B. K. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) ONE Himatlal Narottamdas died leaving behind him four sons and two daughters viz (1) Govindlal (2) Somalal alias Natvarlal who is plaintiff No. 1 (3) Shankerlal who is plaintiff No. 2 (4) Ambalal (5) Bai Jethi and (6) Bai Godavari who is defendant No. 2. Bai Jethi was married to one Keshavlal who is defendant No. 2/1 and they had one son Indravadan through that marriage who is defendant No. 2/2. The eldest son Govindbhai died in 1966 leaving behind him one son Vipinchandra who is defendant No. 2/4. Bai Jethi died on 25th September 1969 during the pendancy of the present suit and therefore her husband Keshavlal and her son Indravadan have been brought as defendants in her place. A partition was effected on March 2 1933 between the aforesaid four sons of Himatlal Narottamdas which is placed on the record at Ex. 31. According to this partition deed it was agreed that the land of old S. No. 621 situated within revenue limits of village Manjarol within Baroda district should not be divided and should be kept Joined and the income from the said land was reserved for the maintenance of Bai Jethi and Godavari for their life time and in their absence for their descendants and in case no descendants surviving the property was to be divided amongst the four brothers. According to the deed of partition Govindbhai was to manage the said land and disburse the income thereof between the aforesaid two sisters and their heirs in their absence. On April 2 1934 the 4th son Ambalal relinquished his share in favour of the three brothers. After the demise of Govindbhai in the year 1966 his son Vipinchandra was managing the affairs. As Vipinchandra in collusion with the two sisters Bai Jethi and Bai Godavari asserted claims to the prejudice of the aforesaid three brothers namely (1) Govindbhai (2) Somabhai and (3) Shankerbhai and when the possession was taken over by the sisters from Vipinchandra Somabhai and Shankerbhai who are respondents Nos. As Vipinchandra in collusion with the two sisters Bai Jethi and Bai Godavari asserted claims to the prejudice of the aforesaid three brothers namely (1) Govindbhai (2) Somabhai and (3) Shankerbhai and when the possession was taken over by the sisters from Vipinchandra Somabhai and Shankerbhai who are respondents Nos. 1 and 2 before me filed the present suit in the Court of Civil Judge (J. D.) Sankheda being Regular Civil Suit No. 200 of 1969 for declaration that they were owners of the land of S. No. 621 and for possession on the ground that the sisters were the life tenants of the income of the land of S. No. 621 and in their absence their heirs were the life tenants and they had no interest in the corpus of the land. ( 2 ) AT the time of hearing of the suit Keshavlal and Indravadan who were original defendants Nos. 2 (i) and 2 (ii) remained absent and the proceedings continued exparte against them. The case of Bai Godavari and Vipinchandra who were respectively original defendants Nos. 1 and 2 (iii) was that the suit was time barred and in any case they have become the owners of the land by adverse possession. They also claimed that they were in possession and enjoyment of the land in their own right under the partition deed. They also contended that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief for possession as there was a tenant of the land in question in respect of which the tenancy proceedings were pending. ( 3 ) ON these pleadings the learned trial Judge raised the necessary issues. On appreciation of the evidence oral as well as documentary the learned Judge found that the sisters were not entitled to have any right title or interest in the corpus of the property but they were merely the life tenants for the usufruct thereof. He therefore passed a decree as prayed for by the plaintiffs granting the declaration sought and also directed the defendants to hand over the possession of the land in question to the plaintiffs. ( 4 ) THE contesting defendants Nos. He therefore passed a decree as prayed for by the plaintiffs granting the declaration sought and also directed the defendants to hand over the possession of the land in question to the plaintiffs. ( 4 ) THE contesting defendants Nos. 1 and 2 (ii) Bai Godavari and Indravadan the son of Bai Jethi carried the matter in appeal before the District Court at Baroda by their Civil Appeal No. 413 of 1970 which also met with the same fate and the learned 2nd Extra Assistant Judge Baroda by his judgment and order of 14th December 1971 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decree of the trial Court. It is this judgment and order of the learned Assistant Judge Baroda which are the subject matter of this appeal before me. ( 5 ) AT the time of hearing of this appeal Mr. Majumdar learned Advocate appearing for the contesting defendant appellants raised the following five contentions:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (5) The appellants have become the cosharers as Govindbhais interest was released by him in favour of the appellants in the consent decree Ex. 42 in Civil suit No. 193 of 1965 on the file of the Court of Civil Judge (J. D ). Dabhoi. ( 6 ) THAT takes me to the last contention seriously pressed by Mr. Majumdar It is claimed by him on behalf of the appellants that they have become the co owners as Govindbhais interest was released in favour of the appellants in the consent decree Ex. 42 in Civil Suit No. 193 of 1965 in the file of the Court of Civil Judge (J. D.) at Dabhoi. Mr. Vin learned advocate appearing for the respondents contended that inasmuch as this consent decree is not registered as required by sec. 17 of the Registration Act it cannot be relied upon for purposes of resting the claim of co ownership. This counter contention of Mr. Vin is sought to be met with by Mr. Majumdar for the appellants by relying en Clause (vi) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 17. Sub-sec. (2) (vi) so far as material for our purposes provides as under: (2) Nothing in Clauses (b) and (c) of sub-sec. (1) applies to (i ). . . . . . . . . . . . . (ii ). . Majumdar for the appellants by relying en Clause (vi) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 17. Sub-sec. (2) (vi) so far as material for our purposes provides as under: (2) Nothing in Clauses (b) and (c) of sub-sec. (1) applies to (i ). . . . . . . . . . . . . (ii ). . . . . . . . . . . . . (iii ). . . . . . . . . . . . . (iv ). . . . . . . . . . . . (v ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . (vi) any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject matter of the suit or proceeding. . In other words the requirement of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 17 about compulsory registration of the non testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create declare assign limit or extinguish any right title or interest in an immovable property of the value of rupees one hundred and upwards would not be applicable to a consent decree comprising immovable property which is the subject matter of the suit Now therefore in order to answer the contention we have to test the submission of Mr. Majumdar that the consent decree Ex. 42 in Civil Suit No 193 of 1965 under which Govindbhai agreed to relinquish his right title and interest in favour of the appellants was a decree of the kind as prescribed under clause (vi) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 17. It should be stated that in the consent decree Govindbhai did agree to release his interest in the land in question in favour of the appellants. However this would not be sufficient for purposes of claiming the protection under clause (vi) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 17. It is to be established that the consent decree in question was relating to the immovable property which was the subject matter of the suit. However this would not be sufficient for purposes of claiming the protection under clause (vi) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 17. It is to be established that the consent decree in question was relating to the immovable property which was the subject matter of the suit. If it is found that the consent decree in question was not relating to the immovable property in the suit or was not relating to immovable property at all it would certainly require a registration if it purports to create declare assign limit or extinguish either in present or in future the right title or interest in the immovable property. It is a common ground that Civil Suit No. 193 of 1965 filed in the Court of Civil Judge (J. D ) at Dabhoi by the appellants was a suit for accounts of the usufructs of the land in question from 1932 A. D. till the date of the suit from Govindbhai and for a decree for the amount that might be found due to the plaintiff together with interest at the foot of the accounts of the management by Govindbhai The crux of the problem is that: Can it be said having regard to the nature of the reliefs claimed in the plaint Ex. 47 in the aforesaid suit that the suit was one for immovable property ? Can it be said that on the true construction of the plaint the suit was for the determination of any right to or interest in the immovable property ? The term immovable property is not defined in the Civil Procedure Code nor has it been defined in the Registration Act 1908 I have therefore to consider what is the meaning of the term immovable property in the General Clauses Act of 1897. Sec. 3 Clause (15) of the General Clauses Act defines immovable property as including land benefits to arise out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. Benefits to arise out of land would include all incorporal hereditaments compensation and allowances charged upon the land. Sec. 3 Clause (15) of the General Clauses Act defines immovable property as including land benefits to arise out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. Benefits to arise out of land would include all incorporal hereditaments compensation and allowances charged upon the land. But it should be noted that the rent that has already accrued due or for that matter the income which has already accrued is not an immovable property since it is a benefit which has already arisen out of the land and it cannot be equated with the rent or income which may accrue in future. It cannot be disputed as a proposition of law that a suit for arrears of rent is not governed by the provisions of sec. 16 of the Civil Procedure Code and it will always be governed by sec. 20 of the said Code. ( 7 ) A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Chintaman Narayan v. Madhavrav Venkatesh (1867-69) Bombay High Court Reports 29 as back as in 1866 in a suit by the plaintiff Chintaman Narayan to recover from the defendant Madhavrav the balance of rents and profits of certain lands situated in the districts of Thana and Satara held that the suit was not one for land or immovable property but to recover from the defendant the balance of certain amounts and profits which it was alleged that the defendant had received on the plaintiffs account and had neglected to pay over. Mr. Majumdar therefore made an attempt to persuade me that the appellants who were the plaintiffs in that suit had over riding charge on the land in question and therefore when he claimed accounts and an ascertained amount at the foot thereof he was trying to enforce the charge and therefore the suit is a suit necessarily for immovable property. I am afraid I cannot agree with such a broad submission On perusal of the relevant clause in the partition deed I do not find the there is any charge created by act of the parties on the land in question If the parties had intended that there should be a charge over the property as to ensure the payment thereof to the sisters it would have bee appropriately provided for in the relevant clause. Instead of making the necessary provision about the charge over the land in question the parties to the partition deed agreed that till the life time of the sisters and their descendants the land in question should be kept and treated as a joint family property and only in absence of any of the descendants of the sisters surviving the land has to be divided between the brothers. I do not think that this provision can legally amount to a charge. In that view of the matter therefore the attempt of Mr. Majumdar to urge that the sisters were trying to enforce the charge by claiming the accounts and the stated amount at the foot of such accounts cannot be sustained. The result is that the 5th contention also should fail because the aforesaid suit being not a suit for claiming any right or interest in the immovable and therefore not for immovable properly the decree passed in respect of the land in question would require registration under sec. 17 (2) of the Registration Act and is not within the terms of exception provided by clause (vi) of sub-sec. (2) of the said section and since the decree in question is not registered it would not create any right title or interest in favour of the appellants before me and therefore their claim to be treated as co-owners cannot be upheld. (Rest of the judgment is not material for reports) .