JUDGMENT Balakrishna Eradi, J. 1. The appellant before us is the 4th decree holder in O.S. No. 42 of 1124 of the Munsiff's Court, Parur. That was a suit filed by the predecessor in interest of the appellant for redemption and recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property which had been mortgaged to the defendant as per a deed of mortgage evidenced by Ext. D4, dated 25th Vrischigam 1104. A decree for redemption was passed in the suit on 10th December, 1953. The decree holder thereafter filed E. P. No. 1233 of 1954 for delivery of possession of the mortgaged property after depositing the mortgage amount as per the terms of the decree. That petition was however stayed by the executing court under Travancore - Cochin Act VIII of 1950. Even though the order of the executing court staying the proceeding under the aforementioned Act was later set aside by the Subordinate Judge's Court, Ernakulam in an appeal filed by the decree holder --A.S. 130 of 1956 --, the judgment debtor carried the matter in Second Appeal to this court and that Second Appeal was ultimately allowed by this court holding that the execution was liable to be stayed under Kerala Act I of 1957, which had come into force in the meantime. Subsequently, after Act IV of 1961 was passed, consequence of which the statutory stay under Act I of 1957 stood lifted, the decree holder filed E.P. 16 of 1962 for recovery of possession of the property in execution of the decree. That petition was also however stayed by the court under Kerala Act VII of 1963 as per an order, dated 1st August, 1963. When the matters stood thus, the original decree holder died. After the statutory stay under Act VII of 1963 was vacated consequent on the coming into force of Act I of 1964, the present appellant in his capacity as assignee from the legal representatives of the decree holder filed E.P. 874 of 1964 on 9th December 1964 praying for the relief of resumption of one half of the decree schedule property under S.17 read with S.132(3)(c) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (Act I of 1964). That application was dismissed by the executing court holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain an application for resumption under the aforementioned provisions. That application was dismissed by the executing court holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain an application for resumption under the aforementioned provisions. The matter was carried by the appellant to the District Court in appeal and if is against the judgment of the District Court dismissing that appeal that this Second Appeal has been filed by the 4th decree holder. 2. After hearing both sides, we are of opinion that the view taken by the courts below that the appellant was not entitled to maintain the application for resumption before the executing court under S.132(3)(c) of Act 1 of 1964 is erroneous and unsustainable. Clause (c) of sub-s.(3) of S.132 reads: "Notwithstanding the repeal of the enactments mentioned in sub-s.(2),-- (c) (i) where the decree holder, plaintiff, appellant or petitioner, as thecase may be, is a person entitled to resumption of land under this Act, he shall have the right to apply to the court to allow resumption of the holding or any part thereof to which he is entitled; .........." It seems to us to be clear that the intention of the Legislature in enacting the said clause was to make a departure from the procedural scheme contained in S.17 of the Act that ordinarily applications for resumption are to be filed by small holders before the Land Tribunal. An exception has been made by the Legislature in respect of cases where proceedings were already pending between the concerned parties before competent civil courts whether by way of suit or appeal or proceeding in execution of decrees. In such cases clause (c) of S.132 (3) confers a right on the decree holder, plaintiff, appellant or petitioner, as the case may be, to apply to the court to allow resumption of the holding or any part thereof to which he is entitled. The resulting position is that in cases, such as the present one, where an application for recovery of possession in execution is pending before the executing court, the decree holder in case he happens to be a person entitled to the relief of resumption under S.17 of the Act, is entitled to move the executing court for the grant of such relief. Sub-clause (ii) of clause (c) states that such an application shall be made within one year from the commencement of this Act and the particulars should be incorporated therein. Sub-clause (ii) of clause (c) states that such an application shall be made within one year from the commencement of this Act and the particulars should be incorporated therein. Sub-clause (iii) authorises the court to deal with and dispose of the application as if it were one for resumption filed before the Land Tribunal under the Act. It is therefore manifest that the court before which the suit, appeal or proceeding in execution stood pending at the time of commencement of the Act is competent to entertain an application for resumption by virtue of the specific provision contained in clause (c)(i) and to dispose it of in accordance with the provisions contained in S.17 of the Act. The contrary view taken by the courts below cannot therefore be accepted as correct. 3. Admittedly, the execution proceeding -- E.P. 816 of 1962 -- filed by the present appellant was pending before the executing court on the date of commencement of Act I of 1964 and it had stood stayed under the provisions of Act VII of 1963. The provisions of S.132(3)(c) are therefore directly attracted in the present case. The dismissal of E.P. 874 of 1964 by the courts below on the preliminary ground that the court had no jurisdiction to grant the relief of resumption was therefore illegal. 4. The counsel for the respondents urged before us that even though the executing court has incorporated in its order a finding to the effect that the appellant herein, who was applicant before it, was a small holder entitled to resumption under S.17 of the Act, the judgment debtors had no opportunity to challenge its correctness by filing an appeal, since the execution petition --E.P. 874 of 1964 -- was finally dismissed by the executing court holding that the petition was not maintainable. It was also pointed out to us by counsel for the respondents that even though his clients had filed a memorandum of cross objection before the lower appellate court challenging the correctness of the aforesaid finding, the lower appellate court also declined to go into the merits of the points raised in the memorandum of cross objection in view of the conclusion reached by it that E.P. 874 of 1964 had rightly been dismissed by the executing court and the appeal had only to be dismissed. We find there is substance in this contention and that justice requires that the respondents herein (judgment debtors) should be afforded an opportunity to reagitate the said matter before the executing court, which will also have to go into the further question relating to value of improvements, if any, payable to the judgment debtors etc. We accordingly set aside the orders passed by the courts below and remand E.P. 874 of 1964 to the executing court for fresh disposal in accordance with law in the light of the concision recorded by us that the appellant is entitled to maintain the said application seeking the relief of resumption under S.17 read with S.132(3)(c) of the Act, which position will stand concluded by this judgment. The parties will bear their respective costs in this court as well as in the lower appellate court.