Judgment :- 1. The petitioner in Execution Applications Nos. 101 and 102 of 1976 in O. S. No. 303 of 1974 in execution on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Muvattupuzha is the petitioner in this Civil Revision Petition. In the above suit, which was decreed against the petitioner's husband and another, the petitioner was not a party. The respondent decree holder took out execution and in execution an order was issued by the Court to attach certain movables. Accordingly, the Amin came to the spot to effect the attachment with Police help. The petitioner obstructed contending that the movables sought to be attached really belonged to the petitioner and not to her husband the judgment-debtor. As there was Police help, the petitioner had no other go but to pay the decree amount to save the movables from attachment. So, according to the petitioner, she paid the amount under protest. Though the payment under protest is recorded in the report of the Amin dated 24 3 1976. as per that report the payment was made for and on behalf of the judgment-debtor, the petitioner's husband. But as per the receipt given to the petitioner by the Amin the payment was not made on behalf of anybody. It is pertinent to note that it was a result of a correction by overwriting in the report the payment became for and on behalf of the husband judgment-debtor The next day the petitioner filed the Execution Applications referred to above. Toe prayer in E. A. 101 of 1976 filed under Order XXI R.58 and 59 of the Code of Civil Procedure was for the dismissal of the petition for attachment finding the possession of the petitioner of the movables sought to be attached E A. No. 102 of 1976 was filed under S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the return of the amount paid by the petitioner on security pending the decision of E. A. No. 101 of 1976. The Execution Court simply dismissed E A. No. 102 of 1976 on 10 61976 without giving any reason Thereafter, on 22 61976 E A. No. 101 of 1976 was dismissed as not maintainable as no attachment was, as a matter of fact, effected and that the decree amount was paid and attachment averted. The Execution Court simply dismissed E A. No. 102 of 1976 on 10 61976 without giving any reason Thereafter, on 22 61976 E A. No. 101 of 1976 was dismissed as not maintainable as no attachment was, as a matter of fact, effected and that the decree amount was paid and attachment averted. Though no attachment was as a matter of fact effected, the objections filed by the respondent decree holder to the Execution Applications before the execution court proceeded on the basis that the attachment was made. 2. The petitioner challenges the above two orders of the execution court in this Civil Revision Petition. Two contentions are raised. They are (1) A third party who paid under protest the decree amount to prevent attachment of his movables is entitled to the return of the amount paid and a petition for the same is maintainable under S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and (2) even though no attachment was effected, a third party who averted attachment of his movables by paying the decree amount under protest is entitled to move the execution court under Order XXI R.58 and 59 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the dismissal of the petition for attachment. 3. In S. Chokalingam Asari v. N.S. Krishna Iyer (AIR. 1964 Madras 404) it is said: "S. 144 merely embodies the cardinal principle of law that acts of Court should not be allowed to work any injury on the suitors and it is the clear duty of the Court to place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for the erroneous order or decree which it had passed. The section is not exhaustive of the powers of the Court to order restitution and in suitable and appropriate cases, where ends of justice require, restitution can be and has been ordered under the Court's inherent jurisdiction. For instance, variation of the decree or the setting aside of the decree need not necessarily be in an appeal but it may be in a separate proceeding, in which case restitution is ordered under inherent jurisdiction apart from the provision under S.144." In Ramnandan Pandey v. Jagarnath Rai (AIR. For instance, variation of the decree or the setting aside of the decree need not necessarily be in an appeal but it may be in a separate proceeding, in which case restitution is ordered under inherent jurisdiction apart from the provision under S.144." In Ramnandan Pandey v. Jagarnath Rai (AIR. 1958 Patna 547) it is said: "Acting in exercise of inherent powers under S.151 a Court can pass any order in the ends of justice or in order to prevent abuse of the processes of the Court." In M. A. Wahid v. Jubeda Begum (AIR. 1952 Nagpur 190) it is said: 'There is, however, one distinction between the exercise of powers under S.144 and the exercise of the Court's inherent jurisdiction While S.144 is mandatory the exercise of the power under S 151 depends upon the discretion of the Court which will be used only in the interests of justice." In the above decision the following passage from Rodger v. Comptoir D' Escompt de Paris ((1871) L.R 3 P.C. 465) is quoted: "One of the first and highest duties of all Courts, is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the suitors and when the expression'the act of the Court', is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary Court, or of any intermediate Court of Appeal, but the act of the Court as whole from the lowest Court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest Court which finally disposes of the case." In Padmanabhan v. Narayanan (1955 KLT. 413) a Full Bench of the Travancore-Cochin High Court has held that an anticipatory obstruction petition will not lie under Order XXI R.99 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the above decision it was also held: "Positive provisions having been made in this behalf there is no scope for resorting to the inherent powers of the court under S.151." 4. But can it be said that a person who has no liability under the decree and whose movables are sought to It is to be noted that R.99 and 100 considered in the above decision deal with the delivery of possession of immovable property in execution of a decree. In Nityananda Kanango v. Pala Devi (AIR. But can it be said that a person who has no liability under the decree and whose movables are sought to It is to be noted that R.99 and 100 considered in the above decision deal with the delivery of possession of immovable property in execution of a decree. In Nityananda Kanango v. Pala Devi (AIR. 1952 Orissa 120) a Full Bench of the Orissa High Court has said: "The Court could not exercise any such anticipatory jurisdiction to inquire into the question of title of a third party prospective obstructor, in an application by him before he had in fact been dispossessed. Such an application was not maintainable under S, 151. In relation to a situation which has been specifically contemplated and provided for by the Code, the exercise of an inherent power by way of a supposed anticipatory jurisdiction to deal with that situation under S.151, is not permissible, unless any such exercise of the inherent power is sanctioned by a course of settled practice of Courts relating to that class of situations. Exercise of inherent powers could not also be supported on the ground that it tended to prevent abuse of process or helped to shorten litigation." This was also a case of delivery of possession of immovable property in execution of a decree. In Radha Kishen v. P.L. Jaitly & Co. (AIR. 1935 Allahabad 343) it is said: "The only method by which a third person can object to an attachment is to file objections after the attachment has been made. He can come to Court and file objections under the provisions of R.58, 0.21. There is nothing in the Civil Procedure Code which allows a third party to come forward with objections before an attachment has been made". 4. 0.21 R.58 and 59 of the Code of Civil Procedure under which E. A No. 101 of 1976 has been filed, read: "58. Investigation of claims to, and objections to attachment of, attached property. There is nothing in the Civil Procedure Code which allows a third party to come forward with objections before an attachment has been made". 4. 0.21 R.58 and 59 of the Code of Civil Procedure under which E. A No. 101 of 1976 has been filed, read: "58. Investigation of claims to, and objections to attachment of, attached property. (1) Where any claim is preferred to, or any objection is made to the attachment of, any property attached in execution of a decree on the ground that such property is not liable to such attachment, the Court shall proceed to investigate the claim or objection with the like power as regards the examination of the claimant or objector, and in all other respects, as if he was a party to the suit: Provided that no such investigation shall be made where the Court considers that the claim or objection was designedly or unnecessarily delayed. (2) Postponement of sale. Where the property to which the claim or objection applies has been advertised for sale, the Court ordering the sale may postpone it pending the investigation of the claim or objection. 59- Evidence to be adduced by claimant. The claimant or objector must adduce evidence to show that at the date of the attachment he had some interest in, or was possessed of, the property attached." It is clear from the wording of R.58 that it applies only to a claim preferred or any objection made to the attachment of any property attached in execution of a decree In this case, admittedly no attachment was, as a matter of fact, made. Hence, no question of invoking the rule arises. Even if there was no justification for seeking the attachment of the movables of the petitioner who is a stranger to the decree, no remedy under the rule is possible as no attachment was made. In this view of the matter, the execution court was perfectly right in dismissing the application as not maintainable. E. A. No. 102 of 1976 was filed for the return of the decree amount paid by the petitioner under protest on security pending the disposal of E. A. No. 101 of 1976. As E. A. No. 101 of 1976 was dismissed as not maintainable, no relief could be granted in E A. No. 102 of 1976. E. A. No. 102 of 1976 was filed for the return of the decree amount paid by the petitioner under protest on security pending the disposal of E. A. No. 101 of 1976. As E. A. No. 101 of 1976 was dismissed as not maintainable, no relief could be granted in E A. No. 102 of 1976. But at the same time, the dismissal of E. A. No. 102 of 1976 with a one word order "rejected" when E. A. No. 101 of 1976 was pending was wrong. No purpose will be served by setting aside that order now, since I am interfering with the order of the execution court in E. A. No. 101 of 1976. For the above reason, the order in E. A. No. 102 of 1976 is not set aside. be attached has no remedy before they are actually attached. When the threatened attachment is with Police help, no effective obstruction can be made by the person in possession of the movables. Why should he suffer the humiliation of an attachment of his movables if he can satisfy the execution court that the movables are his and they cannot be attached in execution of a decree against somebody else. Any attachment can be averted by tendering the amount for the realisation of which the attachment was ordered. Payment of the amount under protest is the only way to avert an attachment when the Police is also at your doors to assist the Amin. Admittedly, there is no specific provision in the Civil Procedure Code empowering the execution court to pass an order for the return of the amount paid under protest to avert an attachment or for the cancellation of the order for attachment before making the attachment. But this does not mean that the execution court should be a silent spectator in matters like this. A court has a duty to prevent the abuse of the process of court It should also see that justice is meted out. It is in such a situation that the inherent powers of a Civil Court under S.151 of the Civil Procedure Code should be exercised. A court has a duty to prevent the abuse of the process of court It should also see that justice is meted out. It is in such a situation that the inherent powers of a Civil Court under S.151 of the Civil Procedure Code should be exercised. If a person who averted an attachment of his movables by payment of the decree amount under protest invokes the inherent jurisdiction of the execution court for the cancellation of the order of attachment and for the return of the amount paid by him. can he be denied reliefs if the court is satisfied that the movables are his. In this case, E. A. No. 101 of 1976 was not filed under S.151 of the Civil Procedure Code. 5. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.