise.it would also amount to denial of the rights granted to him under S.79 of the Act. 8. In other words, it is for the kudikidappukaran to exercise the option whether he would continue to be a kudikidappukaran or not when the but terming part of the kudikidappu ceased to exist. Otherwise.it would also amount to denial of the rights granted to him under S.79 of the Act. 8. If the argument of the counsel for the revision petitioners is accepted, and the definition of "kudikidappu" contained in S.2 (25) (b) of the Act is tried to be read and understood in its strict and literal sense, valuable right conferred on the kudikidappukaran would be lost to him in many a case. There could be instances where the land owner manages to get the but or homestead destroyed or demolished, and then plead that in the absence of a but or a homestead in existence on the land kudikidappu is not complete, and therefore the kudikidappukaran is not entitled to invoke the provisions for purchase of kudikidappu. That never seems to have been in the intention of the legislature. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that what was a kudikidappu as on 1-1-1970, on which date Act 35 of 1969 came into force, would not cease to be a kudikidappu merely for the reason that the but or the homestead therein ceased to be in existence subsequently, and that the kudikidappukaran would not lose his right to purchase the kudikidappu unless tainted with the disqualifications enumerated in clauses (i) to (iv) of S.75 (1) of the Act. For the foregoing reasons, the revision fails, and is dismissed, however, without any order as to costs in the circumstances of the case.